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M. TULLII CICERONIS

DE NATURA DEORUM

LIBRI TRES

WITH INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY

BY

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TOGETHER WITH

A NEW COLLATION OF SEVERAL OF THE ENGLISH MSS.

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FRATRI DILECTO

JOHANNI E. B. MAYOR,
LATINARUM LITTERARUM APUD CANTABRIGIENSES PROFESSORI,
QUI PRIMUS PÆRILEM MIHI MENTEM
QUO ET IPSÆ PÆER FLAGRABAT
ANTIQUITATIS AMORE IMBIIT,
HIC GRATÌ LABORÌS FRUCTUS
DEDICATUR.

PREFATORY NOTE.

In bringing out the First Volume of my edition of Cicero's De Natura Deorum, I have to return my best thanks to the Syndics of the University Press for having undertaken its publication, and both to them and to Mr J. H. Swainson, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, for the use of the collations of various English MSS. made by the latter, and placed by him in the hands of the Syndicate; also to Mr Samuel Allen of Dublin for the loan of two valuable MSS., an account of which is given in the fifth section of my Introduction. I have further to acknowledge with my hearty thanks the assistance received from friends who have looked over portions of the proof-sheets, as they were passing through the press, especially to my brother, the Rev. John E. B. Mayor, Professor of Latin
at Cambridge, and to my former pupil, Mr H. P. Richards, now Fellow and Tutor of Wadham College, Oxford; but above all to Mr J. S. Reid, whose name is well known to scholars from his excellent editions of the *Academica* and other works of Cicero, and to my old and valued friend Mr H. J. Roby. The help which I have received from the two latter is only imperfectly represented by the additions and corrections marked with the signature *R.*, in the case of those supplied by Mr Roby, and *J. S. R.*, in the case of those supplied by Mr Reid. Many of my own notes have been modified, and perhaps more should have been, in deference to their candid and searching criticism.

The remaining volume will, I hope, be completed for publication during the course of next year.

*April, 1880.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduction:</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Historical Sketch of Greek Philosophy</td>
<td>ix—xxxvii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Analysis of Book I.</td>
<td>xxxvii—xxxix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Dramatis Personae</td>
<td>xl—xlii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Sources of Book I.</td>
<td>xlii—liv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Text and Orthography</td>
<td>liv—lxxvii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix on Davies’ MSS.</td>
<td>lxxvii—lxx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanation of Symbols</td>
<td>lxx, lxxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text of Book I. with Critical Notes</td>
<td>1—43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Swainson’s Collations of Book I.</td>
<td>45—64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentary on Book I.</td>
<td>65—228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY FROM THALES TO CICERO*.

As Cicero continually refers to the views of earlier philosophers, it seems desirable here to give a short preliminary sketch, which may serve to show their relations to each other, leaving points of detail to be discussed in the notes on each particular passage.

Greek philosophy had its origin not in the mother country, but in the colonies of Asia Minor and Magna Graecia. This is owing partly to the reflectiveness belonging to a more advanced civilization, and partly to the fact that the colonists were brought in contact with the customs and ideas of foreign nations. The philosophers of the earliest, or Pre-Socratic period, are broadly divided into the Ionic and the Italic Schools. Both had the same object of interest, to ascertain the nature, the origin, the laws, the destiny of the visible

* The modern works which have been found most useful in drawing up this sketch are the following, arranged in what I consider to be their order of importance. Full references will be found in the two which stand at the head of the list.

Ritter and Preller, Historia Philosophiae Graecae et Romanae ex fontium locis contexta.

Zeller, History of Greek Philosophy.

Grote, History of Greece, together with his Plato and Aristotle.


Schwegler, Hist. of Philosophy, tr. by Sterling.

Krische, Die theologischen Lehren der griechischen Denker.


A. Butler, Lectures on Ancient Philosophy.

The Fragmenta Philosophorum in Didot’s series ought to have been more useful than any of these, but its value is much lessened by the want of discrimination shown in the selection and arrangement of the writers quoted.

M. C.
world. But while the former with the Ionic sensitiveness to all outward influences dwelt more upon the material element itself and the life which manifested itself in its ever-changing developments, the latter (who, if not themselves Dorian, were yet surrounded by Dorian settlers, with their Doric ideal of discipline, order, stability, superiority to sense, as opposed to the Ionic ideal of free growth, of ease, beauty and nature,) turned their thoughts more to the laws by which the world was governed, or the one unchanging substance which they believed to underlie its shifting phenomena.

The first name in Greek philosophy is the so-called founder of the Ionic or physical school, Thales of Miletus, a contemporary of Solon (B.C. 640—550), said to be of Phenician descent. With him begins the transition from the mythological to the scientific interpretation of nature, the transition, as Grote puts it, from the question Who sends rain, or thunder, or earthquakes, and why does he send it? to the question What are the antecedent conditions of rain, thunder, or earthquakes? The old cosmogonies and theogonies suggested the idea of development under the form of a personal history of a number of supernatural beings variously related to each other. The first parent of all, according to Homer, was Oceanus (Il. xiv. 201, 210), perhaps a nature-myth to be interpreted of the sun rising and setting in the sea. Thales stripped him of his personality, and laid down the proposition that water is the one original substance out of which all things are produced. Aristotle conjectures that he was led to this belief by observing that moisture is essential to animal and vegetable life; probably it was also from the fact that water supplies the most obvious example of the transmutation of matter under its three forms, solid, fluid and gaseous. Thales further held that the universe is a living creature; which he expressed by saying that 'all things are full of God,' and in agreement with this he is reported to have said that 'the magnet had a soul.' It is this portion of his doctrine which is travestied by the Epicurean critic in Bk. i § 25.

The second of the Ionic philosophers was Anaximander, also an inhabitant of Miletus (B.C. 610—540). He followed Thales in seeking for an original substance to which he gave the name of ἀρχόν, but he found this not in Water, but in the ἄρχετος, matter indeterminate (i.e. not yet developed into any one of the forms familiar to us) and infinite, which we may regard as bearing the same relation to Hesiod’s primaeval Chaos, as Water did to the Homeric Oceanus.
The elementary contraries, hot, cold, moist, dry, are separated from this first matter by virtue of the eternal movement belonging to it; thus are produced the four elements; the earth was in the form of a cylinder, self-poised, in the centre of the universe; round it was air, and round that again a fiery sphere which was broken up so as to form the heavenly bodies. As all substances are produced out of the Infinite so they are resolved into it, thus 'atoning for their injustice' in arrogating to themselves a separate individual existence. The Infinite is divine, containing and directing all things: divine too are the innumerable worlds which it is ever generating and re-absorbing into its own bosom. (N. D. i 25.)

After Anaximander comes Anaximenes, also of Miletus, who is supposed to have flourished about 520 B.C. While his doctrine approaches in many respects to that of Anaximander, he nevertheless returned to the principle of Thales in so far that he assumed as the ἀρχὴ, a definite substance, Air, in contradistinction to the indefinite ἀτομον of his immediate predecessor. Air is infinite in extent and eternal in duration. It is in continual motion, and produces all things out of itself by condensation and rarefaction, passing through successive stages from fire downwards to wind, cloud, water, earth and stone. As man's life is supported by breathing, so the universe subsists by the air which encompasses it. We are told that Anaximenes gave the name of God both to his first principle Air, and to certain of its products, probably the stars. (N. D. i 26.)

The greatest of the Pre-Socratic philosophers, Heraclitus of Ephesus, known among the ancients as the obscure and the weeping philosopher, was a little junior to Anaximenes. Following in the steps of his predecessor, he held that it was one and the self-same substance which by processes of condensation and rarefaction changed itself into all the elements known by us, but he preferred to name this from its highest potency fire, rather than to stop at the intermediate stage of air. But the point of main interest with him was not the original substance, but the process, the everlasting movement upwards and downwards, fire (including air), water, earth; earth, water, fire. All death is birth into a new form, all birth the death of the previous form. There is properly no existence but only 'becoming,' i.e. a continual passing from one existence into another. Each moment is the union of opposites, being and not-being: the life of the world is maintained by conflict, πόλεμος παρηχο

b 2
INTRODUCTION.

πάντως. Every particle of matter is in continual movement. All things are in flux like the waters of a river. One thing alone is permanent, the universal law which reveals itself in this movement. This is Zeus, the all-pervading reason of the world. It is only the illusion of the senses which makes us fancy that there are such things as permanent substances. Fire exhibits most clearly the incessant movement and activity of the world: confined in the body it constitutes the human soul, in the universe at large it is God (the substance and the process being thus identified).

Heraclitus is the first philosopher of whom we read that he referred to the doctrines of other philosophers. He is said to have spoken highly of some of the seven Wise Men, but condemned severely Pythagoras and Xenophanes as well as the poets Hesiod, Homer and Archilochus. Though I agree with Ueberweg in classing him with the older Ionics, yet his philosophy was no doubt largely developed with a reference to the rival schools of Italy.

In the N. D. allusion is twice made to the obscurity of Heraclitus (I 74, III 35), but he does not appear in the catalogue of philosophers criticized by Velleius, and this though Philodemus had certainly treated of him, as we may see from the allusions in the Fragments (Compertz, pp. 70, 81). The reason for this omission is probably that, his philosophy having been incorporated into the Stoic system, it was unnecessary to discuss it separately. See Hirzel, p. 7 foll., and N. D. III 35, I 74.

We must now cross the water with Pythagoras of Samos, born 582 B.C., who settled at Crotone in Italy, 529 B.C., and there founded what is known as the Ionic school. He seems to have found in the mysteries and in the Orphic hymns the starting point which Thales had discovered in Homer; and there can be little doubt that his doctrine and system were also in part suggested by his travels in Egypt. He established a sort of religious brotherhood with strict rules and a severe initiation, insisted on training in gymnastics, mathematics and music, and taught the doctrines of immortality and of the transmigration of souls, and the duty of abstaining from animal food. He is said to have committed nothing to writing himself, but his doctrines were religiously guarded by his disciples (cf. N. D. I 10), and recorded by Archytas and Philolaus, the latter a contemporary of Socrates.

The new and startling feature in the Pythagorean philosophy
as opposed to the Ionic systems, was that it found its $\alpha \rho \gamma \nu$, its key of the universe, not in any known substance, but in number and proportion. This might naturally have occurred to one who had listened to the teaching of Thales and Anaximander. After all it makes no difference, he might say, what we take as our original matter, it is the law of development, the measure of condensation which determines the nature of each thing. Number rules the harmonies of music, the proportions of sculpture and architecture, the movements of the heavenly bodies. It is Number which makes the universe into a $\kappa \sigma \mu \lambda \rho \kappa \sigma$, and is the secret of a virtuous and orderly life. Then by a confusion similar to that which led Heraclitus to identify the law of movement with Fire, the Pythagoreans went on to identify number with substance. One, the Monad, evolved out of itself Limit (order) and the Unlimited (freedom, expansiveness), the Dyad; out of the harmonious mixture of these contraries all particular things were produced. Again, One was the point, Two the line, Three the plane, Four the concrete solid (but from another point of view, as being the first square number, equal into equal, it was conceived to be Justice). Yet once more, One was the central fire, the heart of the universe, the throne of Zeus, round which revolved not only the heavenly bodies, but the earth itself. The Decad is the ordered universe surrounded by its fiery envelope. The Pythagorean doctrine of the soul and of God is variously reported. Zeller thinks that Cicero’s representation belongs to the later teachers, and not to Pythagoras himself, as it is not supported by Plato and Aristotle. If we may trust the oldest accounts, there does not seem to have been any close connexion between the religious and philosophical opinions of Pythagoras. We are told that he believed in One God eternal, unchangeable, ruling and upholding all things, that the soul was a ‘harmony,’ that the body was its prison, in which it was punished for past sin and disciplined for a divine life after death, that those who failed to profit by this discipline would pass into lower forms of life, or suffer severer penalties in Hades (N. D. i 27, 74, iii 27, 88).

The second of the Italic schools was the Eleatic, founded by \textit{Xenophanes} of Colophon in Asia Minor (b. 569 B.C.), who migrated to Elea in Italy about 540 B.C. While the Pythagoreans strove to explain nature mathematically and symbolically, the Eleatics in their later developments did the same by their metaphysical abstractions. Xenophanes himself seems to have received his first philosophical
impulse in the revulsion from the popular mythology. He condemned anthropomorphism and polytheism altogether, and said that Homer and Hesiod had attributed to the Gods conduct which would have been disgraceful in men. God is one, all eye, all ear, all understanding; he is for ever unmoved, unchangeable, a vast all-embracing sphere. See N. D. i 28. It is disputed whether the last expression is to be taken literally, implying that the universe is God, or whether it is a metaphor to express God's perfection and omnipresence. The chief representative of the Eleatic School is Parmenides (b. 515 B.C.). He disengaged the doctrine of Xenophanes from its theological form, and ascribed to Being what his predecessor had ascribed to God. His philosophy is the antithesis of that of Heraclitus. While Heraclitus said all is motion and change, the appearance of fixity is merely illusion of the senses; Parmenides asserted, with distinct reference to him, that all that exists has existed and will exist the same for ever, that it is change and multiplicity which is illusory. It is only by thought we can become conscious of the really existent; being and thought are the same, sense can only give rise to uncertain opinion. In such language we see partly a protest against the vagueness of the conception of development or 'becoming,' by which the Ionic philosophers endeavoured to explain the origin of things, 'You say fire becomes water, but each thing is what it is, and can never be otherwise;' partly an idea of the indestructibility of matter; partly an anticipation of the later distinction between necessary and contingent truth; thus one point dwelt upon by him was the impossibility of any separation of parts of space.

But though truth only belonged to the world of real existence, Parmenides condescended to give his romance of nature for the benefit of those who could not penetrate beyond the world of phenomena. He begins with two principles, light and darkness, also called fire and earth, or male and female; and supposes all things to proceed from their mixture. The existing universe consists of a central fire, the seat of the presiding Deity, and of several concentric rings of mingled light and darkness, bounded on the outside by a wall of flame. The first-born of Gods was Love, by whom the union of opposites is brought about. In this we may trace a reminiscence of the Hesiodic Ερως (N. D. i 28).

Zeno of Elea (b. 490 B.C.) is chiefly known from his arguments showing the absurd consequences of the ordinary belief in the
phenomenal world. Parmenides must be right in denying motion and multiplicity, for their assertion leads to self-contradiction. Zeno was in consequence called the inventor of Dialectic. His arguments, especially the famous ‘Achilles,’ still find a place in treatises on Logic (N. D. i i 82).

The clearly marked opposition between the Ionic and the Eleatic views of nature, as shown in Heraclitus and Parmenides, had a powerful influence on the subsequent course of philosophy. Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists agreed in accepting the Eleatic principle of the inmutability of substance, while denying its absolute Oneness; and they explained the Ionic ‘becoming’ as the result of the mixture of a number of unchangeable substances. Empedocles of Agrigentum (b. 500 B.C.) held that there were four eternal, self-subsistent elements or ‘roots of things,’ which were being continually separated and combined under the influence of Love and Hatred. At times Love has the upper hand, at times Hate. When Love has the complete supremacy the elements are at rest, united in one all-including sphere (Σφαῖρος): when Hate prevails, the elements are entirely separate. The soul, like all other things, is formed by the mixture of the elements, and is thus capable of perception, for like can only be perceived by like. In his opinions on the Gods and on religion, Empedocles was chiefly influenced by Pythagoras. He believed in the existence of Daemons intermediate between Gods and men, some of which had passed into mortal bodies as an atonement for former sins, and could only be restored to their original state after long ages of discipline. While he speaks of God at one time as one spirit pervading the world in swift thought, in other places he speaks of Gods produced like men from the mixture of the elements, but possessed of a longer existence, and then again we find divinity attributed to Sphaerus and the four elements and two moving powers (N. D. i 29).

Returning now to Ionia, we see the effect of the Eleatic school in the speculations of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (b. 500 B.C.), of whom Aristotle says that he appeared among the older philosophers like a sober man among drunkards. Instead of the four elements of Empedocles, which he declared to be themselves compounds, he assumed an indefinite number of ‘seeds’ of the different kinds of matter. To these seeds later philosophers gave the distinctive name
INTRODUCTION.

of 'homoemeries,' denoting that the constituent particles of bodies were of the same nature as the bodies which they composed, while the unqualified atoms of Democritus gave rise to the different qualities of their compounds by the mode in which they were compounded. In the beginning these seeds were huddled together in a confused chaos, then came Nous, the pure self-moving intelligence, almighty and all-wise (this takes the place of the half-conscious Love and Hate of Empedocles), and communicated a rotatory impulse to the inert mass, by means of which the cognate particles were gradually brought together and reduced to order. Nous is the soul of the world and dwells in all living things, even plants, as the principle of their life. Whether Anaxagoras called it by the name of God is doubtful. Plato and Aristotle complain that, having begun well, he failed to make full use of the right principle with which he started, and turned his attention to mechanical causes, only having recourse to Nous as a deus ex machina when the others failed. (N. D. i 26.)

Diogenes of Apollonia in Crete was a younger contemporary of Anaxagoras, against whom he took up a reactionary position and defended the older Ionic doctrine, assuming Air to be the one principle out of which all things were produced, and assigning to it all the attributes of Nous. Both he and Anaxagoras taught at Athens, but were compelled to leave it on a charge of impiety. (N. D. i 29.)

Of far greater importance is Democritus, born at the Ionic colony of Abdera in Thrace, B.C. 460, the chief expositor of the Atomic theory, which was originated by his elder contemporary and friend, Leucippus the Eleatic (N. D. i 66). Briefly stated, their doctrine is that of Anaxagoras, minus Nous and the qualitative diversity in the seeds or atoms. They adopted the Eleatic view so far as relates to the eternal sameness of Being, applying this to the indivisible, unchangeable atoms, but they denied its unity, continuity and immobility, and they asserted that 'Not-being' (the Vacuum of their system) existed no less than 'Being,' and was no less essential as an ἀφράτης, since without it motion would be impossible. The atoms are absolutely solid and incompressible, they are without any secondary qualities, and differ only in size (and therefore in weight), in figure, position and arrangement. Though too small to be seen or felt by us, they produce all things by their combinations; and the compounds have various qualities in accordance with the differences in
the constituent atoms, the mode of arrangement, and the larger or smaller amount of vacuum separating the atoms. Thus Soul, the divine element pervading the world, is a sort of fire made up of small, round, smooth atoms in continual motion, and largely mixed with vacuum. The account given by Democritus of the origin of the existing universe is that there were, to begin with, an infinite number of atoms carried downwards by their own inherent gravity at different rates in proportion to their magnitude, that thus they impinged one upon another, and gave rise to all sorts of oblique and contrary movements, out of which was generated an all-absorbing rotatory motion or vortex. Under these various movements corresponding atoms found their fitting places and became entangled and hooked together so as to form bodies. Thus the earthy and watery particles were drawn to the centre where they remained at rest, while the airy and fiery rebounded from them and rose to the circumference, forming a sort of shell between the organized world and the infinitude of unorganized atoms on the outside. There was an endless number of such worlds in various stages of growth or decay under the influx or efflux of atoms; the destruction of each world followed upon its collision with another world.

The account given of the mind and its operations was, as follows:—Particles of mind or soul were distributed throughout the body, and were continually escaping owing to their subtle nature, but, as they escaped, their place was taken by other particles inhaled in the breath. When breathing ceased there was nothing to recruit the living particles, and death speedily followed. Every mental impression was of the nature of touch, and was caused either by actual contact with atoms as in the case of taste and hearing, or by images thrown off from bodies external to us, and entering in through the pores.

These images were a kind of film consisting of the surface atoms which were continually floating off from all bodies without any disturbance of their mutual order, and were, so to speak, a sample of the object from which they were detached. Democritus also used the same word (eĩδωλα) for the anthropomorphic combinations of the finest soul-atoms which he believed to exist in the air, and to be at times perceived by men. These were the Gods of the popular religion, not immortal, though longer lived than men: some were friendly, some malignant; he prayed that he might himself only meet with the former. Cf. N. D. i 29 & 120.
Democritus closes the series of the pre-Socratic dogmatists, men who devoted themselves to the investigation of Nature as a whole, believing that the investigation would lead to the discovery of the truth. Between these and Socrates, the great regenerator of philosophy, is interposed the sceptical or Sophistic era. That the latter was a natural and necessary stage in the development of Greek thought will be apparent from the following considerations:

What we are told about Pythagoras and his disciples must have been more or less true of all the early philosophers. The sage no less than the poet believed himself the organ of a special inspiration, which in the case of the former revealed to him the inner truth of nature; those who were worthy to receive the revelation listened with reverence to his teaching, and rested their faith implicitly on their master's authority. But when different schools sprang up, each asserting their own doctrines with equal positiveness; when the increase of intercommunication spread the knowledge of these contradictory systems throughout the Greek-speaking world; when philosophical questions began to be popularized by poets like Euripides, and discussed in the saloons of a Pericles or an Aspasia; when Zeno's criticisms had made clear to the public, what had been an esoteric truth to the hearers of Parmenides and Heraclitus, that not merely traditional beliefs, but even the evidence of the senses was incapable of standing against the reason of the philosophers,—the result of all this was a widespread scepticism either as to the existence of objective truth altogether (Protagoras) or as to the possibility of the attainment of physical truth by man (Socrates). If we remember at the same time the incredibly rapid development in every department of life which took place in Greece and especially in Athens during the 5th century b.c.; the sense which must have forced itself on all the more thoughtful minds, of the incompetency of the old beliefs to explain the problems of the new age which was dawning upon them; and on the other hand the growing importance of oratory and the immense stimulus to ambition, held out in a state like Athens, to those who were of a more practical turn of mind,—we shall not be surprised if there was much curiosity to learn the opinions of the most advanced thinkers, and much eagerness to acquire the argumentative power by which a Zeno could make the worse cause appear the better. The enlightened men who came forward to supply this demand called themselves by the name of Sophists, or teachers of wisdom. They were the first who made
a profession of the higher education, and some of them amassed considerable fortunes by their lectures on rhetoric, the art of speaking, which was also made to include instruction in regard to political and social life. The speculative interest of the older philosophers was in them changed into a predominantly practical interest, 1st, as to how to acquire wealth and notoriety for themselves, and 2ndly, as a means to this, to attract by omniscient pretensions, by brilliant declamation and startling paradox, clever and ambitious young men of the richer classes; and then to secure their continued discipleship by careful training with a view to the attainment of political power*.

**Protagoras** of Abdera (B.C. 490—415) and **Gorgias** of Leontini in Sicily (B.C. 480—375) are the earliest of the so-called Sophists. Protagoras taught in Sicily and at Athens, from which latter place he was banished on a charge of impiety in consequence of his treatise on Theology referred to by Cicero, N. D. i 29 & 63. His treatise on Truth began with the famous sentence, 'Man is the measure of all things;' meaning that truth is relative, not absolute, that what each man holds to be true, that is true to him; and similarly in regard to conduct, that it is impossible to pronounce universally that one kind of conduct is right, another wrong: right and wrong depend upon opinion; what is generally thought right is right generally; what each thinks right is right for him, just as each man's sensations are true for him, though perhaps not for another; there is therefore no more reason for one general assertion than for another, perhaps an opposite assertion. It is plain that this was a sort of conciliation theory naturally springing from the fact of the opposition of philosophical schools: 'each of you are equally right relatively, equally wrong absolutely; there is no need for quarrel.' Protagoras also wrote on Grammar and Philology. Gorgias is said to have first come to Athens in B.C. 427, and afterwards to have travelled about giving lectures from town to town. He devoted himself mainly to the cultivation of rhetoric, but also wrote a treatise *peri φύσεως*, in which he maintained 1st 'that nothing exists' (*i.e.* doubtless 'in the absolute Eleatic sense'); 2nd that if anything did exist, still it could not be known; 3rd that even if it could be known, the knowledge of it could not be communicated

* The general features of the Sophistic period are photographed in the Clouds of Aristophanes, and in Thucydides' chapters on the Plague of Athens and the Corecyrean revolution, and his speeches generally.
to others. **Hippias** of Elis and **Prodicus** of Ceos were some twenty years younger than Protagoras. The former was best known for his scientific attainments: he is said to have given utterance to the revolutionary sentiment of the age in the phrase, 'Law is a tyrant over men, forcing them to do many things contrary to nature.' Prodicus is famed for his moral apologue on the Choice of Hercules narrated by Xenophon. Cicero (N. D. i 118), following Philodemus, reports that he considered the Gods of popular religion to be merely deified utilities, Bacchus wine, Ceres corn, &c.

But the extreme effects of the disintegration of established beliefs were not seen in the teachers, but in some of their pupils who were less dependent on public opinion, young aristocrats who fretted under democratic rule, and were eager to take advantage of the disorganized state of society in order to grasp at power for themselves. Such was the Callicles of the Gorgias, such Critias and Alcibiades, both disciples of Socrates, of whom we have now to speak.

**Socrates** was born at Athens 470 B.C.; he was the son of Sophroniscus a sculptor, and Phaeonarete a midwife. While sharing the general scepticism as to the possibility of arriving at certainty in regard to the Natural Philosophy which had formed the almost exclusive subject of earlier speculation, he maintained, in opposition to most of the popular teachers of his time, the certainty of moral distinctions, and laid down a method for the discovery of error on the one side, and the establishment of objective truth on the other. The main lines of his philosophy are given in three famous sentences: (1) that of Cicero, that he brought down philosophy from heaven to earth; (2) his own assertion that he practised in regard to the soul the art (μαθητική) which his mother had practised in regard to the body, bringing to birth and consciousness truths before held unconsciously; (3) Aristotle's statement that Socrates was the first to introduce inductive reasoning and general definitions. But more important than any innovation in regard to method was the immense personal influence of Socrates. His force of will, his indifference to conventionalities, his intense earnestness, both moral and intellectual, contrasting so strongly with the dilettantism of ordinary teachers, and yet combined with such universal interest and sympathy in all varieties of life and character, his warm and genial nature, his humour, his irony, his extraordinary conversational
powers, these formed a whole unique in the history of the world; and we can well believe that they acted like an electric shock on the more susceptible minds of his time. For we must remember that Socrates did not, like earlier philosophers, content himself with imparting the results of solitary meditation to a few favoured disciples: nor did he, like the Sophists, lecture to a paying audience on a set subject; but obeying, as he believed, a divine call, he mixed with men of every class wherever they were to be found, cross-questioning them as to the grounds of their beliefs, and endeavouring to awaken in them a consciousness of their ignorance and a desire for real knowledge. His own account of his call is as follows: one of his disciples was told by the Oracle at Delphi that Socrates was the wisest of men. Socrates could not conceive how this should be, as he was conscious only of ignorance; but he determined to question some of those who had the highest repute for wisdom; accordingly he went to statesmen and poets and orators, and last of all to craftsmen, but everywhere met with the same response: none really knew what were the true ends of life, but each one fancied that he knew, and most were angry when Socrates attempted to disturb their illusion of knowledge. Thus he arrived at the conclusion that what the oracle meant was that the first step to knowledge was the consciousness of ignorance, and he believed, in consequence of other divine warnings, that it was his special mission to bring men to this consciousness.

The next step on the way to knowledge was to get clear general notions, by comparing a number of specific cases in which the same general term was employed; or, according to the phraseology of ancient philosophy, to see the One (the kind or genus, the general principle, the law, the idea,) in the Many (the subordinate species or individuals, the particulars, the phenomena, the facts) and conversely to rise from the Many to the One. The process of doing this he called Dialectic, i.e. discourse, since it was by question and answer that he believed the proposed definition could be best tested, and the universal idea which was latent in each individual could be brought to light. Truth and right were the same for all: it was only ignorance, mistake, confusion which made them seem different to different men. And similarly it is ignorance which leads men to commit vicious actions: no one willingly does wrong, since to do right is the only way to happiness, and every man desires happiness. Thus virtue is a knowledge of the way to happiness,
and more generally, right action is reasonable action; in other words, virtue is wisdom, and each particular virtue, such as courage or temperance, wisdom in reference to particular circumstances or a particular class of objects. Self-mastery and superiority to the outward conditions of life are essential to happiness.

In regard to religion, Socrates, while often employing language suited to the popular polytheism, held that there was one supreme God who was to the universe what the soul of man was to his body, that all things were arranged and ordered by Him for good, and that man was the object of His special providence and might look for guidance from Him in oracles and otherwise. The soul was immortal, and had in it a divine element. Socrates believed that he was himself favoured beyond others in the warning sign (τὸ ἑαυτόν) which checked him whenever he was about to take an ill-judged step.

The personal enmity provoked by the use of the Socratic elenchus, and the more general dislike to the Socratic method as unsettling the grounds of belief and undermining authority, a dislike which showed itself in the Clouds of Aristophanes as early as 423 B.C., combined with the democratic reaction, after the overthrow of the Thirty, to bring about the execution of Socrates in the year 399 B.C. The charges on which he was condemned were that he did not believe in the Gods of the established religion, that he introduced new Gods, and that he corrupted the young; the last charge probably referring to the fact that Socrates freely pointed out the faults of the Athenian constitution, and that many of his disciples took the anti-popular side (N. D. ii 18, 167).

Our authorities for the life of Socrates are the writings of his two disciples, Xenophon and Plato. The former (440—355 B.C.) was a soldier and country gentleman with a taste for literature, who endeavoured to clear his master's memory from the imputation of impiety and immorality by publishing the Memorabilia, a collection of his noteworthy sayings and discourses. Xenophon was banished from Athens for fighting in the Spartan ranks at Coronea. Plato is distinguished from the other disciples of Socrates as the one who represents most truly the many-sidedness of his master, completing indeed and developing what was defective in him and incorporating all that was valuable in the earlier philosophers. Before treating of him it will be convenient to speak shortly of the 'imperfect' or one-sided Socraticists.
Euclides of Megara, the founder of the Megaric and so ultimately of the Sceptic school, was chiefly attracted by the negative teaching of Socrates, and his followers are noted as the inventors of various sophisms which served them as offensive weapons against their opponents. The main positive doctrine attributed to them is that they identified the Good, which Socrates called the highest object of knowledge, with the Absolute One of Parmenides, denying the existence of Evil.

Antisthenes (N. D. i 32), the founder of the Cynic and indirectly of the Stoic school, was the caricature of the ascetic and unconventional side of Socrates. Nothing is good but virtue, nothing evil but vice. Virtue is wisdom, and the wise man is always perfectly happy because he is self-sufficient and has no wants, no ties and no weaknesses. The mass of men are fools and slaves, and the wise man is their appointed guide and physician. Acting on these principles the Cynics were the mendicant Friars of their time, abstaining from marriage and repudiating all civil claims while they professed themselves to be citizens of a world-wide community. On the subject of religion Antisthenes stated explicitly, what was doubtless implied in the teaching of Socrates, that there was only one God, who is invisible and whose worship consists in a virtuous life.

Aristippus of Cyrene (N. D. III 77), the founder of the Cyrenaic school, resembled Antisthenes in dwelling exclusively upon the practical side of his master's teaching. He interpreted the somewhat ambiguous language of Socrates about happiness in a purely eudaemonistic sense and declared that the only rule of life was to enjoy the present moment. Wisdom was essential to this, as it freed the mind from prejudice and passion. It was the boast of Aristippus no less than of Antisthenes 'mihi res, non me rebus subiungere conor'. Among the more prominent members of this school were Theodorus (N. D. i 2, 63), surnamed the Atheist, who lived towards the close of the 4th century, B.C. He objected to the doctrine of his predecessor on the ground that it did not leave sufficient scope to wisdom, since pleasure and pain are so much dependent on outward circumstances; and put forward as the chief good not the enjoyment of passing pleasure, but the maintaining of a calm and cheerful frame of mind. Euhemerus, whose religious system is referred to by Cicero (N. D. i 119), was a pupil of his. His contemporary, Hegesias, called πανθεόναρεος from his gloomy doctrine, considered that as life has more of pain than pleasure, the aim of the wise man should be not
to obtain pleasure, but to steel himself against pain. Thus in the end the Cyrenaic doctrine blends with the Cynic.

Plato, the 'deus philosophorum' (N. D. ii 32), was born at Athens 428 B.C. and became a disciple of Socrates in 408 B.C. After the death of his master he left Athens and lived at Megara with Euclides. From thence he visited Cyrene, Egypt, Magna Graecia and Sicily. After nearly ten years of travelling he took up his residence again at Athens and began to lecture in the gymnasium of the Academia. He died in his eightieth year.

Building on the foundation of Socrates, he insists no less than his master on the importance of negative Dialectic, as a means of testing commonly received opinions; indeed most of his Dialogues come to no positive result, but merely serve to show the difficulties of the subject discussed and the unsatisfactory nature of the solutions hitherto proposed. As he makes Socrates the spokesman in almost all the Dialogues, it is not always easy to determine precisely where the line is to be drawn between the purely Socratic and the Platonic doctrine, but the general relation of the one to the other may be stated as follows.

In his theory of knowledge Plato unites the Socratic definition with the Heraclitean Becoming and the Eleatic Being. Agreeing with Heraclitus that all the objects of the senses are fleeting and unreal in themselves, he held that they are nevertheless participant of Being in so far as they represent to us the general terms after which they are named. Thus we can make no general assertion with regard to this or that concrete triangular thing: it is merely a passing sensation: but by abstraction we may rise from the concrete to the contemplation of the Ideal triangle, which is the object of science, and concerning which we may make universal and absolutely true predications. If we approach the Ideal from below, from the concrete particulars, it takes the form of the class, the common name, the definition, the concept, the Idea; but this is an incomplete view of it. The Ideal exists apart from, and prior to, all concrete embodiment. It is the eternal archetype of which the sensible objects are the copies. It is because the soul in its pre-existent state is already familiar with this archetype that it is capable of being reminded of it when it sees its shadow in the phenomenal existences.
which make up the world of sense*. All knowledge is reminiscence. What cannot be traced back to this intuitive consciousness in the soul itself is not knowledge, but mere opinion. Dialectic is the means by which the soul is enabled to recover the lost consciousness of the Ideal. The highest Ideal, which is the foundation of all existence and all knowledge is the Ideal Good, personified as God. He, as the Creator or Demiurgus, formed the universe by imprinting the ideas on the formless chaotic Matter. The process of creation is described in the *Timaeus* under the form of a myth, Plato holding, like Parmenides, that it was not possible to arrive at more than a symbolical adumbration of physical truth. The cause and ground of creation is the goodness of God, who seeks to extend his own blessedness as widely as possible. He begins his work by constructing the soul of the world out of the two elements before him, the immutable harmonious Ideals and changing discordant Matter. This soul he infuses into the mass of matter, which thereupon crystallizes into the geometrical forms of the four elements, and assumes the shape of a perfect sphere rotating on its axis. The Kosmos thus created is divine, imperishable and infinitely beautiful. Further, each element is to have living creatures belonging to it. Those belonging to the element of fire are the Gods, both the heavenly bodies and those of whom tradition tells us. All these were fashioned by the Demiurgus himself, but the creatures belonging to the other elements, including the mortal part of man, were the work of the created gods. The immortal part of man, the reason, is of like substance with the soul of the world, and was distributed by the Demiurgus amongst the stars till the time came for each several particle to enter the body prepared for it by the created gods, where it combined with two other ingredients, the

* The reader will remember the magnificent ode in which Wordsworth has embodied Plato’s sublime conception. The fact which underlies it was well illustrated by the late Prof. Sedgwick, commenting on Locke’s saying that “the mind previous to experience is a sheet of white paper” (the old *rasa tabula*), “Naked he comes from his mother’s womb, endowed with limbs and senses indeed, well fitted to the material world, yet powerless from want of use: and as for knowledge, his soul is one unvaried blank; yet has this blank been already touched by a celestial hand, and when plunged in the colours which surround it, it takes not its tinge from accident, but design, and comes forth covered with a glorious pattern.”—*Discourse* p. 53. The Common-sense Philosophy of the Scotch and the *à priori* judgments of Kant are other forms of the same doctrine.
INTRODUCTION.

appetive (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν) and the spirited (τὸ θυμοειδὲς) which it had to bring into subjection. If it succeeded, it returned to its star on the death of the body; if it failed, it was destined to undergo various transmigrations until its victory was complete. In all these physical speculations Plato was much influenced by the Pythagoreans.

We have now to speak of his ethical doctrines, which were based upon the psychological views mentioned above. The soul is on a small scale what the State or city is on a large scale; it is a constitution which is in its right condition when its parts work harmoniously together, when the governing reason is warmly supported by its auxiliary the heart, and promptly and loyaly obeyed by the appetites. Thus perfect virtue arises when wisdom, courage and temperance are bound together by justice. The highest good is the being made like to God; and this is effected by that yearning after the Ideal which we know by the name of Love (N. D. 1 18—24, 30 al.).

Aristotle (longe omnibus—Platonem semper excipio—provstant et ingenio et diligentia, Tusc. 1 22) was born at Stagira, a Greek colony in Thrace, in the year 385 B.C. He came to Athens in his 17th year and studied under Plato for twenty years. In 343 B.C. he was invited by Philip, King of Macedon, to superintend the education of his son Alexander, then a boy of 13. When Alexander set out on his Persian expedition Aristotle returned to Athens and taught in the Lyceum. As he lectured while walking, his disciples were called Peripatetics. On the death of Alexander, Aristotle left Athens to escape from a charge of impiety, and settled at Chalcis in Euboea, where he died 322 B.C.

Aristotle’s philosophy may be roughly described as Plato put into prose and worked out in detail. The vague mysticism, the high poetic imagination, of the master was altogether alien to the scholar, but the main lines of the two systems are the same. Plato’s Dialectic method was developed by Aristotle into the strict technical science of Logic: Plato’s Ideas were shorn of their separate supra-mundane existence and became the first of the four famous Causes of Aristotle, the formal, the material, the efficient, the final, which are really four kinds of antecedent conditions required for the existence of each thing. For instance, in order to the production of a marble statue by Phidias there is needed (1) the pre-
existence in his own mind of the ideal form which is subsequently impressed upon the stone; (2) the existence of the stone; (3) the process of carving; (4) the motive which induced the sculptor to make the statue, as for instance the desire to do honour to the God whose statue it is. But the opposition of form and matter is not confined to such simple cases—it covers the whole range of existence from the First Matter, which is mere potentiality of being at the one extreme, to the First Form which is pure immaterial actuality, the Divine Being, at the other extreme. The intermediate links in the chain are matter or form according as they are viewed from above or below, as marble for instance is form in reference to stone generally, matter in reference to statue; vitality is form in reference to the living body, matter in reference to rationality. God the First Form, is also the First Mover, the cause of the upward striving of the universe, of the development of each thing from the potential into the actual; and this not by any act of creation, for He remains ever unmoved in His own eternity, but by the natural tendency which all things have towards Him as the absolutely Good, the object and end of all effort, of all desire. The universe itself is eternal, a perfect sphere, the circumference of which is composed of the purest element, ether, and is carried round in circular motion by the immediate influence of the Deity. In it are the fixed stars, themselves divine. The lower planetary spheres have a less perfect movement and are under the guidance of subordinate divinities. Furthest removed from the First Mover comes the earth which is fixed in the centre, and composed of the four inferior elements. Still it exhibits a constant progressive movement from inorganic into organic, from plant into animal, from life which is nutritive and sensitive only into life which is locomotive and finally rational in man. The human soul is a microcosm uniting in itself all the faculties of the lower orders of animated existence, and possessing besides, the divine and immortal faculty of reason. As each thing attains its end by fulfilling the work for which it is designed by nature, so man achieves happiness by the unobstructed exercise of his special endowment, a rational and virtuous activity. Pleasure is the natural accompaniment of such an activity. Virtue, which may be described as perfected nature, belongs potentially to man's nature, but it becomes actual by the repetition of acts in accordance with reason. It is subdivided into intellectual and moral, according as it is a habit of the purely rational part of the soul, or as it is
a habit of the emotional part which is capable of being influenced by reason, but not itself rational. Every natural impulse is the potential basis of a particular virtue which may be developed by repeated actions freely performed in accordance with the law of reason so as to avoid either excess or defect. Since man is by nature gregarious, his perfection is only attainable in society, and ethical science is thus subordinate to political science (N. D. i 33, ii 42, 44, 95, al.).

The later Peripatetics are of no great importance. Cicero mentions in the N. D. Aristotle’s immediate follower Theophrastus (N. D. i 35), whose treatise on Friendship is copied in the Laelius; and Strato (N. D. i 35), who succeeded Theophrastus as head of the school in the year 288 B.C. Critolaus was one of the three philosophers who were sent by the Athenians as ambassadors to Rome in the year 155 B.C., and whose coming first introduced the Romans to the new world of philosophy. Cratippus presided over the school during the lifetime of Cicero, who sent young Marcus to Athens to attend his lectures.

To return now to the Academy, this is divided into three schools, the Older, the Middle and the New Academy*. To the first belong the names of Speusippus (i 32), Xenocrates (i 34) and Polemo, who successively presided over the school between 317 and 270 B.C., as well as those of Heraclides of Pontus (i 34), Crantor and Crates. They appear to have modified the Platonic doctrines mainly by the admixture of Pythagorean elements. Crantor’s writings were used by Cicero for his Consolatio and Tusculan Disputations. The chief expounders of the Middle Academy were its founder Arcesilas 315—241 B.C. (i 11, 70), Carneades of Cyrene 214—129 B.C. (i 4, ii 65, iii 44), one of the Athenian ambassadors to Rome in 155 B.C., and Clitomachus of Carthage, his successor in the presidency. They neglected the positive doctrine of Plato, and employed themselves mainly in a negative polemic against the dogmatism of the Stoics, professing to follow the example of Socrates, though

* Cicero only recognized the Old and the New Academy, the latter corresponding to what is above called the Middle Academy, but including Philo. Antiochus himself claimed to be a true representative of the Old Academy. Later writers made five Academic schools, the 2nd founded by Arcesilas, the 3rd by Carneades, the 4th by Philo, the 5th by Antiochus.
they thought that even he had approached too near to dogmatism in saying that he knew that he knew nothing. Probable opinion was the furthest point in the direction of knowledge to which man could attain. The Academic argument put into the mouth of Cotta in the 3rd book of the N. D. is mainly derived from Clitomachus, the literary exponent of the views of his master Carneades, who is said to have never written anything himself. The New Academy commences with Philo (N. D. 159, 113), a pupil of Clitomachus and one of Cicero's teachers. In it we see a return to dogmatism combined with an eclectic tendency which showed itself most strongly in Philo's pupil Antiochus (N. D. 16, 16), who endeavoured to reform the Academy by uniting Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines with the original Platonism. Cicero studied under him and used some of his writings for the De Finibus. Brutus, to whom the N. D. is addressed, was one of the most distinguished adherents of this stoicized Academy.

We turn now to the two most important developments of post-Aristotelian philosophy, Stoicism and Epicureanism. To understand them it is necessary to look for a moment at the changes which had been brought about by the conquests of Alexander. While Greece proper lost its national life, the Greek language and Greek civilization spread throughout the world, and the Greeks in their turn became familiarized with Oriental thought and religion. Thus the two main supports of the authoritative tradition by which practical life had hitherto been regulated, the law of the State and the old religion of Greece, were shaken from their foundations. The need which was most strongly felt by the best minds was to find some substitute for these, some principle of conduct which should enable a man to retain his self-respect under the rule of brute force to which all were subject. It must be something which would enable him to stand alone, to defy the oppressor, to rise superior to circumstances. Such a principle the Stoics boasted to have found. Zeno (N. D. 136 al.), the founder of the school, was a native of Citium in Cyprus. He came to Athens about 320 B.C. and attended the lectures of Crates the Cynic and afterwards of Stilpo the Megarian and of some of the Academics, and began to teach in the στοά πουκίλη about 308 B.C. He was succeeded by Cleanthes of Assos in Asia Minor about 260 B.C. (N. D. 137, 11 13, 24, 40, 63). Among his other pupils were Aristo of Chius (N. D. 137), Herillus of
INTRODUCTION.

Carthage, Persaeus, who like his master was a native of Citium (N. D. i 38), Aratus of Soli in Cilicia, the author of two astronomical poems translated by Cicero (N. D. ii 104—115). Cleanthes was succeeded by Chrysippus of Soli (b. 280, d. 206), who developed and systematized the Stoic philosophy (N. D. i 39 a). Next came Zeno of Tarsus, and Diogenes of Babylon, one of the three ambassadors to Rome in 155 B.C. From this time forward Stoicism begins to show a softened and eclectic tendency, as we may see in Panaetius of Rhodes (180—111 B.C.), the friend of Scipio and Laelius, whose work περὶ τῶν καθήκων formed the basis of the De Officiis (N. D. ii § 118), and also in his pupil Posidonius of Apamea in Syria, who was one of Cicero’s instructors (N. D. i 7 & 123, ii 88), and from whom much of the Stoic argumentation in the N. D. is probably derived.

The end of philosophy with the Stoics was purely practical. Philosophy is identical with virtue. But since virtue consists in bringing the actions into harmony with the general order of the world, it is essential to know what this order is, and thus we arrive at the famous triple division of philosophy into physics, including cosmology and theology, which explains the nature and laws of the universe; logic, which ensures us against deception and supplies the method for attaining to true knowledge; ethics, which draws the conclusion for practical life. The chief point of interest in the Logic of the Stoics is their theory as to the criterion. They considered the soul to resemble a sheet of blank paper on which impressions (φαντασίαι) were produced through the senses. The concept (ἐννοια) was produced from the impressions by generalization, which might be either spontaneous and unconscious, giving rise to common ideas or natural anticipations (κοιναὶ ἐννοιαὶ, ἐμφυτοὶ προλήψεις), or it might be conscious and methodical, giving rise to artificial concepts. In entire opposition to Plato they held that the individual object alone had real existence; the universal, the general term, existed only in the mind as subjective thought. The truth or falsehood of these impressions and conceptions depended on their possession of τὸ καταληπτικὸν, the power of carrying conviction. An impression which was not merely asssented to, but forced itself irresistibly on the mind, was a καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, a perception that has a firm grasp of reality. The same irresistible evidence attaches to a προλήψεις, but artificial concepts required to have their truth proved by being connected with one or other of these criteria.
The physical theory of the Stoics is a pantheistic materialism. The only real existences are such as can act and be acted upon, and these are bodies, for like can only act on like. But these bodies are not moved simply by mechanical laws, as Democritus supposed. The whole universe is an embodied spiritual force, of which we may call one part passive, one part active, but all is alike material. The active portion is soul, a fiery ether pervading the whole, but having its principal seat in the heaven which encompasses it on every side; the passive portion consists mainly of the inferior elements, water and earth. These latter proceed from the former and are periodically reabsorbed into it in the world-conflagration. The universe itself, as a perfect living creature, is rightly called God, but the name is more particularly given to the soul of the universe, who is also known by many descriptive appellations, Rational or Artistic Fire (πῦρ νοερὸν, πῦρ τεχνικὸν), All-penetrating Air, Spirit, Reason, Nature, Providence, Destiny, Law, Necessity, the Ruling Principle (τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν), and, with reference to his creative and 'informing' power, the Generative Reason (λόγος σπερματικός). The gods of the popular religion represented different activities of the one true Deity. The human soul is an emanation from Him. Although it outlives the body, it will only retain its individual existence till the next conflagration, and that only in the case of the wise. The stars being made of pure fire are divine.

In all this we see the influence of Heraclitus, who was much quoted by the Stoics, though the distinction of the active and passive elements in the universe has been with some probability referred back to the Aristotelian distinction between Form and Matter. They agreed with Aristotle also in holding the unity, finiteness and sphericity of the world, but, unlike him, considered that there was an unlimited void beyond it. That which was peculiarly Stoical was the strong moral colouring which they gave to their materialistic system. The all-pervading fire was at the same time the all-seeing Providence who created and governed all things for the best ends, and makes each several existence, each several fact, conspire together for the good of the whole. It is the privilege of man to be able knowingly and willingly to act as a rational part of the rational whole, instead of yielding himself up to irrational and selfish impulse: but however he acts, he must perforce carry out the divine purpose, as Cleanthes says in his noble hymn:
INTRODUCTION.

ἀγον δὲ μ' ὁ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ' ἦ Πνευμάτων,
ὅτι ποι' ἕμν εἰμι διατητήμενος.
ὡς ἐφομεν γ' ἀκοινοι' ἢν δὲ μὴ θ'νω,
κακὸς γενομένος, οὐδὲν ἠττον ἐφομει.

From this it follows that the summum bonum is to live according to nature and it is through virtue or wisdom that we are enabled to do this. One who thus lives is αὐταρκής, in need of nothing. External good, external evil are matters of indifference; they only provide the field in which virtue is to exercise itself. Pleasure is a natural concomitant of activity, but is not a natural end: not even if we count as pleasure that high delight which belongs to virtuous activity, for pleasure regarded in itself has a tendency to lead man away from the true end, viz. acting not for self, but for the whole. Man’s reason being a part of the reason of the universe reveals to him the divine law. As the emotions are liable to confuse or to disobey reason, it is the part of the wise, i.e. of the virtuous, man to uproot them altogether. Wisdom is not only speculative, judging what is in accordance with nature or the divine law, but practical, strongly willing what is thus determined to be right. We may distinguish different virtues in thought, but in fact no virtue can exist apart. He who has a right judgment and right intention is perfectly virtuous, he who is without right judgment and intention is perfectly vicious. There is no mean. The wise man is perfectly happy, the fool perfectly miserable: all the actions of the former are wise and good; all the actions of the latter foolish and bad. There may be a progress towards wisdom, but, until the actual moment of conversion, even those who are advancing (οἱ προκόπτοντες) must still be classed among the fools. Thus we have the strange union of a highly ideal ethics with a materialistic philosophy. But it was impossible to maintain this uncompromising idealism in practice. The later Stoics found themselves compelled to admit that apart from virtue and vice, the absolute good and evil, there were preferences to be made among things indifferent, from which it followed that besides perfectly virtuous actions (καταρθώματα) there was a subordinate class of appropriate actions (καθήκομα). In the same way, since they were compelled to allow that their perfectly wise man, whom they vaunted to be equal to Zeus, had never existed, they found it necessary to allow a positive value to προκόπη, progress towards wisdom, and to self-control, as contrasted with absolute apathy.

One other characteristic doctrine of the Stoics may be mentioned
here. It will have been noticed that many representatives of the
school were not of Greek birth, but only connected with Greece
by the Macedonian conquests. It was easy to rise from this fact
to the higher doctrine which flowed naturally from their first princi-
ple, the doctrine namely that all men were members of one state,
that the world is the common City of Gods and men, that all men
are brethren as having the same Divine Father.

Epicureanism may be roughly described as a combination of the
physics of Democritus with the ethics of Aristippus. Epicurus
(341—270 B.C.) was an Athenian, born in Samos, where he is said
to have received instruction in the doctrines of Plato and Democritus
(N. D. 172 & 93). He founded his school at Athens about 306 B.C.,
teaching in his own ‘Garden,’ which became not less famous than the
Stoic ‘Porch’. Among his most distinguished disciples were Metro-
dorus (N. D. 186, 113) and others mentioned N. D. 193. Cicero men-
tions among his own contemporaries Phaedrus, Zeno of Sidon (N. D. 1
59, 93) and Philodemus of Gadara: and his account of the Epicurean
doctrines is probably borrowed from these, especially from the last.
Epicureanism had great success among the Romans; but, with the
exception of the poet Lucretius, none of the Latin expounders of
the system seem to have been of any importance. Cicero speaks
with great contempt of Amafinius and Rabirius (cf. Tusc. ii 7, and
Zeller on the Epicureans, ch. 15).

The end of the Epicurean philosophy was even more exclusively
practical than that of the Stoics. Logic (called by Epicurus ‘Canonic’,
as giving the ‘canon’ or test of truth) and physics, were merely sub-
ordinate to ethics, the art of attaining happiness. Knowledge in
itself is of no value or interest. In fact it has a tendency to corrupt
and distort our natural judgment and feeling: and thus Epicurus
prided himself on being mainly self-taught (N. D. 172). Truth is
based on the senses: our sensations are always to be trusted: error
comes in when we begin to interpret them. Repeated sensations
produce a permanent image or general notion (πρόληψις, so called
because it exists in the mind as an anticipation of the name which
would be unmeaning if it could not be referred to a known type).
These general notions also are to be trusted as a natural and sponta-
nous growth. But opinions (ὑπολήψεις) about these may be either
ture or false; true, if testified to by the sensation, or, supposing such
direct evidence unattainable, if there is no contrary sensation; false,
in all other cases. Epicurus himself does not seem to have carried his logical investigations further than this.

The only reason for studying physics was to free the soul from superstitious fears, and with this view to prove that the constitution of the universe might be explained from mechanical causes. The two main principles asserted by Epicurus were that nothing could be produced out of nothing, and that what exists cannot become non-existent. From these principles he deduced the truth of the atomic system, differing however from Democritus in one important point, viz. in his explanation of the manner in which the atoms were brought together. Democritus had asserted that the heavier atoms overtook the lighter in their downward course, and thus initiated the collision which finally resulted in a general vortical movement. Epicurus retaining the same crude view of 'up' and 'down' held that each atom moved with equal speed and that they could only meet by the inherent self-movement of the atoms, which enabled them to swerve from the rigid vertical line, and he found a confirmation of this indeterminate movement of the atoms in the free will of man. In other respects there is little difference between the physical views of Democritus and Epicurus. Both held that there were innumerable worlds continually coming into being and passing out of being in the infinitude of space. As to subordinate arrangements Epicurus thought it unnecessary and indeed impossible to assign any one theory as certain. It was enough if we could imagine theories which were not palpably inadmissible, and which enabled us to dispense with any supernatural cause. Nor was it at all necessary to suppose that the same phenomenon, e.g. sunrise, always proceeded from the same cause. The existence of the present race of animals was explained, as it had been by Empedocles, on a rude Darwinian hypothesis. Out of the innumerable combinations of atoms which had been tried throughout the infinite ages of the past, those only survived which were found to be suited to their environment. The eye was not made to see with, but being made by the fortuitous concourse of atoms it was found on trial to have the property of seeing. But though denying in the strongest terms any creative or governing Reason, Epicurus did not object to Gods who did not interfere with the world or with man. On the contrary he held that the universality of the belief in Gods proved that such belief was based upon a primary notion, a real πρόληψις, though it had been corrupted by the admixture of idle imaginations, ὑπολήψις.
And he pleased himself with the thought that he might find in the Gods a pattern of the true philosophic life. Perfect happiness, immortality and human shape were of the essence of this πρόληψις. Hence he inferred that they must be composed of the finest atoms and enjoy eternal repose in the vacant spaces between the worlds, undisturbed by those labours of sustaining and superintending the universe which were ascribed to them by other schools, as well as by the popular religion (N. D. i 43—56). Such Gods were worthy of the worship and the imitation of the philosophers. On the nature of the soul and the manner in which it receives its impressions by images from without, Epicurus follows Democritus.

While the ethical doctrines of Epicurus are mainly the same as those of Aristippus, he differs from him in attaching more value to permanent tranquillity than to momentary gratification, and also in preferring mental pleasures to bodily, as stronger and more enduring. Virtue is desirable as the means to attain pleasure. The wise man, i.e. the virtuous man, is happy because he is free from the fears of the Gods and of death, because he has learnt to moderate his passions and desires, because he knows how to estimate and compare pleasures and pains so as to secure the largest amount of the former with the least of the latter. The distinction between right and wrong rests merely on utility and has nothing mysterious about it. One chief means of attaining pleasure is the society of friends. To enjoy this we should cultivate the feelings of kindness and benevolence.

The four last mentioned schools, i.e. the Academy, the Lyceum, the Porch and the Garden were, and had long been, the only recognized schools at the time when Cicero was growing up to manhood. Cicero was personally acquainted with the most distinguished living representatives of each. In his 19th year, B.C. 88, he had studied under Phaedrus the Epicurean and Philo the Academic at Rome; in his 28th year, B.C. 79, he attended the lectures of the Epicureans Phaedrus and Zeno, as well as of Antiochus, the eclectic Academic, at Athens, and in the following year those of Posidonius, the eclectic Stoic, at Rhodes. Diodotus the Stoic was for many years the honoured inmate of his house. He had also a high esteem for the Peripatetic Cratippus, whom he selected as the tutor for his son at, what we may call, the University of Athens. Nor did he only attend lectures: his letters show that he was a great reader of philosophical books, and he left behind him translations or adaptations of various dialogues
and treatises of Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Crantor, Carneades, Panactius, Antiochus, Posidonius, and others. In a word he was confessed to be by far the most learned and accomplished of the philosophical amateurs of his time. As to the nature of his own views, we shall be better able to form a judgment, if we look first at the man and his position. Cicero was much more of a modern Italian than of an ancient Roman. A novus homo, sprung from the Volscian municipium of Arpinum, he had none of that proud, self-centred hardness and toughness of character which marked the Senator of Rome. Nature had gifted him with the sensitive, idealistic temperament of the artist and the orator, and this had been trained to its highest pitch by the excellent education he had received. If he had been less open to ideas, less many-sided, less sympathetic, less conscientious, in a word, if he had been less human, he would have been a worse man, he would have exercised a less potent influence on the future of Western civilization, but he would have been a stronger and more consistent politician, more respected no doubt by the blood-and-iron school of his own day, as of ours. While his imagination pictured to him the glories of old Rome, and inflamed him with the ambition of himself acting a Roman part, as in the matter of Catiline, and in his judgment of Caesar, and while therefore he on the whole espoused the cause of the Senate, as representing the historic greatness of Rome, yet he is never fully convinced in his own mind, never satisfied either with himself or with the party or the persons with whom he is most closely allied. And this indecision of his political views is reflected in his philosophy. Epicureanism indeed he condemns, as heartily as he condemns Clodius or Antony; its want of idealism, its prosaic regard for matter of fact, or rather its exclusive regard for the lower fact to the neglect of the higher, its aversion to public life, above all perhaps its contempt for literature as such, were odious in his eyes. But neither is its rival quite to his taste. While attracted by the lofty tone of its moral and religious teaching, he is repelled by its dogmatism, its extravagance and its technicalities. Of the two remaining schools, the Peripatetic had forgotten the more distinctive portion of the teaching of its founder, until his writings were re-edited by Andronicus of Rhodes (who strangely enough is never mentioned by Cicero, though he must have been lecturing in Rome about the time of his consulship), and it had dwindled accordingly into a colourless doctrine of common sense, of which Cicero speaks with respect indeed, but without
enthusiasm. The Academy on the other hand was endeared to him as being lineally descended from Plato, for whose sublime idealism and consummate beauty of style he cherished an admiration little short of idolatry, and also as being the least dogmatic of systems, and the most helpful to the orator from the importance it attached to the use of negative dialectic. But while Cicero defended the Academic doctrine of Agnosticism in regard to speculative questions of metaphysics, while he held it impossible to give any demonstrative proof either of the immortality of the soul or of the existence of God, he refused, both on the ground of sentiment and of policy to extend his scepticism to practical questions of morality and religion. He held in common with the Stoics that the universal instinct of mankind must be regarded as testifying to a universal truth; and, in common with Scaevola and the elder generation of Roman statesmen, that it was the duty of a good citizen to accept the tenets of the national religion except in so far as they might be inconsistent with the plain rules of morality. Thus the conclusion of his argument on the nature of the Gods may be considered to point the way, vaguely indeed and hesitatingly, to the mysticism of later times, when the human mind wearied out with its fruitless search after truth, abjured reason for faith, and surrendered itself blindly either to the traditions of priests or to the inward vision of the Neo-Platonists.

§ 2. ANALYSIS OF BOOK I.

A. Introduction Ch. I § 1—Ch. vii § 17.
B. Epicurean Argument Ch. viii § 18—Ch. xx § 56.
C. Academic Criticism of Epicurean Theology Ch. xxi § 57—Ch. xliv § 124.

Aa. Importance and difficulty of the subject, variety of opinions, some asserting the existence of the Gods, some doubting, some denying it. Those who believe in their existence differ as to their nature; the Epicureans denying that they pay any regard to human affairs, the Stoics affirming that the universe is ordered by them for the good of man, while the Academy holds that man has no right to dogmatize, and confines itself to the criticism of other schools. 1—5.
INTRODUCTION.

Ab. C.'s defence against his critics. He had always been a student of philosophy, but had only lately begun to write upon it, partly by way of useful employment in his enforced absence from public life, partly as a solace under his heavy loss. His manner of expounding the different tenets of each school without stating his own opinion was intentionally adopted to provoke thought. The Academic school to which he belonged was unfairly branded as sceptical. It simply maintained the doctrine of probability in opposition to Stoic dogmatism. iii 5—v 12.

Ac. Preamble to the dialogue itself. In order that the reader may be enabled to form his own judgment, C. reports a conversation held at the house of Cotta in which the Epicureans were represented by Velleius, the Stoics by Balbus, the Academics by Cotta, Cicero forming the audience. vi 13—17.

Ba. Epicurean polemic against the orthodox theology of Plato and the Stoics, with their beliefs in a Creator, a mundane God, and a superintending Providence. viii 18—x 24.

Bb. Historical Section.

i. Epicurean criticism of the theological tenets of twenty seven philosophers from Thales to Diogenes of Babylon. x 25—xv 41.

ii. Epicurean criticism of the popular belief, as seen in the writings of the poets or in Oriental religions. XVI 42, 43.

Bc. Epicurean exposition. Universal consent is a sufficient proof of the existence, blessedness, and immortality of the Gods. Such Gods must be free from care and passion, and are to be regarded with reverence, but without fear. Experience and reason both assure us that they are formed like men, but their bodies are of far finer texture than ours, and are perceptible to the mind alone, not to the bodily senses. That they are immortal is farther shown by the law of equilibrium, which provides that what is deficient in one place is compensated for in another. Thus the destructive forces which prevail in this mortal region are balanced by conservative forces elsewhere. To believe in a divine Creator and Governor of the world is to believe in a God who is full of care and trouble himself, and who causes pain to others, and is therefore an object of superstitious fear. The God of Epicurus passes his time in tranquil contemplation, while worlds are made and unmade by the fortuitous movements of innumerable atoms throughout the infinity of space. XVI 43—xx 56.
Ca. Cotta commences his reply with an expression of his belief in the existence of the Gods, but holds it impossible to arrive at any certainty with regard to the divine nature. xxi 57—xxii 61.

Cb. Weakness of the argument derived from universal consent. Negatively, such consent is unproved: positively, many have held a contrary opinion. xxiii 62—64.

Cc. The atomic doctrine is opposed to science. If it were true it would be inconsistent with the belief in the immortality of the Gods. When Epicurus, by way of evading the difficulty, speaks of quasi-corporeal Gods, he becomes unintelligible. xxiii 65—xxvii 75.

Cd. Weakness of the argument in favour of anthropomorphism. If the Gods present themselves to our eyes in human form only, that is because our ancestors, whether from superstition or policy, established that belief among us; elsewhere the case is different. If that form seems to men the most beautiful, that is merely the prejudice of race. If it is said that experience shows rationality to be confined to that form, on the same ground we might attribute all the properties of man to the Gods; but reason shows the danger of arguing from our limited experience, and it shows also that a body which is suitable for man is unsuitable for such a being as God is supposed to be. xxvii 76—xxxvii 102.

Ce. Even if we grant that there are such images as Epicurus describes, what ground have we for thinking that there is any reality corresponding to them? or, in any case, for supposing that they reveal to us a blessed and immortal being? Immortality you think proved by your doctrine of equilibrium, but the same doctrine would prove the immortality of men. And how can beings be happy who are without activity and therefore without virtue? As to pleasures of sense they are worse off than men. All that can be predicated of them is absence of pain, yet even this is impossible since they must be in constant fear of dissolution from the influx and efflux of atoms. xxxvii 103—xli 114.

Cf. The Epicurean principles, if accepted, are fatal to religion. What inducement is there to worship beings without activity and without benevolence? Epicurus' profession of piety was merely a blind to deceive the multitude. xli 115—xliv 124.
§ 3. DRAMATIS PERSONAE.

The Dialogue is represented as taking place on occasion of the *Feriae Latinae* at the house of C. Aurelius Cotta. The year of its supposed occurrence has to be determined from the following data supplied by the Dialogue. Cotta and Cicero are both residing at home; the former is Pontifex but not consul, the latter, in spite of his youth, is treated as an authority in philosophical questions, and allusion is made to his Athenian experience, which is however assigned to Cotta. The facts of Cotta's life may be briefly summed up. He was born 124 B.C. and like his brothers Marcus and Lucius (who so warmly espoused the cause of C. against Catiline and Clodius) took an active part in the politics of his time. He belonged 'to that wise and far-seeing party in the Senate, which aimed at checking the corrupt and oppressive rule of the jury-courts of *equites*, and at breaking the power of the city rabble by giving the franchise to the Italian yeomen' (Wilkins *De Oratore* p. 5). After the murder of their leader Drusus in 91 B.C. (*V. D. iii 80*), Cotta with many others of the party was driven into exile under the law of Q. Varius (*V. D. iii 81*), by which all who had encouraged the insurrection of the Italian allies were declared guilty of treason. He remained in exile throughout the Social War, and only returned home when order had been restored by Sulla in 82 B.C. Shortly afterwards he became a member of the college of *pontijlices* and in the year 75 B.C. was elected consul. During his year of office he restored to the tribunes some of the privileges which Sulla had taken from them. On ceasing to be consul he was appointed to the province of Gallia, where he gained some unimportant successes for which a triumph was decreed to him, but he died of the effects of an old wound before he was able to enjoy it. He appears in company with P. Sulpicius Rufus as one of the younger interlocutors in the *De Oratore*; and his quiet persuasive style of reasoning is contrasted with the passionate energy of the latter in the *Brutus* § 201 foll. In the 3rd book of the *De Oratore* Cotta is said to have devoted himself to the study of the Academic system of philosophy as a part of the training of an orator, in consequence of a speech of Crassus there recorded, see § 145 *numquam conquiescam ante quam illorum amicites vias rationesque et pro omnibus et contra omnia disputandi*
percepero. One of his most famous speeches was that in defence of his uncle Rutilius alluded to in N.D. III 80.

To allow of Cotta's being pontifex and not consul, the time of the Dialogue must be laid between 82 and 75 B.C.; and as Cicero was studying at Athens in 79 and 78 and did not return to Rome till 77 B.C., we narrow the possible limits to the interval between 77 and 75, when Cicero was about 30 years of age and Cotta about 48.

Little is known of C. Velleius, the spokesman of the Epicureans, beyond the fact that he was born at Lanuvium (N.D. i 82), was a friend of the orator Crassus (see note on i 58) and held the office of Tribune in the year 90 B.C. He is called rudis dicendi (Or. iii 78), and is described as holding the first place among the Romans of his sect (N.D. i 15). In the De Finibus L. Manlius Torquatus is the Epicurean disputant.

Of Q. Lucilius Balbus, the spokesman of the Stoics, we know even less. He was an interlocutor in the lost dialogue entitled Hortensius and is praised as not inferior to the most distinguished Stoics of Greece. In the De Finibus the Stoics are represented by Cato, in the De Divinatione by Q. Cicero.

In this dialogue as in the De Republica and De Oratore Cicero himself merely appears as a κωφὸν πρὸσωπον: see my note on i 34 s.v. Ileraclides.

The dialogue is dedicated to M. Junius Brutus, the conspirator, who had been carefully trained in philosophy by his maternal uncle Cato, and had embraced with ardour the Stoic-Academic doctrines of Antiochus. It is a tribute not less to the weight of character, than to the philosophical attainments of Brutus, that Cicero, twenty one years his senior, dedicated to him four of his treatises besides the Natura Deorum, viz. the Orator, Paradoxa, De Finibus and Tusculanae Disputationes, and has also introduced him as an interlocutor in the dialogue de claris oratoribus which is called after him. It appears from the De Finibus that Brutus had previously addressed a treatise De Virtute to Cicero cf. i 8; quem timeam lectorem, cum ad te ne Graecis quidem cedentem in philosophia audeam scribere? Quamquam a te ipso id quidem facio provocatus gratissimo mihi libro, quem ad me de virtute misisti. Quintilian speaks in high terms of the merits of the philosophical writings of Brutus x 1 § 123 sufficit ponderi rerum: scias cum sentire quae dicit, with which may be compared Caesar's judgment of the man, magni refert hic quid velit; sed quicquid volet,

M. C. d
It is not to be wondered at that Cicero found such a personality to be rather oppressive at times. In a letter to Atticus vi 1 § 7 he complains that Brutus *etiam cum rogat aliquid, contumaciter, arroganter, δικαιονήτως solet scribere*. A list of his works is given in Orelli’s *Onomasticon*.

§ 4. ON THE SOURCES OF THE FIRST BOOK OF THE DE NATURA DEORUM.

It is now generally recognized that Cicero’s philosophical treatises are not to be regarded as original works, but are, as he himself calls them, ‘adaptations from the Greek’; *απόγραφα sunt, minore labore faint; verba tantum affero quibus abando*, *Att. xii 52*. Hence it has been the endeavour of later editors to identify the writers from whom Cicero has borrowed in each case; and careful monographs have been written on the *fontes* of different treatises, as of the *Tusculanae* by Heine 1863, and Zietzschmann 1868; of the *De Divinatione* by Schiche 1875, and by Hartfelder 1878; and K. F. Hermann (*De interpretatione Timaei*, Gott. 1842) has given reasons for believing that the translation of the *Timaeus* was intended to be incorporated in a larger work treating of the origin of the world. Not of course that Cicero was always equally dependent upon his authorities. He naturally moves with more freedom when he is treating of moral and social questions, as in the *De Officiis*, than when he touches on abstruse points of metaphysics, as in the *Academica* or *De Finibus*. We should therefore be justified in supposing with regard to our present treatise, that Cicero had not himself read all the different books referred to in §§ 25—43, probably also that he had not read the Epicurean books referred to in §§ 43, 45, 49; even if this *a priori* conclusion had not been confirmed by the fortunate discovery, among the Herculaneum MSS, of a treatise which is generally held to be the original of a considerable portion of the Epicurean argument con-

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1 Compare on this subject Hirzel *Untersuchungen zu Cicero’s Philosophischen Schriften* pp. 4—45, Schweneke in the *Jahrb. f. class. philol.* 1879 pp. 49—66, and Diels’ *Doxographi Graeci* p. 121 foll., a work which has appeared since my own remarks were written; also Spengel *Philodemus περὶ εἰσορίας*, Munich 1863; Sampe *Philodemni De Pictate*, Göttingen 1861; Nurnck *Ueber Philodemus περὶ εἰσορίας* (in *Mélanges Gr. Rom.*, St Petersburgh 1861); Comperz *Herkulaneische Studien* vol. 2, Leipzig 1866.
tained in the first book of the N. D. I will begin with giving a short account of this treatise, proceeding then to point out the more striking resemblances between it and the present work, and will finally examine more in detail the relations of the two to each other.

In the year 1752 great curiosity was excited by the discovery of a library at Herculaneum in the house which has been called after Piso the father-in-law of Caesar 1, from the fact that "its site agrees with Cicero's statement that the residence of the Pisos was visible from his own villa at Puteoli' (Hayter's Report on the Herculaneum MSS, London 1811, p. 31); and also from the fact that most of the MSS found there contained treatises by writers belonging to the Epicurean school, of which Piso was an adherent, and that many of them bore the name of Philodemus, who is known (from Cicero's speech in Pisonem) to have been the intimate friend and instructor of Piso. The difficulty of unrolling the charred papyri was very great, and it was not till the year 1793 that the 1st Vol. of Herculaneensia (containing the treatise of Philodemus περὶ μονομούχης) appeared at Naples. At the instigation of the English Ambassador, Sir W. Hamilton, the Prince of Wales undertook to supply the necessary funds for carrying on the work more actively, and also sent his librarian, the Rev. John Hayter, to assist in opening and copying the MSS; in which he succeeded so well that, in the four years from 1802 to 1805, more than 200 were unrolled. In the latter year the work had to be abandoned in consequence of the French occupation of Naples, but copies of 94 MSS, after remaining for a while at Palermo, were ultimately sent to England and presented to the Bodleian together with four unopened papyri 2; and in

1 Comparetti, in his paper La Villa di Pisoni in Ercolano, Nap. 1879, maintains that two of the busts found there represent Piso and his colleague Gabinius; and certainly they agree remarkably well with Cicero's description of the pair in his speech Pro Sest. 18.

2 Among the unpublished facsimiles at Oxford there is one of considerable interest to students of the N. D. It appears as No. 26 in the catalogue of Herculaneum rolls given in the Preface to the Oxford Herculaneensia Vol. 1, 1824, and is there entitled Φιλοδημὸν περὶ θεῶν. Through the kindness of the Sublibrarian, Mr Bywater, I have been enabled to examine this, and find that the real title is περὶ θεῶν, the title-page consisting of four longitudinal strips which have been wrongly pasted together, so as to make a portion of a broken letter look like an θ following θε. There are several pages which are fairly legible, but I did not in the short time at my disposal discover anything which would serve to illustrate the Epicurean argument in Cicero.
the year 1810 a volume of Herculaneumia, edited by Drummond and Walpole, was published in London. This contained an anonymous fragment, twelve columns in length, entitled by the editors περὶ τῶν θεῶν. The fragment excited considerable interest owing to the resemblances it presented to parts of the speech of Vellecius in the first book of the N. D., and it was ably reviewed in the Quarterly¹ and Edinburgh during the course of the year. Hayter wrote a reply to the former in the same year, speaking of the book as Φαίδρου περὶ θεῶν. The same authorship had been already claimed for it by Mürr, in a German translation of Philodemus περὶ μουσικῆς (Berlin, 1806), in which he announced that among the forthcoming Herculanean publications there was a treatise entitled Φαίδρου περὶ φύσεως θεῶν, which had been made use of by Cicero for his own work on the same subject. Hayter allows that the name Philodemus would naturally suggest itself, but he says the space does not admit of reading so many letters. An improved text with notes was brought out in 1833 by Petersen at Hamburg, under the title Phaedri Epicurei, vulgo anonymi Herculaneensis, de Natura Deorum. He uses the following arguments to show that Phaedrus must be the author. Since Cicero's chief instructors in the doctrines of Epicurus were Zeno and Phaedrus, both of whom are prominently mentioned in the N. D., it is natural to suppose that he must have borrowed from one or the other. And as Phaedrus is spoken of in terms of warmer praise (see § 93) he seems the more likely of the two; besides Zeno (§ 94) is said to have attacked his own contemporaries, whereas the latest writer criticized in the speech of Velleius is Diogenes of Babylon, who died not later than 150 B.C. The strongest argument however in favour of Phaedrus is, that in a letter to Atticus (xiv 43), written about the time of the composition of the N. D., Cicero asks to have his treatises περὶ θεῶν et περὶ Πάλλαδος² sent to him; just as in xiii 8 he asks for Panaetius περὶ προφοίωσ, which we know to have been used by him in N. D. ii 118, De Diein. i 6, 12, ii 88;

¹ See n. on § 39 under Chrysippus.
² The older reading is Φαίδρου περὶ ρασδῶν et Εὐλαίδος, which was supposed to refer to two books of Dioclesarchus, C. having asked for other writings of his in earlier letters. It was suggested that the former treatise might be a criticism of the Phaedrus of Plato, which D. is known to have condemned as too ornate; while the latter was identified with the βίος Εὐλαίδος of which some fragments still remain.
and in xii 32 for Dicaearchus, used in Div. i 5, 113, ii 105, Tusc. i 21, 77.

The question of authorship was thus supposed to be settled, and for several years the fragment was generally referred to as the peri phusēos of Phaedrus; but in 1862 it appeared in the 2nd. vol. of the new series of Herculaneensia published at Naples, as a portion of a much larger whole (12 columns out of 147) bearing the name Philod. Hen. eispebeias of which the three capital letters alone are now legible. Whether the remainder were restored from faint traces or on conjecture merely, is not stated; the fact that the volume is found in a collection containing many writings which are undoubtedly by Philodemus, and the marked resemblance of style between those writings and the present make it at all events highly probable that it is rightly attributed to him. What then do we know of this Philodemus beyond the fact of his connexion with Piso? Cicero speaks of him as a man of elegance and taste, distinguished in literature no less than in philosophy, non philosophia solum, sed etiam litteris, quod fere ceteros Epicureos neglegere dicunt, perpolitus (In Pis. 70); and in the de Finibus ii 119 Torquatus, the Epicurean speaker, mentions him as an authority to whom difficult questions may be referred. That he had studied the history of philosophy is shown by an allusion in Diog. L. x 3 to the 13th book τῆς τῶν philosóphōn svntēcteis written by him. Zeller states (Stoics tr. p. 390), that not less than 36 treatises by him have been discovered at Herculaneum.

He was much influenced by Zeno, whose disciple he was, see his peri sēmeiōn p. 24 Gomp. ήμιν μὲν οὖν διαλεγόμενος ο Ὁσίων καὶ λόγους τῶν ἀντιδιάκολοντων τοὺς ἐκκειμένους προεφέρετο καὶ τοιαύταις ἀπαντήσει πρὸς αὐτῶς ἔχρητο, also p. 26, and cf. the reference to Z.'s lectures in the peri eispebeias p. 118 Gomp. [αι] Ζώνων γενόμεναι συναγωγαί διάσαβον; some of his treatises are professedly based upon those of Zeno, e.g. Petersen p. 8, mentions one under the Latin title De moribus ac vitis, opus ex libro Zononis contractum; the Herculanean vol. vi, Naples 1839, contains another entitled peri τῆς τῶν θεῶν εὐστοχουμένης διαγωγῆς κατὰ Ζώνων; and in the preface to

1. It had been however already claimed for Philodemus in 1818, by Blomfield on Æsch. Ag. i. 362, and in the Italian Bullet. Archæolog. for 1835 p. 46.
3. Gomperz has stated all that is known on this point in a letter printed by Diels, Doxographi p. 529.
4. Comparetti (l. c. p. 5) has more recently fixed the number at 26.
the Oxford Hecataeensia, vol. i. p. v. the words Ζήτωρος σχολοῦν occur in the mutilated title of the Philodemian treatise numbered 1389. This is of importance in regard to the question whether the resemblances between Cicero and Philodemus are to be explained by direct copying on the part of the former, or whether both writers may not have borrowed from Zeno.

I proceed now to point out what is the nature of these resemblances, and I think it will be seen that they cannot be simply set aside by such remarks as Schömann's (Introduct. p. 18) "ähnliche Angaben und Urtheile, wie dort, kamen ohne allen Zweifel in gar manchen anderen epikureischen Schriften ebenfalls vor." General arguments no doubt might be a part of the common Epicurean tradition, but it is most improbable that this should be the case with regard to minute points of criticism and to particular citations from the writings of opponents, some of them misinterpreted, and likely therefore to have been exposed by hostile criticism, if they were in common use. Such references are those to Xenophon's Απομνημονεύματα (Phil. p. 71, N. D. 31); to the Φενικὸς of Antisthenes (Phil. p. 72, N. D. 32), in support of a proposition of which we have no information from other sources; to the 3rd book of Aristotle's περὶ φιλοσοφίας (Phil. p. 72; N. D. 33); to Chrysippus περὶ θεῶν bk i (Phil. p. 77, N. D. 41), treating of the Stoic theology in general, bk ii (Phil. p. 80, N. D. 41) containing his explanation of the mythology of Orpheus, Musaeus, Homer and Hesiod; to the περὶ τῆς Ανθρωπίνης of Diogenes of Babylon (Phil. p. 82, N. D. 41).

Assuming then, as we may, that there is an undoubted connexion between the two treatises, the next point is to determine its nature and extent. If we compare them broadly together, we find the Epicurean argument in the 1st book of the N. D. made up of three parts, (1) a preliminary polemic against the Platonic and Stoic views of the origin of the world and the nature of God (§§ 18—24); (2) a critical review of earlier philosophers from Thales to Diogenes of Babylon, followed by a brief notice of the popular mythology in Greece and elsewhere (§§ 25—43); (3) an exposition of the Epicurean theology. Similarly the Philodemian treatise, as we have it, is made up of three parts (1) a criticism of the popular mythology (pp. 5—61); (2) a criticism of older philosophers (pp. 65—89); (3) an exposition of the Epicurean theology (pp. 93—151). The resemblances noticed above belong to the second, or historical section, which we will now examine more closely. Cicero's list of philosophers is as fol-
SOURCES OF BOOK I.

I: (1) Thales, (2) Anaximander, (3) Anaximenes, (4) Anaxagoras, (5) Alcmaeon, (6) Pythagoras, (7) Xenophanes, (8) Parmenides, (9) Empedocles, (10) Protagoras, (11) Democritus, (12) Diogenes of Apollonia, (13) Plato, (14) Xenophon, (15) Antisthenes, (16) Speusippus, (17) Aristotle, (18) Xenocrates, (19) Heraclides, (20) Theophrastus, (21) Strato, (22) Zeno, (23) Ariston, (24) Cleanthes, (25) Persaeus, (26) Chrysippus, (27) Diogenes of Babylon. The first name which we meet with in the Philodemian fragment is Pythagoras p. 66, but there are clear allusions to Anaximenes (1) in p. 65, to Anaxagoras (2) p. 66 (see nn. on the corresponding passages in the N. D.): there is no reference to Alcmaeon or Xenophanes, but after Pythagoras (3) follows Parmenides (4) in p. 67, then Democritus (5) p. 69, Heraclitus (6) p. 70; Diogenes of Apollonia (7) p. 70; Prodicus, alluded to but not named, (8) p. 71, cf. p. 76; Xenophon (9) p. 71; Antisthenes (10) p. 72; Aristotle (11) p. 72; Theophrastus (12) possibly alluded to in p. 73, see n. on N. D. i 35; Persaeus (13) p. 75; Chrysippus (14) pp. 77—82; Diogenes of Babylon (15) p. 82; Cleanthes (16) is incidentally alluded to in p. 80, and Zeno (17) in p. 84.

Considering the very fragmentary state of the Philodemian treatise from p. 65 to 75 (i.e. till we reach Persaeus), it is remarkable that more than half of Cicero’s list should be found in it almost in the same order; that in both Aristippus should be omitted; lastly that both should end with Diogenes, making no mention of his successors Antipater and Panaetius, the latter of whom exercised a far greater influence over the Romans than any other Stoic. It appears strange however that Heraclitus and Prodicus are not included in Cicero’s list. Hirzel thinks this is because Philodemus identifies the teaching of Persaeus with that of Prodicus p. 76, and the teaching of Heraclitus with that of Chrysippus p. 81; to which Schwencke objects that Philod. gives the doctrines of Prodicus and Heraclitus by themselves in the first instance, and only mentions their agreement with

1 The names which appears only in one list are printed in italics. Diels has facilitated the comparison of Cicero and Philodemus by printing them in parallel columns (Doxog. pp. 531—550).

2 The order is sometimes hardly what we should expect, e.g. the Xenophonic Socrates comes after Plato and before Antisthenes.

3 This is especially remarkable in a writer like Philodemus, who, as we know from the anonymous treatise published by Comparetti, Turin 1875, had touched on these later Stoics in other writings.
the Stoics in a later page, and that Cicero wrote in too great a hurry either to foresee this, or to correct what he had already written. Perhaps this is going too far. It is plain that Cicero felt the necessity for compressing very much the historical review, and a simple means of doing this was to omit repetitions. He was also about to speak of Prodicus in Cotta’s reply (V. D. i 118), and he alludes to Heraclitus as the forerunner of the Stoics in iii 35, stating that, as he chose to be unintelligible, it was useless to discuss his opinions.

So far there appears to be no improbability in Cicero’s having borrowed directly from Philodemus, but it becomes more difficult to suppose this, when we compare the two writings more minutely. Thus, while both criticize Anaximenes, Ph. has nothing in common with C., but merely speaks of air as without sensation; while there is a fair agreement as to the doctrines of Anaxagoras, there is no criticism in Ph.; on Pythagoras and Democritus Ph. is too fragmentary to allow of comparison; on Parmenides there is hardly any agreement; on Diogenes they agree to a certain extent, but Ph. is much fuller; on Xenophon Ph. quotes correctly, as far as the fragment is legible, but gives no criticism, while C. is wrong throughout; on Autisthenes they agree, but Ph. has no criticism; on Aristotle there is nothing legible in Ph. beyond the actual reference; on Theophrastus Ph. has merely a reference to a treatise not mentioned by C.; on Persaeus there is substantial agreement, but Ph. is much fuller, he does not however give anything of the criticism we find in C.; between Theophrastus and Persaeus C. has some 32 lines on Strato, Zeno, and Cleanthes, to which there was probably something corresponding in pp. 73—75 of Ph., where we can trace broken allusions to the universal reason and the power that holds all things together, but the names are lost; while there is general agreement on Chrysippus (see my n. on V. D. i 39), Ph. is much fuller, except where C. dilates on the Stoic idea of the Divine Law; so on Diogenes of Babylon.

This slight sketch will show that, if C. has borrowed from Ph. he has used him with the utmost freedom, omitting without scruple, and, if we may weigh the evidence of the fragments according to the ordinary law of chances, one would say, adding not unfrequently from other sources. It is true that the absence of criticism after each name in Philodemus, may be explained by the fact that he reserves it all for the end (pp. 84—89). But then when we examine this later criticism, we find nothing in common between it and that
in C., as will be seen from the following summary of Ph.'s remarks. 'The Stoics in general are far more opposed to the established religion than we Epicureans; if they grant the existence of a deity, which they do not all do, they at any rate acknowledge no more than one God, while they impose on the multitude with their names and allegories. They are worse atheists, with their ethers and elements, than Diagoras, who confessed the existence and power of the Gods. By asserting that God cannot be the author of evil they do away with religious sanctions, which we retain; they call the Gods mortal, we assert their eternity. Even if they allowed punishment in word, who could fear these senseless elements? None would regard Gods incapable of motion or of sense; or pay any heed to the moral teaching of those who are in doubt whether there are Gods or what is their nature, or who plainly deny them: men might even be encouraged to sin by those who speak of endless strife among the Gods. Thus the philosophers are reducing men to the state of brutes, for they remove the check of religion and also of public opinion, which are the best helps for restraining injustice.' It is plain that there is more of serious thought and of a real interest in religion and morality here, than there is in the flippant sarcasms put into the mouth of Vellelius.

We go on to the other sections of Philodemus. The first, dealing with the popular mythology, is made by C. a mere appendix to the section we have just been considering; and while it occupies some 60 pp. in Ph. it is condensed into a dozen lines by C. It will be seen from my nn. on §§ 42, 43 that most of the points touched by C. are fully treated by Ph., but there is no allusion to the Magians in the extant fragments of the latter. In the 3rd section, as far as we can judge from broken phrases (see n. on § 49 doct eam esse vim), Ph. seems to have treated of the divine nature in a manner not unlike C.; he speaks of the Gods as free from anger and favour and absolutely perfect and blessed, and he is equally strong against superstitious fears; but he makes religion a much more practical thing (see the passages quoted on § 44 quod beatum esset). Thus 'piety is productive of innocence and harmlessness (p. 95); by innocence man may imitate the blessedness of the Gods (p. 148); Epicurus honoured his parents, loved his brothers, observed all religious duties (p. 118), and charged his disciples to do the same in obedience to the laws (p. 126), but not for that reason only, but also because prayer is natural when we think of beings surpassing in power and excellence (p. 128); while
other philosophers have disseminated their views as to the immorality of parts of the popular religion, Epicurus laid down the plain rule that we must conform except where impiety is commanded (p. 120); God is friendly to the good, estranged from the bad (124); if Epicurus had been a hypocrite he would never have taken such pains in writing on the subject of religion (p. 134). Hirzel p. 15 foll. calls attention to the fact that certain points e.g. the ἰδεοπαία and the quasi corpus mentioned by C. are not referred to Epicurus by Diog. L. and may probably be considered later developments of Epicurean doctrine.

There is still the first section of Cicero to consider, which has nothing corresponding to it in the fragments of Philodemus. It is a preliminary criticism of the Platonic and Stoic theories of the origin of the world, turning chiefly on the difficulties involved in the idea of creation at any given moment. The argument is similar to that contained in Lucr. v. 110—234, and Plut. P. Philosoph. p. 881, but given more fully than in either. We find no allusion to it in the following sections of the N. D. To this is joined an argument (repeated in the later sections) against a mundane deity, as inconsistent with the divine attributes of rationality and blessedness. Such a preliminary criticism comes naturally enough to prepare the way for the positive statements of the Epicurean theology, as there was no body of belief which could be upheld against the latter, except such as was derived either from Plato or the Stoics.

When we try to determine the connexion between this and the historical section which follows, there is much to suggest the conclusion of Krische (p. 23) and Hirzel, that the latter section was inserted as an afterthought. Thus in § 36 we find ut jam ad vestros Balbes veniam, though the Stoics, whom Balbus represents, had been already treated of in the earlier section; similarly in regard to Plato (§ 30 compared with § 18); and the inconsistency is still more manifest in § 25, if we insert alia with most editors, reading hanc quidam vestra, quaelia vero alia sint ab ultimo repetam (see my notes on these passages). It is further objected that there are no subsequent allusions to the historical section either by Cotta or Balbus; but Cotta does allude to it three times, §§ 63, 91, 94, and, even if he had not done so, there would be nothing surprising in it, since Cicero, as Schwenecke remarks p. 56, is not likely to have had any Greek treatise at hand in which the historical errors of the Epicureans were pointed out: and there was no occasion for Balbus to recur to an
exposition which had been already dealt with by Cotta. His allusions to the remainder of the speech of Velleius are very scanty (II 47 and 73). On the whole I think the framework of the book requires some such review of previous philosophers to justify the frequent references to the diversity of opinion on the subject of theology, e.g. in § 1 and § 13 ponam in medio sententias philosophorum, and then si consenserint omnes, in § 14 doctissimorum hominum tanta dissensio; in § 42 exposui non philosophorum judicia, sed delirantium somnia, compared with § 94; expressions which would, I think, be less appropriate, if Cicero confined himself strictly to the three schools represented by the disputants. The repetitions complained of are scarcely to be called repetitions, for they leave out the main point in the previous argument against Plato and the Stoics, viz. the question as to a creation in time; but as far as they are such, they may be explained by the haste and carelessness which characterize the whole treatise, and of which we shall see instances in the latter half of the 1st book; the special difficulty of § 25 is, I think, removed by the explanation given in my note.

There is one other point which is likely to strike the reader, and which calls for a few remarks, and that is the inferiority of the historical section to the other two. In the 1st section there is the usual Epicurean arrogance of manner, but the objections stated are in themselves of interest and importance; and so as regards the arguments of the 3rd section; but in the 2nd section we meet with little besides misrepresentation and abuse. Is this a mark of a different authority having been used, or has C. wished to give us a sample of the way in which Epicureans, such as Colotes, composed their histories of philosophy, and at the same time to illustrate the charge he has himself brought against the Epicureans, vestra solum legis, ceteros causa incognita condemnatis, N. D. II 73?

What then is the general conclusion to which we are led by this comparison of the two treatises? The impression left upon my own mind is that as far as the historical section extends certainly, and possibly for the expository section also, both have copied a common original, most likely Zeno, the teacher of both Philodemus and Cicero; whom Cotta calls the spokesman (coryphaeus) of the school, and of whom he makes the suggestive remark, that he attended his lectures at the request of Philo the Academician, in order that he might the better understand how well the latter had succeeded in refuting him, while he also compares his style of arguing to
that of Velleins (§ 59). It would further seem that Cicero has preserved Zeno’s sharp sayings, which were softened down by the gentler Philodemus, who may also have added a good deal of his own in the later section\(^1\). But then why does the historical review stop at the middle of the 2nd century B.C.? It seems as if we must go back a step further and trace Zeno’s criticisms to Apollodorus δ κωπωτι-\(\)παρτός, the predecessor of Zeno in the chair of Epicurus, who flourished towards the end of the 2nd century B.C. and is said to have written more than 400 books (Zeller \textit{Stoics} tr. p. 389).

With regard to the sources of the other two sections I do not think we are yet able to arrive at any positive conclusion. It is possible that Zeno wrote a treatise \(\pi\varepsilon\rho\iota\ \theta\varepsilon\omega\nu\) in four books, the 1st disproving what might be considered the orthodox theology of Plato and the Stoics, the 2nd giving a history of the traditional beliefs, the 3rd a history of philosophical speculation on the same subject, the 4th containing the views of the most advanced Epicureans; but it is equally possible that Phaedrus (as suggested by the letter to Atticus) may have been the authority copied by Cicero for his first and last sections; on the other hand it is quite possible that C. may have found his treatise unsuited to his purpose.

We proceed now to inquire what is the original source of the criticism of Epicurus which is put in the mouth of Cotta. It is natural at first sight to suppose that this, as well as the criticism of the Stoical doctrines assigned to Cotta in the third book, is derived from Clitomachus, the editor of the writings of the great Academic critic, Carneades. But further consideration shows that there are many difficulties in the way of this identification. Carneades is quoted by name in bk. III 29, 41, but never in bk. I, where, on the contrary, we find Posidonius referred to as the authority from whom a part of the argument is borrowed (§ 123); and Schwenecke has pointed out the strong vein of Stoicism which runs through the speech. Compare for instance the jest at the expense of the Academy in § 80, the definitions of \textit{sanctitas} and \textit{pictas} in § 115, the view of wisdom as a bond of union not only between man and man, but between man and God § 121, the idea of virtue as an active principle

\(^1\) Hirzel assigns the historical section to Philodemus, as the author, and the earlier and later sections to Zeno. Schwenecke would give all to Zeno (pp. 56, 57). Diels (p. 126) is inclined to make Philodemus copy from Phaedrus, which does not seem to me probable.
§ 110, the approving mention, slightly veiled it is true under an Academic form, of the Stoic doctrine of the divinity of the universe § 95, and of the teleological argument § 100. Schwenckel carries the argument further than this. He notices certain marks which indicate a more or less close following of his authority on the part of Cicero, such as the introduction of quotations from Latin authors, allusions to Roman customs, to other writings of his own, &c.; and in reference to this particular section, which professes to be a reply to what has gone before, he remarks that it is very unlikely that C. could have met with an independent treatise, whether Academic or Stoic, which should just meet and refute the arguments in the Epicurean treatise used by him for the earlier sections; that precise references therefore to the preceding argument are probably additions by C.; and from this he draws the conclusion that the last part of Cotta's speech, from § 115 to the end, has undergone least manipulation and most faithfully represents the original authority; and it is precisely here that we find the largest amount of Stoic matter. Again, noticing the remarkable break after § 105, where Cicero after proposing to consider the question of the abode and manner of life of the gods in § 103, suddenly recurs to their nature, leaving the previous question altogether unanswered, he suggests that we have here a fragment of the original, which C. began to translate, but found to be unsuited to his purpose of meeting the speech of Velleius and forgot afterwards to cancel. Here again there are marked indications of a Stoic origin, as I have pointed out in my notes on the bestiae quae igne nasci putantur, and on naturae accommodatum.

There are however some arguments which need consideration in favour of the Academic origin of the section. Thus Hirzel has pointed out the close resemblance between parts of this and the sceptical argument in Sext. Emp. ix; also the inconsistency between Cotta's statement as to the superstition of Epicurus § 85, and that which is quoted from Posidonius in § 123; and lastly the anti-Stoic sentiments which we find interspersed, e.g. the repeated profession of agnosticism § 57, 66, 84, 91, 94, the contempt for the consensus gentium § 62, the objection to the rationalizing and allegorizing of the myths § 119. Swencke replies with considerable force that Sextus has himself borrowed from a Stoic original in such passages as ix 123 and 131; that we find the opposing views as to the sincerity of Epicurus' religious belief stated in Sext. Emp. ix 58 and
64, and may suppose both to have been similarly stated by Posidonius, though he expressed his own assent to the latter; that C.'s motive for maintaining the other view in § 85 was probably the wish to give his own experience on the subject; lastly that the anti-Stoic remarks are no more than were required in order to give the proper colouring to a speech put in the mouth of an Academic; that they occur sometimes in purely Stoic passages; that in general the Stoic writers form the store-house from which C. borrows his arguments against Epicurus, whilst he attacks the Stoics themselves with weapons forged by the Academy, as in the De Finibus; that in the present treatise this is foreshadowed by the language used of the Epicurean doctrines in § 3, cf the Stoic in § 4; that Euhemerism is not the same as Stoicism, and that the observations about the mysteries are an interpolation of Cicero's (see my nn. on § 119). See further, as to the difference between the undoubted criticism of Carneades and that contained in this section, my note on § 92 under habebit igitur.

§ 5. TEXT AND ORTHOGRAPHY.

The text which I have given agrees in the main with that of the latest editor, C. F. W. Müller, Teubner, 1878, but I have endeavoured throughout to weigh the evidence, internal and external, for each reading to the best of my ability; and I have in some instances retained the reading of the MSS, where it had been altered by Müller in common with all the recent editors. Thus I have thought it unnecessary to insert a second eadem before requiro in § 21, and I have three times ejected a non which they had inserted, before potest in § 21, before nihil in § 93, before paulat in § 111. Elsewhere I have ventured on transposition of sentences as in §§ 5, 30 and 97; and on emendations of words, as in §§ 26, 49, 71. In the critical notes my object has been to put the reader in possession of the requisite data for forming an independent judgment on the text. As a foundation I have given the more important of the readings contained in the 2nd ed. of Orelli, brought out under Laitter's supervision in 1861; but, though the MSS (ABCEP)\(^1\) there cited supply the principal material for determining the text of the 1st book of the N.D., they do not seem to me to

\(^{1}\) For a description of the MSS see the note prefixed to the text.
possess such a transcendent superiority, either in point of accuracy or of age, as to make it unnecessary to weigh carefully the evidence furnished by other MSS. I have therefore thought it my duty to examine, as far as was in my power to do so, all evidence which could throw a light on the condition of the text up to the end of the 15th century. Thus, besides the critical editions of Orelli, Heindorf and Creuzer, I have had in constant use the Ascension ed. of 1511, and two MSS (U and Y) most kindly lent to me by S. Allen Esq. of Dublin, whose father’s name will be familiar to students of Cicero under the Latinized form ‘Alanus.’ I am further indebted to J. H. Swainson, Esq., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, for the use of his very careful collation of eight MSS. seven belonging to the British Museum, and one to the Cambridge University Library, as well as of the two earliest printed texts. This collation is given in an abridged form at the end of the volume, Another MS (O), recently purchased by the Trustees of the British Museum, has been collated for me by a member of the staff of the MSS department there: but in this, as in the other cases, I have myself compared the collation with the MS, wherever special importance attached to a particular reading. In like manner the readings of four Oxford MSS given at the end of the Oxford 4to edition of 1783 have been tested for me, e o u by H. P. Richards, Esq., and ψ by J. S. Reid, Esq.² Beside the ms readings, I have also mentioned the differences between my text and those of Schömann, Müller and Baiter, both in his earlier and later editions.

In order to show that the record preserved to us in Orelli’s MSS is at any rate not so complete as to dispense either with emendations or with a careful comparison of other MSS, I have given below, 1st, a list of passages, in which the text is supported exclusively by what are considered the inferior MSS in opposition to all Orelli’s MSS: in many of these cases the true reading had been independently restored by conjecture, and it is of course open to question how far the MSS themselves are to be considered as witnessing to a traditional reading or merely giving the scribe’s emendation; 2nd, a list of passages in which the received text is supported by one only of Orelli’s MSS; and 3rd a list of passages in which the

² I may mention as an illustration of the danger of trusting to negative evidence in the case of ms readings, that scarcely one in ten of the inferences which I had drawn ex silentio on the part of the Oxford collator of 1783 was verified on examination of the ms themselves.
INTRODUCTION.

received text rests solely on conjecture unsupported by any existing MS. Under each head I have mentioned only those readings which are accepted (except where otherwise stated) by Baiter, Schömann, and Müller in common with myself.

1. True reading preserved by inferior MSS in opposition to all Orelli's MSS.

§ 1. in scientiam for scientiam, El.

§ 2. in primis for imprimesque, Cψ

§ 16. hac for hoc, Asc. U.

§ 18. oculis (om. animi), Asc. V (Schömann dissents).

§ 26. continentem for incontinentem, Asc. UCHMRV.

§ 28. commenticiam for conventiciam, Asc. INOV.

§ 29. corumque for corumque, Asc. CMV.

§ 31. dicimus for dicimus, M of Moser.

§ 36. omnem for omnium, G. Red. Asc. V.

vi divina for ut div., G.

§ 37. ipsum mundum demum for i.d.m., M.

§ 38. dicit esse for esse, UH Asc.

§ 39. viatam vim for f. umbram, El. (Baiter dissents).

§ 41. dicerat for dicerit, UYLO.

§ 49. docet for doccat, C.

§ 53. neyatis for negetis, El. GU.

§ 55. res for spes, UHM Asc. Red.

§ 61. consensu for consensu, Asc. Rψ.

§ 68. quod enim for quia enim, El. Reg. UO.

§ 70. esse verum for esset v., UYL.

§ 71. quod vos for quam v., CMNR Asc.

§ 77. quasi sui for quam sui, I of Moser.

§ 81. defendes for defendens, UYL.

§ 82. Aegyptio for Aegypto, Asc.

§ 83. laudamus Athenis for l. esse Ath., I of Moser.

§ 86. aliquid esse for aliquid iste, El. Oxf. e.


§ 88. diceretur for dicerentur, UYC Asc.

§ 89. quid for quod, YHLMor.

§ 95. nonquanne for nonquamne, R.
TEXT AND ORTHOGRAPHY.

§ 97. at figura for ad figuram, UCHLO. (Baiter dissents).
§ 99. ad speciem nec ad usum for speciem nec usum, G. (Baiter and Müller read by conjecture specie nec usu.)
§ 103. oportet et for oportet, CN of Moser.
§ 104. ratione for rationis, UYOC El.
attigeris for attigerit, C.
§ 106. tu for tum, Asc.
§ 108. fuerunt for fuerant, UYOC Asc.
§ 109. faciet for facient, G. Red.
§ 110. ex individuis for ex divinis, V, Herv.2 se ipsa for se ipse, Asc. CR.
§ 111. Vellei for velle, UMRV.
§ 113. nam etiam for nam enim, G.
§ 116. allicere for elicere, GHRV.
voluptate for voluntate, ULMNORV.
§ 123. homunculi for homunculis, MR Herv.

2. True reading preserved by inferior MSS in opposition to all but one of Orelli's MSS.1

§ 1. ut before magno argumento, B9 Asc. UILLO (Baiter dissents).
§ 18. descendisset for descendis (or descendens) sed, B Asc. CNMR.
§ 25. si di for sic di, EUCV.
§ 26. animal for anima, BM Asc.
§ 28. reprehenditur for reprehenderetur, E (and by correction in B) CLMN.
§ 34. de natura for in natura, BUCV.
§ 37. sententia est qui for sententias qui, A9UCM Asc.
§ 56. metuemus for metuemus, B9UCMV.
§ 58. anteferret et for anteferret, Asc. PBH.
§ 65. doce for doceas, PCHL Asc.
punctis for cunctis, B Asc. U.
§ 71. corpus aut quasi, om. all but BUYO.
§ 72. olet for floret, BLO.
§ 78. corpori for corpore, CU Asc.
§ 79. exorientem for exoriente, BUM.
at erat for aderat, CK.

1 I have not thought it necessary here to distinguish, as I have done in the critical notes, between positive evidence and ex silentio inference, as regards the readings of Orelli's ms.

M. C.
INTRODUCTION.

§ 81. quid si for quod si, E Asc. 
sic occurrit for si a., DGC.

§ 85. offensionem for offensione EUY Asc. CH.

§ 86. religionis for religiones, B'UCHLO.

§ 108. potuerant for potuerant A'UY Asc. CO.

§ 114. pulchre for pulchro, C'CHLO Asc.

§ 120. soleant EN of Moser.

§ 122. nulla re for in u. r. CUY Asc. HO.

3. True reading restored by conjecture in opposition to all MSS.

Greek for Latin in πρόνοιαν § 18, στεφάνης § 28, ἀσώματον § 30, εἰμαρρένην § 55, μαντικῷ § 55, &e. 

iis for his repeatedly.

§ 13. omnium repeated.

§ 19. afficiendum for efficiendum.

§ 20. palmaria for palmaris. (Schömann dissent.)

§ 27. qua for quae.

§ 28. continentem ardore for continentem ardom.

cingat for cingit.

revocet for revocat.

§ 33. a magistro non dissentiens. Other conjectures are given by Sch., Ba. and Mu., but all alike change the MS reading.

modo deus moveri for modo mundus moveri. (Sch. gives a different conjecture.)

§ 39. universitatemque for universam atque.

§ 45. vitae actionem mentisque agitationem for vitam et actionem mentis atque agitationem.

§ 49. ad nos for ad deos. Ba. gives a different conjecture.

§ 64. om. aut before Neptuni.

§ 70. fieret for fieri.

nimis callide for nisi callide.

§ 72. quidem for quidem.

§ 73. inane for inanes.

§ 74. liceat for liceat.

§ 76. quod quoniam for ut quoniam.

§ 77. omnino for omnium.

§ 81. a parvis cuius for apparuisse.

§ 82. add alia nobis.

§ 85. add visu after humano.

venerantes for numerantes.
§ 86. om. *id esse mortale.*
§ 87. *deorum numero* for *d. natura.*
§ 89. transpose *sumpisses tuo jure.*
§ 96. *deorum* for *deo* (Sch. dissent).  
§ 103. *superior aeri aetheriis* (MSS vary, other conjectures by Ba. and Sch.)
§ 104. *porro* for *postremo.*
§ 107. *num* for *nunc.*
     *ea forma* for *ex forma.*
     Cercopis, MSS vary.
§ 111. *quarundam,* MSS vary.
§ 122. *in imbecillitate* for *imbecillitatem.*

Any one who will take the trouble to compare the text of the *Na. D.*, as it now stands, with the text of the earlier editions from the *Ed. Pr.* of 1471 to the *Variorum Ed.* of 1818 will be astonished at the improvement which has been effected, owing in great part to judicious emendations by successive generations of scholars. The value and even the necessity of conjecture, as a means of restoring the text of this, as of other ancient writings, is sufficiently shown by the readings cited under the last head, but it may be proved even more conclusively by reference to other passages, which did not admit of the same brevity and simplicity of statement, such as § 24 *quodque in deo,* § 25 *si di possunt,* § 65 *nihil est enim,* in which it is confessed that the present text is wrong, though editors are not agreed on the right mode of restoring the true text. Whilst I am upon this subject, it may be well to give a few illustrations from the present book, of the commoner sources of corruption in MSS, so as to assist my younger readers in judging of the admissibility of any proposed emendation. The illustrations are taken from the various readings in Orelli’s edition as well as from my own. I make no attempt at an exhaustive analysis, but simply group together examples of similar confusion.

Addition or omission of final *m*; see critical notes on *speciem*¹
§ 99, *figuram* § 97, *qua* § 89, *exorientem* § 79, *imbecillitate* § 122, 

¹ An asterisk is prefixed wherever the reading is doubtful.
INTRODUCTION.

Interchange of t and d: see on quot § 84, *inquit § 109, relinquit § 123, id § 113, aliquid § 57 and § 104, apud § 62, sed § 61; so at for ad in § 14, §§ 97; ad for at § 79 (twice), § 82, § 84, § 90, § 109, § 115, § 116, § 122.

Interchange of final is and es; see on *intellegentis § 23, *religionis § 86, maris § 95, voluptatis § 113, *mentis § 120.

Interchange of final of i and e; see on *intellegentis § 23, *religionis § 86, maris § 95, voluptatis § 113, *mentis § 120.

Interchange of final of i and e; see on *intellegentis § 23, *religionis § 86, maris § 95, voluptatis § 113, *mentis § 120.

Interchange of quid and quod: see on quot § 84, inquit § 109, relinquit § 123, id § 113, aliquid § 57 and § 104, apud § 62, sed § 61; so at for ad in § 14, §§ 97; ad for at § 79 (twice), § 82, § 84, § 90, § 109, § 115, § 116, § 122.

Omission or addition of prefix in: see on *inscientiam § 1, incontinentem § 26, lastrationem § 87, individuis, § 110.

Omission or addition of initial H: see on orarum § 119, omnium § 108, and his below.

Confusion between is, iis, his: see on §§ 2, 3, 7, 10, 11, 12, § 31, § 50, § 55, § 61, § 66, § 103, § 113, § 116, § 122, § 123.

Confusion between quid and quod: see on §§ 10, § 81, § 87.

Confusion between est, sit, sint, sunt: see on disputatum est § 15, pulcherrima est § 48, aestimanda est § 55, aliquando est § 68, ausa est § 93, dicendum est § 95, natura est § 96, variae sunt § 1, *vero § 25, caelo sunt § 34, quidem sunt § 41, innumerabilia sunt § 50, animis sunt § 103, sunt quae § 109.

Interchange of parts of verbs generally,


(2) of Singular and Plural: see on diceretur § 88, vident § 101, faciet § 109.

(3) of Second and Third Person; see on inquit § 100 and *§ 109, attigeris § 104.

Mistakes in the division of words: see notes on § 14 addubitare, § 18 descendisset, § 25 cur aequae, § 37 sententia est, qui aether, § 39 *universitatemque, § 63 postequae, aporte, § 66 similiora, § 79 exorientem, at erat, § 81 *a parvis enim, § 89 *argumentis sententiam, § 103 homunculi similum, § 76 informatum.
TEXT AND ORTHOGRAPHY.

Omission of repeated words or syllables, and of words interposed between repeated words or syllables: see on § 13 omnium omnium, § 26 in infinito, *omnia in eo, § 25 *aquae adjunxit—aquam adjunxit, § 66 *hamata, § 71 quasi corpus aut quasi, § 78 formica formicae, § 81 apud eos—apud nos, § 82 *alia nobis, § 71 *in ceris dicretur, § 58 anteferret et, § 103 oportet et, § 49 *neque eadem ad, § 98 nisi in eo—nisi in eo, § 103 *superior aeri aetheris, § 98 *moribus paribus, § 2 *natura trahimur.

Construction altered through the influence of a nearer word: see on § 2 continet—in primis changed to continet est—in primisque, § 25 *mentem changed to et mente, § 36 vi divina, changed to ut divinam, § 49 docet changed to doceat after ut, § 70 esse changed to esset after utrum, fieret changed to fieri to suit following esse, § 71 quam for quod after mirabilius, § 73 inanes for inane to suit imagines, § 104 rationis for ratione to suit mentis.

Substitution of synonyms: see on § 68 quia for quod, so igitur for ergo constantly in C.

Interpolation,

(1) by unintentional repetition: see on § 63 *aut before Neptuni suggested by aut Carbo, § 35 *immittendique after minuendi.

(2) to complete construction: see on § 86 id esse mortale added after si quid sit, § 107 *quam inserted after minus probari possit.

(3) owing to explanatory gloss: see on § 33 *Platone added to explain magistro, § 13 *Terentius, &c. added before Synephebis, § 34 *tum to explain modo, § 58 *L. Crasso to explain familiixri, § 112 *nectar ambrosiamque to explain epulas, § 1 *id est principium philosophiae to explain the allusion to the Academicians, § 28 *praeterea added to correct omne, § 25 *alia added to escape apparent inconsistency.

(4) owing to controversial gloss: see on § 19 *animi added as an answer to the question quibus oculis, on § 21 *quod ne—tempus esset possibly an answer to the preceding intellegi potest.

I proceed now to discuss the question of spelling. This has caused me some difficulty, as I am aware that my own feeling, or perhaps I should rather call it my prejudice, is opposed to the theory and practice of the most eminent both amongst our own and foreign scholars. I think however it is not mere obstinacy which prompts me to follow my own course in this matter, even
INTRODUCTION.

against the advice of friends for whose judgement I have the highest respect, and who have studied the subject far more deeply than I can pretend to have done.

It appears to me that this apparently unimportant question is not obscurely connected with the larger question whether the Classics are still to form the staple of higher education amongst us. If their claim to do so is to be allowed, they must show good reasons for it, and they must at the same time leave room for other more immediately pressing studies. I believe that this claim will be allowed in so far as the study of the Classics supplies the necessary instrument for entering into the life and thought of the ancient world, and one of the best instruments for learning the laws which regulate the expression of thought. But the Universities will have to see to it that this is done far more thoroughly than it has yet been done; and for this purpose it will be necessary to drop some of the impedimenta which now occupy the time of the learner without tending, in any corresponding degree, to discipline and feed the mind. Yet, of late years, it seems to me that the burden of the impedimenta has been added to rather than reduced by the new importance which has been given to questions of etymology and orthography. No doubt a wonderful advance has been made in these departments, and, as special subjects for investigation, they naturally and rightly attract to themselves the attention of leisured scholars, but I cannot think they should be made so prominent as they have been in College and University examinations. Viewed in relation to the main ends of a classical education, I hold that spelling is simply a necessary evil, and that, for practical purposes, the best spelling is that which obtrudes itself least, and least diverts the attention of the reader from the thought of the writer. In books therefore which are printed for ordinary reading, we should not seek to reproduce the spelling of a particular age or of a particular author, except where, as in Chaucer, it may be needed to show the scansion of a line, but we should endeavour to give the normal spelling of the language after it assumed a fixed and stationary form; just as we do not in our common Shakespeares reproduce the inconsistent spelling of the early folios and quartos, though for the purpose of studying the history of the language we rightly print facsimiles of these. In Latin it is generally agreed that the

1 See on this subject the very sensible remarks of Ritschl, Opusc. n pp. 722 foll. and 723. I can but echo his final words, spoken with reference to the
language attained its highest formal development in the period which may be named after Quintilian, between Nero and Hadrian, according to Brambach (Hülfsbüchlein f. Lat. Rechtschreibung, p. vii), between the death of Augustus and that of Trajan, according to L. Meyer (Orthographiae Latinae Summariurn p. 5). The latter lays down the following rules for our modern spelling of Latin: ne inaequalitate scribendi aut oculi offendatur legentum aut in errorem inducantur animi, scriptura nostra reddi oportet ad certae usum ac morem aetatis, et quidem ejus, qua ipsa lingua scriptorum pariter ingenii et studiis grammaticorum ad summam est adducta perfectionem; and in p. 6, praeterea ut in sermone, ita in scriptura tamquam scopulum nos fugere oportet quaevis insitata.

Adopting these rules, it will follow first, that we need not trouble ourselves to frame a conjectural text, such as Cicero might have written, but should use the undoubted spelling of the latter half of the first century A.D.; and secondly, that where this spelling itself was variable, as in the u or i of the superlative terminations, and the i or e of the accusative plural of i-nouns, we should select one mode and adhere steadily to that. In making the selection I should myself wish to apply to our own case the principle suggested by Meyer's second rule, that, of two allowable spellings, that should be preferred which is usitatius, least of a novelty to ordinary English readers.

Turning now to Müller's text I find there several examples of inconsistent, and some of unusual and, as I believe, incorrect spelling. This is the more to be wondered at, because in his excellent review of Baiter and Halm's ed. in the Jahrb. f. Cl. Philol. for 1864, vol. 89, p. 261 foll. he condemns a similar inconsistency in them.

The following are the points in which the spelling in my edition will be found to differ from that in Müller's:

(1) I have always given the superlative termination in -imus; Müller at times has the form in -umus. Thus we find facillume § 9, but facillimum § 61; turpissime § 29, but turpissine § 93; simillimus § 49, but simillimus § 98; praestantissimus § 47, but praestantissimus § 96; also levissumus § 13, vaferrumus § 39.

attempt to expel the old German forms 'genitiv', 'Virgil': möge doch nicht deutscher Pedantismus einen Schatten auf deutsche Wissenschaft werfen, der gegen diese selbst den Spott des weiteren Kreises der Gebildeten herausfordern muss!
Ixiv

INTRODUCTION.

(2) I have always written \( u \) after \( v \); Müller generally does so, e.g. \( \text{vult} \) in § 13, 33, 34, 69; \( \text{vultis} \) in §§ 89, 103, 107; \( \text{Vulcanus} \) § 81; but \( \text{vot} \) in § 41; \( \text{votis} \) § 93; \( \text{Vulcanus} \) §§ 83 and 84.

(3) I have always written \( es \) in the Acc. Pl. of the \( i \)-declension; Müller usually has \( is \), but we find \( \text{utiles, salutares} \), § 38, \( \text{inmortales} \) § 45, \( \text{leves} \) § 59, \( \text{similes} \) §§ 90, 91, \( \text{venerantes} \) § 85, \( \text{notices} \) § 54 though \( \text{partis} \) comes just before. Baiter consistently gives \(-is\) in all cases.

(4) I have regularly assimilated, where it was allowable, because there is no doubt that assimilation was the tendency of the Latin language, and was practised in speaking even in the exceptional cases where it was necessary to preserve the spelling unaltered for the purpose of distinctness or to show the etymology, as in \( \text{adsum} \) (Roby, Vol. 1, p. 49 n.); Müller as a rule does not assimilate, but we find exceptions, as in regard to the assimilation of \( \text{in} \) before labials:

before \( b \); \( \text{imbecillus} \) § 122, but \( \text{imbecillus} \) § 45.

\( p \); \( \text{inpurus} \) § 63, \( \text{inpadenter} \) § 69 &c., but \( \text{impius} \) § 63, \( \text{impendo} \) § 45. (Baiter in both cases keeps \( in \).) So \( \text{comprehensio} \) § 94, but \( \text{comprehendo} \) § 30.

\( m \); \( \text{immensus} \) § 22, and \( \text{inmortalis} \) frequently.

\( in \) before linguals:

\( l. \text{intustris} \) § 12; so \( \text{conligatus} \) § 9, but \( \text{colligo} \) § 4, \( \text{comparo} \) § 16 (where Baiter has \( \text{conligo} \) and \( \text{comparo} \)).

\( r. \text{inriigo} \) § 120, \( \text{inrideo} \) § 101.

Assimilation of \( d \):

before \( p. \text{adpeto} \) § 104, but \( \text{appeto} \) immediately after; so \( \text{adpulsus}, \text{adprechendo} \), but \( \text{appareo} \) § 37, \( \text{apparatus} \) § 20, \( \text{appello} \) § 36.

\( j. \text{adjluo} \) § 49, but \( \text{ajjluo}\) §114 and \( \text{affluentia} \) § 51, \( \text{aufcetus} \) § 36, but \( \text{officio} \) § 19; so \( \text{adjvero}, \text{adjrmo} \) &c.

\( r. \text{adrideo} \) § 17 and § 97, but \( \text{arripio} \) § 77.

\( l. \text{allicio} \) § 116.

\( s. \text{adsentior} \) § 12, \( \text{adssequor} \) § 23, \( \text{adsilue} \) § 114.

\( t. \text{attinet} \) § 84.

\( u. \text{adnuo} \) § 113.

\( c. \text{accurate} \) § 15.

\( g. \text{adprerior} \) § 57.

(5) I have always preserved an \( s \) following \( x \) in composition; Müller varies, giving \( \text{exsistent} \) § 97, \( \text{existat} \) § 49, \( \text{vestitit} \) § 12 and § 21, \( \text{extitit} \) § 55 and § 91, \( \text{ extincti} \) § 29.
(6) In regard to nouns borrowed from the Greek I have followed Madvig's rule (Gram. § 33 obs. 3), 'Where both forms are in use, it is better to adhere to the Latin', in accordance with the principles laid down by Quintilian i 5 § 63 and Cicero Att. vi 9, (see the quotations in Roby §§ 471, 482). Thus I have always used the termination -em for the Acc. of Greek nouns in -es, whereas Müller writes, at one time, Socraten (i 93), Timocraten (i 93), Simoniden (i 60), Nausiphanen (i 93), Cleanthen (iii 5), but more generally Socratem (i 31), Timocratem (i 113), Simonidem (Div. i 56), Eupedo- dalem, Aristotelem, Ganymedem, Archimedem, Euphratem, Xenophanem &c. So I have written ibim, Apim in i 82, where Müller has Apim but ibin: I have uniformly written Zeno, but in § 70 Müller gives Zenon.

(7) I have always written di in the Nom. and dis in the Abl.; Müller uses di or dei, dis or deis indiscriminately.

(8) I have written Lyceo in § 72 where Müller has Lycio, but in Div. i. 8 and 22 he gives the spellings Lyceum, Lyceo. Where he writes oportune § 15, opportunitas § 92¹, benivolentia § 58, Xerxes § 115, Aryia § 82, I have written with Baiter opportune, opportunitas, benevolentia, Xerxes, Aryia. In one instance, incoho, I have preferred the less usual spelling to the ordinary inchoo (which Müller keeps) not merely on the ground that it has most authority in its favour, but because it is the more rational, as showing better the etymology and probably also the pronunciation.

Thus far I have not departed much from the prevalent usage in the latest editions. I have now to plead guilty to two heresies. The first is that I have used the character J for the consonantal I. My reasons for doing so are as follows: (1) the use of J, to distinguish the consonant from the vowel I, seems to me to stand on the same footing with the use of V to distinguish the consonant from the vowel U. Neither use was known to the ancients, but convenience has led most editors to preserve the distinctive V, indeed Madvig, who had dropped it in his first edition of the De Finibus, returned to it in the later editions; and all who write on the phonetics of Latin are compelled to mend the unscientific orthography of the Romans by treating the J and V as distinct letters known by distinctive characters. (2) It might perhaps be

¹ See his own remarks on the untrustworthiness of MSS in their spelling of double letters, l. c. p. 133.
somewhat bold for us in the nineteenth century to commence a
reform of the alphabet which Cicero used, but in the first place
we do not commence the reform, we merely keep the spelling
which the common sense of preceding centuries has handed down
to us; and in the next place we know from Quintilian i 4 § 11,
that Cicero himself felt the need of distinctive marks for the con-
sonantal and the vowel I, and that it was his practice to double
the I in writing such a word as Ajax. Though this symbol did not
pass into general use, yet it was felt by others that some sort of
distinctive mark was needed, and a tall I was occasionally employed
in the imperial times to denote the consonantal sound of I. If the
intervening generations have provided us with a more convenient
character, I do not see why we are to throw away this advantage,
any more than we do those of punctuation or of the discriminating
types, which were equally unknown to the Romans. I may be
allowed by the way to express my regret that Baiter, in common
with many German editors, has ceased to mark the beginning of
the sentence by a capital letter, thus making it more difficult
to glance rapidly over a page and catch the general sense. What
was the motive for this beyond a mere love of change in trivial
details I am unable to conjecture.

If I may hope that my use of the letter J, as above explained,
may be conceded, as at worst a venial error, I fear that the par-
ticular use of it, which I am about to confess, can only be viewed
in the light of a mortal sin by philologists of the modern school.
I refer to my retention of the oldfashioned spelling of the compounds
of jacio, conjicio rejicio disjicio for conicio ricio dissicio. As there
can be no doubt that the latter was the usual spelling of the
Quintilian age, how am I to defend the infringement of the rule,
which I have myself laid down above? My answer is that rules
must give way to principles, and the principle of good spelling
is that it should represent correctly the etymology and the pro-
nunciation of the word, neither of which is done by the spellings in ques-
tion. Another inconvenience arising from the omission of the J is
that the laws of prosody will thus be broken in almost all the cases
in which the compounds of jacio appear in Latin verse. In urging
these objections I do no more than repeat what was said by the
ancients themselves. Gellius has a chapter on this very subject
(V. A. iv 17) in which he finds fault with the omission of the con-
sonantal i in the compounds of jacio, as confusing versification
APPENDIX ON DAVIES' MSS.

and giving rise to a wrong pronunciation. He quotes hexameter lines containing the words obieiebat, conicere, subicit, and says many readers lengthen the first vowel in order to make the lines scan, but ob, con and sub are essentially short syllables and only lengthened by the consonant which follows, secunda enim litera in his verbis per duo i, non per unum scribenda est; nam verbum ipsum non est ‘icio’ sed ‘iacio’ et praeteritum non ‘icit’ fecit, sed ‘iecit’. Id ubi compositum est, ‘a’ litera in ‘i’ mutatur, sicuti fit in verbis ‘insilio’, et ‘incipio’, atque ita1 vim consonantis capit, et idcirco ea syllaba productius latiusque paulo pronuntiata priorem syllabam brevem esse non patitur. Then he goes on to say that quod apud Vergilium positum invenimus ‘inice’, sic esse ‘iniice’, ut supra dixi, et scribendum et legendum sciamus. I should wish therefore to keep the spelling with j in all except the rare cases in which the consonantal i ceases to exercise any influence on the quantity of the preceding syllable, as in reice Verg. Ecl. iii 96, adicit Mart. x 82 1. In such exceptional cases the spelling would be changed as in other cases of syncope or diaeresis.

APPENDIX ON DAVIES' MSS.

It is a curious fact that, of the six MSS used by Davies for his edition of the Natura Deorum, viz. the Codex Regius, Bp. Moore's copy of the Stephanus edition containing two marginal collations (styled by Davies Codices Elienses), the ms lent to him by Dr Richard Mead (Med.) and those belonging to the Cambridge University Library (Cant.) and to the Library of Lincoln College, Oxford (Lin.), all but the two last have disappeared. In order to save trouble to others who may be interested in the text of Cicero, and also in the hope that possibly some one among my readers may be able to supplement my account with further information, I print here all that I have been able to ascertain about the history of the lost ms.

In the Preface to the 1st edition of the N.D. 1718, Davies describes the Codd. El. as follows: usum editionis Stephanicae cum duobus optimis mss collatue dedit summus mei, dum in vivis erat, patronus, Ioannes Morus, nuper Eliensis Episcopus. Ten years later, in the Preface to his edition of the De Legibus, he speaks more

1 Fortasss legendum ‘itaque prima i vim’: ‘ita’ videtur etiam ex more librarium exarantium 1 pro ‘prima’. Otho’s note in loc.
slightly of the value of these readings: ‘Elienses: variae lectiones signifikat, quas ex ms quodam vir doctus editioni Roberti Stephani A.D. M.D.XXXIX adlevit. Iste codex, quantum judicare datur, non magnum prae se tulit vetustatem. It will be seen that Davies here employs the Sing. Codex, as he also does in the list of mss used by him for the Academica I, A.D. 1725 (collationem ms factam in exemplari editionis Stephanicae) while for Academica II he mentions on the same page variae lectiones ex duobus mss excerptas et allitas orae editionis Stephanicae. Yet again, after having stated in the Preface to the 1st ed. of the Tusculans 1708, that Bp. Moore had lent him his Stephanus cum duobus optimis mss collatum, he adds in the 2nd ed. 1723 hos Elienses primum ac secundum nominavi: itis nunc accessit ab eadem mans tertius in pergamina scriptus, and cites all three together in his notes as Elienses tres, e.g. on nisi haeret I § 27. From this it would appear that the collations of the two codices were in the same handwriting, and that Davies, after he had brought out his 1st ed., discovered in Bp. Moore's Library a complete text of the Tusculans copied out by the writer of the collations. No mention is made of these mss in the Preface to either of the editions of the De Divinatione and De Fato 1721 and 1730, nor have I come across any reference to them in the notes to the De Divinatione, but Cod. El. appears frequently in the notes to the De Fato.

Bentley's Life and Letters furnish some additional information on the earlier history of the Codices. In July 1692 Bentley, writing to Graevius, who was then engaged on a new edition of his Cicero, informs him that Moore, at that time Bishop of Norwich, is prepared to send him lectiones variantes in Libris Philosophicis Ciceronis, quas ex vetusto codice descripsit quidam in ora ed. Rob. Stephani in fol. Graevius, in his reply (Sept. 1692), accepts with thanks the Bishop's offer, but says that he must finish the orations before he can proceed to the Philosophical works. In Jan. 1693 Bentley writes again to say that the Bishop will send the volume itself, and remarks in reference to the value of the readings quantivis esse pretii re ipsa compendii. Graevius, writing in the following December, acknowledges the receipt of the volume, which, he says, he will guard nigris diligentius ucis; all posterity shall know how grateful he is to the lender. Frequent allusions to the book appear in the subsequent correspondence, but Graevius is still too busy to make use of it, until at last the Bishop becomes impatient, and Bentley writes in Aug. 1702 saepe mihi auem collit celeberrimus Praesul Norvicensis de
Codice suo, quem jam per decennium, opinor, apud te detines. Optimum esset si velles tibi describere, et codicem hoc remittere; dolet enim tam bonum librum tam diu bibliothecae suae locupletissimae deesse. To this Graevius replies Nov. 1702, desribendas varias manadavis juveni, ne longius justo retineatur hic liber. Proximo vero ut salvus Viro Summo reddatur mihi erit curae; and again in December Cicero in quo nunc describendo sudat adolescens redibit ad vos proxima cum hirundine. The correspondence closes with a letter from Burmann in the following month, Jan. 15 1703, announcing Graevius’ death.

It would be interesting to know whether the collation made by the adolescens was ever completed, and whether it is still in existence at Utrecht or elsewhere. The volume itself must have been returned to its owner, as it was lent by him to Davies for his 1st ed. of the Tusculans, which appeared in 1709, and seems to have been used by the latter until his death in 1732. As Bp. Moore’s Library was purchased by Geo. I and presented to the University of Cambridge in 1715, the Stephanus ought to have found its way to the University Library, and to be now safely locked up in one of the cases there, but Mr Bradshaw, the present learned Librarian, informs me that he can discover no trace of it, nor is there anything to be heard of it at Queens’ College, of which Davies was President.

I turn now to the Codex Regius which is described as follows in Davies’ preface to the N.D., mss Elienses exicipit Codex membranaeus in Bibliotheca Regia Londini servatus, cujus mihi copiam fecit Richardus Bentleius. The same MS is described in the Preface to the De Legibus as belonging to the Royal Library at St James’; mutilus est, nec ultra medium partem libri secundum progreditur. Est annorum, ut videtur, cccc. It was also used for the Academica Bk. II and for the De Divinatione and De Fato, but apparently not for the Tusculans, where Reg. stands for a Paris Codex. Bentley who succeeded Justell as “Library Keeper to His Majesty at St James” in April 1694, wrote in May to Graevius, offering to send him variantes lectiones ex duobus vetustissimis Codd. ex Bibliotheca Regia Sancti Jacobi, but it does not appear whether they were ever sent. As the King’s Library was removed in 1752 to the British Museum, these two codices ought now to be there, but by a strange fatality these also have disappeared. Is it possible that they were among the 200 volumes ‘destroyed or greatly injured’ by the fire at Abingdon House in 1731, on which see Monk’s Life of Bentley, II 308.
Of 'Med.' I know nothing beyond the fact that it was used by Davies for the Tusculanae, De Legibus and De Dicinatone as well as for the *Natura Deorum*, and that in the preface to the *De Legibus* he describes it as a ms of about 300 years old.

As regards the value of these ms, Madvig in his Preface to the *De Finibus* makes a broad distinction between Cod. El. 1 and Cod. El. 2, considering the latter to belong either to the better or to the mixed class of ms, while he has no hesitation in classing the former with the inferior ms. He finds fault with Davies for so frequently confounding the two. In the 1st book of the *N. D.* I notice three generally accepted readings, which rest either wholly or chiefly on the authority of Cod. El., *inscientiam* § 1, *vim* § 39, *esse* § 86; and two in the 2nd Bk. resting on Cod. Reg., *ruptum dicitur* § 66, *hic quaerat quispiam* § 133. It is evident from these facts that it would be of great service to Ciceronian criticism, if the ms could be recovered and carefully collated.

**EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS*.1*

A. Codex Leidensis (Vossianus) no. 84, written in the xth century (C in Moser's ed.).

B. Codex Leidensis (Vossianus) no. 86, written in the xth century (B in Moser).

C. Codex Leidensis (Heinsianus) no. 118, written in the xth century (A in Moser, H in Baiter).

E. Codex Erlangensis no. 38, written in the xth century (N of Moser).

P. Codex Palatinus no. 1519, a defective but very ancient ms, containing §§ 1: 27—73, ii 16—68, 111—156, 162—168, iii 6—95.

V. Codex Vindobonensis no. 189, written in the xth century. Defective, wants the whole of Bk 1, and Bk ii §§ 1—16, and 86—92.

U. Codex Uffenbachianus, formerly in the possession of Crenzer, now the property of Samuel Allen, Esq., written in the xth century, collated by Mr J. S. Reid and myself (G in Moser).

T. Another xth century codex belonging to Mr Allen; small 4to. parchment; injured by late corrections, which often make it impossible to decipher the original reading; collated by myself.

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1 The account of the first six ms is taken from the 2nd ed. of Orelli as revised by Baiter 1851.

2 Miller says of this *N. Jahrb.* xii 114 'A is an arbitrary text, inferior to both B and V. The writer omit what he could not make sense of.'

3 'B is taken directly from the archetype of the existing ms, according to Hahn, but the writer mistakes the abbreviations &c.' Miller *I. c.* From the description in Orelli it would seem as if §§ 64—91 of Bk 1 were wanting, but it is often cited in the critical notes on these §§, and it is evident from Bait's ed. of the *De Legibus* p. 105, that these pages are simply misplaced in the Codex.

4 'C is carelessly written, but without deliberate alteration of the older ms.' Miller *I. c.*

5 'V is the nearest approach to the archetype. Its marginal readings of the first hand are corrections from the archetype.' Miller *I. c.*
EXPLANATIONS OF SYMBOLS.

Oxf. e. o. u. ψ. Four Oxford codices, e in the Bodleian bears date 1459, o at Merton stated in Coxe's Catalogue of mss to belong to the 12th century, u at Lincoln (Line. of Davies) assigned to the 15th century, ψ at Balliol also of the 15th century. These are collated in the Oxford edition of 1783.

G. Codex Glogavensis, used by Heindorf, 'contains certissimas emendationes,' Baiter pref. to De Finibus.

Red. Codex Rehdigerianus, used by Heindorf.


Reg. Codex Regius belonging to the Royal Library of St James', used by Davies, now lost.


The letters BHILMNOG in thick type denote the mss (all but C contained in the British Museum), and RVV, the editions collated by Mr Swainson. See his description of these prefixed to the collations given at the end of this volume. B and K are the most important of these mss. Sometimes readings will be found in my critical notes, which are not given in Mr Swainson's collation. These have been added by myself from personal examination of the mss.

X. denotes the consensus of Orelli's mss.

Mus. denotes the consensus of the Museum mss, so far as the contrary is not stated.

[ ] The present editor, thinking it more satisfactory that the evidence for each reading should be given in a positive form, has made use of square brackets to signify that the mss denoted by the inclosed letters are presumed, ex silentio on the part of previous editors, to show a given reading.

+ denotes that the same reading occurs in other mss besides those cited.

Or. The revised Orelli, 1861.
Ba. Stereotype ed. of Baiter, 1864.
Sch. Schömann's 4th ed. 1876.
Mu. C. F. W. Müller's ed. 1878.

edd. denotes the consensus of the four editions. It is always stated when the reading in one of these differs from that of the text.

Ed. denotes that the present editor is responsible for a reading.
M. TULLII CICERONIS

DE NATURA DEORUM.

LIBER PRIMUS.

I. Cum multae res in philosophia nequaquam satis adhuc explicatae sint, tum perdifficilis, Brute, quod tu minime ignoras, et perobscura quæstio est de natura deorum, quæ et ad agnitionem animi pulcherrima est et ad moderandam religionem necessaria. De qua tam variae sunt doctissimorum hominum tamque discrepantes sententiae, ut magno argumento esse debeat causam [id est, principium philosophiae] esse inscientiam, prudenterque Academicos a rebus incertis assensionem cohisse. Quid est enim temeritate turpius, aut quid tam temerarium tamque indignum sapientis gravitate atque constantia quam aut falsum sentire aut, quod non satis explorate perceptum sit et cognitum, sine ulla dubitatione defendere? Velut in hac 2

quaeestionem plerique, quod maxime veri simile est, et quo omnes
duce natura trahimur, deos esse dixerunt, dubitare se Protagoras,
nulos esse omnino Diagoras Melius et Theodorus Cyrenaicus
putaverunt. - Qui vero deos esse dixerunt, tanta sunt in varie-
tate et dissensione, ut eorum momentum sit dinumerare senten-
tias. Nam et de figuris deorum et de locis atque sedibus et
actione vitae multa dicuntur, deque his summa philosophorum
dissensione certatur; quod vero maxime rem causamque con-
tinet, utrum nihil agant, nihil moliantur, omni curatione et
administratione rerum vacent, an contra ab iis et a principio
omnia facta et constituta sint et ad infinitum tempus regantur
atque moveantur, in primis magna dissensio est, eaque nisi di-
judicatur, in summo errore necesse est homines atque in maxi-
marum rerum ignoracione versari.- II. Sunt enim philosophi
et fuerunt qui omnino nullam habere censerent rerum humana-
rum procurationem deos. Quorum si vera sententia est, quae
potest esse pietas, quae sanctitas, quae religio? Haeque em
omnia pure atque caste tribuenda deorum numini ita sunt,
si animadveruntur ab iis et si est aliquid a dis immortalibus
hominum generi tributum. Sin autem di neque possunt nos 2
juvare nec volunt nec omnino curant nec quid agamus animad-
vertunt nec est quod ab iis ad hominum vitam permanare
possit, quid est quod ullos dis immortalibus cultus, honores,
preces adhibeamus? In specie autem fictae simulationis, sicut
reliquae virtutes, item pietas inesse non potest, cum qua simul 2
sanctitatem et religionem tolli necesse est, quibus sublatis per-
turbatio vitae sequitur et magna confusio; atque haud scio an
pietate adversus deos sublata fides etiam et societas generis
humanus et una excellentissima virtus, justitia, tollatur. Sunt
autem alii philosophi, et eui quidem magis atque nobiles, qui 3
decorum mente atque ratione omnem mundum administrari et

2 trahimur Cobet Va. Lect. p. 460 (tra. lost after natura cf. Qff. 1 18 trahimur
et dueimur), vehimur Asc. U. Mus. Klotz, venimus BECO Or. Ba. Mu. Sch., veni-
imus C. 3 Cyrenaicus mss, Cyrenaeus G. Ba. 4 [putaverunt] Ba. after
Bake. 5 dinumerare B CEC, annumerare Asc. UHIN, innumerare B', enumerare
Klotz. 7 his Asc. CEU, is (superscr. h) A, his DN + Or. Ba. Sch. 9 con-
tinet mss generally, cont. est Asc. U +, cf. the next note. 12 in primis C
Oxf. v Manutius, in primisque CEU Mus, in primis quae AB. dijudicatur AB
CE +, dijudicetur D UH, cf. Madv. Fin. 11 86. 19 iis cll., his mss generally.
regi censeant, neque vero id solum, sed etiam ab isdem hominum vitae consuli et provideri; nam et fruges et reliqua, quae terra pariat, et tempestates ac temporum varietates caelique mutationes, quibus omnia, quae terra gignat, maturata pubescant, a dis immortalibus tribui generi humano putant multaque, quae dicentur in his libris, colligunt, quae talia sunt, ut ea ipsa di immortalibus ad usum hominum fabricati paene videantur. Contra quos Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret homines non socordes ad veri investigandi cupiditatem. Res enim nulla est, de qua tanto opere non solum indocti, sed etiam docti dissentiant; quorum opiniones cum tam variae sint tamque inter se dissidentes, alterum fieri profecto potest, ut earum nulla, alterum certe non potest, ut plus una vera sit.

III. Multum autem fluxisse video de libris nostris, quos complures brevi tempore edidimus, variumque sermonem, partim admirantium unde hoc philosophandi nobis subito studium exstitisset, partim quid quaque de re certi haberemus scire cupidientium. Multis etiam sensi mirabile videri eam nobis potissimum probatam esse philosophiam, quae lucem eriperet et quasi noctem quandam rebus offunderet, desertaeque disciplinæ et jam pridem relictæ patrocinium necopinatum a nobis esse susceptum. Qua quidem in causa et benevolos objurgatores placare et invidos vituperatores confutare possimus, ut alteros reprehendisse paeniteat, alteri didicisse se gaudeant; nam qui admonent amice, docendi sunt, qui inimice insectantur, repellendi. Nos autem nec subito coepimus philosophari nec mediocrem a primo tempore actatis in eo studio operam curamque consumpsimus, et, cum minime videbamur, tum maxime philosophabamur, quod et orationes declarant refertae philosophorum sententiæ et doctissimorum hominum familiaritates, quibus semper domus nostra floruit, et principes illi, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus, Posidonius, a quibus instituti sumus. Et si omnia philosophiae præcepta referuntur ad vitam, arbitramur nos et publicis et privatis in rebus ea praestitisse, quae ratio et doctrina praescipserit. IV. Sin autem quis requirit, quae causa

6 ea ipsa mss, corr. ead. m. in ei ipsi B, et ipsi Bonh, ea ipsi Heind. after Ern. 14 multum—susceptum follows after repellendi (l. 26) in all the mss and edd. See Comm.
nos impulerit, ut haece tam sero litteris mandaremus, nihil est, quod expedire tam facile possimus. Nam cum otio langueremus, et is esset rei publicae status, ut eam unius consilio atque cura gubernari necesse esset, primum ipsius rei publicae causa philosophiam nostris hominibus explicandam putavi, magni existimans interesse ad decus et ad laudem civitatis res tam graves tamque praecellaras Latinis etiam litteris contineri; eoque me minus instituti mei pacnitet, quod facile sentio, quam multorum non modo discendi, sed etiam scribendi studia commoverim. Complures enim Graecis institutionibus eruditi ea, quae dicissent, cum civibus suis communicare non poterant, quod illa, quae a Graecis accepissent, Latine dici posse diffiderent. Quo in genere tantum profecisse videor, ut a Graecis ne verborum quidem copia vinceremur. Hortata etiam est, ut me ad haece conferrem, animi acgritudo fortunae magna et gravi commota in injurya; eujus si majorem aliquam levationem reperire potuissent, non ad hane potissimum confugisse; ea vero ipsa nulla ratione melius frui potui, quam si me non modo ad legendos libros, sed etiam ad totam philosophiam pertractandum desisset. Omnes autem ejus partes atque omnia membra tum facillime noscuntur, cum totae quaestiones scribendo explicantur; est enim admirabilis quaedam continutio seriesque rerum, ut alia ex alia conexa et omnes inter se aptae colligataeque videantur. V. Qui autem requirunt, quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt, quam necesse est; non enim tam auctores in disputando quam rationis momenta quaerenda sunt. Quin etiam obest plerumque iis, qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum, qui se docere profitentur; desinunt enim suum judicium adhibere, id habent ratum, quod ab eo, quem probant, judicatum vident. Nec vero probare soleo id, quod de Pythagoreis accepimus, quos ferunt, si quid affirmarent in disputando, cum ex iis quaerentur, quare ita esset, respondere solitos; 'Ipse dixit'. 'Ipse' autem erat Pythagoras. Tantum opinio praecjudicata poterat, ut etiam sine ratione valeret auctoritas. Quem autem admirantur nos hane potissimum disciplinam securitos, iis quattuor Academ-
micis libris satis responsum videtur. Nec vero deserturumque rerum patrocinium suscepmus; non enim hominum interitu sententiae quoque occidunt, sed lucem auctoris fortasse desiderant; ut haec in philosophia ratio contra omnia disserendi nullamque rem aperte judicandi profecta a Socrate, repetita ab Arcesila, confirmata a Carneade usque ad nostram viguit aetatem; quam nunc prope modum orbam esse in ipsa Graecia intellego. Quod non Academiae vitio, sed tarditate hominum arbitrino contingisse. Nam si singulas disciplinas per-cipere magnum est, quanto majus omnes? quod facere iis necesse est, quibus propositum est veri reperiendi causa et contra omnes philosophos et pro omnibus dicere. Cujus rei tantae tamque difficilis facultatem esse me non profiteor, secutum esse praee me fero. Nee tamen potest esse, ut, qui hac ratione philosophentur, ii nihil habeant quod sequantur. Dictum est omnino de hac re alio loco diligentius, sed, quia nimir indociles quidam tardique sunt, admonendi videntur sapiepius. Non enim sumus ii, qui omnibus verum esse videatur, sed ii, qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adjuncta esse dicamus tanta similitudine, ut in iis nulla insit certa judicandi et assentiendi nota. Ex quo existit illud, multa esse probabilia quae, quamquam non percipentur, tamen, quia visum quendam haberent insignem et illustrem, iis sapientis vita regeretur.

VI. Sed jam, ut omni me invidia liberem, ponam in medio sententias philosophorum de natura deorum. Quo quidem loco convocandi omnes videntur, qui, quae sit earum vera, judicent. Tum demum mihi procar Academia videbitur, si aut consenserint omnes, aut erit inventus aliquis, qui, quid verum sit, inven-nerit. Itaque mihi libet exclamare, ut est in Synephebis:

Pro deum, popularium omnium, omnium adulescentium
Clamo, postulo, obsecro, oro, ploro atque imploro fidem,

non levissima de re, ut queritur ille in civitate fieri facinora capitalia,
ab amico amante argentum accipere meretrix non vult;
14 sed ut adsint, cognoscant, animadvertant, quid de religione, pietate, sanctitate, eacrimoniis, fide, jure jurando, quid de templis, delubris sacrificiisque sollemnibus, quid de ipsis auspiciis, quibus nos praesunum, existimandum sit; haec enim omnia ad hanc de dis immortalibus questionem referenda sunt. Profecto eos ipsos, qui se aliquid certi habere arbitrantur, addubitare cogent doctissimorum hominum de maxima re tanta dissensio.

15 Quod cum saeppe alias, tum maxime animadverti, cum apud C. Cottam, familiarem meum, accurate et diligentiter de dis immortalibus disputatum est. Nam cum feriis Latinis ad eum ipsius rogatu arcessituque venissem, offendi eum sedentem in exedra et cum C. Velleio senatore disputantem, ad quem tum Epicurei primas ex nostris hominibus deferebant. Aderat etiam Q. Lucilius Balbus, qui tantos progressus habebat in Stoicis, ut cum excellentibus in eo genere Graecis compararetur. Tum, ut me Cotta vidit, Peropportune, inquit, venis; oritur enim mihi magna de re altercatio cum Velleio, cui pro tuo studio non est alienum te interesse. VII. Atque mihi quoque videor, inquam, venisse, ut dicis, opportune. Tres enim trium disciplinarum principes convenistis. M. Piso si adesset, nullius philosophiae, carum quidem quae in honore sunt, vacaret locus. Tum Cotta: Si, inquit, liber Antiochi nostri, qui ab eo nuper ad hunc Balbum missus est, vera loquitur, nihil est, quod Pisonem, familiarem tuum, desideres; Antiocho enim Stoici cum Peripateticis re concinere videntur, verbis discrepare; quo de libro, Balbe, velim scire quid sentias. Egone? inquit ille: miror Antiochum, hominem in primis acatum, non vidisse interesse plurimum inter Stoicos, qui honesta a commodis non nomine sed genere

toto disjungerent, et Peripateticos, qui honesta commiserent cum commodis, ut ea inter se magnitudine et quasi gradibus non genere different: haec enim est non verborum parva, sed rerum permagna dissensio. Verum hoc alias; nunc, quod coepimus, si videtur. Mihi vero, inquit Cotta, videtur; sed ut hic, qui intervenit (me intuens), ne ignoret, quae res agatur, de natura agebamus deorum, quae cum mihi videretur perobscura, ut semper videri solet, Epicuri ex Velleio sciscitabar sententiam. Quam ob rem, inquit, Vellei, nisi molestum est, repetam, quae coeperas. Repetam vero, quamquam non mihi, sed tibi hic venit adjutor; ambo enim, inquit arridens, ab eodem Philone nihil scire didicistis. Turn ego: Quid didicerimus, Cotta videbit, tu autem nolo existimes me adjutorcum huius venisse, sed auditorem, et quidem aequum, libero judicio, nulla ejus modi adstrictum necessitate, ut mihi, velim nolim, sit certa quaedam tuenda sententia. 

VIII. Tum Velleius fidenter sane, ut solent isti, nihil tam verens, quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur, tamquam modo ex deorum concilio et ex Epicuri intermundiis descendisset, Audite, inquit, non futilles commenticianque sententias, non opificem aedificatoremque mundi, Platonis de Timaeo deum, nec anum fatidicam, Stoicorum πρόνοιαν, quam Latine licet providentiam dieere, neque vero mundum ipsum animo et sensibus praeditum, rotundum, ardentem, voluptilem deum, portenta et miracula non disserentium philosophorum, sed sonniantium. Quibus enim oculis intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua construix a deo atque aedificari mundum facit? Quae molitia, quae ferramenta, qui vectes, quae machinæ, qui ministri tanti munere fuerunt? Quem ad modum autem oboediere et parere voluntati architecti aër, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt? Unde vero ortæ illæ quinque formæ, e quibus reliqua formantur, apte cadentes ad animum afficiendum pariendosque sensus? Longum est ad omnia, quæ talia sunt, ut optata magis
quam inventa videautur; sed illa palmaria, quod, qui non modo natum mundum introduxerit, sed etiam manu paene factum, is eum dixerit fore sempiternum. Hunc censes primis, ut dicitur, labris gustasse physiologiam, id est naturae rationem, qui quicquam, quod ortum sit, putet acerternum esse posse? Quae est enim coagmentatio non dissolubilis? aut quid est, cujus principium aliquod sit, nihil sit extremum? Πρόνοια vero si vestra est, Lucili, cadem, requiro, quae paulo ante, ministros, machinas, omnem totius operis designationem atque apparatus; sin alia est, cur mortalem fecerit mundum, non, quem ad modum Plato-

10 nicus deus, sempiternum. IX. Ab utroque autem sciscitor, cur mundi aedificatores repente exstitorint, innumerabilia sacca dormierint; non enim, si mundus nullus erat, sacca non erant. Sacca nunc dico non ea, quae dierum noctiumque numero annuis cursibus conficiuntur; nam fateor ea sine mundi conversione effic non potuisse; sed fuit quaedam ab infinito tempore aesternitas, quam nulla circumscriptio temporum metiebatur; spatio tamen qualis ea fuerit, intellegi potest. [Quod ne in cogitationem quidem cadit, ut fuerit tempus aliquod, nullum cum tempus esset.] Isto igitur tam immenso spatio quacro, 20 Balbe, cur Πρόνοια vestra cessaverit. Laboremne fugiabeat? At iste nec attingit deum nec erat ullus, cum omnes naturae numini divino, caele, ignes, terrae, maria, pararent. Quid autem erat, quod concupisceret deus mundum signis et luminibus tamquam aedilis ornare? Si, ut deus ipse melius habitaret, antea videlicet tempore infinto in tenebris tamquam in gurgustio habitaverat. Post autem varietatene cum detectari putamus, qua caelum et terras exornatas videmus? Quae ista potest esse oblectatio deo? Quae si esset, non ea tam diu carere potuisset.

1 illa palmaria Dav. ed. 1, illud palmar e Dav. ed. 2, illa palmaris MSS Sch. 3 dixerit MSS, dixit Mu. (Adn. Cr.). 7 Πρόνοια Manutius, pronoia MSS Sch. Mu. vero si vestra est Lucili cadem requiro ADB MSS, si vero vestra est lucili cadem require E, vero si vestra est Lucili cadem, cadem requiro Heind., vero vestra si cadem est, Lucili, cadem requiro Sch. after Lambinus, vero vestra si, Lucili, cadem est, cadem requiro Madv., vero vestra, Lucili, si est cadem, cadem requiro Or. Ba. Mu. 9 designationem CE + dissignationem ADBK Mu. 18 intellegi potest XBKLO, intellegi non potest Asc. UCIMNV + Sch. Or. Ba. Mu. (who also suggests qui potest). quod ne—esset transposed by Wyttenbach before sed fuit l. 16 (perhaps better before spatio), see Comm. 21 Πρόνοια see above.
An haec, ut fere dicitis, hominum causa a deo constituta sunt? Sapientiumne? Propere paucos igitur tanta est facta rerum molitio. An stultorum? At primum causa non fuit, cur de improbis bene meretur; deinde quid est assecutus? cum omnes stulti sint sine dubio miserrimi, maxime quod stulti sunt; miserius enim stultitia quid possimus dicere? deinde quod ita multa sunt incommoda in vita, ut ea sapientes commodorum compensatione leniant, stulti nec vitare venientia possint nec ferre praesentia. X. Qui vero mundum ipsum animantem sapientemque dixerunt, nullo modo viderunt, animi natura intellegentis in quam figuram cadere posset; de quo dicam equidem paulo post; nunc autem hactenus admirabor eorum tarditatem, qui animantem immortalem et eundem beatum rotundum esse velint, quod ea forma neget nullam esse pulchriorrem Platon. At mini et cylindri vel quadrat! vel coni vel pyramidis videtur esse formosior. Quae vero vita tribuitur isti rotundo deo? Nempe ut ea celeritate contorqueatur, cui par nulla ne cogitari quidem possit; in qua non video ubinam mens constans et vita beatae possit insistere. Quodque in nostro corpore si minima ex parte significtur, molestum sit, cur hoc idem non habeatur molestum in deo? Terra enim profecto, quoniam mundi pars est, pars est etiam dei. Atqui terrae maximas regiones inhabilitabiles atque incultas videamus, quod pars earum appulsu solis exarserit, pars obliguerit nive pruinaque longinquosolis abscessu; quae, si mundus est deus, quoniam mundi partes sunt, dei membra partim ardentia, partim refrigerata dicenda sunt.

Atque haec quidem vestra, Lucili. Qualia vero sint, ab ultimo repetam superiorum. Thales enim Milesius, qui primus de talibus rebus quaesivit, aquam dixit esse initium rerum, deum autem eam mentem, quae ex aqua cuncta fingeret. Si
di possunt esse sine sensu, mentem eur aquae adjunxit? Menti ante men car aquam adjunxit, si ipsa mens constare potest vacans corpore? Anaximandri autem opinio est nativos esse deos longis intervallis orientes occidentesque, cosque innumerabiles esse mundos. Sed nos deum nisi sempiternen intellegere quire possumus? Post Anaximenes aera deum statuit, eumque gigni esseque immensus et infinitum et semper in motu; quasi aut aër sine ulla forma deus esse possit, cum praestertim deum non modo aliqua, sed pulcherrima specie deceat esse, aut non omne, quod ortum sit, mortalitas consequatur. XI. Inde Anaxagoras, qui accept ab Anaximene disciplinam, primus omnium rerum discriptionem et modum mentis infinitae vi ae ratione designari et confici voluit; in quo non vidit neque motum sensui junctum et continentem in infinito ullum esse posse, neque sensum omnino in eo quod non ipsa natura pulsa sentir. Deinde si mentem istam quasi animal aliquod voluit esse, erit aliquid interius, ex quo illud animal nominetur; quid autem interim mente cingatur igitur corpore externo. Quod quoniam non placeat, aperta simplexque mens nulla re adjuncta, qua sentire possit, fugere intellegentiae nostrae vim et notionem videtur. Crotoniates autem Alcmaeo, qui soli et lumae reliquisque sideribus animoque praeterea divinitatem dedit, non sensit esse mortalibus rebus immortalitatem dare. Nam Pythagoras, qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentionem et communcament, ex quo nostri animi carperentur, non vidit distractione humanorum animorum discerpi et lacerei deum et, cum miseri animi essent, quod plerisque contingere, tum dei.

partem esse miseram; quod fieri non potest. Cur autem quicquam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset deus? quo modo porro deus iste, si nihil esset nisi animus, aut infius aut infusus esset in mundo? Tum Xenophanes, qui mente ad
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5 juncta omne [praeterea, quod esset] infinitum, deum voluit esse, de ipsa mente item reprehenditur ut ceteri, de infinitate autem vehementius, in qua nihil neque sentiens neque conjunctum potest esse. Nam Parmenides quidem commenticium quiddam coronae simile efficit (στεφάνυν appellat) continentene
ardore lucis orbem, qui cingat caelum, quem appellat deum: in quo neque figuras divinam neque sensum quisquam suspicari potest. Multaque ejusdem monstra, qui quidam qui bellum, qui discordiam, qui cupiditatem ceteraque generis exhibet ad deum revocet, quae vel morbo vel somno vel oblivione vel
15 vetustate delentur; eademque de sideribus, quae reprehensa in alio jam in hoc omittantur. XII. Empedocles autem multa alia peccans in deorum opinione turpissime labitur. Quattuor enim naturas, ex quibus omnia constare censet, divinas esse vult; quas et nasci et extinguiri perspicuum est et sensu omni carere. Nec vero Protagoras, qui sese negat omnino de dis habere quod liqueat, sint, non sint qualesve sint, quicquam videtur de natura deorum suspicari. Quid? Democritus, qui tum imagines earumque circuitus in deorum numero refert, tum illam naturam, quae imagines fundat ac mittat, tum
25 scientiam intellegentiamque nostram, nonne in maximo errore versatur? Cum idem omnino, quia nihil semper suo statu maneat, neget esse quicquam sempiternum, nonne deum omnino ita tollit, ut nullam opinionem ejus reliquam faciat? Quid? aër, quo Diogenes Apolloniates utitur deo, quem sensum
habere potest aut quam formam dei? Jam de Platonis in-
constantia longum est dicere, qui in Timaeo patrem huius
mundi nominari neget posse, in Legum autem libris, quid sit
omnino deus, anquiri oportere non euceat. Idem et in Timaeo
dicit et in Legibus et mundum deum esse et caelum et astra
et terram et animos et eos, quos majorum institutis accepimus;
quae et per se sunt falsa perspicue et inter se vehementer
repugnantia. Quod vero sine corpore ullo deum vult esse, ut
Gracci dicunt, ἀπώματον, id quale esse possit, intellegi non
potest; carent enim sensu necesse est, carent etiam
voluptate; quae omnia una cum deorum notionem com-
prehendimus. Atque etiam Xenophon pauci-rius verbis eadem
fere peccat; facit enim in iis, quae a Socrate dicta rettulit,
Socratem disputantem formam dei quaeri non oportere,
eundemque et solem et animum dicere, et modo unum, tum
autem plures deos; quae sunt isdem in erratis fere, quibus ea,
quae de Platone diximus. XIII. Atque etiam Antisthenes in eo
libro, qui physicus inscribitur, populares deos multos, natural-
em unum esse dicens tollit vim et naturam deorum. Nec multo
secus Speusippus, Platonem avunculum subsequens et vim
quandam dicens qua omnia regantur, camque animalem, evel-
lere ex animis conatur cognitionem deorum. Aristotelesque in
tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro non [Platone]
dissentiens; modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem, modo
mundum ipsum deum dicet esse, modo alium quendam praeficit
mundo eique eas partes tribuit, ut replicatione quadam mundi
motum regat atque tueatur, tum caeli ardom deum dicit esse
non intellegens caelum mundi esse partem, quem alio loco ipse
designat deum. Quo modo autem caeli divinum ille sensus
in celeritate tanta conservari potest? ubi deinde illi tot di, si
numeramus etiam caelum deum? Cum autem sine corpore

1 jam X, nam UH El. 4 idem et—repugnantia follows comprehensim
in all the sss and edd. see Comm. 8 repugnant Cobet V. L. p. 460.
[ut Gracci dicunt ἀπώματον] Or. Ba. 9 asomatōn X. 13 iis As., his X.
17 diximus M of Moscr, diximus X Mus. 23 a magistro non dissentiens
Diel's Doxog. p. 530, a magistro uno Platone dissentiens XBK Oxf. co+., a mag.
Plat. diss. UV Oxf. u, a mag. suo Plat. diss. Red., a magistro suo Platone non
idem vult esse deum, omni illum sensu privat, etiam prudentia. Quo porro modo deus moveri carens corpore aut quo modo semper se movens esse quietus et beatus potest? Nec vero ejus condiscipulus Xenocrates in hoc genere prudentior, cujus in libris, qui sunt de natura deorum, nulla species divina descriptur; deos enim octo esse dicit, quinque eos, qui in stellis vagis nominantur, unum, qui ex omnibus sideribus, quae infixa caelo sunt, ex dispersis quasi membris simplex sit putandus deus, septimum solem adjungit octavamque lunam; qui quo sensu beati esse possit, intellegi non potest. Ex eadem Platonis schola Ponticus Heraclides puerilibus fabulis referit libros, et modo mundum, tum mentem divinam esse putat, errantibus etiam stellis divinitatem tribuit, sensuque deum privat et ejus formam mutabilem esse vult codemque in libro rursus terram et caelum refert in deos. Nec vero Theophrasti inconstantia ferenda est; modo enim menti divinum tribuit principatum, modo caelo, tum autem signis sideribusque cælestibus. Nec audiendus ejus auditor Strato, is qui physicus appellatur, qui omnem vim divinam in natura sitam esse censet, quae causas gignendi, augendi, minuendi habeat, sed careat omni sensu et figura. XIV. Zeno autem, ut jam ad vestros, Balbe, veniam, naturalem legem divinam esse censet, eamque vim obtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria. Quam legem quo modo efficient animantem, intellegere non possimus; deum autem animantem certe volumus esse. Atque hic idem alio loco aethera deum dicit, si intellegi potest nihil sentiens deus, qui numquam nobis occurrit neque in precibus neque in optatis neque in votis; aliis autem libris rationem quandam per omnem naturam
rerum pertinentem vi divina esse affectam putat. Idem astra hoc idem tribuit, tum annis, mensibus annorumque mutationibus. Cum vero Hesiodi ἱερογυνια, id est originem deorum, interpretatur, tollit omnino usitatatas perceptasque cognitiones deorum; neque enim Jovem neque Junonem neque Vestam neque quemquam, qui ita appelletur, in deorum habet numero, sed rebus inanimis atque mutis per quandam

significationem hae dicet tributa nomina. Cujus discipuli Aristonis non minus magno in errore sententia est, qui neque formam deis intelligi posse censeat neque in deis esse dicit, dubitetque omnino, deus animans necne sit. Cleanthes autem, qui Zenonem audivit una cum eo, quern proximo nominavi, ipsum mundum deum dicit esse, turn totius naturae menti atque animo tribuit hoc nomen, turn ultimum et altissimum atque circumfusum et extremum omnia eingentem atque complexura ardorem, qui aether nominetur, certissimum deum judicat; idemque quasi delirans in suis libris, quos scripsit contra voluptatem, turn fingit formam quandam et speciem deorum, turn divinitatem omnem tribuit astra, tum nihil ratione censet esse divinius. Ita fit, ut deus ille, quem mente noscimus atque in animi notione tamquam in vestigio volumus reponere, nusquam prorsus appareat.

At Persacus ejusdem Zenonis auditor, eos dicit esse habitos deos, a quibus magna utilitas ad vitae cultum esset invena, ipsasque res utiles et salutares deorum esse vocabulis nuncupatas, ut ne hoc quidem diceret, illa invena esse deorum, sed ipsa divina. Quo quid absurdius, quam aut res sordidas atque deformes deorum honore afficere aut homines iam morte deletos reponere in deos, quorum omnis cultus esset futurus in luctu? Jam vero Chrysippus, qui Stoicorum somniorum vaferrimus habetur

1 pertinentem ABE +, pertingentem CBK +. vi divina esse affectam G Manut. 
5 Heind. 6 appelletur ABEPK +, appellatur CUTBLO + Or. Sch. 9 sententia est qui A2 UCM Asc. +, sententias qui A2 BEK, sentius qui CB. 13 ipsum mundum deum M add., ipsum deum mundum MSS generally. 23 dicit Asc UH +, om. XBEK, dixit Sch
interpres, magnam turbam congregat ignotorum deorum, atque ita ignotorum, ut eos ne conjectura quidem informare possimus, cum mens nostra quidvis videatur cogitatione posse depingere. Ait enim vim divinam in ratione esse positam et in universae naturae animo atque mente, ipsumque mundum deum dicit esse et ejus animi fusionem universam, tum ejus ipsius principatam, qui in mente et ratione versetur, communemque rerum naturam universitatemque omnia continentem, tum fatalem vim et necessitatem rerum futurarum, ignem praeterea et eum, quem ante dixi, aethera, tum ea, quae natura fluenter atque manarent, ut et aquam et terram et aeram; solemn, lunam, sidera, omnem universae rerum, qua omnia continerentur, atque etiam homines eos, qui immortalitatem esse consueverunt. Idemque disputationem aethera esse eum, quem homines Jovem appellarent, quia aere per maria manaret, eum esse Neptunum, terramque eam esse quae Ceres diceretur, similique ratione persequitur vocabula reliquorum deorum. Idemque etiam legis perpetuae et aeternae vim, quae quasi dux vitae et magistra officiorum sit, Jovem dicit esse, candemque fatalem necessitatem appellat, sempiternam rerum futurarum veritatem; quorum nihil tale est, ut in eo vis divina inesse videatur. Et haec quidem in primo libro de natura deorum; in secundo autem vult Orphei, Musei, Hesiodi Homerique fabellas accommodare ad ea, quae ipse primo libro de dis immortalibus dixerat, ut etiam veterrimi poetae, qui haec ne suspicati quidem sint, Stoici fuisse videantur. Quem Diogenes Babyloni consequens in eo libro, qui inscribitur de Minerva, partum Jovis ortumque virginis ad physiologistam tradueens disjungit a fabula.

XVI. Exposui fere non philosophorum judicia, sed deliriamentum somnia. Nec enim multo absurdiora sunt ea, quae poetarum vocibus fusa ipsa suavitate nocuerunt, qui et ira inflammatos et libidine furentos deos feceruntque, ut eorum bella, proelia, pugnas, vulnera videmus, odia praeterea,
discidia, discordias, ortus, interitus, querellas, lamentationes, effusas in omni intemperantia libidines, adulteria, vincula, cum humano genere concubitus mortalesque ex immortalis procreatorum. 43 Cum poëtarum autem errore conjungere licet portenta magorum, Aegyptiorumque in eodem genere dementiam, tum etiam vulgi opiniones, quae in maxima inconstantia veritatis ignoratione versantur.

Ea qui consideret quam inconsulta ac temere dicantur, venerari Epicurum et in eorum ipsorum numero, de quibus haec quaestio esse deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quae est enim gens aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum? quam appellat πρόληψις Epicurus, id est anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intellegi quicquam nec quae orta nec disputari potest. Cujus rationis vim atque utilitatem ex illo celesti Epicuri de regula et judicio volumine acceperimus. XVII. Quod igitur fundamentum hujus quaestionis est, id praeclare jactum videtis. Cum enim non instituto aliquo aut more aut lege sit opinio constituta maneatque ad unum omnium firma consensio, intellegi nesses est esse deos; quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus, de quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse nesses est; esse igitur deos confitemendum est. Quod quoniam fere constat inter omnes non philosophos solum, sed etiam indoctos, fateamur constare illud etiam, hanc nos habere sive anticipationem, ut ante dixi, sive praecognitionem deorum (sunt enim rebus novis nova ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus ipse πρόληψις appellavit, quam antea nemo eo verbo nominarat)—hanc igitur habemus, ut deos beatos et immortales putemus. Quae enim nobis natura informationem ipsorum deorum dedit, cadem insculpit in mentibus, ut eos aeternos et beatos haberemus. Quod si ita est, vere exposita illa sententia est ab Epicuro, quod beatum

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3 immortalis MSS generally. immortalibus CNO Dav. Heind.
14 πρόληψις Bed (? see Moser) edd., prolémín (but prolepsin 1. 28) A, prolepsin B, prolepsin EP, pro plebs in B (but problemam l. 28), prolepsin Asc. 21 esse om. Or. (by mistake?). fere BE, fieri ACPEK. 25 fateamur B (corr. from fateamur) edd., fateamur MSS. 31 ipsis deorum [X] E, d. i. U Asc. [Mus.] Sch.
aeternumque sit, id nec habere ipsum negotii quicquam nec exhibere alteri, itaque neque ira neque gratia teneri, quod, quae talia essent, imbecilla essent omnia. Si nihil aliud quae-reremus, nisi ut deos pie coleremus et ut superstitione libe-
5 raremur, satis erat dictum; nam et praestans deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum et aeterna esset et beatissima (habet enim venerationem justam, quicquid excellebit), et metus omnis a vi atque ira deorum pulsus esset; intellegitur enim a beata immortalique natura et iram et gratiam segregari; quibus remotis nulos a superis impedere metus. Sed ad hanc confirmandam opinionem anquirit animus et formam et vitae actionem mentisque agitationem in deo.

XVIII. Ac de forma quidem partim natura nos admonet, 46 partim ratio docet. Nam a natura habemus omnes omnium 15 gentium speciem nullam iam nisi humanam deorum; quae enim forma alia occurrit umquam aut vigilanti cuquam aut dormienti? Sed ne omnia revocentur ad primas notiones: ratio hoc idem ipsa declarat. Nam cum praestantissimam naturam, 47 vel quia beata est vel quia sempiterna, convenire videatur ean-
20 dem esse pulcherrimam, qua ejus compositio membrorum, qua conformatio linamentorum, qua figura, qua species humana potest esse pulchrior? Vos quidem, Lucili, soletis (nam Cotta meus modo hoc, modo illud), cum artificium effingitis fabricamque divinam, quam sint omnia in hominis figura non modo ad 25 usum, verum etiam ad venustatem apta, describere. Quodsi 48 omnium animantium formam vincit hominis figura, deus autem animans est, ea figura profecto est, quae pulcherrima est om-
nium; quoniamque deos beatissimos esse constat, beatus autem esse sine virtute nemo potest nec virtus sine ratione constare 30 nec ratio usquam inesse nisi in hominis figura, hominis esse specie deos confitendum est. Nec tamen ea species corpus est, 49 sed quasi corpus, nec habet sanguinem, sed quasi sanguinem. XIX. Haequamquam et inventa sunt acutius et dicta sub-
tilius ab Epicuro, quam ut quivis ea possit agnoscre, tamen

11 anquirit [X]BE, inquirit Mus. vitae actionem mentisque agitationem Beier (Off. i 17), vitam et actionem mentis atque agitationem xss. 27 pul-
cherrima est Mad. see Comm., pulcherrima sit xss. Mus. nisi in [B]UT+, nisi ACEPBK, sine others.

M. C. 2
fretus intelligentia vestra dissero brevius, quam causa desiderat. Epicurus autem, qui res octultas et penitus abditas non modo viderit animo, sed etiam sic tractet, ut manu, docet eam esse vim et naturam deorum, ut primum non sensu, sed mente cernatur, nec soliditate quadam neque eadem ad numerum sit, ut ea, quae ille propter firmitatem οτερέμνα appellat; sed, imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptors, cum infinita simillimarum imaginum series ex innumerabilibus individuis exsistat et ad nos affluat, cum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem inteatam in fixture nostram intelle- 

50 gentiam capere, quae sit et beata natura et aeterna. Summa vero vis infinitatis et magna ac diligentis contemplatione dignissima est, in qua intelligi necesse est eam esse naturam, ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant. Hanc ισονομίαν appellat Epicurus, id est aequabili tributionem. Ex hac 15 igitur illud efficitur, si mortalium tanta multitudo sit, esse immortalium non minorem, et si, quae interimant, innumera-bilia sint, etiam ea, quae consequent, infinita esse debere.

Et quaeque a nobis, Balbe, soletis, quae vita deorum sit, 51 quaeque ab iis degatur actas. Ea videlicet, quae nihil beatius, 20 nihil omnibus bonis affluentius eogitari potest. Nihil enim agit, nullis occupationibus est implicatus, nulla opera molitur, sua sapientia et virtute gaudet, habet exploratum fore se semper 52 cum in maximis, tum in aeternis voluptatibus. XX. Hunc deum rite beatum dixerimus, vestrum vero laboriosissimum. 25 Sive enim ipse mundus deus est, quid potest esse minus quie-tum quam nullo puncto temporis intermisso versari circum axem caeli admirabili celeritate? ( nisi quietum autem nihil beatum est); sive in ipso mundo deus inest alicuis, qui regat,
qui gubernet, qui cursus astrorum, mutationes temporum, rerum vicissitudines ordinesque conservet, terras et maria contemplans hominum commoda vitasque tueatur, ne ille est implicatus molestis negotiis et operosis! Nos autem beatam vitam in animi securitate et in omnium vacuum munerationem ponimus. Docuit enim nos idem, qui cetera, natura effectum esse mundum, nihil opus fuisse fabrica, tamque eam rem esse facilem, quam vos offici negatis sine divina posse sollertia, ut innumerabiles natura mundos effectura sit, efficat, effecerit. Quod quia quem ad modum natura efficere sine aliqua mente possit non videtis, ut tragici poëtae, cum explicare argumenti exitum non potestis, neque implicatus est in negotiis et operosis!

Qui enim non timeat omnia providentem et cogitantium et animadvertentem et omnia ad se pertinentem, curiosum et plenum negotii deum? Hinc vobis exstitit primum illa fatalis necessitas, quam *eiμαρψέντη* dicitis, ut, quicquid accidat, id ex aeterna veritate causarumque continuacione fluxisse dicatis. Quanti autem haec philosophia aestimanda est, cui tamquam aniculis, et iis quidem indoctis, fato fieri videantur omnia? Sequitur *ματίτι* vestra, quae Latine divinatio dicitur, qua tanta imbueremur superstitione, si vos audire vellemus, ut haruspices, augures, **hāriōlī**, vates, conjectores nobis essent colendi. His terroribus ab Epicuro soluti et in liberratem vindicati nec metuimus eos, quos intellegimus nec sibi fingere ullam molestiam nec alteri quaerere, et pie sancteque
colimus naturam excellentem atque praestantem. Sed elatus studio vereor ne longior fuerim. Erat autem difficile rem tamquam tamque praelaram incohatum relinquire; quamquam non tam dicendi ratio mihi habenda fuit quam audiendi.

57 XXI. Tum Cotta comitavit, ut solebat: Atqui, inquit, Vellei, nisi tu aliquid dixisses, nihil sane ex me quidem audire potuisse. Mihi enim non tam facile in mentem venire solet, quare verum sit aliquid, quam quare falsum; idque cum saepe, tum, cum te audirem, paulo ante contigit. Roges me, qualem naturam deorum esse ducem, nihil fortasse respondeam. Quae ras, putemne talem esse, quals modo a te sit exposita, nihil dicam mihi videri minus. Sed ante quam aggrediad ad ea, quae a te disputata sunt, de te ipso dicam quid sentiam. Saepe enim de familiari illo tuo videor audisse, eum te togatis omnibus sine dubio anteferret et paucos tecum Epicureos et Graccia compararet, sed, quod ab eo te mirifice diligite intellegebat, arbitrabar illum propter benevolentiam ubernius id dicere. Ego autem, etsi vereor laudare praeassertem, judico tamen de re obscura atque difficili a te dictum esse dilucide, neque sententias solum copiose, sed verbis etiam ornatus, quam soleut vestri. Zeno, nem, quem Philo noster coryphaeum appellare Epicureorum solebat, cum Athenis esset, audiebam frequentem, et quidem ipso auctore Philone, credo, ut facilius judicarem, quam illa bene refellerentur, cum a principe Epicureorum accepisset, quem ad modum dicerentur. Non igitur ille, ut plerique, sed isto modo, ut tu, distincte, graviter, ornate. Sed quod in illo mihi usu saepe venit, idem modo, cum te audirem, accedebat ut moleste ferrem tantum ingenium (bona veniam me audies) in tam leves, ne dicam in tam ineptas sententias incidisse. Nec ego nunc ipse aliquid afferam melius. Ut enim modo dixi omnibus fere in rebus, sed maxime in physicis, quid non sit, citius, quam quid sit, dixerim. XXII. Roges me, quid aut

quaeritur primum in ea quaestione, quae est de natura
deorum, sintne di necne sint. "Difficile est negare". Credo, si
in contione quaeratur, sed in hujus modi sermone et consessu
facillimum. Itaque ego ipse pontifex, qui caerimonias religioso-
nesque publicas sanctissime tuendas arbitror, is hoc, quod
primum est, esse deos, persuaderi mihi non opinione solum, sed
etiam ad veritatem plane velim. Multa enim occurrunt, quae
conturbent, ut interdum nulli esse videantur. Sed vide, quam
tecum agam liberaliter; quae communia sunt vobis cum ceteris
philosophis, non attingam, ut hoc ipsum; placet enim omnibus
eis inprimis deos esse. Itaque non pugno;
rationem tamen cam, quae a te affertur, non satis firmam puto.
XXIII. Quod enim omnium gentium generumque hominibus
ita videretur, id satis magnum argumentum esse dixisti, cur
esse deos confereremur. Quod cum leve per se, tum etiam
falsum est. Primum enim unde tibi notae sunt opiniones na-
tionum? Equidem arbitror multas esse gentes sic immanitate
efferatas, ut apud eas nulla suspicio deorum sit. Quid? Dia-
goras ätheos qui dictus est, posteaque Theodorus, nonne aperte
deorum naturam sustulerunt? Nam Abderites quidem Protagoras, cujus a te modo mentio facta est, sophistes temporibus illis vel maximus, cum in principio libri sic posuisset: 'De divis, neque ut sint neque ut non sint, habeo dicere', Athenienium jussu urbe atque agro est exteminatus, librique ejus in contiono combusti. Ex quo equidem existimo tardiores ad hanc sententiam profitendam multos esse factos, quippe cum poenam ne dubitatio quidem effugere potuisset. Quid de sacrilegis, quid de impis perjurisque dicemus?

Tubulus si Lucius umquam,
Si Lupus aut Carbo, Neptuni filius,
ut ait Lucilianus, putasset esse deos, tam perjurum aut tam impurus fuisset? Non est igitur tam explorata ista ratio ad id, quod vultis, confirmandum, quam videtur. Sed quia commune hoc est argumentum aliorum etiam philosophorum, omittam hoc tempore; ad vestra propria venire malo.

Concede esse deos; doce me igitur, unde sint, ubi sint, quales sint corpore, animo, vita; haec enim scire desidero. Abuteris ad omnia atomorum regno et licentia; hisce, quodcumque in solum venit, ut dicitur, effingis atque efficis. Quae primum nullae sunt. Nihil est enim quod vacet corpore; corporibus autem omnis obsidetur locus; ita nullum inane, nihil esse individuum potest. XXIV. Haec ego nunc physicorum oracula fundo, vera an falsa necio, sed veri tamen similiora quam vestra. Ista enim flagitia Democriti, sive etiam ante Leucippi, esse corpuscula quaedam levia, alia aspera, rotunda alia, partim autem angulata et pyramidata, hamata quaedam et

quasi adunca, ex his effectum esse caelum atque terram nulla co-
gente natura, sed concursu quodam fortuito,—hanc tu opinionem,
C. Vellei, usque ad hanc aetatem perduxisisti, priusque te quis de
omni vitae statu quam de ista auctoritate dextercit; ante enim
5 judicasti Epicureum te esse oportere, quam ista cognovisti. Ita
necessae fuit aut haec flagitia concipere animo aut suspense
philosophiae nomen amittere. Quid enim mereas, ut Epicureus 67
esse desinas? 'Nihil equidem', inquis, 'ut rationem vitae beatae
verbatimque deseram'. Ista igitur est veritas? Nam de vita
10 beata nihil repugno, quam tu ne in deo quidem esse censes,
nisi plane otio linguat. Sed ubi est veritas? In mundis,
credo, innumerabilibus, omnibus minimis temporum punctis aliis
nascentibus, aliis cadentibus. An in individuis corpusculis tam
praecella opera nulla moderante natura, nulla ratione fingenti-
15 bus? Sed oblitus liberalitatis meae, qua tecum paulo ante uti
coeperam, plura complector. Concedam igitur ex individuis
constare omnia. Quid ad rem? deorum enim natura quaeritur.
Sint sane ex atomis; non igitur aeterni. Quod enim ex atomis, 68
id natum aliquando est; si natum, nulli dei ante quam nati; et
20 si ortus est deorum, interitus sit necessae est, ut tu paulo ante de
Platonis mundo disputabas. Ubi igitur illud vestrum beatum et
aeternum, quibus duobus verbis significatis deum? quod
cum efficere vultis, in dumeta correptis. Ita enim dicebas,
non corpus esse in deo, sed quasi corpus, nec sanguinem, sed
25 tamquam sanguinem.

XXV. Hoc persaepe facitis, ut, cum aliquid non veri simile 69
dictatis et effugere reprehensionem velitis, afferatis aliiquid, quod omnino ne fieri quidem possit; ut satius fuerit illud ipsum, de quo ambigebatur, concedere, quam tam impudenter resistere. Velut Epicurus cum videret, si atomi ferrentur in locum inferior-rem suopte pondere, nihil fore in nostra potestate, quod esset earum motus certus et necessarius, invenit, quo modo necessita-tem effugere, quod videlicet Democritum fugerat; ait atomum, cum pondere et gravitate directo deorsum feratur, declinare pau-
70 lulum. Hoc dicere turpius est quam illud, quod vult, non posse defendere. Idem facit contra dialecticos; a quibus cum tradi-
tum sit in omnibus disjunctionibus, in quibus ‘aut etiam aut
non’ poneretur, alterum utrum esse verum, pertimuit, ne, si concessum esset hujus modi aliiquid, ‘Aut vivet eras aut non
vivet Epicurus’, alterutrum fieret necessarium: totum hoc
‘aut etiam aut non’ negavit esse necessarium; quo quid dici 15
potuit obtusius? Urgebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum ipse falsa
omnia diceret, quae sensibus viderentur, Zeno autem non nulla
visa esse falsa, non omnia; timuit Epicurus, ne, si unum visum
esse falsum, nullum esset verum: omnes sensus veri nuntios
dixit esse. Nihil horum nimis callide; graviorem enim plagam 20
accipiebat, ut leviorem repelleret. Idem facit in natura deorum;
dum individuorum corporum concretionem fugit, ne interitus
dissipatio consequatur, negat esse corpus deorum, sed tam-
quam corpus, nec sanguinem, nec tamquam sanguinem. XXVI.
Mirabile videtur, quod non rideat haruspex, cum haruspiciem 25
viderit; hoc mirabilius, quod vos inter vos risum tenere possitis.
‘Non est corpus, sed quasi corpus’. Hoc intellegerem quale
esset, si in ceris diceretur aut fictilibus figuris; in deo quid sit
‘quasi corpus’ aut ‘quasi sanguis’, intellegere non possum; ne tu

8 directo Mn. (Adn. Cr.), directo mss generally Or, Ba, Sch. deorsus
ABEP, deorsum CU Mus. 11 disjunctionibus EU Asc. CIV, disjunctionibus
or devinctionibus mss generally, disjunctionibus edd. cf. § 41. 12 alterum
utrum XBK, alterutrum CLU+Sch. esse verum TUL+, esset verum XBKM.
14 alterutrum fieret edd., alt. fieri mss. 20 nimis callide Allen, h callide K,
nisi callide CECB, nisi valde ABPVUT+, nisi calide Dav., nisi calide Kl., nisi
valide Kreuzer. 26 quod vos Asc. CRMN, quem vos XBK+. 28 si mss
diceretur Ed. see Comm., fingeretur mss and edd. 29 corpus aut quasi
OTU[B], om. ACEP'BHKNC.
quidem, Vellei, sed non vis fateri. Ista enim a vobis quasi 72
dictata redduntur, quae Epicurus oscitans halucinatus est, cum
quidem gloriaretur, ut videmus in scriptis, se magistrum habu-
isse nullum. Quod et non praedicanti tamen facile equidem
crederem, sicut mali aedificii domino gloriante se architectum
non habuisse; nihil enim olet ex Academia, nihil ex Lyceo,
nihil ne e puerilibus quidem disciplinis. Xenocraten audire
potuit, quem virum, di immortales! et sunt qui putent audisse;
ipse non vult; credo plus nemi. Pamphilum quendam, Pla-
tonis auditorum, ait a se Sami auditum; ibi enim adulescens
habitat cum patre et fratribus, quod in eam pater ejus Neocles
agripeta venerat; sed cum agellus cum non satis aleret, ut
opinor, ludi magister fuit. Sed hunc Platonicum mirifice con-
temnit Epicurus; ita metuit, ne quid umquam didicisse videatur.
In Nausiphane Democriteo tenetur; quem cum a se non neget
auditum, vexat tamen omnibus contumeliis. Atqui si haec
Democritae non audisset, quid audierat? quid est in physicus
Epicuri non a Democrito? Nam etsi quaedam commutavit, ut
quod Paulo ante de inclinatione atomorum dixi, tamen pleraque
dicit eadem, atomos, inane, imagines, infinitatem locorum innum-
merabilitatemque mundorum, eorum ortus, interitus, omnia fere,
quibus naturae ratio continetur. Nunc istuc 'quasi corpus' et
'quasi sanguinem' quid intellegis? Ego enim te scire ista 74
melius quam me non fateor solum, sed etiam facile patior; cum
25 quidem semel dicta sunt, quid est, quod Velleius intelligere
possit, Cotta non possit? Itaque corpus quid sit, sanguis quid
sit, intellego; quasi corpus et quasi sanguis, quid sit, nullo pror-
sus modo intellego. Neque tu me celas, ut Pythagoras solebat
alienos, nec consulta dicis occulte tamquam Heraclitus, sed
30 (quod inter nos liceat) ne tu quidem intellegis. XXVII. Illud 75
DE NATURA DEORUM.

video pugnare te, species ut quaedam sit deorum, quae nihil concreti habeat, nihil solidi, nihil expressi, nihil eminentis, sitque pura, levis, per lucida. Dicemus igitur idem, quod in Venere Coa: corpus illud non est, sed simile corporis, nec ille fusus et cundore mixtus rubor sanguis est, sed quaedam sanguinis similitudo; sic in Epicureo deo non res, sed similitudines rerum esse. Fac id, quod ne intellegi quidem potest, mihi esse persuasum; cedo mihi istorum adumbbratorum deorum lineamenta atque formas.

Non deest hoc loco copia rationum, quibus docere velitis humanas esse formas deorum; primum quod ita sit informatum anticipatumque mentibus nostris, ut homini, cum de deo cogitet, forma occurrat humanum; sed etiam rationem fictam, ut non videret species istas hominum collatas in deos aut consilio quodam sapientium, quo facilius animos imperitorum ad deorum cultum a vitae pravitate converterent, aut superstitione, ut essent simulacra, quae venerantes deos ipsos se adire crederent? Auxerunt autem haec eadem poëtac, pictores, opifices; erat enim non facile agentes aliquid et molientes deos in aliarum formarum imitatione servare. Accessit etiam ista opinio fortasse, quod homini homine pulchrius nihil videatur. Sed tu hoc, physice, non vides, quam blanda conciliatrix et quasi sit luna natura? An putas ullam esse terra marique belum, quae non sui generis belua maxime delectetur? Quod ni ita esset, cur non gestiret


25 Constiteram exorientem Auroram forte salutans,
Cum subito a laeva Roscius exoritur.
Pace mihi liceat, caelestes, dicere vestra,
Mortalis visust pulchrior esse deo.

Huic deo pulchrior; at erat, sicuti hodie est, perversissimis oculis.

30 Quid refert, si hoc ipsum salsum illi et venustum videbatur?

80 Redeo ad deos. XXIX. Ecquos, si non tam strabones, at pactulos esse arbitramur? ecquos naevum habere? ecquos silos, flaccos, frontones, capitones, quae sunt in nobis? an omnia emendata in illis? Detur id vobis; num etiam una est omnium facies? nam si plures, aliam esse alia pulchriorem necesse est. Igitur aliquis non pulcherrimus deus. Si una omnium facies est, flores in caelo Academiam necesse est; si enim nilili inter deum et deum differt, nulla est apud deos cognitio, nulla perceptio. Quid, si etiam, Vellei, falsum illud omnino est, nullam aliam nobis de deo cogitantibus speciem nisi hominis occurrere? tam tamenne ista tam absurdâ defendes? Nobis fortasse sic occurrit, ut dicis; a parvis enim Jovem, Junonem, Minervam, Neptunum, Vulcanum, Apollinem reliquisque deos ea facie novimus, qua pictores fictoresque voluerunt, neque solum facie, sed etiam ornatu, acetate, vestitu; at non Aegyptii nec Syri nec fere cuncta barbaria; firmiores enim video apud cos opiniones esse de bestiis quibusdam quam apud nos de sanctissims templis et simulacris deorum. Etenim fana multa spoliata et simulacra deorum de locis sanctissimis ablata videmus a nostris; at vero ne fando quidem auditum est crocodilum aut ibim aut faciem violatum ab Aegyptio. Quid igitur censes? Apim illum, sanctum Aegyptiorum bovem, nonne deum videri Aegyptiis? Tam hercle quam tibi illam vestram Sospitam, quam tu numquam ne in sonnis quidem vides nisi cum pelle caprina, cum hasta, cum scutulo, cum calceolis repandis. At non est talis Argiva nec Romana Juno. Ergo alia species Junonis Argivis, alia Lanuvinis, alia nobis. Et quidem alia nobis Capitolini, alia

1 ecquos corr. from etquos B, et quos ACEBH +, et quasi Asc. 2 ecquos—

Atheniensium caderet, verbis reliquisse deos, re sustulisse. Itaque in illis selectis ejus brevibusque sententiis, quas appellatis κυπίας δόξας, haec, ut opinor, prima sententia est: 'Quod beatum et immortale est, id nec habet nec exhibet cuiquam negotium'. XXXI. In haec ita exposita sententia sunt qui existiment, quod ille inscitia plane loquendi fecerat, fecisse consulto; de homine minime vafro male existimant. Dubium est enim, utrum dicat aliquid esse beatum et immortale an, si quid sit. Non animadvertunt hic eum ambigue locutum esse, sed multis aliis locis et illum et Metrodorum tam aperte quam paulo ante te. Illo vero deos esse putat, nec quemquam vidi, qui magis ea, quae timenda esse negaret, timeret, mortem dico et deos. Quibus mediocres homines non ita valde moventur, his ille clamat omnium mortalium mentes esse perterritas. Tot milia latrocinantur morte proposita, aliis omnia, quae possunt, fana compilant. Credo, aut illos mortis timor terret aut hos religionis.

Sed quoniam non audes (jam enim cum ipso Epicuro loquant) negare esse deos, quid est, quod te impediat aut solem aut mundum aut mentem aliam quam sempiternam in deorum numero ponere? 'Numquam vidi', inquit, 'animam rationis consilique participem in ulla alia nisi humana figura'. Quid? solis numquidnam aut lunam aut quinque errantium siderum simile vidisti? Sol duabus unius orbis ultimis partibus definiens motum cursus annuos conficit; hujus hanc lustrationem ejusdem incensa radiis mensu spatio luna compleat; quinque autem stellae eundem orbem tenentes, aliae propius a terris, aliae remotius, ab isdem principiis disparibus temporibus eadem spatia conficiunt. Num quid tale, Epicure, vidisti? Ne sit
igitur sol, ne luna, ne stellae, quoniam nihil esse potest, nisi quod attigimus aut vidimus. Quid? deum ipsum numne vidisti? Cur igitur credis esse? Omnia tollamus ergo, quae aut historia nobis aut ratio nova affert. Ita fit, ut mediterranei 5 mare esse non credant. Quae sunt tantae animi angustiae? Ut, si Seriphi natus esse nec umquam egressus ex insula, in qua lepusculos vulpeculasque saepe vidisses, non crederes leones et pantheras esse, cum tibi, quales essent, diceretur; si vero de elephanto quis diceret, etiam rideri te putares. An quiquam (97) 10 tam puerile dici potest (ut eundem locus diutius urgeam), quam si ea genera belurarum, quae in rubro mari Indiave gignuntur, nulla esse dicamus? Atqui ne curiosissimi quidem homines exquiendo audire tam multa possunt, quam sunt multa, quae terra, mari, paludibus, fluminibus exsistunt; quae 15 negemus esse, quia numquam vidimus.


NATURA DEORUM.

video te venisse gradibus; a ratione ad humanam figuram quo modo accedis? Pracepitare istue quidem est, non descendere. Nec vero intellego, cur maluerit Epicurus deos hominum similes dicere quam homines deorum. Quaeres, quid intersit; si enim hoc illi simile sit, esse illud huic. Video; sed hoe dico, non ab hominibus formae figuram venisse ad deos; di enim semper fuerunt, nati numquam sunt, siquidem acerni sunt futuri; at homines nati; ante igitur humana forma quam homines ea, qua erant figura di immortales. Non ergo illorum humana forma, sed nostra divina dicenda est. Verum hoc quidem, ut voletis; illud quaero, quae fuerit tanta fortuna (nihil enim ratione in rerum natura factum esse vultis), sed tamen quis iste tantus casus? unde tam felix concursus atomorum, ut repente homines deorum forma nasciderunt?

Verum hoc quidem, ut voletis; illud quaero, quae fuerit tanta fortuna (nihil enim ratione in rerum natura factum esse vultis), sed tamen quis iste tantus casus? unde tam felix concursus atomorum, ut repente homines deorum forma nasciderunt?

Seminane deorum decidisse de caelo putamus in terras, et sic homines patrum similis exstitisse? Vellum diceretis; deorum cognitionem agnoscerem non invitus. Nihil tale dicitis, sed casu esse factum, ut essemus similis deorum. Et nunc argumenta quaerenda sunt, quibus hoc refellatur! Utinam tam facile vera invenire possim quam falsa convincere!

XXXIII. Etenim enumerasti memoriter et copiose, ut mili quidem admirari liberet in homine esse Romano tantam scientiam, usque a Thale Milesio de deorum natura philosophorum sententias. Omnesne tibi illi delirare visi sunt, qui sine manibus et pedibus constare deum posse decreverint? Ne hoc quidem vos movet considerantes, quae sit utilitas quaerendae humanis deos esse? Quid enim pedibus opus est sine ingressu? quid manibus, si nihil comprehendendum est? quid reliqua discriptione omnium corporis partium? in qua nihil inane, nihil sine causa, nihil supervacaneum est [; itaque nulla ars imitari sollertiam naturae potest]. Habebit igitur linguam deus et non loquetur, dantes, palatum, fauces nullum ad usum,
quaeque procreationis causa natura corpori affinxit, ea frustra habebit deus, nec externa magis quam interna, cor, pulmones, jecur, cetera, quae detracta utilitate quid habent venustatis? quandoquidem haec esse in deo propter pulchritudinem vultis.

5  Istisne fidentes somniis non modo Epicurus et Metrodorus et Hermarchus contra Pythagoram, Platonem Empedoclemque dixerunt, sed meretricula etiam Leontium contra Theophrastum scribere ausa est? scito illa quidem sermone et Attico, sed tamen. Tantum Epicuri hortus habuit licentiae. Et soletis quier; Zeno quidem etiam litigabat. Quid dicam Albucium? Nam Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius; sed stomachabatur senex, si quid asperius dixeram, cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime, Phaedoni Socratico turpissime male dixerit, Metrodori, sodalis sui, fratrem, Timocratem, quia nescio quid in philosophia dissentiret, totis voluminibus considerit, in Democritum ipsum, quem secutus est, fuerit ingratus, Nausiphonem magistrum suum, a quo nihil didicerat, tam male accepere.

10  XXXIV. Zeno quidem non eos solum, qui tum erant, Apollodorum, Silum, ceteros, figebat maledictis, sed Socratem ipsum, parentem philosophiae, Latino verbo utens scurrum Atticum fuisses dicebat, Chrysippum numquam nisi Chrysippam vocabat. Tu ipse paulo ante, cum tamquam senatum philosophorum recitares, summus viros desipere, delirare, dementes esse dicebas. Quorum si nemo verum vidit de natura deorum, verendum est, ne nulla sit omnino.

Nam ista, quae vos dicitis, sunt tota commenticia, vix digna lucubratione anicularum; non enim sentitis, quam multa vobis suscipienda sint, si impetraritis, ut concedamus eandem hominem esse et deorum figuram. Omnis cultus et curatio corporis erit eadem adhibenda deo, quae adhibetur homini, ingressus, cursus, accubitio, inclinatio, sessio, comprehensio, ad extremum etiam sermo et oratio. Nam quod et mares deos et feminas esse dicitis, quid sequatur, videtis. Equidem mirari satis non pos-

8 est B¹C, sit AB²EBK +.  17 nihil mss generally, non nihil N Red. edd. after Pearce.  19 Silum CBK, Sillum UHMR +, sillum A, Sylillum Asc. + Sch., sive BE.  21 Chrysippam AUG, Chrisippam BH²K², crisippam CECO, chry-

sippum BH²K¹, cesippum V Asc., Chesippum Dav. Heind.

M. C.
sum, unde ad instas opiniones vester ille princeps venerit. Sed 
clamare non desinitis retinendum hoc esse, deus ut beatus 
immortalisque sit. Quid autem obstat, quo minus sit beatus, si 
on sit bipes? aut ista, sive beatitas sive beatitudo dicenda est 
(utrumque omnino durum, sed usu mollienda nobis verba sunt), 
verum ea, quaeccumque est, cur aut in solem illum aut in hunc 
mundum aut in aliquid mentem acternam figura membrisque 
corporvis vacuam cadere non potest? Nihil aliud dieis nisi: 
‘Numquam vidi solem aut mundum beatum’. Quid? mundum 
practer hunc unquamne vidisti? Negabis. Cur igitur non 
sehena milia esse mundorum, sed innumerabilia ausus es 
dicere? ‘Ratio docuit’. Ergo hoc te ratio non docuit, cum 
praestantissima natura quaeratur, eaque beata et 
aeterna (quae 
sola divina natura est), ut immortalitate vincamur ab ea 
natura, sic animi praestantia Vinci, etque animi, item 
corpus? Cur igitur, cum ceteris rebus inferiores simus, 
forma pares sumus? ad similitudinem enim deorum propius 
accedebat humana virtus 
quam figura. XXXV. Ipsa vero quam nihil ad rem pertinet, 
quae vos delactat maxime, similitudo! Quid? canis nonne 
similis lupo? atque, ut Ennii,
Simia quam similis, turpissuma bestia, nobis!
at mores in utroque dispares. Elephanto beluarum nulla pru- 
dentior; at figura quae vastior? De bestiis loquor; quid? inter 
ipsos homines nonne et similitibus formis dispares mores 
et moribus paribus figura dissimilis? Etenim si semel, Vellci, 
suscipimus genus hoc argumenti, attende, quo scerpat. Tu enim 
suaca nisi in hominis figura rationem inesse non posse; 
sum et alius nisi in terrestri, nisi in eo, qui natus sit, nisi in eo,
qui adoleverit, nisi in eo, qui didicerit, nisi in eo, qui ex animo constet et corpore caduco et infirmo, postremo nisi in homine atque mortali. Quodsi in omnibus his rebus obsistis, quid est, quod te forma una conturbet? His enim omnibus, quae posuist, adjunctis in homine rationem esse et mentem videbas; quibus detractis deum tamen nosse te dicis, modo liniamenta maneant. Hoc est non considerare, sed quasi sortiri, quid loquare. Nisi forte non hoc quidem attendis, non modo in homine, sed etiam in arbore, quicquid supervacaneum sit aut usum non habeat, obstare. Quam molestum est uno digito plus habere! Quid ita? Quia nec ad speciem nec ad usum alium quinque desiderant. Tuus autem deus non digito uno redundat, sed capite, colo, cervicibus, alvo, tergo, poplitibus, manibus, pedibus, feminibus, cruribus. Si, ut imm mortalis sit, quid haec ad vitam membra pertinent? quid ipsa facies? Magis illa, cerebrum, cor, pulmones, jecur; haec enim sunt domicilia vitae; oris quidem habitus ad vitae firmitatem nihil pertinent.

XXXVI. Et eos vituperabas, qui ex operibus magnificis atque praeclaris, cum ipsum mundum, cum ejus membra, caelum, terras, maria, cumque horum insignia, solem, lunam stellasque, vidissent, cumque temporum maturitates, mutationes vicissitudinesque cognovissent, suspicati essent aliquam excellentem esse praestantemque naturam, quae haec effecisset, moveret, regeret, gubernaret. Qui etiamsi aberrant a conjectura, video tamen, quid sequantur; tu quod opus tandem magnum et egregium habes, quod effectum divina mente videatur, ex quo esse deos suspicere? Habebam, inquis, in animo insitam informationem quandam dei. Et barbati quidem Jovis, galeatae Minervae; num igitur esse tales putas? Quanto melius haec vulgus imperitorum, qui non membra solum hominis deo tribuant, sed usum etiam membrorum. Dant enim

arcum, sagittas, hastam, elipeum, fusciam, fulmen, et si, actiones quae sint deorum, non vident, nihil agentem tamen deum non quent cogitare. Ipsi, qui irridentur, Aegyptii nulla belua nisi ob aliquam utilitatem, quam ex ea caperent, reconsideraverunt; velut ibis maximum vim serpentium conficiunt, cum sint aves excelsae, cruribus rigidis, corneo proceroque rostro; avertunt pestem ut illae nec morsu vivae nec odore mortuae. Possum de ichneumonis utilitate, de crocodilorum, de faelium dicere, sed nolo esse longum. Ita concludam, tamen beluas a barbaris propter beneficium consecratas, vestrorum deorum non modo beneficium nullum exstare, sed ne factum quidem omnino. Nihil habet, inquit, negotii. Profecto Epicurus quasi pueri delicati nullo cessatione melius existimat. 

XXXVII. At ipsi tamen pueri, etiam cum cessant, exercitatione aliqua ludicra delectantur; deum sic feriatum voluimus cessatione torpere, ut, si se commoverit, vereamur, ne beatus esse non possit? Hace oratio non modo deos spoliat motu et actione divina, sed etiam homines inertes efficit, siquidem agens aliquid ne deus quidem esse beatus potest. Verum sit sane, ut vultis, deus effigies hominis et imago; quod ejus est domicilium? quae sedes? qui locus? quae deinde actio vitae? quibus rebus, id quod vultis, beatus est? utatur enim suis bonis oportet et fruatur, qui beatus futurus est. Nam locus quidem iis etiam naturis, quae sine animis sunt, suus est cuique proprius, ut terra infimum teneat, hanc inundet aqua, superior ærei, aetheris ignibus altissima ora reddatur. Bestiarum autem terrenaæ sunt aliae, partim aquatiles, aliae quasi anciptes in utraque sede viventes; sunt quaedam etiam, quae igne nasci putantur appareantque in ardentibus fornacibus saepe volantates. Quaero igitur, vester deus primum ubi habi-
tet, deinde quae causa eum loco moveat, si modo movetur aliqua, porro, cum hoc proprium sit animantium, ut aliquid appetat, quod sit naturae accommodatum, deus quid appetat, ad quam denique rem motu mentis ac ratione utatur, postremo quo modo beatus sit, quo modo aeternus. Quicquid enim horum attigeris, ulcus est. Ita male instituta ratio exitum reperire non potest. Sic enim dicebas, speciem dei percipi cogitatione, non sensu, nec esse in ea ullum soliditatem, neque eandem ad numerum permanere, eamque esse ejus visionem, ut similitudine et transitione cernatur, neque deficiat umquam ex infinitis corporibus similium accessio, ex eoque fieri, ut in haec intenta mens nostra beatam illum naturam et sempiternam putet. XXXVIII. Hoc, per ipsos deos, de quibus loquimur, quale tandem est? Nam si tantum modo ad cogitationem valent nec habent ullum soliditatem nec eminentiam, quid interest, utrum de Hippocentauro an de deo cogitemus? Omnem enim talem conformationem animi ceteri philosophi motum inanem vocant, vos autem adventum in animos et introitum imaginum dicitis. Ut igitur Ti. Gracchum cum videor contionantem in Capitolio videre de M. Octavio deferentem sitellam, tum eum motum animi dico esse inanem, tu autem et Gracchi et Octavii imaginem remanere, quae, in Capitolium cum pervenerint, tum ad animum meum referantur; hoc idem fieri in deo, cujus crebra facie pellantur animi, ex quo esse beati atque aeterni intelli-gantur. Fac imaginem esse, quibus pulsantur animi; species dumtaxat objicitur quaedam; num etiam, cur ea beata sit, cur aeterna? Quae autem istae imaginem vestrae aut unde? A Democrito omnino haec licentia; sed et ille reprehensus a multis est, nec vos exitum reperitis, totalque res vacillat et claudicat. Nam quid est, quod minus probari possit? Omnium


108 Quid, quod ejusdem hominis in meum aliae, aliae in tuum? quid, quod earum rerum, quae numquam omnino fuerunt neque esse potuerunt, ut Scyllae, ut Chimaeræ? quid, quod hominum, locorum, urbis carum, quaæ numquam vidimus? quid, quod, 10 simul ac nili collibitum est, præsto est imago? quid, quod etiam ad dormientem veniunt invocatae? Tota res, Vellei, nugatoria est. Vos autem non modo oculis imagines, sed etiam animis inculcatis. Tanta est impunitas garriendi, XXXIX. At quam licenter! 'Fluentium frequenter transitio fit visionum, ut e multis una videatur'. Puderet me dicere non intellegere, si vos ipsi intellegerevis, qui ista defenditis. Quo modo enim probas continenter imaginès ferri? aut, si continenter, quo modo acertæae? 'Innumerabilis', inquit, 'suppeditat atomorum'. Num eadem ergo ista faciet, ut sint omnia sempiterna? Con- 20 fugis ad aequilibritatem (sic enim ἰσονομίαν, si placet, appelle- mus) et ais, quoniam sit natura mortalis, immortalis etiam esse oportere. Isto modo, quoniam homines mortales sunt, sint aliqui immortales, et quoniam nascuntur in terra, nascuntur in aqua. 'Et quia sunt quae interimant, sunt quae conservent'. Sint 25 sane, sed ea conservent, quae sunt; deos istos esse non sentio.

Omnis tamen ista rerum effigies ex individuis quo modo cor-
poribus oritur? quae etiam si essent (quae nulla sunt), pellere se
ipsa et agitari inter se concursu fortasse possent, formare, figu-
rare, colorare, animare non possent. Nullo igitur modo immor-
talem deum efficitis. XL. Videamus nunc de beato. Sine
virtute certe nullo modo; virtus autem actuosa, et deus vester
nihil agens; expres virtutis igitur; ita ne beatus quidem.
Quae ergo vita? 'Suppeditatio', inquis, 'bonorum nullo malorum
interventu'. Quorum tandem bonorum? Voluptatum, credo;

denem ad corpus pertinentium; nullam enim novistis nisi pro-
jectam a corpore et redenuntem ad corpus animi voluptatem.
Non arbitror te, Vellei, similem esse Epicureorum reliquorum,
quos pudeat quarundam Epicuri vocum, quibus ille testatur se
ne intellegere quidem ulla bonum, quod sit sejunctum a deli-
catis et obscenis voluptatibus; quas quidem non erubescens
persequitur omnes nominatim. Quem cibum igitur aut quas
potiones aut quas vocum aut florum varietates aut quos tactus,
quos odores adhibebis ad deos, ut eos perfundas voluptatibus?
ut poëtae quidem [nectar ambrosiam] epulas comparant et aut
Juventatem aut Ganymedem poca ministrantem; tu autem,
Epicure, quid facies? Neque enim, unde habeat ista deus tuus,
video, nec quo modo utatur. Locupletior igitur hominum
natura ad beate vivendum est quam deorum, quod pluribus
generibus fruitur voluptatum. At has leviores ducis voluptates,
quibus quasi titillatio (Epicuri enim hoc verbum est) adhibetur
sensibus. Quousque ludis? Nam etiam Philo noster ferre non
poterat asperrnari Epicureos molles et delicatas voluptates;

1 ex individuis Herv. 2 V, ex divinis La and M of Moser, ex divinis mss
generally. 2 quae nulla sunt UTO[B], om. ACHCRBK + Sch. Or. Ba., que
nulla sunt trans. after corporum E. 3 ipsa Asc. CR, ipsa ADEBK, ipsae C.
agitare conj. Mu. 12 Vellei MRVU +, velle XBK. 13 pudeat mss, non
pudeat edd. after Lamb. quarundam Kl. Sch. Mu. after Lachmann on Lucr.
116, earundem (for earundem=quarundam, see Mu. Adn. Cr. on the interchange
of e and c) CUCMRV Herv. Asc. +, corum DOL Or. Ba., eadem ABK, codem E,
Sch. epulas mss generally, epulis UILNO Asc. Heind., in epulas J. S. Reid
conj. 20 juventatem [AI] BK, juventutem CE. 26 nam etiam Philo G,
nam enim Philo (or filo) XBK +, nam Philo LRVY.
DE NATURA DEORUM.

summa enim memoria pronuntiabat plurimas Epicuri sententias iis ipsis verbis, quibus erant scriptae; Metrodori vero, qui est Epicuri collega sapientiae, multa impudentiora recitabat; accusat enim Timocratem, fratrem summ, Metrodorus, quod dubitet omnia, quae ad beatam vitam pertinent, ventre metiri, neque id semel dicit, sed saepius. Annuere te video; nota enim tibi sunt; proferrem libros, si negares. Neque nunc reprehendo, quod ad voluptatem omnia referantur (alia est ea quaestio), sed doceo deos deos esse voluptatis exspectes, ita vestro judicio ne beatos quidem. XLI. At dolore vacant. Satin est id ad illam abundantem bonis vitam beatissimam? Cogitat, inquit, assidue beatum esse se; habet enim nihil aliud, quod agitet in mente. Comprehende igitur anirno et propone ante oculos deum nihil aliud in omnino aeternitate nisi Mihi pulchre est et Ego beatus sum cogitantem. Nee tamen video, quo modo non videatur iste deus beatus, ne intereat, cum sine ulla intermissione pulsetur agiteturque atomorum incursione sempiterna, cumque ex ipso imaginibus semper affluant. Ita nec beatus est vester deus nec acernus.

At etiam de sanctitate, de pietate adversus deos libros scripsit Epicurus. At quo modo in his loquitur? Ut Ti. Coruncanium aut P. Scaevolam, pontifices maximos, te audire dicas, non eum, qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem, nec manibus, ut Xerxes, sed rationibus deorum immortalium templum et aras evertet. Quid est enim, cur deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, cum di non modo homines non colant, sed omnino nihil eurent, nihil agant? At est eorum eximia quaedam praestansque natura, ut ea debeat ipsa per se ad se colendam allicere sapientem. An quicquam eximium potest esse in ea natura, quae sua voluptate lactans nihil nec actura sit umquam neque

2 his BR, his MSS generally. 10 at A\(3\)CBK+, a A\(5\)BE0HC. 14 pulchre Asc. CEHLOCO, pulchro XBKM. 15 cogitantem here K ends. 16 non vereatur ABHLO Sch. Mu., non moveatur CEB, videatur MRCVU Asc., non pereat Or. Ba., non contereatur Madv. ne intereat B Sch. Mu., om. ACE Mus. Or. Ba., Heind. suggests quomodo videatur sibi iste deus beatus, aut quomodo non vereatur, ne intereat, Allen quo modo sibi videatur i. d. b. nec, ne intereat, vereatur. 21 Ti. edd. after Heind., om. MSS. 28 allicere GHRV, allicere U, elicere XOB+. 30 voluptate UOLMNVR, voluptate XTBC+.
agat neque egerit? Quae porro pietas ei debetur, a quo nihil acceperis? aut quid omnino, cujus nullum meritum sit, ei debere potest? Est enim pietas justitia adversum deos; cum quibus quid potest nobis esse juris, cum homini nulla cum deo sit communitas? Sanctitas autem est scientia calendorum deorum; qui quam ob rem colendi sint, non intellego, nullo nec accepto ab ipsis nec sperato bono.

XLII. Quid est autem, quod deos veneremur propter ad mirationem ejus naturae, in qua egregium nihil videmus? Nam superstitione, quod gloriaris soletis, facile est liberari, cum sustuleris omnem vim deorum; nisi forte Diagoram aut Theodorum, qui omnino deos esse negabant, censes superstitiosos esse potuisse. Ego ne Protagoram quidem, cui neutrum licuerit, nec esse deos nec non esse. Horum enim sententiae omnium non modo superstitionem tollunt, in qua inest timor inanis deorum, sed etiam religionem, quae deorum cultu pio continetur. Quid? ii, qui dixerunt totam de dis immortalibus opinionem factam esse ab hominibus sapientibus rei publicae causa, ut, quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium religio ducaret, nonne omnem religionem funditus sustulerunt? Quid? Prodicus Cius, qui ea, quae prodessent hominum vitae, deorum in numero habita esse dixit, quam tandem religionem reliquit? Quid? qui aut fortes aut claros aut potentem viros tradunt post mortem ad deos pervenisse, eosque esse ipsos, quos nos colere, precari venerarique solemus, nonne expertes sunt religionum omnium? quae ratio maxime tractata ab Euhemero est, quem noster et interpretatus et secutus est praeter ceteros Ennius. Ab Euhemero autem et mortes et sepulturae demonstrantur deorum. Utrum igitur hic confirmasse videtur religionem an penitus totam sustulisse?

Omittio Eleusinem sanctam illam et augustam,

Ubi initiantur gentes orarum ultimae,
praetereo Samothraciam eaque, quae Lemni
Nocturno aditu occulta coluntur,
Silvestribus saepibus densa.

Quibus explicatis ad rationemque revocatis rerum magis natura
conscieitur quam deorum.

120 XLIII. Mihi quidem etiam Democritus, vir magnus in pri-
missis, cujus fontibus Epicurus hortulos suos irrigavit, nutare
videtur in natura deorum. *Tum enim censet imagines divini-
tate praeditas inesse in universitate rerum, tum principia men-
tis, quae sint in codem universo, deos esse dicit, tum animantes*
imagines, quae vel prodesse nobis soleant vel nocere, tum ingen-
tes quasdam imagines tantasque, ut universum mundum com-
pletantur extrinsecus; quae quidem omnia sunt patria Demo-
criti quam Democrito digniora. *Quis enim istas imagines com-
prehendere animo potest?quis admirari?quis aut cultu aut*
religione dignas judicare? *Epicurus vero ex animis hominum*
extraxit radicitus religionem, cum dis immortalibus et opem et
gratia sustulit. *Cum enim optimam et praestantissimam*
naturam dei dicat esse, negat idem esse in deo gratiam; tollit
id, quod maxime proprium est optima praestantissimaeque
naturae. Quid enim melius aut quid praestantius bonitate et
beneficentia? Qua cum carere deum vultis, neminem deo nec
deum nec hominem carum, neminem ab eo amari, neminem
diligi vultis. *Ita fit, ut non modo homines a dis, sed ipsi di
inter se ab aliis alii neglegantur.* XLIV. Quanto Stoici melius, 25
qui a vobis reprehenduntur! Censent autem sapientes sapien-
tibus etiam ignorantis esse amicos. Nihil est enim virtute amabi-
lus; quam qui adeptus erit, ubicunque erit gentium, a nobis
diligetur. *Vos autem quid mali datis, cum in imbecillitate*
gratificationem et benevolentiam ponitis! Ut enim omittam 30
vim et naturae deorum, ne homines quidem censetis, nisi imbe-

tate Lamb., inimbecillitate G Moser's MN, inimbecillitate ABUT, inimbecillatatem CE Mus.
cilli essent, futuros beneficos et benignos fuisse? Nulla est caritas naturalis inter bonos? Carum ipsum verbum est amoris, ex quo amicitiae nomen est ductum; quam si ad fructum nostrum referamus, non ad illius commoda, quem diligimus, non erit ista amicitia, sed mercatura quaedam utilitatum suarum. Prata et arva et pecudum greges diliguntur isto modo, quod fructus ex iis capiuntur; hominum caritas et amicitia gratuita est. Quanto igitur magis deorum, qui nulla re egentes et inter se diligunt et hominibus consulunt! Quod ni ita sit, quid veneramur, quid precamur deos? cur sacris pontifices, cur auspiciis augures praesunt? quid optamus a dis immortalibus? quid vocamus?

At etiam liber est Epicuri de sanctitate. Ludimur ab homine non tam faceto quam ad scribendi licentiam libero. Quae enim potest esse sanctitas, si di humana non curant? quae autem animans natura nihil curans? Verius est igitur nimium illud, quod familiaris omnium nostrum Posidonius disseruit in libro quinto de natura deorum, nullos esse deos Epicuro videri, quaeque is de dis immortalibus dixerit, invidiae detestandae gratia dixisse. Neque enim tam desipiens fuisse, ut homunculi similem deum fingeret, liniamentis duntaxat extremis, non habitu solido, membris hominis præeditum omnibus, usu membro rum ne minimo quidem, exilem quemad atque per lucidum, nihil cuiquam tribuentem, nihil gratificantem, omnino nihil curantem, nihil agentem. Quae natura primum nulla esse potest, idque videns Epicurus re tollit, oratione relinquit deos. Deinde, si maxime talis est deus, ut nulla gratia, nulla hominum caritate teneatur, valeat; quid enim dicam ‘propitius sit’? Esse enim propitius potest nemini, quoniam, ut dicitis, omnis in imbecillitate est et gratia et caritas.

PREFACE TO THE COLLATIONS.

The following is Mr Swainson's account of the MSS and editions collated by him.

B. Burney MS No. 148, small quarto, parchment, probably belongs to the 13th century, but appears from the handwriting to be copied from a MS of the 11th. This is the best of the British Museum MSS. It agrees closely with Orelli's Cod. C. (the Leyden MS 118), which belongs to the 12th century; thus in i 25 both omit adiuxit, i 26 for descriptionem both have discrepationem, i 36 for pertinentem, pertinentem, i 95 for bipes, impes, ii 37 quodque... expletumque sit om., ii 147 spicuarem for disputarem, iii 86 protulissem for P. Rutilii sim. [Add i § 17 fretum for aequum, § 18 descendens sed for descendisset, § 23 naturam intelligentis, § 25 curaque for cur aquae, § 37 sentias qui for sententia est qui, § 43 nec intelligi quicquam om., § 63 a parte for aperte, § 66 foramata for pyramidata, § 81 Junonem om., § 82 censes apud nullum for censes Apim illum, § 85 GR. added after sententiae, § 93 Silum, § 102 ratio for oratio, § 115 exeres for Xerxes. Ed.] The De Legibus which follows is styled "De iure ciuili et naturali iusticia." (Written in Italy.)

H. Harleian MS 2465, late 15th cent. Parchment for the first 21 folios, the rest paper written in a different and later hand commencing with -pites of ancipites in i 103. Followed by "li- bellus de mondi essentia," i.e. Timaeus. A parchment leaf at the end (part of a legal instrument) gives the date 1418. The first part agrees mainly with Cod. G. of Moser; thus both give causarum for rerum in i 9, Jouem ignem for Jouem in i 40, insert immittendique after minuendi in i 35. It has also much in common with Cod. Red. of Heindorf. Where it is corrected it is often impossible to decipher the original reading, and, as many of the corrections are
wrong, this is to be regretted. The paper part of the MS. agrees most closely with Cod. Fa. of Moser and Cod. Glog. of Heindorf, e.g. in 1 106 dissentem for decretum sitellum. (Written in Italy.)

I. Harleian ms 2511, 15th cent. Parchment quarto very clearly written. Followed by the *De Divinatione* of which Book II is styled "De Fato," at the end of this is *Finis*, 1401; then comes "De Essentia Mundi," at the end *(End)*. This is a very worthless MS with constant omissions and blank spaces and seems to have been written by a scribe ignorant of Latin. After Ch. 10 of Book I, I have only noted the more extraordinary readings. It agrees mainly with Moser's Codd G and K. (Written in Italy.)

K. Harleian ms 2622, end of the 11th cent., parchment, medium quarto; unfortunately ends with the word "Nec" in 1 114. Preceded by "Paradoxa Stoicorum Sex." Though the transcriber is careless and the MS. is full of his corrections, yet this is the best of the Harleian MSS, often closely agreeing with B and Cod. C. of Orelli. (Written in Flanders or Germany.) The united testimony of B and K is almost always decisive as to orthography.

L. Harleian ms 4662, latter part of the 15th cent., parchment. The present chapters are marked in the margin by a later hand. Followed by the *De Divinatione* (which is full of lacunae) and the *Paradoxa.* It abounds with transpositions and mainly agrees with I. [Notwithstanding its eccentricities, it contains some valuable readings. Ed.] (Italy.)

M. Harleian ms 5114, latter part of the 15th cent., parchment folio, very clearly written. Contains *De Legibus*, *De Academiciis*, *De Natura Deorum*, *De Divinatione*, *De Officiis*. The MS comes nearest to C. below and Oxf. e. In many places it agrees with the readings of Thanner's edition of 1520. (Italy.)

N. Additional MSS 11932, middle of 15th cent. Paper, small folio, from the library of Bishop Butler. Followed by the *De Divinatione*, *De Fato*, *De Creatione Mundi* (*Timaeus*). This agrees most closely with Cod. Red. of Heindorf and Cod. O. of Moser. [The scribe is more intelligent than the writer of I, but very unconscientious. Ed.] (South Germany or North Italy. I am indebted to Mr E. M. Thompson for this information, and for the correction of the dates in the Catalogue.)
PREFACE TO THE COLLATIONS.

[O. Additional mss 19586, end of 14th cent. Finely written on vellum, folio; is closely allied to L and I but less eccentric than either. It also agrees frequently with H and U; has been a good deal altered by the corrector. Contains De Inventione, Rhetoricorum Lib. IV., De Oratore, Oratoris ad M. Brutum liber, De Optimo genere Oratorum, De partitione Artis Oratorioe, De Officiis, De Amicitia, De Senectute, Tusculanae Disputationes, De Creatione Celi, De Divinationibus, De Natura Deorum, Orationes. Collated by Mr Bickley of the British Museum, and compared by myself. Ed.] The preceding eight mss are all in the British Museum.

C. ms 790 Dd. xiii. 2, in the Cambridge University Library, 15th cent. Finely written on parchment, folio. See the Catalogue of the mss preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge, I 507. The ms was written "per manus Theodoric Nycolai Werken de Abbenbroeck (in S. Holland): liber explicit anno domini mccc44 alias 1444." It is the Cod. Cantabrigiensis of Davies, who says of it on i 20, "codex est perparvi pretii," but it has some excellent and unique readings. [A remarkable feature of this ms is the frequency of small alterations, either in the order of the words, or in the words themselves, as igitur for ergo &c. Ed.] It is divided into chapters, Book i into the prologue (which absurdly ends with the word repellendi in ch. 3 § 5) and 62 chapters; Book ii into 68, and Book iii into 77 chapters. The collation given by Davies is imperfect and often wrong.

R. The Roman edition of 1471 of the Opera Philosophica. Vol. i contains the N. D.; there are two copies of it in the British Museum, in one of which (N. 720, l. 6) a folio, containing i 25 § 69 effugeret to i 27 § 77 eodem modo, is wanting, but the other (C. i. c. 11) is perfect. It was printed by Sweynheym and Pannartz, as the lines declare at the end of the Cato Maior; "Hoc Conradus opus Sweunheym ordine Miro Arnoldusque simul Pannartz una aede colendi Gente Theotonica: Rome expediere sodales." Then follows the date "Anno Xvi MCCCCLXXI die vero xxvii mensis Aprilis Rome in domo magnifici viri Petri de Maximo." The text is generally very good, many of the best readings in the edition of Hervag (Basle, 1534), praised by Moser and Creuzer, seem taken from it, and many of the conjectures attributed to Lambinus may be already found there. It was probably printed from the ms in the
Vatican called La. by Moser, or from some ms from which La. was derived, hence the reading Antenulus for a nonnullis in iii § 53, &c.

V. The Venice edition of 1471 printed by Vindellinus de Spyra. There is a copy of this in the Grylls Collection in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge. The volume contains a life taken from Plutarch, then the lives of Cornelius Severus which are found in M. Ann. Seneca, Susor. vii (given by Orelli, Ecl. Poet. Lat. p. 261, Anthol. Lat. 2. 155), "Oraque magnanimum...sub umbras," with the date at the foot a.d. m.cccc.lxxi. The volume ends with a treatise "de disciplina militari," which is found in several of the older editions. [Generally agrees with the edition of Ascensius. Ed.]

V1. By this I denote the ms corrections in the Grylls copy of V which are often of great value.

Z denotes the consensus of all the above mss.

There is a copy of the Bologna edition of 1494, in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, bound up with the edition by Victor Pisanus of the Orator, &c., printed at Venice, in 1492. This copy belonged to R. Laughton, and is the one used by Davies who frequently gives its readings. It is noticeable for the reading in iii 63 "et Orbonae ad," but otherwise generally agrees with V.

[I have printed Mr Swainson's collations in full for all the mss as far as § 12, but after that only for B and K, giving selected readings of the others, except in doubtful and disputed passages, where all the readings are given. I have also occasionally added authorities for the reading in the Text, where Mr Swainson had only noticed the variants. Ed.]
COLLATIONS OF ENGLISH MSS.


BOOK I.


philosophiae Gracis cuius sit scepticismi potissimum

de quern Posidonius admirantur praescripsit e requirunt eorum iden et gwod ratum am referuntur

et multorum facillime.
melieux quid Dio- 
fec
dos possmus quaque rei
dixit *
gae Eoque... commovcrimus rationis causa profecisse nobis ortuwa

co?K2J/?< rensi. etiam} is ipsi tarn coeratque

atque miem habent orationes? enim arc-
solo videantur Philo re/ertae eripiet studio

nos sententias gae praeiudicata expedire cum diet philosophabamur

projitentur ferar,n goreis philosophari Pythagoreis autem

insert guin necesse omiis iniuria minus guom quidem iruditi cwm

oracione referantur oratores.

studii... qui
tarnen

necesse

ante

quod

qui

text

philosophiam

Aizs

BC,

L.

C.

V.

Vj.

Vj.

B.

L.

C.

Diodorus NO, diodoctus L. Philo philo L, pilio N, filio C. Antiochus Anth. HN, Antianus I. Posidonius Possidonius BHIMNC.


sermo.

instructis

instituti


alia ex alia neixa] alia ex alia noxa I, aliae ex aliis nexae MNC. After nexa HV insert ratione. aptae] actae H, aperte O. vidcantur] uidentur N.


13 VI. Only a selection of the readings is given from this point.


infixa caelo] infixæ quasi c. HN, fixa c. LO, infra caelos M, infra infixa caelo C.
sunt[ sing] BKLM. octavamque octauamque HIMNRV. qui quo...non potest\]
om. LO. possint] possunt HMN. Heraclides] Er. BMC, Eracleitus N,

is] Strato his B, Stratoris LV, text V.] minuendi] minuendique NR, immit-

tendique add HV.

XIV. obtinere] opt. HLV, retinere N. interlegere...animantem] om. c. 36
alio] in alio V. si] sed N. potest] qui potest N. omnam Naturam\nom. V, naturam omnium H, omnium naturam all others.
theogoniam id est originem deorum] Z (but id est originem is only in marg.
of L. usitatas] insitas HV, usititas V. appelletur] HMKCRV, appel-

lutar BLO. sententia est] sentias B, sentencias K. Cleanthes] Cleantes

IIKCR, Cloantes I. mundum deum] M, d. m. BK. undique...atque\nom. O. undique] undeque V, cingentem] cingente B, agentem L.
qui aether] quia ether B. nominetur] nominatur L. delirans] delir-

H, ratione LNO, nacione C.

XV. at Persaeus] atque persiedius N, at Perseus O. dicit] HMKCRV, 38
om. BIKL, vult O. a quibus] e quibus K. quo quid] quicquid K.
auferimus O, nera referimus L, vetterinus MC, “vaferimus al.” C, referi-

rnis B. eos ne] eos nec HLMCR, nec eos N. cogitatione] cognitione O.
atque R. fatalem] facilem K. vim et necessitatem] umbra et nec. Z.

ut et aquam] et om. HCOV. et terram et] terram N. solem] et solem et LO.
continentur] continentur H, continentur N. eum] deum eum H, deum
ipsam N, deum V. appellet] appellant M, appellat R. manaret B.
Neptunum] Neptunum B (Corssen l. 435). religiorum

eterorum O. etiam] om. CO. et aeternae] et om. B. Orphei 41
orfei BK. Musaei] Musi K. dixerat] LO, dixerit all others. sunt
IC, sint all others. eo] om. LO. de] om. C. partum...ortumque

partu...ortique BIKL. traducens] transducens R, deducens LOC. deingit

traingit H (diuuint marg.), diwingit V. a] om. O.

XVI. deliberantium] deliberantium K. mulu] multa K. inducerunt 42
deos] inducerint d. O, d. introducerunt N. fecerant] fecerint O. que-

immortalibus] NCO, immortali others. in maxima inconstantia] m. in con-

stantia H. veritatis] veritatique V. ignorance] ignorantiae K, 43
et] ut HMN. habere] haber HMKCV, text V, bene L. τηδηγη] pro

plebs in B, problemum H, problemis K, problemis L, problemi MC, problemi B, problemi RV.

id est anteceptam] id est ante coceptam BK, om. L. in-
XXVII. quoniam et inde H, "al. et inde" V, cognitiones cogitationes accum omnium omnium H, deos deum O, fere fieri BKLO, om. N, fateamur fateamur BHKMOCV, etiam iam H. Πρότερον problesin B, problesin HN, problesin K, prolensis C, προλεσία R. nominatur nomi-


46 XVIII. natura...partim] om. L. ratio] nos ratio V. qua] qua B.


52 XX. mundus deus d. m. HN. admirabilis] mirabilis O. sive in ispo] si uero in ispo BK, sine ispo in V. hominum] omnium O. ne

53 nec HV, text V, fabrica tamque eam] fabricumque eam HN, fabricatam eam L, fabricatam camque V, text V. facile] facile HO. negatis

54 negetis BHIKLMOCR. mundos...natura] om. K. oram] horum HO. ulterior HNV, ultimae O.igitur] mundi add OV, latitu-


XXIV. oracula] oracul BKM, uocabula I. "veri tamen simuliora] ueri 66 simile tamen si meliora B, verisimili tamen simuliora HMOV, verisimili tamen uerisimiliem L, uerisimile tamen simuliora KN, tamen uerisimile simuliora C,


XXXI. inscita] inscita B, institutia I, inscientia K. plane before inscita C.
fecerat] fecerit Z except fecerun B.  

dicat aliquid esse beatum] dic. al. 86  

beat. esse H, dicat aliquid iste beat. O and others. d. i. a. b. C, al. dicat iste B. V.  
sit] sit id esse immortale C, sit id esse mortale BKLO.  

animadventur] enim  
aduertunt B.  
te] om. BHKNV, rest. V., esse putat p. esse C. his  

tie R. ille B.  

proposita] postp. HV, text V.  

religionis 87  

CHO, religiones BK, religio MR.  

Epicuro] Epicuro B. loquar  

loquor N. aliquam] om. V. numero] natura Z, except O which has naturam.  
inquit] inquid B. om. LLO. in ulla alia] in nulla alia B.  
ulla alia H, in nulla C, nulla alia V.  


propius] propinquius L.  

eisdem] B, hisdem K, hidem H, hisdem CR.  

temporibus] temporis K. 88  

num] nunc BKM.  

attigimus] attingimus HKC. aut[ vel K. numne]  

minime H, nonne LMCVR.  

omnia tollamus ergo] BHKNCV, tollamus ergo  

omnia others.  

fit] fiel R.  

mediterranei mare esse non] mediterraneum mare esse non HV, medium terram mare undique circumsesse IL, med. t. n. circa undique esse O, mediterraneum mare non VV,  

ex insula] om. K. vulpeculasque] vulpelasque B.  

diceretur] LMCV, diceretur BHKNR.  

elephanto] elefante B, elephante NO.  

rideri] uideri H, irideri ONV. 89  

quae] que BK, argumenti sententiam B, argumenti sententiam BKMMOV,  

argumenti sententia L, argumenta sententiam C, argumento sententiam O. esse]  

om. BK1, rest. K2.  

XXXII. quem tibi] que tibi B, om. lacuna I.  

istuc peruenire...gradatim] om. B.  

After peruenire, Quid autem est istuc gradatim HILMN, Quod autem est istuc gradatim BKLO.  

Quod est autem istuc gradatim C, Quod autem est istuc: gradatim V.  

sumpsisses tuo iure] om. H. a beatis] habeatis BL. ad rationem...gradibus] om. B.  

a ratione] quid O. maluerit[ mali crit B, voluerit N.  

Epicurus] before 90  

maluerit V.  

dicere] esse H. illud huic] huic illud C. venisse]  

peruenisse V.  

hominis nati] sunt add OV.  

e qua] eaque C. erant  

forma] forma erant C.  

hoc quidem] hoc om. B. ut] uti R.  

iste tantus] est iste tantus H, est iste talis V, text V.  

semianae] semina Z. 91  

decidisse] ecidisse V.  

de caelo] de caelo ILON, om. C. essemus  

similes] s. ess. V.  

possim] BHLMCV, possem KR.  

XXXIII. liberet] KMCV, jubet KL, uidetur N.  

esse] om. H. usque]  

aisque K.  

a] ad I. Thale Mileso] Thalem Milium IV, Thalete  

Milesio C.  

deorum natura] n. d. V.  

omniae tibi] omnes CH, text 92  

marg. H.  

delirare] deliverare H1, text H2, declinare O.  

posse] om.  

HVO.  

decreverunt] BK, decreverunt others.  

nr] nec HV, text V.  

quaeque] quae H, que O, quantaque V.  

opportunitas] oport. BCV. in- 

gressu] press C.  

comprehendendum est] comprehendatur O.  

reliqua] de reliqua K.  

discipline] N, descriptione B, descriptione others.  

supervacuenum] super vacuacum BK, vacuum HN, supervakuum V.  

sollertiam [naturea] n. s. KC.  

affixit] affixit MCRV.  

pulmones] pulmo VO.  

ceteraque] quae om. H, ceteraque OV, quae O.  

in deo] inde BK1, in  

deis K2.  


hic marcus N, Hemarcus C, Sinachus V.  

Leontium] Leonticum O, leno-


100 XXXVII. et] at HCRV. horum] eorum L0. rieissitudinesque] que om. L. efficisset] BK, fecisset others. aberrant] aberrant BHN, aberrunt L0. a coniectura Z. esse deos] deos esse H. habebam] habebamus H², habebo L0. iniquis iniquid B. nun] non L. esse tales]

existimavit BHKM.

XXXVII. defectuantur B, defectamur L. volumus] nolumus
B, "al. nolumus" marg. B. vereamur] vereantur H. oratio] KO,
ratio CB. spoliat] expoliat O. motui] muta B, mutu L. ne] nec
N, ac R. inundet] KB, inundat HMOV, text V1. superior aeri
aetheris] superi ether BK, superior aether HINO, superior et haece alius aer L,
supremum ether MR, supremus aether et C, supinum aether V, superior aer B1,
ora] hora BO. autem] om. K, quidem L0. sunt] sint BKC. igne
BK, igni LMOV. volitantem] voluntates B. moveat] moneat B. porro
postremo Z, sit] om. K. appellant] apparente B. ratione OC,
rationalis BK. attigeris] C, attigerit BHKMRVO. reperire] reperire
BK, invenire O. equo] eo H. 105

confirmationem] confirmationem McMCV, text V1, vocant] vacant B.
atem] om. C. introituin] intitum, o written above latter i B. Ti] titum BKC, Tiberium
LN, Ty. R. Graechum] grassum graceum L, Grachum C. rideo]
video L0V, text V1, uidero] nidero M. ] Marco BK. sitellam] om. H, si cellam N,
socelatum C. tum] tamen HC. tu] cum BN, tum KMO. Octavri] octavi
in deo] in deo uideo C. esse] etiam esse C. beati atque aeterni intelligantur
beatus atque eternus intelligatur C. dum taxat] B (see Corscen n. 882).
oblicitur] BHKLMN, obicibur others. nun] nunc Z. omnino haec] omnis
hic C. reprehens us a multis] a. m. r. HC. vacillat] vacillat L (see
Munro on Lucr. 111. 504). quam] MNCRV, om. BHKLO. omnum in
homimum in N. ea] ex Z. illi ergo] BK, ergo illi CV. Cercopis
ceretis BHCV, Cerconis KL'm, Critonis LN'N, Crotonis N0. ceronis V1,0. id
est] idem B. id est imago ejus] om. L. incurrit] occurrit N.
earum C. fuerunt] CO3, fuerant BK1. potuerant] CO, potuerunt BK.
Scyllae] scillae BK, chillae C. invocatae] non vocatae L0V, invocata R.
inculcatis] conculcatis H1V1.

XXXIX. at] ad BHKMRVO. licenter Fluentium] licentiam fruen-
dam HN. si vos] suos B, text marg. B. continenter] quae continentur
NV, text V1. si continenter] si continetur BV, text V1. inquir] KV,
inquis H1V, inquid BO, om. MC. faciet] facient BHKMRVO. acquili-
bratatem] aequalitatem H, aequalitatam L, aequalibrum libertatem MCR, aequa-
bilitatem V, text V1, equi libertatem O. isoquidav] isonomiam C, isonomiam
RV, isonomiaJ others. placat] placeat B. nascantur] nascantur BMO. 110
conservant L. ea conservent] ea quae conservent N. quae sunt] before
conservent L. indviduis] V1, diuinis Z. quae nulla sunt] O, om. BK
HCR. se ipsa] C, seipsa R, se ipse BK, se ipsae H. agitarii] cogitari B.
figurare] fuware MRV, text V1. inmortalis deum effictis] d. imm. facitis C.

XL. vester] noster BK, uidetur LO, Vellel] MRV, uelle BHKLO. 111
uelle N. quarundam] eadem BK, eiusdem HN, earum LO, earundem
NOTES.

A. INTRODUCTION. I. i—vii. 17.

a. Dedication to Brutus. The importance and difficulty of the subject; variety of opinions; some asserting the existence of the gods, some doubting, some denying it. Those who believe in their existence differ as to their nature; the Epicureans denying that they pay any regard to human affairs, the Stoics affirming that the universe is ordered by them for the good of man, while the Academy holds that man has no right to dogmatise, and confines itself to the criticism of the other schools. §§ 1—5.

Cum sint—tum est. Heindorf with some of the less important MSS reads sunt, 'sermonis legi convenienter'; but both constructions are allowable, see Madv. Fin. i 19, Roby Gr. §§ 1734, 1735. The Ind. which is found in the very similar passage Divin. i 7 cum omnibus in rebus temeritas turpis est, tum in eo loco maxime which concerns religion, is more naturally used in comparing particular cases ('as—so' 'both—and'); the Subj. views the particular case in relation to the general principle, as in Off. III 5 cum tota philosophia frugifera sit, tum nullus feracior in ea locus est quam de officiis, and Lael. 23 with Seyffert's note. Translate, 'while there are many questions in philosophy which are far from having been fully cleared up, there is one of special difficulty, I mean the inquiry into the nature of the gods'. ['I think that in nearly all the passages where cum—tum is used by C. there is a contrast between a general statement and a particular case, whether the clause with cum contains an Ind. or a Subj. If the cum clause introduces a fact viewed as a concession made by the speaker, then the Subj. is necessary; otherwise not'. J. S. R.]

ad agnitionem animi pulcherrima: 'ennobling as regards our recognition of the soul's nature'. For construction cf. i 98 ad figuram quae vastior? II 87 ad speciem pulchriores, 155 nulla species ad rationem praestantior. The thought is that expressed by Minucius Felix 17 nisi divinitatis rationem diligenter excusseris, nescias humanitatis, and by C. himself in the Tusculans, written a few months before the N. D. animus divinus est...si deus aut anima aut ignis est, idem est animus hominis i 65; ut deum agnoscis ex

M. C. 5
operibus ejus, sic ex memoria vim divinam mentis agnoscei 170; ut ipsa se mens agnosceat, conjunctamque cum divina mente se sentiat v 70; also N. D. 191, Déc. 164 and the striking passage in Leg. 18 24, 25. See too the fragment of the Consolatio quoted on § 9, and Somn. Scip. 24 demum to seito esse: ut mundum ex quaedam parte mortalem ipsa deus acernus, sic fragile corpus animus sempiternum moget. If the soul is divine, either as being in itself divinum particula aurae (the Stoic view) or as of kindred nature (τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γίνεσθαι εὐμέλεια, πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεών τε) or as capable of being made like to God (Plato's ὄμοιωσις τῷ θεῷ), it is evident that the inquiry into the divine nature will throw light upon our own, and will at the same time raise our ideas as to the dignity of man. See on the general subject the introductory Sketch of Greek Philosophy and Krische Die theologischen Lehren der Griechischen Denker p. 7. The word cognitio is not used elsewhere by C. On the distinction between it and cognitio (read by Wolf and others) see Schömann's Opusc. III 291, Heidmann zur Krit. d. N. D. Neustettin 1858.

pulcher: for spelling, see Orator 160 cum scirem ita majores locutos esse ut nasquam nisi in vocali adsipiratione utentur, loquebar sic ut pulceros, Cetegos, triumpos, Kartaginum dicearem: aliquando, idque sero, convicio aurium cum extorta mihi veritas esset, usum loquendi populo concessi, scientiam mihi reservavi. Roby Gr. § 132. ['That the e passed into ch in pulcer and not in ludi-cher is no doubt due to the l as in sepulchrum'.] J. S. R., who refers to Corssen 113 150, Ribbeck Verg. Prov. p. 424, and quotes Roscher in Curtius' Studien II 145, scripturam 'pulcher' non probant Varro (cf. Charis. p. 73, 17 k) et Scurias (p. 2256 Pa.), probaverunt Probus (cath. 14, 38 k) Santra (ap. Sccurias l. l.) qui vocabulum a Graeco πολύχρωμος derivandum esse censet, Velius Longus (2230 Pa.), Marius Victorinus (2466 Pa.).

ad moderandum religionem: 'for regulating religious observances.' These will vary according to the idea we have of God: contrast the worship of a Bacchus and an Apollo, still more of Juggernaut and of Christ. The same idea is expressed in the words 'God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth'. Cf. Dicin. II 149 ut religio propaganda est quae est juncta cum cognitione naturae, sic superstitionis stirpes omnes ejiciendae. C. lays down rules for religious rites in Leg. II 19—22, and Seneca in Epp. 41 and 95 (primus est deorum cultus deos cedere, satis illos coluit quisquis imitatus est, &c.) and other passages cited by Zeller Stoic. p. 326 Eng. tr. See for Epicurean view Luerc. v 1198 nec pietas uilla, &c.

de qua: the relative refers to the remoter antecedent quaestio. Heidmann, who would himself omit qua—necessaria, quotes exx. from Luerc. 76, 97, 100. Cf. Dietrich ad Sall. Cat. 48.

tam variae—inscientiam. The mss are very corrupt here: A and B read sint for sunt; ut is omitted in most; A and C omit ten lines from esse debitum to sententias; Ursinus tells us that the words causam—scientiam and the que after praeceter did not exist in a ms used by him; B² E have
causa principium, B² causa et principium, C² causam id est principium; lastly all but one appear to have scientiam for inscientiam. Wytenbach followed by Heindorf and Creuzer omits the clause id est principium philosophiae, which is usually explained by a reference to Arist. Met. i 210 διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἀγνωσίαν ἐφιλοσοφήσαν, ‘the great discrepancy of opinions is an evidence that the cause or starting-point of philosophy was the painful consciousness of ignorance, and that the Academics are justified in refusing to make any affirmation on points where certainty is unattainable’. (See Krische p. 7.) But this explanation is unsatisfactory on several grounds; (1) there is no reason for making any reference to the origin of philosophy, (2) the present discrepancy of opinions is no argument as to what may have been the origin of philosophy, (3) the origin of philosophy is in no way connected with the Academic principle (itself the result of a long history of philosophy) that man must be content with probability, (4) bare ignorance is very far from being the cause of philosophy, and it would be an altogether wrong use of words to make inscientia=τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἀγνωσίαν, (5) principium philosophandi would have been a more appropriate expression for the supposed sense. Nor is it much more satisfactory to interpret the clause as affirming that the Socratic confession of ignorance is the starting-point of philosophy in the individual (cf. Ac. i 44). If we retain the ordinary reading, I think it is best to take it as giving the sceptical view, ‘the cause and origin of this whole windbag of philosophy is ignorance’, cf. Sext. Emp. Math. ix 29 τὸ πολύτροτον τῆς ἀποφάσεως (παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς φιλοσόφοις) τὴν ἀγνωσίαν τοῦ παντὸς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστημοτάτητα. But though such language may have been used by Hortensius and others (Fin. i 2), it is hardly conceivable that C. should have adopted it as his own. I should prefer therefore to follow Ursinus (if one only knew what his ms. was1) or Heind., whose reading gives an excellent sense though somewhat clumsily expressed: ‘the discrepancy of opinions proves that they all sprang from ignorance, and that the Academics are right in refusing to make any positive assertion’. The interpolation of the clause omitted by him would be easily accounted for by the supposition that id principium philosophiae was a gloss on the words Academicos assensionem cohibuisse, meaning that this was the leading principle of their philosophy. The variety of opinions was the 10th of the common-places used by the Sceptics to prove that knowledge was unattainable, see Sext. Emp. Hyp. i 14 145. Baiter, in order to keep the sit of the majority of mss, inserts cum, reading debet for debeat in apodosi, but this is awkward after cum multae; and it is also more natural to introduce the discrepancy of opinion as a distinct statement to be proved by what follows, velut in haec quæstione, rather than to refer to it as already known. Orelli follows Earnesti in inserting id before magno, an

alteration which Sch. also (Opusc. iii 294) thinks required unless debent is substituted for debat of mss. Might not the subject of the verb be supplied from the preceding clause (tam variis esse) ? [I take the words causam — insciuntiam to mean that the true theory of philosophy is that which denies επιστημη, in other words that which the Academics oppose to the Stoics'. J. S. R.]


ass. cohib. the επιστημη of the Sceptics and Academics. Ac. ii 59.

turpis: most mss have fortius from which Manutius conjectured foodius, but Sch. (Opusc. iii 358) points out that this word, which implies something shocking or disgusting, would be far too strong for the occasion. Turpis is used in similar passages, e.g. i 70 hoc dice re turpis est, Ac. i 45 (Arcisidas nequeat) quiquequam esse turpis quam cognitioni et perceptioni assensionem approbationemque praecurre, Dicin. i 7 omnibus in rebus temeritas in adsentiente erroque turpis est.

perceptum et cognitum: the two verbs serve to translate the single Gr. v. καταλαμβάνασθαι. See Reid on Acad. ii 34 percipti atque comprehendi, 'C. proceeds as usual on the principle described Fin. iii 14 et notitias quae sit, pluribus notatum vocabulis ideam declarantibus'. The Academica are occupied with the discussion whether our knowledge amounts to a perc. et cog., i.e. whether we can arrive at real certainty both by sense-impressions and by reasonings, and whether the Stoics affirmed, or must be satisfied with a greater or less amount of probability, according to the Academic view. The word explorare has a half-technical force: Quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis explorati? is the exclamation of the Academic (Ac. ii 129).


§ 2. velut: 'for instance', introducing an example of a general principle already stated, cf. § 101 velut ibes, ii 124 relati crocallili.

quod — trahimur: relative clause explained by the following deos esse.

quo = ad quod. The argument from universal consent is urged § 33, ii 12, Leg. i 24, Tusc. i 30.

plerique deos esse dixerunt, dubitare se Protagoras, nullos esse Diogoras: 'While the majority have maintained the existence of the Gods, Prot. (see Introduction) doubted, &c.' On the asyndeton see § 20 cuius principium; on Diag. and Theod. § 63. All three names are referred to by Min. F. c. 8.
sunt in varietate: § 31 sunt idem in erratis, § 37 magno in errore sententia est, § 29 in maximo errore versatur, so § 43.

ut molestum sit: ‘that it would be troublesome’. The Subj. belongs to the clause independently of its consecutive subordination, unless we include (as we probably should do) molestum est in the class of cases, such as longum est, in which the Latin idiom has the Ind. where we use the Subj. See n. on § 19.

dinumerare: ‘to reckon up in groups’, see Sch. Opusc. III 359.

figuris: e.g. round or in human shape, § 46; locis ‘regions’, e.g. the internum; sedes implies a closer connexion, as of Neptune with the sea, of Juno with Argos, see § 103.

actio vitae: verbal from agere vitam; see §§ 17, 45, 103, Div. II 89, actio rerum Ac. II 62, with Reid’s n. [and cf. actio vitae Off. I 17; actio rerum Off. I 83, 127, 153; agitatio rerum De Or. III 88; actus rerum Suet. Claud. 15, 23, Nero 17, Aug. 32. J. S. R.]

quod—continet: relative clause explained by following substantival clause utrum—moveantur ‘as to that which’. The proper antecedent is de eo omitted after dissenso est.

rem causamque: ‘the matter in dispute’.


moliatur: ‘attempt’, used of a laborious undertaking.

curatione: less common in this sense than procuratio, but found in II 158.

facta: not creation out of nothing—no philosophy had broached this idea, see Mosheim in Cudworth III 140 foll.—but the bringing of order out of Chaos.

errore: ‘uncertainty’, see Fin. v 6 15, Liv. I 21 in re tam clara nominem error manet, utrius populi Horatii, utrius Curii at fuerint, with Seeley’s note, Ov. Fast. IV 669; and the exx. in Sch.’s note here. [As error is coupled here with ignatio, so with incendentia in Sull. 40. J. S. R.]

Ch. II. § 3. fuerunt qui censerent: the proper Perf. is strictly followed by the Pres. or Perf. Subj. but the fact that the same form stands for Perf. and Aor. in Latin often leads to a confusion in the construction; cf. § 8 tantum profeces videmur ut vincemur, 54 imposuistis quem timeremus, II 153 satis doceasse videor quanto anteiret, and exx. in P. S. Gr. § 229, where this is stated to be the prevailing idiom in C. (we have the Perf. however in § 7 proscripseserit). See also Roby p. 194 n. and § 1510. [Cf. Hugo Lieven Die Consecutio Temporum des Cicero Riga 1872 esp. exx. in p. 45 (2). J. S. R.]

pietas: duteous affection towards those to whom we are in any way bound, our relations, benefactors, our country, the Gods; sanctitas purity, uprightness, dignity of character, the disposition which seeks to fulfil all righteousness; religio (in its subjective meaning) a sense of obligation, not necessarily accompanied by personal attachment. The definitions given by C. himself elsewhere do not seem very applicable, e.g.
§ 116 quae pictas ei debetur a quo nihil acceperis?.....est enim pictas justitia adversarum deos.....sanctitas autem est scientia colendorum deorum where see nn.; and Top. 23: 90 sanctitas=aequitas erga manes.

pure atque caste: a phrase properly used of the white garments and ceremonial washings of the sacrificer, but also of the mind, as in Dic. 1 121 castus animus purusque, Leg. 11 24 casta jubet lex adire ad deos, animo videlicet in quo sunt omnia.

tribuenda: not a very appropriate word in reference to what precedes (sanctitas, &c.) but the antithesis requires that the same word should be used of man and of God; see the following tributum and cf. III 24.

ita—si: with a limiting force, ‘it is our duty to render these only on the supposition &c.’ See Holden on Off. III 13 etera ita legere si ea virtuti non repugnarent, Mayor’s Second Philippic p. 128, and Alanus (Allen) on Dic. 1 10 ita expowan si area animo. Also cf. n. on ita ut § 54.

permanare: strictly ‘to percolate’, to find its way from some Epicurean intermendum to the earth.

quid est quod: ‘what ground is there for’, lit. ‘what is there in respect of which’. Cf. § 22 quid crat quod conceipserit? and 74, 117; so nihil est quod § 16, quid est cur § 115, III 7. The answer of the Epicureans is given § 45: we naturally adore the divine perfections without thought of any advantage to ourselves, see Ovid ex Pont. II 9 23, foll.

in specie fictae simulationis: ‘in a mere empty profession’, lit. ‘the outside show of a made-up pretence’. The epithet ficta adds emphasis without introducing any new conception, as in Off. III 39 ficta et commen-ticia fabula. The reference is to the Epicureans (see §§ 56, 115 seq. III 3, Plut. non posse sanar. p. 1102 ii), but the remark applies also to C.’s friends, the Academicians, see § 61, III 5, and the polemic of Cotta throughout.

sicut—item non postet: ‘there is no room for piety any more than for the other virtues’. For ut—item see Madv. Fin. III 48, Acad. II 110. For the negative understood in the first clause from the second, see N. D. III 68 huic ut seelus, sic us ratio quidem defuit.

quibus sublatis—confusio: this would come more naturally at the end of the sentence after tollatur, as Wytenbach remarks; but Lactantius quotes it (De Ira c. 8) in relation to religion, Epicurus religiones funditus detet, qua sublata confusio ac perturbatio vitae sequitur. We must consider therefore the following clause to be added by an afterthought, atque having its strong force, ‘and indeed’. On the general phrase, cf. Ac. II 99 with Reid’s n.

§ 4. hand scio an: with its usual positive force ‘it may be that’, Roby Gr. § 2256.

fides—tollatur: much the same is said of parental affection, Att. vii 2 lactor probari tibi φυσικώς esse ὑπὸ πρὸς τὰ τέκνα. Etenim hanc si non est, nulla postet esse homini ad hominem naturae adjunctio, qua sublata vitae societas tollitur. On the relation of religion to morality, see ii 153, Leg. 1 43, Fin. III 73, Off. III 28, quae (i.e. justice and the social virtues) qni
tollunt etiam adversus deos impii sunt. Ab his enim constitutam inter homines societatem evertunt. In Fin. iv 11, the knowledge of the Deity gained through the observation of nature is said to produce moderation, magnanimity and justice; in Leg. ii 15 seq. the moral influence of religion is based more on the sanctity of oaths, and the fear of divine vengeance; elsewhere it is the aspiration to imitate the divine life which is morally influential, Tusc. i 72, v 70: in Rep. vi 13 seq. we read that nothing is more pleasing to God than a life devoted to the good of our fellow men, that it is the path of justice and piety which leads to heaven. If such sentiments as these were in any degree fostered by the ancient religions,—and what reader of Herodotus can doubt that this was the case even before they had undergone the rationalizing and purifying influence of philosophy?—I think it must be allowed that Bp. Lightfoot (note on Galatians iv 11) has taken too narrow a view in confining their propaedeutic influence to their ritual. There is of course another side which is well shown in Tholuck’s tract on the Moral Influence of Heathenism, but in judging of this we must not forget the crimes and the immoralities which have resulted from the antinomian and the ecclesiastical spirit in Christianity itself, in spite of the stress which it has always laid on good works as the test and fruit of religious faith.

**una excellentissima**: ‘the most preeminent of all’, see Mayor Sec. Phil. p. 127. So Aristotle Eth. v 1 15 justice in the wide sense ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶ τελεία, ἄλλ’ οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἄλλα πρὸς ἔτερον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάς κρατιστὴ τῶν ἀρετῶν δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, κ.τ.λ. Cf. Off. 1 20 justitia, in qua virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua viri boni nominatur; III 25 omnium est domina et regina virtutum.

**nobiles**: i.e. the Stoics, as taking an exalted view of human nature, in opposition to the Epicureans whom he calls plebei, Tusc. i 55.

**ab isdem vitae consuli**: as an intransitive verb, consulo has to be used impersonally in the passive, like noceo, persuadeo, &c., see Roby § 1422.


**tempestates**: ‘changes of weather’. Like the Germ. wetter, temp. has a neutral as well as a bad sense.

**temporum varietates**: ‘the alternations of the seasons’.

**caeli mutationes**: ‘the varying phenomena of the heavens’, cf. Tusc. i 68.

**maturata pubescant**: ‘ripened by which all that the earth produces bursts into leaf’.

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1 See more on this subject in Nägelsbach Nach-Homerische Theologie pp. 191—318, Plut. M. 1125.
colligunt: 'adduce'; so *Dict. ii 33 multa Stoici colligunt.

his libris: see II 151—168.

fabricati paene: 'one might almost say, to have constructed these precise things for the good of man'. The word is used with a sneer at any thing which implies personal agency on the part of the Creator in §19, where see n., and Acad. II 87 (see too §§ 30 and 119) *natura quae finixerit, est ut tuo verbo utar, quae fabricata sit, hominem. Cf. *V. D. i 20 mundam manu paene factum.

ita: to be taken with disseruit, not with multa, 'alleged many arguments so as to stimulate men's inquiry after truth', see Off. II 8. This was the proper use of the Socratic elenchus (see the admirable chapter on Socrates in Grote's *Greece, also his Plato i 241 foll.) but it had been misapplied by the later Academics. For the collocation ita multa, see ita late §54, and Sch. here. [So in Senec. 12 ita cupide where ita refers to quasi below. J. S. R.]

§ 5. docti: 'educated' πεπαθέμενοι, used esp. of philosophers; a learned man [rather 'one who makes his livelihood by his learning'. J. S. R.] is litteratus, Holdon on Off. II 2.

alterum fieri—vera sit: We find the same thought, Acad. II 115, 147, Plut. Pl. Q. p. 1000. It is an Academic common-place, inconsistent with C.'s own belief, cf. Leg. I 47 perturbat nos opinionum varietas, hominumque dissenso, et quia non idem contingit in sensibus, hos natura certos putamus, illa, quae aliis sic, aliis seces noc isdem semper uno modo videntur, ficta esse divinam. Quod est longe alter. Though none of the theories propounded were perfect, yet any one of them was better either than blank ignorance and indifference, or than a dilettantist scepticism. A fairer view of the varieties of belief is taken by Aristotle, *Metaph. i 992 b, and even by the Epicurean Philodemus peri εισεβείας p. 109 Gomp. *those who have written about the Gods deserve admiration for their intention, καὶ μὴ διὰ τὴν ἄδουμαν ἀνώτατος ποιήσεως πάντας δὲ άνθρώπων μωρία λέγειν ἀνώτατος, ἐπειδήπερ οὐδεὶς ἰκνηύμινας peri τοῖς θεοῖς ὑπάρχει ἐχαν ἀποδείξεις....οἷς δὲ σέβονται πάντες εἰ μὴ παράκοποι τινες’. Similarly the Christian *Lactantius, VII 7 *Facile est docere paene universam veritatem per philosophorum sectas esse divisam. Non enim sic philosopham nos essentius ut Academicici solent, quibus ad omnia reprehendere propositum est, quod est potius calumniari et illudere...Quod si extilisset alicui qui veritatem sparsam per singulos, per sectas diffusam colligeret in unum, is profecto non dessorint a nobis, as he then proceeds to show in detail.

b. Cicero's defence against his critics. *He had always been a student of philosophy, but had only lately begun to write upon it, partly by way of useful employment in his enforced absence from public life, partly as a solace under his heavy loss. His manner of expounding the different tenets of each school, without stating his own opinion, was intentionally adopted in order to provoke thought. The Academic
school to which he belonged was unfairly branded as sceptical. It simply maintained the doctrine of Probability in opposition to Stoic dogmatism. III § 5—v § 12.

Ch. III. § 6. fluxisse video: ‘I observe that a rumour has spread far and wide’: so Tusc. iv 2 Pythagorae doctrina fluereat, and manare frequently. [Cf. Nägels. Stil. § 131, 4. J. S. R.]

brevi tempore: C.’s purely philosophical works all belong to the interval between the death of his daughter Tullia, Feb. 45 B.C., and the end of 44 B.C. Teuffel arranges them chronologically as follows: de consolatione, Hortensius, de finibus, Academica, Tusculanae disputationes, Timaeus, de natura deorum, Cato, de divinatione, de fato, Laelius, de gloria, de officis, de virtutibus.1 It must further be remembered that Caesar’s death occurred about the time of the publication of the present work, March, 44 B.C., and that C. was much occupied with politics from that time until his death, at the age of 65, on Dec. 7, 43 B.C.

quid certi habere habemus: ‘what positive belief I held’. So aliquid certi habere § 14. Livy seems to make certi predicative (complement) in v 33 si quiequam humanorum certi est, capi Roma non potuerat; cf. the use of pensi habere. I do not know of any similar case in C. He generally uses habeo certum or pro certo to express ‘I am positive of a thing’. The word formed a battle-ground between the Stoics, who maintained sapientem nihil opinari, nulla in re falli (Mur. 61), and the Academics, qui nihil affirmant et, quasi desperata cognitione certi, id sequi volunt quodcunque verisimile videatur Fin. ii 43, cf. De Orat. iii 67. [C. is exceedingly fond of the Gen. after quid, cf. Ac. ii 25 quid offici sui sit ‘what belongs to one’s duty’. J. S. R.]

eam potissimum: ‘that rather than any other’, ‘precisely that’. Cf. hanc potiss. § 9 and 11.

quae lucem eriperet: ‘which in their view &c.’ The charge is one continually made against the Academy: see Acad. ii 16 Arcesilas conatus est clarissimus rebus tenebras obscurare; § 61 eam philosophiam sequare quae confundit vera eam falsis, spoliat nos judicio: ... tantis offusis tenebris ne scintillulam quidem ullam nobis ad dispiciendum reliquerunt; 26 si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis tollitur quasi quaedam lux lumineque vitae 30.

deserta et relictae: so Ac. i 13 relictam a te veterem, tractari novam, ii 11 prope dimissa revocatur. Cf. § 11 and Ac. ii 129 omittu illa quae relictam jam videntur, ut Herillum. Des. refers to desertion by an adherent, such as Antiochus; rel. to general neglect.

qua quidem in causa: Heindorf and Schömann have in vain done their best to find some reference for these words in their ordinary position at the beginning of the chapter; and the sentence beginning multum autem

1 Reid (Introd. to Laelius p. 9) more correctly puts Hortensius first, n.c. 46, then the Consolatio and next to that the Academica.
comes in equally abruptly after repellendi. It appears to me that the natural connexion may be restored by transposing them, so as to make quae quidem—repellendi follow esse suspectam (cf. § 30); multum autem then becomes the commencement of a new paragraph in which C. leaves the general subject and proceeds to defend himself against attacks made upon him; causa will refer to the criticism passed upon his philosophical studies, while objurgatores and vituperatores are two classes of critics. [I have always taken these words to mean 'now in dealing with the case at issue between the dogmatists and Academicians, I have an opportunity of soothing my kind reprovers, &c.' One object C. has in view is to set himself right with the public, cf. § 13 ut omni me invidia liberem. J. S. R.]

benevolos objurgatores placare: 'pacify friendly critics'.

invidos vituperatores: 'malicious fault-finders'. We find C. defending himself against the same charges in Fin. i 1, Div. ii 4, Acad. ii 5—9, Off. ii 2—8, Tusc. iv 4 which should be compared for the whole passage.

refertae ... sententiis: so Brut. 65 (of Cato the Censor) refertae sunt orationes et verbis et rebus illustribus. In his rhetorical treatises C. recommends the study of philosophy as necessary to the orator (De Orat. i 83, iii 85 seq.) and takes credit in a letter written to Cato, b.c. 50, for introducing in forum atque in rem publicam atque in ipsam aciem that philosophy quae quibusdam otii esse ac desidiae videtur, Fam. xv 4 ad fin., cf. Quintil. xii 2 § 5 foll. Weidner remarks on the philosophical tone of his youthful treatise De Inventione in contrast with that of Cornificius on the same subject. Cicero was one of those who led the way in bringing about that transfusion of Roman technicalities by the spirit of Greek philosophy which made Roman law so important a factor in our modern civilization. [Probably C. alludes to such passages as Sest. 3, Balb. 3, Pis. 37, Post red. 14, Pro domo 47, Caed. 39—42, Mar. 63, Phil. xi 28, Deiot. 37, Marcell. 19. J. S. R.]

floruit: 'has been honoured', Nägels. Stil. § 128, 3.

Diadotus the Stoic lived with C. from the year 84 B.C. till his death in 59 B.C. He is spoken of in high terms Ac. ii 115 D. a puero amavi; mecum vivit tot annos; cum et admiror et diligo; Tusc. v 113 D. Stoicus cecus multos annos nostrae domi vivit; is vero, cum in philosophia multo etiam magis assidue quam antea versaretur, et cum calibus Pythagoricorum more ueterum, cumque ei libros noctes et dies legerentur; tum, quod sine oculis fieri possit uix videtur, geometricae manus uel tenerat, verbis praecipiens discentibus, uade, quo, quamque lineam scribereant. On his death he left C. II S fortasse centes, Att. ii 20. On the other names cf. Introduction and Diet. of Biog.

§ 7. referuntur ad vitam; 'if, as we are agreed, all philosophy has a practical aim (cf. Fin. iii 4 ars est philosophia vitae, i 42 Mad., Tusc. iv 5, v 5), I can point to my life as a proof of my philosophy'. The interest in pure speculation hardly survived the death of Aristotle.

praestitisses: 'to have carried out', 'made good'. In prose, we have
an example of the Perf. Subj. after proper Perf. _praestitisse_, see n. on censerent § 3.

Ch. iv. _otio langueremus_: so § 67 'Epicurus denies happiness to God, nisi plane otio langueat', Off. iii 1 ducet res quae languorem afferunt ceteris, illum (Scipionem) acuebant, otium et solitudo. C. elsewhere pleads otium, his forced inaction under the autocracy of Caesar, as an excuse for turning to literature, e.g. in a letter to Varro, Fam. ix 6 quis non dederit ut, cum opera nostra patria uti nolit, ad eam vitam revertamur quam multi etiam publicae proponendam putaverunt?

_necessis esset_: evidently written before the Ides of March.

_ipsius rei publicae causa_: cf. Div. ii 1 seq. quarenti mihi multumque et diu cogitanti quanam re possem prodesse quam plurimum, ne quando intermitterem consulere rei publicae, nulla major occurrebat quam si optarum artium vias tradere meis civibus; and a letter to Varro, Fam. ix 2 nobis set illud, una vivere in studiis nostris... et si minus in curia atque in foro, at in litteris et libris guberno rem publicam et de moribus ac legibus quaerere; [Phil. ii 20. J. S. R.], also the opinion of Athenodorus, a friend of C.'s, quoted by Seneca Tranq. 3.

§ 8. _multorum—scribendi studia_: repeated in Off. ii 2, but, as Sch. says, we have no certain information of any to whom it would apply. Lucretius, Varro, and the Pythagorean Figulus wrote without waiting for any impulse from C. The prose expounders of the Epicurean philosophy, Amafinius, Rabirius and Catius, are always mentioned in terms of contempt, as in Acad. i 5, Fam. xv 16 and 19, Tusc. iv 6 (where the popularity of the first is said to have produced a crowd of imitators). Probably Brutus, to whom the _N. D._ is addressed, may be one of those referred to, cf. Ac. i 12. [Mr Reid doubts this, as it appears from Fin. i 8 that Brutus had the start of C. in writing, and is rather disposed to think that Varro is alluded to, as in the _Acad._, he is said to have only made a beginning of philosophy, _philosophiam inochas._ i 9, so that C. may have here claimed credit for inducing V. to bring out some of those philosophical treatises which are included in the list of his works.]

_instituti_: 'resolution', _institutionibus_: 'trained under Greek teachers', lit. 'by 'Greek methods'. C. elsewhere speaks of them as men _qui se Graecos magis quam nostros haberi volent_ Fin. iii 5.

_quod—diffidenter_: 'because, as they said'. Roby § 1744.

_professisse—vinceremur_: the tense of a Subj. after Perf. Inf. is determined by the Inf. not by the principal verb; see P. S. Gr. § 229 8 and Draeger _Hist. Synt._ § 126, also n. on § 3 qui censerent. [The exx. of this sequence quoted by Lieven from _N. D._ are i 6, 8, 10, 16, 58, 60, 63, 85, 90, ii 8, 72, 96, 150, 153, 157, iii 12, 20, 50, 54, 70, 84, 88. J. S. R.] On the general subject of translation from Greek into Latin, and the comparative merits of the two languages at this time, see Munro’s Lucretius (Introduction p. 100 seq.) 'in his day the living Latin for all the higher forms of composition both prose and verse, was a far nobler language than the
living Greek.... When Cicero deigns to translate any of their sentences (Epicurus, Chrysippus, &c.) see what grace and life he instils into their clumsily expressed thoughts! How satisfactory to the ear and taste are the periods of Livy when he is putting into Latin the heavy and unctuous clauses of Polybius!... Whatever Greek writer Cicero wishes to explain, he can find adequate terms to express the Greek: is it a new sense given to a word in common use? he can always meet λόγος or εἴδος with ratio or species: is it a newly coined word? his qualitas is quite as good as Plato's τούτος.' C. makes the same boast of the superiority of Latin in Fin. i 10 and elsewhere; Lucretius on the contrary bewails the patrii sermonis cypstas i 832, and so Seneca Ep. 58.

§ 9. fortunae—injuria: his daughter's death, [so Ac. i 11 fortunae gracissimo pervultus culnere. J. S. R.]. See the letters written in the following months, Att. xii 14 (March 45 B.C.) omnem consolationem vincit dolor; xii 20 (same month) quod me hortaris ut dissimulam me tum graviter dolere, possimne magis quam quod toto dies consumo in litteris?; xii 40 (May 45 B.C.) quod scribis te vereri ne et gratia et auroritatis nostra minuat, ego quid homines aut reprehendat aut postulent nescio: ne doleam? qui potest? ne jacem? quis inquam minus? Legere isti laeti qui me reprehendunt tum muta non possunt quam ego scripsi; xiii 26 (same month) credibile non est quantum scribam, qui cito noctibus, nihil enim somni; cf. too Fam. iv 5. 6, v 15. Some of the fragments of the Consolatio preserved by Lactantius illustrate C.'s language in this treatise, e.g. fr. 5 Orelli, 'if we are right in believing that human beings have been exalted to heaven and in raising shrines to their memory, the same honour is assuredly due to my Tullia, quod quidem faciam, teque omnium optimam doctissimamque approxabantibus dis immortalibus ipsis in corum coetu locatum ad opinionem omnium mortuam mortalium conscerabo'; and in fr. 6 he declares that the good levi quadam ac facili lapsu ad deos, il est ad naturam sui similum, pervolare.

animi aegritudo commota injuria: Allen notices the carelessness of construction by which the adj. is made to agree with the governing case instead of the governed. See his n. on Div. i 62 faba labet inflationem tranquillitati mentis quaerenti vera contrariam. It may be explained as an extension of the use of abstract for concrete which we find in such passages as Off. iii 36 error hominum arripuit, for errantes homines, Hor. Ep. ii 1 191 trahitur manibus regum fortuna retortis. [Cf. Leg. i 8 occupata opera for occupatas, Fat. 42 assensio non possitieri nisi commota viso = nisi is qui adsentietur commotus fuerit. The best collection of exx. of hypallage adjectici which I know is in Kübler Ausf. Gramm. vol. ii p. 1682. J. S. R.]

[quam si me dedissem: quam fruiturus fui si dedisse. Dedisse is a completed future (fuerat si dedero) from a past point of view; and subjunctive because protasis to a future participle understood. R.]

totam philosophiam: cf. Div. ii 4 ut nihilam philosophiae locum esse
pateremur qui non Latinis litteris illustratus pateret; Tusc. ii 1 difficile est in philosophia paucorum esse ei nota cui non sint aut plura aut omnia. C. accepted the tripartite division, of post-Aristotelian philosophy, into στοιχεία (under which may be grouped the De Finibus, De Officiis, Tusculanae Disputationes, De Legibus, De Republica, Lucretius, Cato, Paradoxa), διαλεκτική (discussed in the Academica, with which may be connected the rhetorical treatises, see Ac. i 32), φυσική (to which belong the present treatise and its adjuncts the De Divinatione and De Fato): see Fin. iv 3, v 4, Ac. i 19, De Orat. i 68, Leg. i 23.

membrā: so De Orat. ii 79 quinque faciunt quasi membrā eloquentiae.

alia ex alia: 'mutually', so § 51 aliae alias apprehendentes.

aptāe: the proper passive force, as in Tusc. v 62 gladium saeta equina aptum, N. D. iii 4 apta inter esse et cohaerentia, Leg. i 56, Tusc. v 40.

Ch. v. § 10. qui requirunt...curiosius faciunt: 'those who wish to know my own private opinion on each point, show themselves more insipid than there is any need for'. See Madv. Fin. i 3.

auctores: Heind. reads auctoritates with B, quoting iii 10 tu auctoritates contornis, ratione pugnas, Leg. Man. 51 and Leg. i 36 et sic et tua libertas disserendi amissa est, aut tu is es qui in disputando non tuum judicium sequere, sed auctoritātī aīorum pārēas. We find the same sentiment in Min. F. 16 and in Jerome as there quoted by the editors.

momentā: 'weight of argument', lit. 'what turns the scale'. Cf. Ac. i 45 cum in cadem re paria contrariis in partibus momenta rationem inveniunt, faciās ab utraque parte assensio sustineretur.

ipse dixit=aiτóς ἐφά, 'the master said it'. So Socrates is referred to as aἰττος by his disciples in the Nubes 196, cf. Diog. L. viii 1, 46. Both the Greek and Latin pronouns are used colloquially by slaves of their masters. Bentham coined the word ipse-dicitum to express excessive deference to authority. It was the boast of the Academics to be nullius addici jurare in verba magistri, see Tusc. v 83, Ac. ii 8, 120, Grote's Plato i 238 foll.

§ 11. quattuor Academicīs: see Reid's Introduction to the Academica p. xxxi foll. There were two editions, the first appeared in two books, entitled Catulus and Lucullus, in the spring of 45 B.C., the second, which was divided into four books and dedicated to Varro, was published in the following August. We possess only the Lucullus and chapters 1—12 of the first book of the second edition.

lucem desiderant: 'the doctrines do not perish though they want the light that might be thrown upon them by a living expositor'. Auctōris: subjective genitive, like lucem ingenii porrigentem et tendentem, De Orat. i 184. For the meaning of auctor here see Off. ii 8, where C. says of his son that studying the tenets of the Peripatetics under Cratippus at Athens, in antiquissimam philosophiam Cratippuro auctore versari. The expositor, no less than the founder, may add weight to the doctrine by the authority of his name.
aperte judicandi: i.e. of speaking one's opinion frankly, not imitating the Socratic epokeia. See Augustin. Ac. iii 43:\footnote{a} et Cicero Academicis morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam nisi qui sequam ad senectutem usque vivisset operire consuessa. So we read (De Orat. i 83) of Charnadas who spoke non quo aperiret sententiam suam, for negative criticism is the mos patrius Academicis;\footnote{b} and Ac. ii 139 of Clitomachus who confessed his ignorance of the real opinions of his master Carnecades.\footnote{c} [Cf. Ac. ii 60 quae sunt tandem ista mysteria? seq., Euseb. Praep. Ev. xiv 8 of the διάφορητα of Carn., also xiv 6, Sext. Emp. P. H. i 234, Diog. L. iv 33, Augest. Ep. 118 § 16. This notion of Academic mysteries was no doubt fostered by Plato's half jocular use of the words διάφορητα (Phaedo 62 v), ὀμύετα, μυστηρία (Theat. 155 e). J. S. R. See also Lobeck Agl. p. 127 foll.] According to Augustine (Ac. iii 41) Metrodorus of Stratonic asserted that the Academics used their negative doctrine (nihil percipit) merely as a weapon against the Stoics, and Aug. believes that they still held, as an esoteric doctrine, all that Plato had taught about the ideal world, in which exists the real truth of which the shadow alone, the veri simile, is to be found on earth (Ac. iii 37 seq.). Though C. professes here to practise the same reserve, he states his views plainly in his Aristotelian dialogues; and even in the Heraclidian dialogues like the present (see n. on Heraclides § 34) he lets it be seen to which side he thinks the probability inclines (see iii 95). However it must be owned that he succeeded in mystifying Alb. Whately in regard to his belief on such an important matter as the immortality of the soul, (see W.'s Essays on Peculiarities of the Christian Religion, App. B. on Cicero).

orbam: after Philo's death. Cf. Ac. ii 17 Philone vivo patrocinium Academicæ non defict; and for the metaphor, Brutus 330 post Hortensii mortem orbac eloquentia quasi tutores relieti simulæ, Plato Theat. 164 e (of the doctrines of Protagoras) εἴπερ ὁ πατήρ τοῦ μίνου ἥδη, πολλὰ Ἀν ἡμῶν· τὸν δὲ ὀρφανὸν αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς προφηλικίζομεν.

singulas disciplinas percipere: 'to master each system separately'.


§ 12 nihil—sequentur: 'nothing to guide them'. The word occurs constantly in the Academica (alluded to just below as αἱ ἄλοι νόμο) in this sense, e.g. ii 8, 24, 33, 36, 99, &c. The Academics maintained in opposition to the Stoics that we can do very well without absolute certainty, in Ip. Butler's words that 'probability is the (only and the sufficient) guide of life'. In the previous sentence we have sequentur used in another sense 'aimed at'. For similar careless repetitions see § 13 inventus—invenit, and Allen on Dir. 1 e. 35.

omnino followed by sed: 'it is true', lit. 'by all means' 'I quite allow'. Cf. § 95 utranque omnino durum sed... § 107, Off. i 83, 120, ii 62, 71, Plin. Ep. ii 4; omnino—utrem Lael. 98; omnino—tamen Plin. Ep. vi 15; also without adversative particle Lael. 69 Reid.
non enim sumus—nota. The Stoics held that we could distinguish true from false sensations (φαντασία, vīsa) by an infallible criterion (σημείον, nota, also translated signum and īnsigne Ac. II 34, 36) termed by Chrysippus καταληψική φαντασία, visum comprehensibile, a sensation in which the soul grasps reality: this is followed by συγκαταθεσις, assensio, a declaration to ourselves that the sensation is true. See Ac. I 41, II 17, 18. The Academics denied the existence of such a criterion, but allowed that some sensations were probably true, others the contrary, id autem non esse satis cur alia posse percipi dīcās, alia non posse, propertea quod multa falsa probabilia sint, nihil autem falsī perceptum et cognitum possit esse (Ac. II 103, and 32—36); the wise man will be guided by what seems most probable, Ac. II 99. Carneades distinguished three degrees of probability, that which was plausible φαντασία πιστὴ (1), that which was also uncontradicted ἀπερισπαστος (2), that which being both of these was further thoroughly examined διεξωθενεῖν (3), Sext. Emp. Math. vii 166—189.

veris falsa adjuncta: see Ac. II 42.

ex quo existit—regeretur: 'from which fact (viz. the close resemblance between true and false sensations) follows the conclusion stated in the Academia, that there were many things of a probable nature, such that though not amounting to a full perception, they could nevertheless, since they had a marked and distinct appearance, serve to direct the conduct of a wise man'. Heind., who is followed by Or. and Ba., proposed to omit this sentence as unsuited to the context, and un-Ciceronian in language. The first difficulty of construction arises from the change of case in the relative clause (quaē—iiē) which may probably be explained by the wish to substitute the weaker Pass. for the personifying Act. (regeretur for regerent). It may be said, Why not then begin the clause with the Abl. quībus instead of quaē, omitting iīs and understanding ea before perciperentur? The answer is that in these complex relative clauses, in which the verbs require different cases, we commonly find the relative attracted to the subordinate case (as quaē here to perciperentur for quībus), see Madv. § 445, Zumpt § 804, where this passage is quoted. The case of the second verb is sometimes expressed by the demonstrative as Fin. II 1, qui mos cum a posterioribus non esset retentus, Arcesilas cun revocavit, sometimes understood from the relative, as N. D. III 35 Heraclitum non omnē interpretantur uno modo, qui quoniam intelligi noluit, omnētumus (sc. eum), Sall. J. 102 qui quanquam accitī ibant, tamen placuit (sc. iīs) verba facere; see Dietsch on Sall. J. 93, Nägelsbach Stil. § 164. The second difficulty is the Subj. regeretur: if we take quaē to be merely connective = et ea, and suppose the clause in orat. rect. to be multa sunt probabilia, quaē...percipiuertur... haberent...regitur, we should have expected regī in orat. obl., cf. Roby § 1781. But the Inf. construction is not always used in these cases, see § 106 tu autem (diois) imaginēs remanere quaē cum pervenerint tum referantur for eas referrī, II 44 continget, Dio. I 46 (Heraclides describes a dream) Mercurium e patera sanguinem visum esse fundere, qui cum terram attigisset refervescere...
videtur, where we should have expected quem referencecere; Tac. Agric. 15
the Britons complained that they had now two kings over them e quibus
legatus in sanctuarium, procurator in bono sacriice instead of legatum sacriice,
see also quotations in Dræger § 447, 2, Reid on Lact. 35 caput esse ad brev-
ricendum securitatem quo frui non possit si quae parturient for frui non posse;
Madv. Fin. i 19 and 30, Ac. i 28 and 41. In the present sentence however
there was a Subj. previous to subordination (multa sunt probabilia quem ha-
beant), the relative having a definitive, and not merely a connective force. It
is only a certain kind of probabilia, of a very distinct appearance and there-
fore leaving on the mind a distinct impression, which can afford practical
guidance. Again there is a third difficulty if we read existit with the
majority of ass. I think Klotz (Ann. Crit. iv 5) is right in saying
that the pronoun (illud) may carry back the thought to a past time (in
this case to the writing of the Academica alluded to just before in
the words alio loco) and so justify the following Imperf., cf. Ac. ii 86 jam illa
probacula quarto artificio esset sensus fabricata natura, De Orat. i 63 illud
est probabilia (quod Societatem dicere solebit) omnes in eo quod scirent satis
esse cognoscere. cf. Dræger § 152, Madv. Fin. iii 67, also Fin. ii 21, 34, 42,
iv 20, Dir. ii 96. [The phrase hinc eobis extitit occurs also § 55 where it
is followed by Pres. Subj. ut quicquid accidat id fluxisse dicitis, which how-
erver is probably to be explained as an attraction to the parenthetic Pres.
(quam dicitis).] Heind. found another stumblingblock in the form visus
instead of visum, C.'s regular equivalent for pharracia : Wolf met the objec-
tion by instancing similar double forms, but the fact is that we want here a
distinct word for a distinct thing. Visum is a particular effect of the
abstract visus, which has both the active and passive force of our word
'look'. Habeo could only be used with the latter (cf. hab. cervationem
§ 45) not with the n. visum. Of course visus has here a wide sense given
to it corresponding to the use of visum for sensation in general. Lastly
H. alleges that the clause is superfluous and too technical. Kl. rightly
answers that without it the thought would be left incomplete. It is not
enough to say that true and false impressions are almost indistinguishable:
that by itself would confirm the opponent's charge that the Academicians
leave themselves no grounds for action; you must go on to affirm the
existence of probable impressions marked out from others by their clear-
ness, so as to afford sufficient practical guidance to the wise. Compare
with the whole the very similar passage Ac. ii 99 quicquid acciderit specie
(=visus in V. D.) probabile, si nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi
contrarium, utetur co sapientes ac sic omnis ratio vitique gubernabatur.

insignem : 'marked', lit. 'bearing a stamp'. Cf. Ac. ii 101, the Aca-
demic sage moreretur mente, moreretur sensibus, et ci multa vera videcantur,
neque tamen habere insignem illum et proprium percepienti notam, i.e.
though they do not answer to the Stoic criterion.

illustrum : 'clear' = perspicuum, Ac. ii 34. Cf. Ac. ii 94 etiam a certis
et illustrioribus colibes ascensionem, Fin. ii 15 Epiro tors noc de se obscura, ut
physici, aut artificiosa, ut mathematici, sed de illustri et facilii loquitur. It corrcsponds to the Gr. ἐνναγίς, as in Sext. Emp. vii 161, η αὐθενσίς πως παθούσα, κατά τὴν τῶν ἐνναγῶν ὑπότασιν ἐνδεικνύει τὰ πράγματα. έν ἀρὰ τῷ ἀπὸ ἐνναγίας πάθει τίς ψυχῆς ζητητόν ἀστὶ τὸ κρατῆρον, and § 171 where he distinguishes between the ἀμφότερα φαντασία and that which σφοδρὸν ἔχουσα τὸ φανεροθα αὐτὴν ἀλήθη πληκτικωτέραν (insignem) ἑνεχεί φαντασίαν, also § 257. Similarly Descartes (Meditation 4) made the clearness and distinctness of the idea his criterion of certainty, see Locke bk ii ch. 29.

c. Preamble to the dialogue itself. In order that the reader may be enabled to form his own judgment on the matter, Cicero reports a conversation held at the house of the pontifex C. Aurelius Cotta in which the Epicureans were represented by C. Velleius, the Stoics by Q. Lucilius Balbus, and the Academics by Cotta, Cicero forming the audience. vi. §§ 13—17.

Ch. vi. § 13. **invidia liberem**: 'to free myself from the odium of maintaining the Academic or negative position that we can know nothing about the Gods, I will lay before my readers the positive views of various schools'. On the invidia attaching to the Academics see Ac. ii 105 sint falsa sane, invidiosa certe non sunt: non enim lucem eripimus; Augustine Ac. ii 12 hinc iis invidia magna conflata est: videbatur enim esse consequens ut nihil ageret qui nihil approbarit; on the contrary they affirmed nullo modo cessare sapientem ab officiis cum haberet quid sequeretur; Lact. iii 6 if Arcesilas had confined his scepticism to physics et se ipsum calumniae invidia liberasset et nobis certe dedisset aliquid quod sequeretur.

**quo loco**: 'and in this matter'. On the omission of in see Madvig § 273 b.

**qui judicent**: 'I invite all the world to listen and decide which of them is true'; not as Sch. 'die Dogmatiker, alle Solche die ein bestimmtes Urtheil aussprechen'.

**tum demum procax**: 'then only shall I allow that the Academy is too saucy (wanting in respect for the other schools) if someone shall have been found to have discovered the truth'. So in Leg. i 13 the Academy is said to be perturbatrix omnium rerum. Cf. Div. ii 53 at impudentes sumus qui, cum tam perspicuum sit, non concedamus, Rep. iii 9 Carneades saepe optimas causas ingenti calumnia judicicare solet: Augustine however makes Arcesilaus the chief offender, Ac. iii 39 Carneades illam velut calumnianti impudentiam qua videbat Arcesilam non mediocriter infamatum deposuit, ne contra omnia velle dicere quasi ostentationis causa videretur. [I suspect pernicious is the true reading. The obstinacy of the Academics in refusing to see the truth is the point insisted on by the dogmatists, cf. Ac. ii 65, Fin. i 2, August. Ac. ii 1. J. S. R.]

**ut est in Synephebis**: 'as we read in the Comrades', a fabula palliata

M. C.
of Caccilius Statius translated from Menander. Other quotations are given N. D. iii 72, Senect. 25. C. blames his style (Brut. 74) but still places him first of Latin comic poets (Opt. Gen. Or. 2). Like Terence he was a foreigner (an Insubrian Gaul) and a slave: he died b.c. 168, cf. Teuffel R. L. § 95. The metre of the lines quoted is trocha. tetr. cat. As regards the reading I have preferred to insert est after ut, as in Tusc. iii 21 ut est in Melanippio, rather than adopt the ille of Ursinus, which seems to me less suited to the following ut queritur ille. [Ut est may also be the true reading in Tusc. i 31 ut ait in Synephebis, where edd. supply ille. J. S. R.]

fidem: 'protection', lit. 'good faith'. He who forgets the common bond of fellowship which unites men together is guilty of a breach of faith: even the Gods would be 'unrighteous' if they neglected the suppliant.

in civitate—non vult: the lines may be reduced to metre by a slight alteration, e.g.

hic in civitate frunt facinora capitilia:
abs amico amante meretricis accipere argentum non vult.

Ribbeck Com. Fr. p. 76 reads nam ab amico amante argentum accipere meretricis nobis vult.

§ 14. religione, pietate, sanctitate: see n. on § 3 and on § 116.

delubris: 'shrines'. The word is commonly used in connexion with the image, whether of a God or hero, which was placed there. Acc. to its etymology (lua cf. lustrum, pollubrum) it must originally have meant a place of expiation. See Dict. of Ant. under Templum.

auspiciiis quibus praesumus. C. was elected a member of the college of Augurs b.c. 53 in place of the younger Crassus killed at Carrhae. How highly he appreciated the dignity of the office may be seen from Leg. ii 31 maximum et praestantissimum in re publica jus est augurum.

addubito: 'to be inclined to doubt' (towards doubt), cf. adlubescere, addormio.

aliquid certi: see n. § 6 quid certi, and Dir. ii 8 si aliquid certi haberem.

§ 15. accurate et diligenter: 'with careful attention to each point'.

feriis Latinis: the annual festival of Jupiter Latialis on the Alban Mount lasted for four days. It was one of the class of f. concep ticae, the time for its celebration being determined by agreement between the two consuls, who regularly presided at it, see Dict. of Ant. and Preller Röm. Myth. p. 1862. Besides the N. D., C. represents the dialogue De Republica as having been held on occasion of a Latin holiday.

ad eum: 'to his house.' So just above apud Cottam 'at his house'.

arcessitu: found only in the Abd. like many similar verbals, e.g.

1 Since writing the above I find that this is the reading adopted in the text of C. F. W. Müller.
injussu, coactu, concessu. On its relation to accersitū see Wilkins in Journal of Philology, no. xii. p. 278.

offendi: 'found'; lit. 'stumbled across'.

exedra: 'saloon'; lit. 'a sitting out'; used not so much, I think, of 'out-of-door seats' (D. of Ant.) as of bays or projections from a central hall or court (περιπτύλιον), which were sometimes very small (Guhl and K. § 80) but more frequently of considerable size with semicircular apses and stone seats along the walls. Vitruvius in his description of the palaestra or gymnasium, such as were attached to Roman villas of the higher class (Att. i 4, Fam. vii 23, De Orat. i 98, Divīn. i 8) recommends that in three of the cloisters surrounding the court there should be exedrae spatiose in quibus philosophi, rhetores, reliquique qui studiis delectantur sedentes disputarent possint v. 11. (Readers of Plato will remember that he places the scene of several of his Dialogues in the Palaestra.) For the use of the word in ecclesiastical writers cf. Bingham Bk. viii c. v. § 4, and c. vi. § 9, c. vii. § 1. C. uses the word De Orat. iii 17, Fin. v 4, and the diminutive exedrīum Fam. vii 23. For the spelling (exedra or exedra) see Sch.'s n. with the refl.

ad quem: C. often uses ad after dēfero, otherwise the Dat. would have seemed more appropriate to express honour done to a person, cf. Draeg. § 186, 3.

primas: sc. partes, προτετυλοντεῖν, a metaphor from the stage frequently used with agere, ferre, dare, concedere, tenere, &c. Secundas is similarly used by Seneca.

progressus habebat: so progressus facere Tusc. iv 44.

Ch. vii. § 16. Piso: M. Pupius Piso Calpurnianus consul in B.C. 61. We learn from Asconius that C. in his youth was taken to him by his father to receive instruction in oratory. His style of eloquence is described in the Brutus § 236, where he is said to have been maxime omnium qui ante fuerunt Graecis litteris eruditus. He was instructed in the Peripatetic philosophy by Staseas (De Orat. i 104) and is introduced as the spokesman of that school, as modified by Antiochus, in the 5th bk. of the De Finibus. As consul he deeply offended C. by favouring Clodius. In the letters written to Atticus about that time he is spoken of as one quod nihil spares boni rei publicae quia non vult; nihil metuas mali quia non audet, Att. i 13; uno vitio minus vitiosus quod iners, quod somni plenus, i 14. He died before the writing of the N. D. as is shown by Att. xiii 19. Krische p. 19 thinks that C.'s reason for omitting the Peripatetic school was the obscurity of Aristotle's teaching on the points which are here discussed. A more probable reason is that on these points he accepted Antiochus' identification of the Stoic with the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy (§ 33) and thought it unnecessary to treat separately of the latter.

nullius philosophiae—locus: on the supremacy of the four great schools see R. and P. § 2 n., Lucian Hermot. 16, Ciris l. 14 si me jam summa Sapientia panjeret arce | quattuor antiquis quae heredibus est data consors,
De Oratore III 16. Professorships of these four schools were established at Athens by M. Antoninus. Besides these there was the Pythagorean school which was ably represented at Rome by P. Nigidius Figulus (Tim. i 1) but had few adherents among the public. A little later we read of the Cynics and the Sextii (R. and P. §§ 469, 473). Sch. thinks that the Academy, which has been just spoken of as orba and relieta, cannot be included in the schools quae in honore sunt; to which Heidtmann replies (p. 28 foll.) that different times are referred to: at the supposed date of the conversation, while Cotta and perhaps Philo were living, the Academy was still flourishing: the case had altered when C. wrote twenty or thirty years later. Perhaps this is presssing C.'s language too far, especially in a hasty composition like the present. Speaking generally, every one living at that time would have counted the Academy among the great schools, though it might be declining in comparison with its former glory. About one hundred years later Seneca (Nat. Quaest. vii 32), deploring that tot familiae philosophorum sine successor deficiant, mentions that the Academy in particular had been overtaken by the usual fate of merely negative schools, Academicici et vetores et minores nullum antistitem reliquerant.

missus est: 'addressed to', cf. Senect. 3, Dir. ii 3, Reid on Lael. 4.
nihil est quod desideres: 'you have no reason for regretting the absence of'. See n. on § 3 quid est quod.

re—verbis: 'really—nominally', § 124 re tollit, oratone reliquit deos. Cf. § 85 verbis reliquisse deos, re sustulisse. So Fin. iv 2 Cato is made to say non verbis Stoicos a Peripateticis, sed universa re et tota sententia dissentire. The relation of the Stoics to the Peripatetics and the old Academy is discussed in the 3rd and 4th books of the De Finibus and Leg. i 54 foll. On the eclecticism of Antiochus see Introduction. For the musical metaphor contained in concinere and discrepare cf. Off. i 145, iii 53 (of honestas and utilitas) verbo inter se discrepare, re unum sonare, and Fin. iv 60. [So συνάδεω Plat. Phaed. 92 c, τὰ ἀπάδοντα Sext. Emp. P. ii. 1 200. J. S. R.]
egone: cf. iii 8. Sch. quotes Leg. i 14, Fin. iii 11.
magnitudine et quasi gradibus. The distinction between degree and kind not being yet familiar to the Romans C. employs this periphrasis for the former, [similar periphrases occur Fin. iii 45—50. J. S. R.]

§ 17. verum hoc alias: sc. tracentus, Roby § 1441, Draeger § 116, Nügelsb. § 183, Madv. Fin. i 9, iv 26. Exx. of similar elliptical constructions are found in §§ 19, 47, Lael. 1 with Reid's n.

mihi vero: 'to be sure it does', so repetam vero just below, 'to be sure I will', cf. iii. 65, Dir. i 100, Fuit. 3, Lael. 16, AC. i 4 &c.

ut hic—ne ignoaret: depends, not upon the principal verb agebamus, but upon the unexpressed 'I will explain', Zumpt § 772, Roby § 1660. When a negative is added to ut final (ίνα), ne is used; when to ut consecutive (δοτε) non. Later writers use ne by itself for the earlier ut ne. C. uses either form, the fuller where he wishes to separate the connective and negative force of the conjunction: this is seen most clearly when several
words intervene between *ut* and *ne*, as in this instance. Cf. Zumpt §347, Madvig §456 and Fin. II 15 n.

**me intuens**: 'with a glance at me'. Sch. refers to II 104, Brut. 253.

**nihil scire**: referring to the Academic doctrine of human nescience, ἀκαράληφτα. So Fin. v 76, 'would you send a youth to receive instruction in doctrines *quaesum plane perdidicerit nihil sciat*?'

**Cotta viderit**: 'that is Cotta's business', lit. 'he will have looked (must look) to that', i.e. I leave it to him to show whether we have learnt anything or not. Cf. III 9 *quam simile istud sit tu videris*, Fin. I 35 *quaer sint causa mox videre*, Liberius in Gell. XVI 7 *duas uxores*? *hoc heroel plus negoti est*, inquit cocios; sed aediles viderint, 'it is their look-out'. Some scholars, as Seyffert ad Lael. 10, have maintained that the mood is Ind. in the 1st and Subj. in the 2nd and 3rd persons, but see Madv. Opusc. II pp. 92, 96, Roby §§ 1593 and 1595 (where exx. of the simple Fut. similarly used are given) and Pref. cv. foll., cf. also Mayor Sec. Phil. p. 158.

**nolo—auditorem**. Both the Romans and Greeks preferred to negative the principal verb where we should join the negative particle with the Inf. as in the well-known instances of *nego*, *ov* φαμι: so here *nolo—adjutorem* instead of *volo—non adjutorem*. If the subordinate sentence is composed of two members, one negative, the other affirmative, the negative verb is still retained, the corresponding affirmative being suggested in thought before the second clause, as here *nolo* suggests *volo* before *auditorem* (sc. existimes me venisse). See Heind. here and on Hor. Sat. I 13, and Madv. §462.

**adjutorem—auditorem**. The antithesis is pointed by the paronomasia (ἀντιόπτωτον) cf. Herenn. IV c. 20, Orat. c. 12, Brut. 38 *suavis quam gravis*, Mayor Sec. Phil. ind. s. v. annominatio. [A curious ex. is Div. II 34 *concentu atque conceans.* J. S. R.]

**et quidem** = *nai rauva* 'and that too', see § 78 n.

**libero judicio**: the constant boast of the Academics, Ac. II 8, Tusc. II 5, Off. III 20. On the contrary the Epicureans are charged with a slavish adherence to their master's teaching, §§ 66 and 72. Fin. II 20 *quis enim vestrum non edidit Epicuri kúrias doξas*? Seneca. Ep. 33, contrasting Stoic freedom with Epicurean submission to authority, *non sumus sub rege: sibi quisque se vindicat*. Omnia quae quismam in illo contubernio locutus est unus ductu et auspiciis dicta sunt; (quoted by Zeller, Stoics tr. p. 394 foll.) [But C. does not spare the Stoics either, cf. Ac. II 120, Tusc. v 33. J. S. R.]

**velim nolim**: 'will I nil I'; 'should I wish it or should I not'. On the omission of the conjunction in short antithetical phrases see Zumpt §752.

B. Epicurean Argument. VIII 18—XX 56. (C. commences with the easiest to deal with, so as to leave the ground clear for the more serious struggle between the Porch
and the Academy. Cf. Fin. i 3 ut autem a facillimis ordiamur, prima veniet in medium Epicuri ratio.)

a. Polemic of Velleius against the Platonic and Stoic views of Creation. §§18—24.

fidenter ut solent: cf. Diog. L. x 121, (Epicurus affirmed that the sage δυνατείς καὶ οὐκ ἀπορήσει.) Self-confidence is the natural characteristic of the materialistic or anti-spiritualist philosophers, a Hobbes, a Bentham, a Conte, who see clearly because their field of view is limited. Those who have had a deeper feeling of the littleness of man in contrast with the vastness of the universe have been fain to take refuge in a docta ignoranitia, professing with Socrates that they know nothing, or with Plato seeking to find the best of human reasonings and use it as a raft for the voyage of life, εἰ μὴ τις δύνατον ἄφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκαλύπτοτερον ἐπὶ βεβαιότερον ἀχύρατον, λέγων θείον τινός, διαπρεβθήνα (Phaedo 85). Compare the manner in which the latter enters upon the discussion of this subject in the Timaeus as translated by C. (c. 3) si forte de deorum natura ortuque mundi dissipantes minus ut quod aequo consequerem, hanc sane erit miracum, contentique esse debibitis si probabilius dicaretur. Λέγων τινί meminisse et nec qui dixerat hominem esse et nos qui judicetis. It is probable that in his representation of Velleius C. had in his eye the sophists of the Platonic Dialogues, such as Thrasy machus, and intended to exhibit him rather as the butt of the company; but the arrogant, bantering tone, and the misrepresentation of opponents, are quite in accordance with what we are told elsewhere of the Epicureans: cf. what is said of Zeno and others § 93, and Hirzel p. 28 foll. On C.'s own position with regard to Epicureanism see Introduction.

ex deorum concilio: see n. on § 43 venerari Epicurum. It is curious that C. was attacked for using the same phrase of himself, probably in his poem on his Consulship, see Quintil. xi 1 24. Iovem illum a quo in concilium deorum advocatam fóll.

intermundia = metakósmia, the empty spaces between the innumerable worlds of Ep. (§ 53) where he supposed the Gods to have their habitation, apart from all cares and dangers (Diog. L. x 89). It is the Homeric Olympus, rationalized by Aristotle, and adapted, or rather forced into the Epicurean scheme, cf. Arist. Cat. ii 1. The word occurs again Fin. ii 75, and is referred to Div. ii 40 deos ipsos iucundi causa inducens Epicurus pelliculos et perfabiles et habitantes, tamquam inter duos locos (the famous asylum of Romulus), sic inter duos mundos proper metum recehram. Compare an interesting passage of Seneca, Benef. iv 19 ut denique, Epicure, domo inceram facias: omnia illi tui, omnem detractions potestatem, et ne eumquam metuculos esset, proferisti illum extra mundum. Haec igitur inspectum ingenti quodam et inexplicabili maro, dicamque a contactu et a conspectu mortalium, non habes quare rerum: nulla illi nec tribuendo nec nouenda materia est. In medio intervalli hojus et alterius
cuali desertus, sine animali, sine homine, sine re, ruinas mundorum supra se circaque se cadentium evitat, non exaudiens vota, non nostri curious. It is to these Lucretius alludes III 18 apparet divum numen sedesque quietae, v 147 illud item non est ut possis credere, sedes | esse deum sanctas in mundi partibus ullis. | Tenuis enim natura deum longeque remota | sensibus ab nostris animi vis mente videtur, where see Munro.

futiles (fundo χιω): ‘baseless’, without solidity or substance; hence effutio ‘to babble’, § 84; π 94, see Vaníček Etym. Wört., Roby § 878.


opifex: a less dignified word than artifex by which C. (Tim. 2) translates the Platonic δημοιρυγός. Ambrose (Hex. i 1) states plainly the difference between the Christian and Platonic ideas of creation. Plato held deum non tanquam creatorem materiae sed tanquam artificem ad exemplar fecisse mundum de materia, thus assuming three First Principles, God, Matter, the Ideas, instead of one. [There is the same contemptuous use of opifex Ac. π 144 and in the well-known description of Zeno as ignobilis verborum opifex. J. R. S.]

de Timaeo. Heind. following Walker, reads in for de as in Tusc. i 63. Sch. understands Timaeo of the Locrian philosopher who is said to have instructed Plato in the tenets of Pythagoras (Cic. Rep. i 16). But the particular doctrine here referred to is not especially Pythagorean: we find it attributed to Socrates by Xenophon (Mem. i 47) πάνω έξοκε ταύτα σοφοῖς τινος δημοιρυγοῦ καὶ φιλοσώφου τεχμηρι. And there is no objection to taking de simply as a reference to the Platonic dialogue, cf. Tusc. iii 53 hi poterant omnes illa de Andromacha deplorare, ‘hæce omnia vidi’ (those lines from the Andromache), Off. iii 82 in ore semper Graecos versus de Phoenissis habebat, Rep. 130 in ore semper erant illa de Iphigenia, Leg. i 1 de Mario with Dumesnil’s n.  

anus fatidica=χρησμολόγος γράφων, Plat. de Nob. c. 13 (with an allusion to the Stoic belief in divination, cf. Div. π 19 anile fatu nomen ἰρσων); elsewhere sneered at as ἐμπονοεῖ ἵ ποιη ἀληθριώδης καὶ τραγική, Plut. Mor. 1101 b. Balbus in his reply (π 73) explains that πρόφοα is not a person but an attribute of the Deity. C. sometimes translates it by prudentia, N. D. π 58, Ac. π 29 Reid.

neque vero: ‘no, nor yet the world itself’, see Madv. Fin. i 25.

mundum—praeditum: a doctrine common to both Plato and the Stoics, cf. Tim. 30 n, δει λέγειν τόνδε τοις κόσμοις ζωον ἐμφυχον ἐννοον τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ γενεσθαι πρόφοον.  

rotundum. See Tim. 33 n and, for the Stoics, N. D. π 46, 47, where reference is made to this passage.

ardentem. This was not Platonic, but borrowed from Heraclitus by the Stoics, see π 23 n.

volubilem. According to the general belief of antiquity it was the heaven that revolved, the earth being fixed in the centre. For exceptions to this belief cf. Ac. π 123 and n. on ederiterate § 24.
portenta: 'chimeras' 'monstrosities' \textit{N. D.} i. 43, iii. 91, \textit{Att. xiv} 21, \textit{Ac. ii} 123. \textit{So monstrata N. D.} i. 28, \textit{Att. iv} 7, i. 11, Plato \textit{Hipp. Ma.} 283 c, \textit{tērēs λέγεις καὶ δαιμονιστῶν}. [For \textit{μισάσινa} cf. Timon in \textit{Athenaeus} xi 113 \textit{δο} \textit{ἀνέπλαττε Πλάτων πεπλασμένα βαύματα εἰδῶς}: for \textit{somniāti̇um} \textit{Ac. ii} 121 with my \textit{n. J. S. R.}]

§ 19. \textit{quibus enim oculis.} The reading \textit{animi} after \textit{oculis} is doubtless a gloss intended to be an answer to the question in the text; Sch., who retains it, translates 'mit was für Geistesangen', but such a guarded complex phrase would be inconsistent with the form of the question, \textit{quibus} implying, like the Gr. \textit{ποῖος}, a palpable absurdity. It could only have been used if an objector in reply to the simple question 'with what eyes could he have seen it?' had already answered 'the eyes of the mind'. Then the latter phrase might have been attacked as itself incongruous, \textit{ποῖος ψυχῆς όμματιν}; but Vell. is made far too simple-minded to guard himself beforehand against any such answer. On the correctness of the phrase \textit{oculis animi} instead of \textit{oculis mentis}, see Sch. and Heidtmann \textit{p. 31}, Klotz \textit{Adn. Cr. ii} 3, Wytt. on \textit{Plut. Num. Vind.} \textit{p. 94}. In \textit{Rep. i} 56 we read that the Stoics \textit{tanquam oculis illa viderunt, quae nos viæ audiendo cognoscimus}.

\textit{vester Plato}: addressed not only to the Academicians C. and Cotta, but to Balbus the Stoic, who speaks of Plato as \textit{deus philosophorum}, \textit{ii} 32.

\textit{fabricam tanti operis qua construisti mundum factit}: 'the construction of so vast a work, I mean the putting together and building up of the world in the ways which he describes'. The relative clause serves rather awkwardly to explain what is meant by \textit{tanti operis}. The construction \textit{fabrica quæ construìt}, instead of \textit{f. construc\textit{t}i}, may be illustrated by the sentence in which Vitruvius defines the term (i 11), \textit{Fabrica est continuata et trita usu meditatio, qua manus perfeclt\textit{ur} e materia unius c\textit{u}jusque generis opus, et ad propositionem de\textit{f}ormationis}. The word \textit{fabrica} is used in the \textit{N. D.} (a) for the workshop or forge (i 11), \textit{Vitruvius Lenni fabricae traditum praefuisse}; (b) for the working or art itself, \textit{ii} 150 the fingers are useful \textit{ad omnem fabricam accris et ferri} 'for every kind of working in iron or brass', \textit{ii} 35 \textit{et pictura et fabrica ceteraque artes habent quandum absole\textit{uti} operis effectum 'as in painting and architecture we look to the general effect' (so more generally \textit{ii} 138 \textit{inc\textit{r}edibilis fabrica naturae et \textit{Dir.} i} 116 \textit{fabrica conceptionis} 'the art of cleaving wood', used much as it is here); (c) for the completed work, \textit{ii} 121 \textit{subtilis discrip\textit{ti}um partium, admirabilis fabricae membrorum 'structure'. In this passage it has a superlative force (like H. Spencer's 'carpenter-theory of creation' \textit{First Principles} p. 120) as in \textit{§ 53 n\textit{atra} eff\textit{f}ectum esse mundum, nihil opt\textit{s}us faus\textit{s}e fabrica, and \textit{Ac. ii} 87 Qua\textit{lis} ista fabrica? ubi ad\textit{hibita? quando? cur? quo modo?} cf. \textit{n. on} \textit{§ 4 fabric\textit{i}i}. If the elaborate constructive processes of the \textit{Timaeus} had been meant to be taken literally, the Epicureans would have had some ground for objecting to their anthropomorphic character, but there can be little doubt that they are figurative like the myths in the \textit{Gorgi\textit{s} and
Phaedrus, cf. Grote’s Plato Vol. III ch. 36 p. 282 foll. Ambrose objecting from the Christian side, says (Hex. i 3) ‘the Creator had no need of art qui momento sua voluntas majestatem tantae operationis inplevit, ut ea quae non erant esse faceret tam velociter, ut neque voluntas operationi prae-curreret neque operatio voluntati’.

quae molitio—fuerunt. The objection is ‘if we take the term δημονυργός literally and look on the Creator as a gigantic builder, where was the needful machinery to be found? or if we accept Plato’s view that the δημονυργός was incorporeal, and therefore incapable himself of touching or being touched, whom did he employ as his agents? If on the otherhand we think of a divine fiat, how could senseless matter act in obedience to this, and what was the origin of those four elements themselves?’ See the answer to this, together with a fragment from N. D. III, in Lact. Inst. Div. p 8.

mole. ferr. vect. mach. ‘His mode of building, tools, levers, scaffold-
ing’.

muneris: used of a public spectacle or a building made over to public use. So in C’s translation of the Timaeus (c. 2), is qui aliquod munus efficere molit—δ δημονυργός (Pl. Tim. 28 A). It is joined with opus in reference to the creation, N. D. II 90 architectum tanti operis tantique muneris, and Tusc. i 70. Cf. Vell. Pat. II 48 and 130. [Mr Roby suggests that munus in this sense may be etymologically connected with munio and moenia.]

illa quinque formae: Plato represents the Demiurgus as educating the four elements out of the primaeval chaos (materia prima, ἑλη, χώρα, τὸ δεξομενον) by stamping upon it certain geometrical forms, the combination of which gave rise to the five regular solids. The material particles which received the form of the cube constituted earth, those which were in the form of a pyramid constituted fire, the octahedron was the basis of air, the eicosihedron of water, while the dodecahedron was the basis of the universe itself, cf. Tim. 48 b, 53 c foll., Grote’s Plato III p. 266 foll., R. and P. §§ 269, 270, Phaedo 110 β δώδεκάκυκλοι σφαιραi with Wytt’s n., Plut. Def. Or. 34 p. 428, Qu. Conv. viii 2 3. This theory was borrowed from the Pythagoreans (Plut. de Pl. Ph. II 6). In the Epinomis 981 c aether appears as a fifth element, quinta essentia, corresponding to the dodecahedron, and this agrees with the statement of Xenocrates preserved in the Scholia to Arist. Phys. p. 427 Brandis. It is strange that none of the editors before Sch. saw the right meaning of the present passage. The reference to the five solids is unmistakable by any reader of the Timaeus, if it is once recognized that reliqua can only be the four elements just spoken of. Davies however seems to have been thinking more of the latter part of the sentence where the MSS have aπτε caderes ad animum efficiendum, and puzzled himself to find five constituents of mind (Plato Tim. 35 A having mentioned only three—the indivisible essence of ideas tαυτόν, the divisible essence of bodies θάτερον, the mixture of both), instead of constituents of
matter. Sch.'s emendation *efficendam* is generally accepted and gives the required sense. Thus we read, with regard to the origin of sensation and the manner in which it affects the reason, *Tim.* 64—65 'such parts of the body as are composed of the finer particles of air and fire readily propagate the impulses from without μέχρι περ ἀν ἐπὶ τὸ φρονήματα ἐλάβοντα ἐξαγγέλῃ τοῦ πνεύματος τὴν δύναμιν: cf. also *Tim.* 42 c speaking of the irrational accretions which gather round the soul from fire and water and air and earth. The only defence for *efficendam* would be that it is a simple mis-understanding of Plato, which would be natural enough on the part of an Epicurean, as we shall see when we come to the historical section, but C. had just been translating the *Timaeus* and he could scarcely have inserted a palpable blunder without correction or notice. Add that the phrase *apte cadere* is not only more appropriate for a continuous influence than for a single creative act, but that it appears to refer to the correspondence between the organs of sense and the external cause of sensation, according to the principle 'like is known by like'; see *Tim.* 68 of the sense of sight, and p. 37 of the soul’s power of cognizing various kinds of objects in virtue of its own constitution from corresponding elements.

*apte cadere*: lit. 'to fall into its niche', here 'nicely adapted to affect the soul'. Cado by itself has nearly the same force, e.g. § 95 c(um ista beatitudo in solem cadere non potest, 'why is that blessedness unsuited to, incongruous with, our idea of the sun?' So just below in *figuram cadere.* We are now in a position to reply to the off-hand *Unde* of Velleius. The five solids are all generated according to Plato (*Tim.* 53) out of two sorts of right-angled triangles, τὰς δ’ ἐτὶ τούτων ἄρχας ἀνωθεν θεὸς οἶδε καὶ ἄνδρῶν ὅσ ἄν ἐκεῖνο φίλος ἂ, that is, they belong to the ideal, supersensaul world, from which the Deity took his pattern for making the sensible world, and of which the rational soul is cognizant, unless it has been so much steeped in sense as to have lost its original faculties.

*longum est*. The Ind. is generally used where we might have expected the Subj. with verbs or phrases expressing duty, necessity, possibility, &c., especially when *sum* is employed with the Fut. Part. or Gerundive, the predication being made absolutely and not in reference to a particular hypothetical action; see Roby §§ 1535, 1566, 1570, Key § 1214 f(ell), Draeger § 145, Kraeger’s *Untersuchungen* (of Ind. in past tenses) Vol. ii pp. 333—388. Other examples of *longum est* are found Av. Dict. 1 30, 1 159, of *possam* 1 101, 1 121, 126, 131, so Bellum erat 1 84, opus erat 89. For the similar Greek use of the past tense of the Ind. without *ἄν* in such words as ἡσε, ἐχείρη, ἐχεῖρ, δικαιον ἴπτε, see Madv. Gr. Gr. § 118, Jelf § 558.

*ad omnia*: sc. *dicere* 'it would take long (to speak in reference to) to comment on all his theories'. Cf. Laol. 32 nisi quid ad have forte vultis with Reid’s n., and my n. on § 17 alius.

*optata*: 'castles in the air' 'dreams', so Rull. 1 utrum cognitata sapientiam an optata fictosorum videnter? Ac. 1 121 sumnia censet have esse
Democriti non docentis sed optantis; Fat. 46 optare hoc quidem est non disputare, Tusc. ii 30, Lael. 18. Cf. the use of εὐχή as in the phrase εὐχαι ρω α Plato Rep. vi 499.

§ 20. sed illa palmaria: 'but the prize for absurdity is due to what we have still to notice'. Pal. has the same ironical force in the only other passage in which it is used by C. sed illa statua palmaris, Phil. vi 15. It has been vainly sought to defend the MS reading palmaris by a reference to the sententias of § 18. On the use of the plural where only one proposition follows, we may say with Sch. that it may be intended to imply Plato's expression of the same thought under various forms (e.g. Tim. 32 c, 33 Λ, 41 Λ), or we may be satisfied with the more general explanation given by Madv. (in Orelli), 'illa Cicero posuit tanquam plura eadem orationis figura enumeraturus. Vid. Opusc. Acad. i 360 not. et illis quae ibi collegi add. N. D. ii 147 quanta vero illa sunt quod et sensibus....Phil. v 17 an illa non gravissimis ignominis sunt notanda quod...'. See also Ac. ii 86 jam illa praecenda quanto artificio esset sensus nostro fabricata natura, a sarcastic reference to the remarks of Lucullus in § 30. [For omission of sunt cf. N. D. i 25 haec quidem vestra; iii 80 sed haec vetera; Off. ii 19 haec ergo rauriora; iii 47 illa praecura; iii 69 quam illa aures &c. J. S. R.]

quod qui introduxerit is dixerit: Heind. followed by C. F. Müller Pref. iv objects to the Subj. dixerit which Draeger explains (§ 151 5 b) as an attraction to the preceding introduxerit. I should be disposed to regard it as an instance of the ordinary confusion by which the verb of saying is put in Subj. instead of the thing said (Roby §§ 1742, 1746). Omitting dixerit we should necessarily have had sempiternus futurus sit to show that this was a supposition of Plato's.

manu paene factum: see n. on § 4 fabricati poæne.

primis labris gustasse: 'to have the slightest taste of', lit. 'with the surface of the lips', primus being used in a sort of restrictive apposition to express not the first of a number of similar things, but the foremost part of one thing, as Fam. iii 6 prima provincia 'the nearest part of the province', Catull. ii 3 primus digitus 'the tip of the finger'. The more common form in this use is primoris, cf. De Orat. i 87 primoribus labris attingere. Similarly we find imus mens, media urbs, &c. Roby § 1295. Cf. the Gr. ἀκρων χείλους φίλοσοφεῖν.

physiologiam: 'natural philosophy' including theology, according to the Stoics and Epicureans, but distinguished from it by Aristotle. Heind. following Manutius omitted the explanatory clause (nat. rat.) as a gloss, but Klotz (Ado. Crit. iv 5) successfully defends it by a large induction of passages, e.g. the explanation of the same word Div. i 90, of προάληψις N. D. § 43, of ἱσονομία §§ 50 and 109, of εἰμαρμένη and μακριτείς § 55, again of the latter Div. i 1, of ψυχικός N. D. i 53, of κυρία διέξα &§ 85 and Fin. ii 20.

quod ortum—ae ternum. So Tusc. i 79 vult enim, quod nemo negat, quiescend neminem sit interire. This principle is often asserted by Plato, as in Rep. viii 546 Α, Phaedrus 245 c d (translated by C. Tusc. i 53), where it is
distinctly stated that that alone is eternal which has in itself the principle of self-movement, ἄτε οὐκ ἀπολείπον εαυτῷ, while that which is moved by another (life being regarded as a species of movement) ceases to live when it ceases to be moved, and is therefore in itself mortal. What is compounded is especially liable to this law, see Tim. 41 άτο δεῖν πᾶν λυτόν, and Phaedo 78 c τό μὲν ἔνωσεν ὅτι φύσι προσήκει τούτῳ πάσχειν, διαφερήναι ταύτην ἔπει ἐνετείθη εἰ δὲ τι τυγχάνει ὧν ἄνωθεν τούτῳ μόνον προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν τούτῳ. How then does the universe being compounded and receiving its principle of movement from without, and therefore essentially mortal, escape dissolution? Because the First-Mover and Compounder eternally wills to keep it together as a living unity, and his will is stronger than any hand, Tim. 32 c, 33 A, 41 A B. This Platonic principle is of course the only ground for the Christian belief in the continuance of any created existence. Bp. Butler, it is true, in defending the doctrine of Immortality against the Materialists (Anal. ch. i) makes use of the argument from indiscripibility; but this is only to show that, even supposing the soul material, it need not necessarily perish in death, of which the only known effect is to dissolve what is dissoluble: he is far from maintaining, as some have done, that each individual soul possesses an inherent immortality a priori, so as to render its extinction impossible even to the Almighty. The argument here used by Velleius is taken from Aristotle De Caelo i 10 where he maintains the eternity of the universe in opposition to the Platonic doctrine of creation. [Cf. for the whole passage Ath. ii 119 and Bernays' Die Dial. d. Arist. 99—114. J. S. R.]

**cujus principium aliquod sit, nihil sit extremum:** 'such as to have a beginning without having an end.' An example of adversative asyndeton equivalent to the opposition of clauses by the use of μίαν and δέ in Greek; see just below sapientes leniant, stulti nec vitare possint. In both instances the first clause is introductory to the second and would be unmeaning without it. For other examples of coordinate propositions, where we should have expected one proposition to be subordinated to the other, see § 23, Roby § 1027, Nägels. § 160, Madv. § 438, and his Gr. Gr. § 159 b, also indices (under Coord.) to Mayor's edd. of Juvenal and the Second Philippic of C. Logically such clauses would come under the head conjunctionum negationis Cie. Top. 57, Fat. 15, cf. Heidt. l. c. 34 foll. On the repetition of sit cf. Tusc. i 76 vereor ne hominē nihil sit non malum aliud, certe sit nihil bonum potius, Tusc. iv 50 vereor ne fortitudine minime sit rubiosa, sitque irascendia tota levitatis.

**si est eadem:** 'if your Pronoea is the same, then I want to know all I asked about before, the agents, engines, &c.' There does not seem to be any need to insert a second eadem, to be the object of requiro, as most of the recent edd. have done (see Sch. Opusc. iii 283). Klotz, on the other hand, retaining the ms reading, makes restra predicative, which gives no meaning, for there has been no allusion to any but the Stoic Pronoea, who is here compared with the Platonic Demiurgus. The difference between
them is that the Demiurgus is pure spirit and exists apart from the
world which he creates, while Pronoea is strictly an attribute of the fiery
soul which animates the world, and from which the world grows as a plant
from a seed. [This again shows that vestra cannot be predicative, for there
is no place for agents and instruments (ministros, machinas) in this natural
and necessary growth.] The Stoic Providence therefore is not eadem, but
alia, and Vell. asks why, if the universe thus contains in itself its own
principle of life, it should fail to be eternal; for the Stoics thought (N. D.
π 118) that it was destined to be destroyed by fire. The answer is that
this destruction is merely the cyclical re-absorption of the universe, as
it grows old, into its original form of fire, from which it issues forth in
renovated strength and beauty.

designationem atque apparatus: ‘the planning and arrangement’.

cecerit: indirect question after requiro.

mortalem non sempiternum: adversative asyndeton answering to
Gk. ἀλλά, Zumpt § 781.

Ch. ix. § 21. aedificatores extiterint: ‘(Dem. and Pron.) rose up
extitī.

extiterint—dormierint: adversative asyndeton answering to μια
and ἦδ. For the argument see Phnt. Plac. Phil. 1 7, Lucr. v 168 quidve novi
potuit tanto post ante quietos | indicere ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?
Mansel endeavouring to show that reason cannot judge of the contents of
religion, admits the justice of this objection against a creation at any par-
ticular moment of time, and quotes an interesting passage from Neander
in reference to Origen’s opinion on the subject: ‘supposing that to create
is agreeable to the divine essence, how is it conceivable that what is thus
conformable to God’s nature should at any time have been wanting? Why
should not those attributes which belong to the very essence of the Deity,
his almighty power and goodness, be always active? a transition from the
state of non-creating to the act of creation is inconceivable without a
change, which is incompatible with the being of God’, Bampton Lect. π
n. 23. The difficulty seems to arise from a failure to recognize that God is
omnipresent in time as in space. We go back in thought to the commence-
ment of finite existence, and imagine a boundless solitude anterior to this,
but all past, present and future events are at every moment equally before
the eye of God, in the same way that all points of space are at all moments
equally near to him. Cf. A. Butler Anc. Phil. π 185, Cudworth iii 490 foll.

saecula: acc. of time. The word means originally ‘generation’ (sero),
then the greatest extent of a life-time, 100 years according to Varro L. L.
v 11, cf. Mayor’s Juvenal xiii 28 n.

quae dierum—conficiuntur: ‘which are made up of a number of days
and nights by means of the annual revolutions’.

fateor—potuisse. So Celsus ap. Or. v 60 sneers at the mention
in Genesis of the 1st, the 2nd and the 3rd day before the creation of
the lights to which the division of night and day is owing. Plato would not have allowed that time existed even as indefinite duration before the universe came into being. 'With the rotation of the Kosmos began the course of time, days, months and years: anterior to the Kosmos there was no time, no past, present or future, no numberable or measurable motion or change.' Grote's Plato piii 256. In Plato's own words ή μὲν οὖ σου τοῦ ζητού φύσις (the ideal) έτύχακεν οὖσα αἰώνιον: καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῷ γεννητῳ (the material copy of the ideal world) παντελῶς προσοπέτευν οὐκ ἦν δυνατών· εἰκώ δ' ἐπισκείν κινήσις τινα αἰῶνος ποιήσαι, καὶ διακομῆν αἷμα οὐρανῶν ποτεί μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἐνί κατ' ἀριθμον ἤωσαν αἰῶνων εἰκόνα, τούτων ὑπ' ἡ χρώμων ὠσμάκαμεν...καὶ τὸ τ' ἦν τὸ τ' ἐστατι, χρώμων γεγονότα εἰδή, φύσεις λαμβάνομεν ἐπί τὴν ἁλίθων οὐσίαν οὐκ ἀρβάως, Tim. 37 v, cf. 39 c translated by Cic. 9 nesciant hos siderum errores id ipsum esse quod rite dicitor tempus, cf. Varro L. L. vi 3 tempus esse divinum intercalatum mundi motus; id diversum in partes aliquot maximè ab sola et lunae curae.

So also Arist. De Caelo i 9 7 'there is neither place nor time outside the circle of the heavens (for time is but the measure of motion) but only a divine unchanging eternity'.

mundi: here used in the narrower sense 'the heavens'.

spatio tamen—tempus esset. I have followed Davies in omitting non before postest with all the best ms's, and followed Heidt. p. 36 in regarding the words quod ne—esset as a gloss. The meaning of the passage is then simple and consistent, 'what was the creator doing during all the ages which preceded the making of the world? For though time was not then portioned out by the movements of the heavenly bodies, yet there must have been a boundless eternity which we can conceive as extended. Well, I ask why was your Pronoea idle in all that vast extent of time?' But with the ordinary reading (defended by Sch. in his note and also in Opusc. iii 299) we have a thought introduced which is not only out of place, but totally inconsistent with the argument. It is not for Vell. to dwell upon the difficulty of conceiving the existence of time prior to creation; that is a point for his opponents to press. According to the reading which I have adopted he merely alludes to it to show that it does not invalidate his argument, and proceeds with an igitur which would be very ill-suited to the other reading. The particle tamen just above would be equally inappropriate after quam nulla—metebatur; there is no opposition between the clauses if we read intelligi non postest, and it is harsh to carry back the opposition to the previous sed fuit quaedam. Independently of the inappropriateness of the proposition in the mouth of Vell. the language is too verbose for the short staccato style of the rest of his speech. Yet again, the sentiments in themselves are non-Epicurean. Infinite time and infinite space are not unintelligible to an Epicurean. Lucretius has no hesitation in telling us what was the state of things before the atoms happened on the existing cosmos with its sun and moon and stars. Sch.'s references to Aristotle and Sext. Emp., as proving the inconceivability
of time in itself, are quite beside the mark. No one disputes that this was the view of many philosophers; the question is, what was the Epicurean view? No doubt Vell. just below uses non-Epicurean arguments, but that is where he can turn them to his own purpose, and make his adversary's case destroy itself. Here it is his own case which is weakened by the insertion of what I hold to be a gloss. As regards the language of the gloss itself, no in cogitationem quidem cadit is equivalent to ne cogitari quidem potest (Ac. ii 82) 'it is impossible even to imagine how there could have been (lit. was) anything of the nature of time before time existed' (I prefer to take it thus rather than to make ut fuerit = fuisset with Sch. in loco and Draog. § 407). It only remains to account for the gloss, and this seems, like animi after oculis § 19, to be easily explained as a correction of the Epicurean doctrine in the text, made by a follower of Plato or Aristotle, who inserted a non before potest, and gave as his reason for negating it quod—esset. For the use of intellego = 'conceive' Heidt. quotes Fin. i 17 evunque motum atomorum nullo a principio sed ex oeterno tempore inteligeti convenire (where see Madv. s. n.), N. D. i 73 istud quasi corpus et quasi sanguinem quid intellegis? iii 38 quadem autem demn intellegere nos possimus nullo virtute praedictum? ii 54 hone igitur in stellis constantiam non possimus intelligere sine mente (sc. obser). § 22. isto spatio. Why the Abl. when we have the Acc. of duration just before, (saepe dorm.)? Because in that case the sleeping is viewed as extending right through the ages, while here the action is viewed as confined within this time, not extending over it; so in tempore infinito just below, cf. hoc spatio (in the interval) conclave concidisse (De Orat. ii 353), casus autem innumeris paene saeculis in omnibus plura mirabilia quam in somniorum visis effecit (Dio. ii 147). The same difference is found in Gr. between the Acc. of duration and the (inclusive) Gen. of time. Practically of course the two very much overlap, see Roby §§ 1182, 1185. Or we might take spatio as the Abl. of Attendant Circumstances, 'though there was all that time', Roby § 1248. at iste—parerent. Heidt. (p. 38) has called attention to the apparent inconsistency of this sentence with the tenets of the speaker. That we cannot connect the idea of toil with our idea of the divine nature is of course of the essence of Epicureanism; but this is bound up with the idea of the divine inactivity, whereas here it is assumed that the work of creation may be accomplished without toil to the creator owing to the willing cooperation of the elements, a supposition which has been just ridiculed by Vell. § 19. There is however no reason to suppose any corruption of the text, as H. does. The argument throughout is ad hominem as shown by the repeated isto, iste, ista. To this H. opposes the language used by Balbus of the labour of creation ii 133 tantarum rerum molitia, tantum laborasse: the answer to which is that B. there speaks rhetorically in a manner opposed to the general spirit of the Stoic philosophy to which Vell. here appeals.
attingit: similarly in iii 33. naturae: 'the elements', so §§ 29, 103, ii 28, 83, Ac. i 39.

ignes, terrae, maria. The singular is more naturally used of the simple elements, as in § 19; the plural of the lands and seas which constitute our globe. Perhaps the latter is employed here to give a certain inflation to the style suited to the ironical force of the sentence. So in § 100 and Leg. i 61 it may be explained as poetical hyperbole, 'all lands, all seas', or are we to consider it only the expression of the naive view which makes our earth the chief member in the universe? Caelum stands for air, ignes for the aetherii ignes (the stars) of § 103. Cf. Draeg. § 4.

quid—quod: see n. on § 3.

signis et luminibus. I think Ernesti right (against Heindl.) in supposing a play on words here. It suits the jocular tone of the passage and particularly the reference to the aediles. The constellations (cf. § 35, Lucr. i 2, v 691) and luminaries of heaven are compared to the statues and illuminations with which the aediles adorn the public buildings of Rome on festal days. The custom originated according to Livy (ix 46) with the victory of the Samnites B.C. 307, when the buildings in the forum were decorated with the gilded shields and other spoils; inde naturam initium fori ornandi ab aedilibus cum tensae ducerentur. So Suetonius tells us (Caes. 10) that Julius Caesar, when aedile, praeter comitium ac forum basilicasque ciitum Capitolium ornavit. We learn from Asconius ad Verr. i 22 that statues and ornaments were borrowed from Greece and elsewhere for these decorations, olim cum in foro ludis populo darentur signis ac tabulis pictis partim ab amicis, partim e Graecia commodatis utebantur; cf. Pro Dom. § 111, Verr. iv 3, Orator 131 (explaining the metaphorical use of the word lumen in oratory) reliqua ex collocacione verborum quae sumuntur quasi lumina magnum afferunt ornatum oratori. Sunt enim similia iis quae in amplo ornatu scene aut fori appellantur insignia; non quod sola ornant, sed quod excellunt. On the illuminations see Friedländer Sitt. Röms ii 144 ed. i, who refers among other passages to Lucil. Sat. iii 23 Romanis ludis forus olim ornatu lucernis. Nocturnal spectacles were not uncommon, especially at the Floraia, the Saenclaria, and the Saturnalia, cf. Ov. Fasti v 361, Dio Cass. lviii 19, Suet. Aug. 31, Stat. Silv. i 6 85. They were much patronized by Caligula (Suet. Cal. 18), Nero (Tac. Ann. xiv 20) and Domitian (Suet. Dom. 4).

si: sc. ornavit. For similar omissions after si cf. § 99 si, ut immortalis sit, iii 81 si, quia Drusum ferro sustulerat, Div. ii 55 si enim, ut intellegeremus.

gurgustio: 'a hovel', 'den', 'cellar'; used of a low tavern, Piso 13 meministine nescio quo e gurgustio te prodire involuto capite, soleatum? et cum isto ore fictio taeterrimam nobis popinam inhalasses...which is referred to again in 18 tu ex tebenricosa popina extractus; of a miser's dwelling, Apul. Met. i 71 brevitatem gurgustioi nostri ne spernas peto; of the poor cottage in which Valerius Cato ended his days, Suet. Gram. 11; of a close bower or
BOOK I. CH. IX § 22.

arbour, Ambr. Hex. i 8 32 ut si quis in campi medio, quem sol meridianus illuminat, locum aliumque obsaepiat et densis ramorum frondibus tegat: nonne quo splendidior foris species loci ejus efigyget, hoc horrenti desuper scena gurgustium ejus intus obscurius fit? where gurg. ejus seems to mean the hollow depth of the arbour, agreeably to Vaniček’s account (Etym. Wört. p. 50) where he connects it with gurges, voro, &c. and supposes it to mean a ‘swallow’ ‘abyss’, ‘hole’ and then ‘a dark mean dwelling’.

varietate. C. translates Plato’s περιευκλεινων by varietate distinctum Tim. c. 10. On the position of -ne cf. Leg. II 12 with Dumesnil’s n.

quae si esset: ‘had it been a delight, he could not have dispensed with it so long’; cf. Lact. I 7 fortasse quaerat aliquis a nobis idem illud, quod apud Ciceronem quaerit Hortensius: si deus unus est, quae esse beata solitudo quest? The Epicureans following Aristotle made the happiness of God consist in the contemplation of his own perfection § 51, which is not however inconsistent with a delight in his perfection as reflected in the creation.

§ 23 ut fere dicitis. The Stoic belief that the universe was made for man is stated at length II 133, 154 foll. where see notes.

sapientiumne. The earlier Stoics divided all mankind into the wise or virtuous (for Zeno summed up all virtue in practical wisdom φρόνησις) and the fools or wicked, allowing of no mean between these extremes, cf. Ac. II 136, Parad. 5, 6, N. D. III 79, Fin. IV 74: the later Stoics confessed that the Sage was merely an ideal not to be found on earth, and introduced an intermediate class of the προκόπτοντες, those who were on the way to wisdom.

propter paucos: the universal complaint, or boast, of philosophers, see III 79 sapientiam nemo assequitur, Div. II 61 si quod raro fit id portentum putandum est, sapientem esse portentum est, Zeller Socrat. tr. p. 313, Stoics tr. p. 254, Lucian Hermotimus 1, Mayor’s Juvenal XIII 26 n.

de improbis bene meretur. Absence of compassion, contempt for ignorance and weakness, despair of reformation, were characteristic marks of the old aristocratic philosophies, in contrast to the new religion which was to be preached in the first instance to the poor. The Epicurean here thinks it impossible that God should do a kindness to bad men or fools, who in the same breath are spoken of as most miserable: the Gospel recognizes human misery and sin as the strongest claims to the divine compassion. Cf. Orig. c. Cels. III 59 and 62.

deinde quod: the 2nd deinde is opposed to maxime, the 1st to primum.

ita multa=tot: so Att. VI 2 8 inclusum senatum habuerunt ita multos dies ut interierint nonnulli. Cf. tam multa—quam multa N. D. I 97.

ut ea sapientes—lenient, stulti nec vitare possint: ‘there are so many troubles in life that all the wise can do is to alleviate them by a balance of good, the foolish can neither avoid their approach nor endure

M. C.
their presence: see n. on § 20, cujus principium. The evils of life were
often urged in opposition to Stoic optimism, see N. D. III 65 seq., Ac. II 120,
and the interesting remarks of Pliny N. H. vii prae.f. Of the two reasons
assigned for the misery of fools the 1st, though mainly Stoic, is also in
accordance with Epicurean teaching, e.g. Fin. i 57 stultt malarum memoria
torquentur: sapientes bona praeterita grata recordatione renovata defectant;
59 nemo stultus est non miser, and the beasts of Lucretius II 7 &c.: the
2nd is distinctly Epicurean cf. Tusc. v 95 (Epicurus held) hoc usurum
compensatione sapiem: ut et voluptatem fugiat si ea majorem dolore
efectura sit, et dolore suscipiat majorem efficientem voluptatem, and the
quotation from a letter of Epicurus written in great pain, Fin. ii 96 com-
pensabatur tamen cum his omnibus animi lactitias quam capièbam memoria
rationum inventorumque nostrorum (quoted by Heidt. p. 42, see also R. and P.
§ 388, 389).

Ch. X. qui vero dixerunt. That the world was a rational creature
was the doctrine both of Plato and the Stoics, cf. § 18.

animi natura intellegentis. Davies' objection to the use of intel-
legens for intellegentiae particeps seems to be answered by the sentence
in the Timaeus c. 3 where C translates oivév ávóntov tòv nóiv évónos
kálidov ékéseba by nihil intellegens intellegente praestantissim. Most MSS
have naturam, which is very possibly right, the subject of the subordinate
clause (posset) being attracted into the object of the principal (viderunt)
see Div. ii 103 videns Epicurum quem ad modum condisciprit with Allen’s
n. and Sch. Opusc. iii 301 foll. The latter thinks intellegentes was inserted
by way of simplifying this construction; but a distinctive epithet is wanted
for animus: otherwise, as it is found apart from rationality in brutes (see
Tusc. i 80 bestiae quarum animi sunt rationis expertes) there would be no
meaning in the words in quam figuram cadere posset. On the periphrastic
use of natura cf. ii 136 alii natura, and Fin. v 33 hoc intellegent, si quando
naturam hominim dicam, hominem dicere me; nihil enim hoc differt, Nügelsb.
Stil. § 50 4.

in quam figuram cadere: cf. n. on § 19. Vell. refers to the human
figure § 43.

§ 24. nunc autem hactenus admirabo: 'on the present occasion
I will content myself with expressing my surprise at their stupidity'.
Most of the edd. place a colon after hactenus, to which Heidt. p. 44 rightly
objects that, wherever hactenus is used thus abruptly with the verb omitted,
it implies a change to a new topic, 'so much for that, and now to turn
He further points out that nunc must be taken with admirabo, if that is
to refer to the immediate present, and ends with the ingenious suggestion
that hactenus is simply the marginal note of a reader to mark where he
had left off. Curiously enough it does appear thus in the margin of one of
the Harleian MSS. I believe however that hact. adm. is an abbreviated
phrase for hactenus dicam ut admiror (Klotz's explanation is not unlike,
as he refers hactenus to qui velint=quatenus illi volunt, Adn. Cr. ii 5) but I am not able to point to a parallel case. For the general form of the sentence Sch. compares Div. i 132 nunc illa testabor following haec habui de divinatione quae dicerem.

qui animantem—velint: (their stupidity) in being ready to predicate roundness of a being who is immortal and blessed into the bargain'. I take animans as a Subst.; Vell. had previously stated that the Stoics considered the world to be alive; here he adopts their view and shows its absurd consequences. Velint subj. after qui=quod ii, Roby § 1740; neget subj. as dependent on subjunctival clause.

Plato: Tim. 33 b, cf. N. D. ii 46 foll. where Balbus criticizes Vell.

ut: sc. ejusmodi ut.

celeritate. As the earth was generally assumed to be at rest in the centre of the universe it was supposed that the heavens made a complete revolution about it every 24 hours. Aristarchus (280 B.C.) propounded the Copernican or heliocentric hypothesis, and was charged with impiety by Cleanthes as κνοίωντα τοῦ κόσμου τὰν ἔστιν. Hicetas the Pythagorean (about 400 B.C.) and Heraclides of Pontus (350 B.C.) are said to have accounted for the apparent movement of the heavens by attributing rotation to the earth, and this is discussed as a legitimate hypothesis by Aristotle. See Lewis Astronomy of the Ancients pp. 170, 189, 252. The question, already debated by the ancients, whether Plato held the same doctrine, is discussed by Lewis p. 142, and at greater length by Grote in a paper contained in his Minor Works.

contorqueatur: used with a Middle force.

mens constant: that 'a steadfast mind' is essential to vita beata is asserted §§ 34 and 52. The objection is taken from Arist. Cael. ii 1 'nor can we suppose that the heaven is kept eternally in its place by the coercive influence of a soul: it is impossible that a soul thus engaged should enjoy happiness, for, if we assume the heaven to have a different natural movement of its own, such coercive movement must necessarily be ἀσχολον καὶ πάσης ἀπηλλαγμένη ῥατιώνς ἐμφόρονος to a soul which has no refreshment of sleep, like the souls of mortals, but is for ever spinning round like Ixion on his wheel'.

insistere: 'find a foot-hold'.

quodque—in deo. The natural way of taking this sentence is certainly to suppose that it continues the argument against a rotatory God. 'The motion would be destructive of the tranquillity we ascribe to God, and, if we may judge from our own feelings, it would also be very uncomfortable'. But then how are we to explain the enim of the next sentence? for the earth is supposed to be immovable; it is the mundus which moves. Sch. therefore following Madv. Fin. iii 73, understands que as passing on to another point in the argument, and makes the clause refer to the extremes of heat and cold spoken of below. To this Heidt. p. 46 objects that the reference of quod must have been made clear by the addition of
some such clause as *molestum autem est in nostro corpore nimio affici aut calore aut frigore*. He would therefore omit *quodque—etiam dei alto-
gather, considering the first part a gloss on the preceding sentence, and
the latter part a gloss to give precision to the argument of the following
*quoniam mundi partes sunt*; (it would also be necessary to change the
following *atqui* into *atque*). I see no objection to the former clause, if
we accept Laehmann’s emendation *sic incipitur* ‘if it is carried along so
fast’ instead of the ms reading *significetur*, which there is no authority
for interpreting (with Wytenbach *in loc.* and Beier *Off.* 146) to mean ‘if
there were the slightest hint (faintest trace) of it’. Sch.’s emendation
(Opusc. III 284, 303) *sic officiatur* only adds an obscurer *sic* to the obscure
*quod*. Another objection to the ms reading might be that *minima ex
parte*, though true enough if we imagine our body hurried along by itself
with the velocity then attributed to the sphere of the fixed stars, would
be absurd exaggeration if spoken with reference to our power of enduring
tropical heat or arctic cold; but we must remember that the ancients,
in their ignorance of geography, really believed that human life was in-
supportable except in the temperate zones. On the whole I have thought
it better to follow the *ss*, though I am not satisfied that the text is
correct.

*minima ex parte*: ‘in the slightest degree’.


*appulsu*: ‘by the sun’s rays beating upon them’, cf. II 141 *frigoris et
caloris appulsus*.

*exarsit*. Heind., with whom Müller agrees, says *conjunctivi rationem
nullam video*. Is it not the Subj. in *orat. obl.* after *videmus*? Previous to
subordination the clause would be *incultae sunt quod exarsit*. The mood is
changed, not because the speaker disclaims responsibility for the statement,
but merely to show that *quod* gives the reason for *incultae*, not for the
principal verb.

*si mundus est deus*. Probably C. meant to have continued *dei mem-
bra sunt*, but interposed *quoniam—sunt* to make the argument clearer.
Lactantius dwells upon the same point Inst. vii 3. See also Aug. C. D.
iv 12.

B. b. *Historical Section* x 25—xvi 43. See Introduction.

i. *Epicurean polemic against the theological tenets of 27 philosophers
from Thales to Diogenes of Babylon* § 25—41.

§ 25. The mode of argument adopted by Vell. is extremely simple. He
begins by assuming the truth of the Epicurean definition of God as a per-
fectly happy eternal being, possessed of reason, and therefore in human
shape (cf. the words of Epicurus in Diog. L. x 123 πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ἔφικ
ἀφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων, ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις υπεγράφη, μὴδὲν
BOOK I CH. X § 25.

μήτε τῆς ἀφθάρσιας ἀλλὰ συνέπειαν μήτε τῆς μακαιρίας πρόσαπτεν πάντοτε τὸ φιλολόγους αὐτοῦ δυνάμεων τὴν μετὰ ἀφθάρσιας μακαιρίαν περί αὐτοῦ δῶρα ἔκρεμον. All opinions which are inconsistent with this are ridiculed as absurdities; as we read in Philodemus¹ p. 96 ‘the Epicureans condemn all who differ from them as ἄν υπεντάσι τῇ προλήψει διαγωνίζοντων’. Further there is no attempt at accuracy in giving the opinions of the earlier philosophers: rather they are intentionally caricatured in order to make them more open to attack. C. in fact has put into the mouth of Vell. a speech suitable to his own description of the Epicurean mode of controversy; fidenter sane, ut solent ipsis nihil tam veram quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur N. D. i 18, vestra solum legitim, vestra amatis, ceteros causa incognita condemnatis (spoken by Balbus N. D. ii 73). If Cotta afterwards praises the speech (ut tu, distincte, graviter, ornate § 59; enumerasti memoriter et copiosse, ut mihi quidem admirari luserat in homine esse Romano tantum scientiam, usque a Thale philosophorum sententias § 91;) this is a part of his well-known courtesy (comiter ut soletat § 57). How far the inaccuracies of the speech are to be attributed to C. himself or to his Epicurean authorities is discussed in the Introduction. Minucius (c. 19) gives a summary of this section to prove an opposite conclusion, viz. that all philosophers agree in asserting that God exists and that he is a spirit, cf. § 42 n.

qualia vero—repetam. The text is uncertain, and presents difficulties whichever reading we adopt. If we insert alia after vero with two of Orelli’s mss, this is in the first place hardly a suitable term for what promises to be an exhaustive disquisition on the earlier systems (ab ultimo repetam); Sch. therefore (Opusc. iii 305 and 359) would prefer either to read cetera for alia, or to transfer superiorum with Dörderlein, placing it before ab ultimo, which would then be taken absolutely as in Invent. i 28 brevis erit, si unde necessae est, inde initium sumetur, et non ab ultimo repetetur; and, in the second place, all these readings are inconsistent with the fact that a large part of the subsequent polemic is directed against the Stoics. I am inclined therefore to retain the old reading, translating ‘Such is a general statement of the Stoic doctrines; I will now proceed to show how they are related to the older philosophies’; more literally ‘to show what their character is, I will trace back their history to its earliest source’. Probably there may have been some Stoic history of philosophy professing to show that their doctrines were substantially the same as those held by the most esteemed of the earlier philosophers. The Epicureans would meet this by endeavouring to prove that such support could only damage their cause. Förtsc’h (Quaest. Tull. 1837) explains it differently, cujus vero generis sint, ita nunc ostendam ut eordiar ab ultimo superiorum, i.e. ea ejusdem generis esse, ita nihili esse; but Vell. has been proving that the Stoic doctrines nihili esse for the last page or more.

¹ The references are to Gomperz’s edition of the Herculanean treatise περὶ εἰσεφέλας, on which see Introduction.
Thales. The statement here made as to the two principles assumed by T. is opposed to all the more ancient authorities. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. Α. 3) makes him the leader of those who started from one material principle, and contrasts Anaxagoras with all his predecessors as having first felt the need of a separate intelligent principle. It is true that by water T. understood something more than mere lifeless matter moved by mechanical causes, like the atoms of Democritus. Water was a living substance endowed with a θεία δύναμις κυητή (Stob. Εἰδ. ι 56) whence Aristotle says (de An. 1 5 17) καὶ εἰ τῷ ὠδῷ τινὲς ψυχῆν μεταχεῖαι φασιν, ὅπερ οὗς καὶ Θεός φύει πάντα πληρή θεῶν εἶναι, to which C. alludes Leg. πι 26; but the system was a pure 'hylozoism'. It was therefore by a mere misunderstanding that later compilers such as Stobaeus, i.e. and Plutarch Plac. Phil. 17 p. 881 ε., attributed to T., who left no writings behind him, (Diog. Λ. 1 23) the statement that God was the soul of the world. C. here departs even further from the truth in his phrase quae ex aqua exspecta figneret, implying a distinct creation out of inert matter by some external force. Elsewhere he gives the usual account, Ac. Π 118 Thales ex aqua dicit constare omnia. [Mr Reid would get rid of the inconsistency in C.'s account of Th. by inserting et between eam and mentem 'that water was the first principle, and that (water) was God and the mind which produced all things out of water'. One would be glad to relieve C. from the charge of talking nonsense, but it is a question here whether he would object to put nonsense into the mouth of Vell, and it must be remembered that we have the evidence of Minucius in favour of the existing reading.]

si di possunt—vacans corpore. The reading of most mss, et mente, cur aqua adjunxit, si ipsa mens &c., teens with difficulties. To what does di' allude? According to the preceding sentence T. only attributed divinity to mind, and here we have just the opposite supposition of deities without mind: then we find a transitive verb without an object, and lastly another supposition as to the possibility of mind existing apart from body, this supposition standing alone as a protasis without an apodosis. If setting aside the grammatical difficulties, we endeavour to establish a general connexion in thought with what precedes, we have to consider whether the argument is direct, or ad hominem, whether corpus is used in its wider sense (= matter), or its narrower (= animated body), lastly how we are to understand the words deus and sensus. It will help to clear the ground if I first give Epicurus' own account of sensation (Diog. Λ. x 63) καὶ μὴν ὅτι ἐξει ἡ ψυχή τῆς αὐτοθέσεως τῆς πλείστην αὐτίαν δεί κατέχειν, οὐ μὴν εἰλθήσει ἀν αὐτὴν εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἀδρούσματος (i.e. the body) ἑστεγά-

1 On the historical section compare throughout Zeller's History (Germ. Vol. i 4th ed. 1877, Vol. ii 3rd ed. pt. 1, 1875, pt. ii 1879, Vol. iii in two parts, 1869; the parts treating of Socrates, of Plato, and of the Stoics and Epicureans have been translated into English), and my introductory sketch of Greek philosophy. I have thought it worth while to add special references to Krische, as his valuable book is in the most repulsive German form, without headings or index or table of contents.
BOOK I CH. X § 25.

The first principles show that the atoms which form the soul and especially its purest part, the mind or reason, which has its seat in the heart, (l.c. 66) are the true source of sensation, but that they can only act when confined within the body, on leaving which they are immediately dissipated and no longer exist as soul. Body by itself, i.e. the compound of grosser atoms known to us by the name of body, is incapable of sensation, but when united with the finer atoms of mind, it becomes sensitive to a certain degree. On the general subject of the relation of soul and body, cf. Lucr. iii esp. 230—237, where he shows that either by itself is alike incapable of sensation. Taking this as our clue, I think the only satisfactory way of getting over the difficulties of the sentence is to suppose that the apodosis to the 2nd protasis has been lost. This was the view of Lambinus who inserted the clause cur aquam menti before adjunxit, changing et mente into mentem. Most of the modern editors have followed in the same track. The text which I have given is that of Baiter except that I go with Lamb. in omitting et mente, which seems to have arisen simply from a misreading of the abbreviated mentē: when this was once taken as an Abl. it would naturally be joined with the preceding sensu by an et. Sch.'s reading runs the first question too much into the second; the first cur must certainly be followed by an adjunxit: and it is also easier to account for the loss of the 2nd clause, if its end was an echo of the 1st. How then will the argument stand? The dogma attacked is, in its most general form, that the first principle is divinely animated water; to which it is objected that we have here an unnecessary combination of two principles: 'if divinity is possible without feeling, why add mind?' Why may not simple water stand for the first principle? On the other hand, if mind is capable of existing alone, unconnected with any body, why tie it down to water? It is difficult to deal with the argument from the ambiguity in the use of the word 'god.' If by 'god' is meant the first principle, then the Epicureans would have allowed that this may exist sine sensu. In their view senseless atoms are the first principles, and they could have no a priori objection to senseless water holding the same office. On the other hand, if the name 'god' implies personality, then it is plain that the first principle of Thales was not a god. Divine persons such as those whom the popular religion recognized were as subordinate in his philosophy as they were in that of Epicurus, but they are certainly not more opposed to the former system than to the latter. The point of the objection seems to be that a dynamical principle, like that of the older Ionic philosophers, as opposed to the mechanical principles of Democritus, is an irrational blending of two contrary principles, the materialistic and the idealistic. In this objection Plato and Aristotle would concur, both holding that the universe took shape under the influence of eternal, self-
BOOK I CH. X § 25.

existential, incorporeal mind\(^1\), whereas Epicurus of course preferred the other alternative and proclaimed the priority of matter. But the form given to the doctrine of Thales in the preceding sentence would not be inconsistent with a pure idealism; indeed Minucius c. 19, quoting this passage says that T. copied the Mosaic account of the Spirit of God moving upon the face of the waters. We may therefore conclude that this form is due to C. himself, and that the author whom he follows could have said nothing of 'mind making all things out of water'; but only described in general terms the combination of two principles. The use of the plural \(d\i\) after the sing. \(d\eus\) may be intended to heighten the supposed absurdity of the dogma, or it may be an allusion to the words already quoted \(\pi\\alpha\tau\alpha\ \pi\lambda\hbox{\ieta} \theta\Theta\nu\\omega\). Another way of dealing with the sentence is to regard \(\sigma\i\ i\rho\sigma\e-\tau\eta\p\omega\alpha\rho\eta\) as an example of repeated protasis: so Heind., Moser, Krische, Kühner. As the repetition of the protasis would be only admissible here, if the 2nd protasis were really a restatement of the 1st, (see Madv. \textit{Fin.} 1, 7, who calls this passage \textit{graciter mondere} we should then have to take \(\mu\epsilon\nu\zeta\) as explaining \(d\i\), and \(s\i\nu\ e\i\\rho\i\o\i\rho\e\i\) as explaining \(s\i\nu\ \s\i\nu\s\i\nu\), interpreting as follows, 'if the gods, i.e. pure mind, can exist apart from feeling, i.e. from a human body (we must take \(\kappa\rho\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\ups\up
have been identified with God, since we learn from Aristotle (Phys. iii 4) that A. considered this to be τὸ θεῖον and to govern (κυβερνάντων) all things. True, the άπειρον was impersonal, but so was άδαφός; and therefore Augustine (C. D. viii 2) is justified in saying that neither A. nor Thales were theists in the proper sense. It seems however that later writers gave a more mechanical aspect to the physical theory of Anaximander, which they regarded as differing from that of Anaxagoras only in the fact that the latter recognized νοῦς where the former had seen only an αἴδος κύησις, cf. Ritter and Preller § 18 foll., with the notes from the Aristotelian commentators. So Plutarch (Plac. Phil. i 3, 4) finds fault with Anaximander, but not with Thales, for making no mention of an efficient cause.

nativos—mundos: so Stob. Ed. i 56 'Αναξ. ἀπεφήνατο τοὺς ἀπείρους οὐρανοὺς θεοὺς, and Plut. Plac. Phil. i 7 τοὺς ἀστέρας οὐρανίους θεοὺς, cf. Zeller i 211. The words orientes occidentesque are to be understood of the worlds which are continually being evolved out of the ἀπειρον and again absorbed into it.

dem intelligere: 'we can only conceive of God as eternal', any other supposition being opposed to the Epicurean πρόληψις, cf. § 43, and on this use of intelligere § 21 n.

§ 26. Anaximenes: ἀέρα ἀπειρον ἐφῇ τῷ ἄρχῳ εἶναι, εἷς οὗ τὰ γιάμανα, τὰ γεγονότα, καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα, καὶ θεοὺς καὶ θεία γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ ἐκ τῶν τούτων ἀπογόνων, Hippol. i 7. This agrees with Philodemus p. 65, so far as it is legible (see Lengnick Ad em. lib. de N. D. ex Philodemo p. 15) and with Aug. C. D. viii 2 omnes rerum causas infinito aeri dedidit, nec deos negavit aut tacuit (in contrast to his predecessors), non tamen ob ipsos aerem factum, sed ἱρὸς ex aerе ortos credidit: also Plut. Plac. Phil. i 3 ἐκ τούτων τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν πᾶλιν ἀναλείπουσαί, οἷον ἡ ψυχή ἡ θαμβάρα, ἀὴρ οὐσία, συγκρατεῖ ἵμαι, καὶ ὁλον τὸν κόσμον πνεύμα καὶ ἄρπ περιέχει. Stobaeus (Ed. i 56) further tells us that he gave the name of God to Air, and he adds the explanation that when the elements are thus deified we must understand that divinity is attributed to the power which has its seat in the element. How then are we to account for C's extraordinary assertion that the air from which all things proceed and into which they are absorbed is not itself eternal, but had a beginning in time (gigni)? Kr. p. 55 holds that it arises from a confusion between the divine air and the subordinate Gods who are produced from this air: a more probable suggestion might be that it is a misunderstanding of the Greek, ἄρπ πάντα γίνεται 'passes into all forms'. [Mr Reid indeed thinks C. meant gigni to be taken in this sense = ἐν γενέσει εἶναι, but this seems hardly consistent with the following quod ortum sit.] I believe that C. is here giving the view, which is stated more at length by Lucretius v 318, (of the ether) denique jam tuere hoc, circum suprapque quod omnem | continet amplexu terram: si procreat ex se | omnia, quod quidam memorant, recipit -que perempta, | totum nativum mortali corpore constat: | cf. what is said of air L. 279, haud igitur cessat gigni de rebus et in res | reccidere, assidue
quoniam fluere omnia constat. In the Acad. II 118 the doctrine is correctly stated infinitum aeru, sed ea quae ex eo orarentur definita: igni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex his omniar. See Krische pp. 52—60.

immensum et infinitum: two words employed to express the single Gr. ἀπέραυν cf. n. on § 2 perceptum et cognitum. The former brings into prominence the idea of space itself, the latter the boundaries which we seek in vain. They are often joined, as in Div. II 91, so immensum et interminatum N.D. I 54. [Et seems to me to introduce the stronger word. To say that a thing has never been measured, is not so strong as to say that it is without end; cf. Ac. II 127 ex qua et minima. J. S. R.]

semper in motu: κάτων δὲ καὶ οὕτως ἀδιάφοροι δεν ἕν καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν γίνεσθαι, Simpl. in Arist. Phys. 6a (quoted with other passages by Zeller I 221).

quasi: Heind. adds vero, but Förtsch cites several passages in which quasi by itself has the ironical force, e.g. Verr. v 169, Planc. 62.

cum praesertim: 'as if formless air could be a God, whereas it is fitting that God should be of the most-perfect shape'. Cf. II 88 praesertim cum sit illa perfecta quam haco simulata sollertius, and see Madv. (Fin. II 25) and Mayor (2 Phil. § 60) on this use. Literally it means 'particularly when we consider that', but this often refers to a thought unexpressed, as here the logical form of the preceding clause would be 'as if we could possibly believe air to be a God'.

The criticism on the doctrine of Anaximenes, like that on Anaximander, is nothing more than an assertion of its irreconcilability with the Epicurean assumption of the eternity and human form of the Gods. In this C. copies Philodemus, who charges the Stoics with denying the Gods whom all worship and whom the Epicureans allow, ἀνθρώπωνεσί γὰρ οὐ νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀέρας καὶ πνεύματα καὶ άιθέρας (p. 84). For pulcherrima specie see n. on § 23 in quam figuram; for the arg. that all that is born must die, n. on § 20 quod ortum.

Ch. XI. Anaxagoras: see Krische 60—68, Hirzel 90—97. His fragments are collected and explained by Schaubach and others. There is little probability in the tradition (Diog. L. II 6) which C. here follows, of the connexion between Anaximenes and Anaxagoras. The doctrines of the latter bear a much stronger resemblance to the Sicilian than to the Ionic school.

primus voluit. This is in accordance with the statements of Aristotle and the best authorities, but is in flat contradiction to the account of Thales given above. The doctrine alluded to is summed up in the words ὁμοῖος πάντα χρήματα ἢν, νοῦς δὲ αὐτὰ διακρίνει διεκόσμησε (Simpl. de cael. f. 145) also in Arist. Met. A 3, νοῦν ἐπελεῖν εἶναι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι, καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν αἰτίων τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάντης. Apparently C. meant to paraphrase διεκόσμησε by the words discriptionem et modum designari et coniect, 'the order and measure of all things was marked out and effected by the power and the wisdom of the infinite mind'. But
though this reading is supported by all the mss, yet most of the later editors have followed Rigalt and Davies in substituting motum for modum, in order to suit the following motum sensui junctum. In confirmation of this emendation they quote Arist. Phys. viii 1, ἐφεσι τα ὁμοὶ πῶντων οὖν καὶ ἡμειώσων κινσων ἐμπούσαι τῶν νοῦν, but as Bouhier, Heind. and Lengnick point out, the original motion by which the cognate particles were brought together was certainly not accompanied by feeling, and therefore cannot be alluded to in C's phrase m. s. j. In the Acad. π 118 C. goes more into particulars with regard to the ὀμοιομερεία, A. materiam infinitam sed ex ea particulæ, similæ inter se, minutæ, eæ primum confusæ, postea in ordinem adductæ esse a mente divina cf. Zeller i 880.

discriptionem. Bücheler has shown (Rh. Mus. n. s. xiii 600) that the word formerly written descriptio should be written discr. whenever it implies distribution or arrangement, as in Senect. 59 where it is equivalent to the διατάσεων of Xenophon.

in quo—sentiret. Epicurean objection: ‘activity and feeling, i.e. rational life, cannot have its seat in what is infinite, nor is feeling possible without’impact’. This is again an appeal to the Epicurean assumption, that rationality is only possible in a being of human form. The νοῦς of An. is described by himself in the words ἀπειρὸν ἐστιν καὶ αὐτοκρατεῖ καὶ μέμικται οὐδεὶς χρῆματι, ἀλλὰ μονὸς αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἐωτοῦ ἐστιν...ἐστι γὰρ λεπτότατον πῶντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρότατον καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἰσχει καὶ ἰσχείσε μέγατον (C.'s vi as ratione) καὶ ὁκοια ἐμελλε ἐκεσιθαι, καὶ ὅκοια ἑν, καὶ ὅκοια νῦν ἑστι, καὶ ὅκοια ἑσταί, πάντα διεκόσμησε νόος, Simpl. in Phys. f. 336. The last sentence reminds one of the fragment of Philodemus p. 66, where we read that ‘mind was, and is, and will be hereafter’, and that ‘it rules and governs all things and superintends their infinite combinations’. Though it is doubtful whether An. himself expressly deified Nous, later writers were certainly justified in regarding it as divine (Sext. Emp. Math. ix 6, Cic. Ac. l.c.) as is practically done by Vell. here. On the other hand he is said to have been banished from Athens for impiety in asserting that the sun was a red-hot stone (Schaubach Anax. frag. pp. 38—52, 139—142), since as Plutarch says (Pericles 23) they could not endure the substitution of irrational causes and blind forces in place of the old divinities.

in quo non vidit: ‘in making which statement he failed to observe’. So non sensit, non vidit, of Alcmeon and Pythagoras below.

motum sensui junctum: this is the distinctive property of mens (sensifer unde oritur primum per viscera motus, Lucr. iii 272). Thus Aristotle says (Anim. i 2) that the ἐμψυχον is thought to be distinguished from ἄψυχον by two marks κινήτη καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι.

continentem: here intr. but trans. in § 39. ‘It may be taken with sensui, repeating the notion of junctum, as we find mari aer continens i 117, cf. Ac. ii 105, Fat. 44 where it stands with proximus; or we may take it absolutely in the sense of ‘continuous’, ‘without break’, whether in
time or space. Taking it in the latter sense it will refer to the one all-pervading movement initiated by the Anaxagorean Nous, in contrast to the innumerable disconnected movements of the Epicurean atoms. Hirzel compares Cleomedes Met. I 1 ἀναίρεσιν γὰρ οὐδενὸς φύσιν εἶναι δυνατὸν· δεί γὰρ κατακρατεῖν τὴν φύσιν οὔτινός ἐστιν.

In infinito: 'in an infinite subject', a more general expression for the preceding mens infinita, not, as Hirzel, p. 94, with a distinct reference to the universe considered apart from mind, though when the unintelligible mens infinita had been changed into the abstract infinitum, it could not fail to suggest to an Epicurean the thought of the infinite void as its only legitimate interpretation. To Anaxagoras the infinity of mind meant its unlimited wisdom and power: here it is understood of a mind not bounded in space or inclosed in body, but the Epicureans recognized no immaterial existence except τὸ κενὸν, which can neither affect nor be affected, but merely makes movement possible to bodies, ὅσοι οἱ λέγοντες ἀσόματον εἶναι τὴν φυσὶν ματαίαςωσιν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν ἔδωκε τοιοῦτο ὃτε πάσχειν (Epic. in Diog. L. x 67). Cf. below on Pythagoras § 28, Plato § 30, Aristotle § 33.

neque sensum—sentiret. The reading of the MSS is omnino quo translated by Kühner 'a sensation which the nature of the infinite mind would experience without being itself moved by it', governing quo by pulsā. Sch. makes natura pulsā. Abl. Abs. (rightly, as I think) and governs quo by sentiret: he proposes also to substitute ipsius for ipsa. The meaning then would be 'a feeling with which it would feel without its own nature being moved'. Heind. inserts tota from the quotation in August. Ep. 118 and takes sensus of the infinitus ille sensus mentis divinæ which penetrates all things, a quo sensu si pellentur natura tota ipsa sensum acciperet. Hirzel, p. 95 agrees with him in making ipsa natura pulsā. Nom. and opposing it to the mens infinita. 'It is denied', he says 'dass es überhaupt eine andere Empfindung als die in der Natur selber lebendig ist, in der Welt gibet'; and to prove that natura may be thus opposed to the divine Mind, he quotes § 53 natura effectum esse mundum. Comparing the objection to the pantheism of Pythagoras § 28, cur autem quicquam ignoraret animus hominis si esset deus?, he considers that the present objection is equivalent to saying dass jedes Wesen nur ein einziges Empfinden, nicht neben dem einigen noch ein fremdes, das göttliche, in sich haben könne. None of these explanations seem to me satisfactory: Sch. and Ku. give a very harsh construction, and the latter's quo (sc. sensu) pulsā makes sensus the cause, not the result of impact. Hirz. agrees with Sch. in retaining the awkward construction quo (sensu) sentiret, and his explanation seems to make the Epicurean attribute feeling to inanimate nature, a conception as abhorrent to them as that of a soul of the universe. Heind. gives a good sense, 'if there were an all-pervading mind then every thing would be sensitive', but if that were what C. meant, he would hardly have expressed it so obscurely. I think a clause is wanted to balance in infinito, and
should propose to insert in eo after omnino and to change quo into quod\(^1\), translating ‘nor did he see that feeling of any kind is impossible unless the feeling subject is of such a nature as to be capable of tangible impression’, lit. ‘nor feeling at all in that which did not feel from its very nature receiving a shock’.\(^c\) In eo—sentiret is a general expression for that which is immaterial. [I understand the ordinary reading as follows, ‘nor can there be sensation at all, without the sentient creature becoming sentient by an impulse from without’, taking quo non=quin, and ipsa as merely emphasizing the subject. J. S. R.]

deinde—videtur: ‘in the next place, if he intended the infinite mind to be a separate living creature (a ζόν άθανατον like the Gods of Epicurus, as opposed to an element pervading all matter) it must have an inner and an outer part: but mind itself is the innermost seat of life, so it must be clothed with a body. Since he objects to this, we are left with nothing but bare unclothed mind, unprovided with any organs of sense, a notion which it passes the force of our understanding to grasp’. Epicurus speaks to the same effect in Diog. L. x 66 (of disembodied soul) ου γάρ οιν τε νοειν αυτήν αλαθαναμένη μη εν τούτῳ τῷ συντήματι καὶ ταῖς κυμήσεις ταῦτας χρωμένην. That ‘animal’ is a name for the compound of soul and body appears from Arist. Pol. I 5 τὸ ζόνον πρώτον συνείστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, and C. Tim. 4 intellegentiam in animo, animum inclusit in corpore ... quam ob causam non est cunctandum profiteri hunc mundum animal esse. In Lucr. iii 136—144 we read that mens or animus has its seat in the breast, while the rest of the soul (anima) is disseminated throughout the body; in 230 foll. one ingredient in mens is said to be a nameless element, not found in the anima, nam penitus prorsum latet hoc natura subestisque | nec magis hac infra quiquam est in corpore nostro | atque anima est animae proponro totius ipsa | 273—275

ex quo nominetur: ‘to justify the name’. [Cf. iii 36 animus ex quo animal dicitur, Tusc. I 21 if animus non est, then frustra animalia appellantur. J. S. R.]

§ 27. quoniam: properly gives the reason for aperta mens, but the contemptuous brevity with which the Epicurean argument is stated has compressed two clauses into one, and quoniam placet now serves as a protasis to the principal sentence.

qua sentire possit: Bouhier adopted this reading from the quotation in Aug. Ep. 118, in place of the quae of the MSS.

fugere—notioenem: ‘to transcend the comprehension of man’s understanding’. For fug. cf. Tusc. I 50 tanta est animi tenuitas ut fugiat aciem, Leg. Man. 28 hujus virti scientiam fugere. Vim et notioenem is a sort of hendiadys for vim noscendi.

Alcmaeo: a younger contemporary of Pythagoras (Krische pp. 68—78). He held the soul ἄθανατον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ίοκίναι τοῖς ἄθανασις, τοῦτο

\(^1\) The two words are constantly confused in the MSS, see C. F. W. Müller Fleck. Jahrb. 1864.
BOOK I CH. XI § 27.

δ' ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ ὡς ἄι κινούμενη κινεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ τὰ θεία πάντα συνεχῶς ἄι, στλήνη, ἤλιον, τοὺς ἀστήρας καὶ τῶν ὀφρύων ὄλου, Arist. An. 1 2. 17. As usual the criticism consists merely in the assertion of the irreconcileability of the doctrine criticized with the Epicurean assumptions. Epic held that the stars and the soul were compounded of atoms and therefore dissoluble; Alc. held that they possessed the property of self-movement and were therefore immortal.

nam Pythagoras. On the elliptical use of nam in passing from one point to another, like autem, quid, jam, see Nägels. Styl. § 196, Draeg. § 348 4. Mayor on Juv. x 204. Here the thought omitted is 'why speak of his friend P. for he is guilty of even greater absurdities'. Cf. nam Parmenides just below; nam Abderites § 63, in a list of irreligious philosophers; nam Phaedro § 93, in a list of Epicureans; nam justitia...nam fortis in recounting the virtues III 38; nam quid ego de Consolatione dicam? in giving a list of his writings Dir. II 3; nam de angue, nam Dionysi equos, nam quod stellas aures in a list of portents Dir. II 65, 67, 68, nam Strato Ac. I 34. I think it is a mistake in Shilleto (Thuc. I 25) to endeavour to explain this use both in nam and γάρ by referring to a supposed earlier meaning of the two words—nam, he says, is nearly equivalent to the German nämlich—therefore may have been the original meaning, the word is coloured by its preponderating use, which gives it its special shrillness as a particle of transition.

animum—carperentur. See Krische 75—86, Zeller I 355 foll. 412 foll. Heinze Logos 179. This doctrine is also ascribed to P. in Senect. 78 Pythagoras Pythagoreíphon nānumam deītabat quin ex universa mente deína delibatam animos haberemus, and in Sext. Emp. Math. ix 127 εν υπάρχειν πνεύμα τὸ διὰ πάντος τοῦ κόσμου δήκον ψυχῆς τρόπον, Diog. L. viii 25 ἀνθρώπους εἶναι πρὸς θεοὺς συγγένεια κατὰ τὸ μετέχειν ἀνθρώπων θερμοῦ...eĩnai δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπόσπαμα αἰθέρος καὶ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ...ἀδιάνυστον τ' εἶναι αὐτὴν ἐπείδηκερ καὶ τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ἀπόσπασαι ἀδίανυστον ἐστιν. This is the exoteric side of the Pythagorean doctrine modified, as is probable, by some Stoic commentator who wished to claim the authority of P. for his own pantheistic system. The statement in the Ac. II 118 Pythagoreí ex numeris et mathematicorum initiiis proficievi volunt omnia is more in accordance with Arist. (Met. 1 5, xiv 3, &c.), who also gives a different account of the Pythagorean psychology (An. I 4 compared with Plato Phaedo 85), 'some call the soul a harmony, some say that it consists of the notes in the sunbeam or the cause of their movement'; On the religious ideas of the Pythagoreans see Zeller I 418 foll. and cf. C. Leg. II 26 bene dictum est ab eo tum maximo et pietatem et religionem verseri in animis cum rebus divinis operam daremus. The most complete account of the Pythagoreans is to be found in Chaugnet Pythagore et la philosophie pythagoricienne, 1873.

intentum per: 'pervading'; lit. 'stretched through, like the warp in the fabric'. 
non vidit—mundo. Epicurean polemic: if each soul is a part of the divine soul, then (1) the separate existence of human souls must cause a laceration of the universal soul, (2) when the individual soul is conscious of pain, a part of divinity is in pain, (3) each soul must partake in the infinite knowledge of the universal soul, (4) it is impossible that an incorporeal soul could be united with a material world. For obj. (1) cf. § 24 dei membri ordentia: it is of course merely straining the metaphor of carpenterur. Both this and the following obj. are based on the Epicurean assumption of perfect happiness as essential to divinity. On the Epicurean pessimism (quod pleisque continget) see § 23 n. Obj. (4) is inapplicable: the writers who attribute to P. the derivation of the human soul from the divine represent him as materializing both under the form of fire or aether.

distractione: Da. adopts Ruhnken’s conjecture detractiune referring to the separation of each soul from the universal soul; but the ms reading may be defended as expressing the division of the universal soul among a number of human souls: animus detractitur de deo, but deus distrahitur in animos.

§ 28. infixus properly of a solid; infusus, of a liquid.

Xenophanes. Krische 86—97. Elsewhere C. gives a more correct account, cf. Ac. II 118 Xen. unum esse omnium, neque id esse mutabile, et id esse divum, neque natum unquam et sempiternum conglobata figura; De Orat. III 20 vetera illi (sc. Eleatae) omnia haec quae supra et subter, unum esse et una vi atque una consensione naturae constricta esse dixerunt, &c. As to the infinity of the universe Arist. (Met. A. 986 b.) distinctly tells us that while Parmenides made the One πεπερασμένον, regarding it from the ideal side, and Melissus, regarding it from the material side, made it ἀπειρόν, Xenophanes oūθεν διεσαφήνεσεν ἄλλ’ εἰς τοῦ δὲν ωὐρανὸν ἀποβάλησα τὸ ἐν εἰναι φράτ τὸν θεόν. In the Aristotelian treatise, Melissus, however (c. 4) it is argued that, if God is spherical (as X. affirmed) he must also be finite, σφαιρετή ὅτα ἀνάγκη πέρας ἡκε, whence later writers attributed this doctrine to him, e.g. Galen, Hist. Ph. III 24 εἴναί πάντα ἐν, καὶ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει θεόν πεπερασμένον, λογικόν, ἀμητάβλητον. On the other hand we read (Meliss. 2) that X. supposed the earth to extend downwards and the air upwards to infinity which may have given rise to the representation of his doctrine here followed by C. or this may have arisen, as Krische thinks (p. 91) from the confusion between the infinite in time (ἀἰνδεῖον) and the infinite in space (ἀπειρόν) cf. Meliss. 1, and Zeller t4 494. One might have expected to find some reference here to the noble protest made by Xen. against the debasing ideas connected with the popular religion, but the Epicureans in their allusions to other philosophers only thought of exalting their own master, and Xen.'s ridicule of anthropomorphism would make his writings especially distasteful to them. The fragments of Xen. were collected and explained by Karsten, 1830.

qui mente—voluit esse. Sch. (in loc. and Neue Jahrb. 1875 p. 685 foll.) takes praeterea—infinitum as a separate clause, translating 'he held
the rational universe to be not only infinite but God'; he allows however that he knows no example of \textit{praeter quaod} used in the sense of \textit{praeter quam quaod}; and if C. had meant this, why should he not have said simply \textit{et inf. et d.?} I think too the context shows that \textit{infinitum} must be taken as belonging to the subject; Vell. objects not to \textit{τὸ πᾶν} being called \textit{ἀπειροῦν}, but to \textit{τὸ ἀπειροῦν} being called \textit{θεόν}. And the same appears from the quotation in Minucius c. 19.\textit{Xen. notum est omne infinitum cum mente deum tradere.} I believe that C. is translating some such original as \textit{τὸ πᾶν, λογικὸν ὅν καὶ ἀπειροῦν, θεόν εἶναι}, and that he has here turned a quality into an independent substance, as was done above in the case of Thales, and also of Democritus (§ 29). Then \textit{praetera quaod esset} (or perhaps \textit{praetera} alone) seems to me a gloss intended to soften the apparent contradiction in the idea of \textit{τὸ πᾶν} in which mind is not included. For \textit{omne=τὸ πᾶν}, cf. \textit{Div.} ii. 103 \textit{quod in natura rerum omne esse dictum, id infinitum esse.} [I am inclined to think that X. used \textit{ἀπειροῦν} in the sense of 'indefinite', and that the true reading here is \textit{praeterea}, not \textit{praetera} ; X.'s God was God just because he had no definite organs (οἶλος ὁρᾶ &c.) like the anthropomorphic Gods. J. S. R.]

\textit{de ipsa—potest esse.} Epicurean polemic : as regards the divinity of mind, \textit{Xen.} is open to the same criticism as Thales and Anaxagoras (for why did he combine mind with infinity? and if it is unbodied mind, how can that feel?): as regards the divinity of the infinite, he is even more to blame, for vacancy is the only infinite, and in this there can be no feeling and no connexion with any thing external (such as mind) since it includes all things in itself. There seems no ground for Kr.'s supposition that \textit{conjunctum} is used in the Lucretian sense (1450) of a property; for void, no less than the atoms, has \textit{conjuncta} in this sense; nor again for Hirzel's view that it is synonymous with \textit{continens} in § 26. The easiest reference is plainly to the preceding \textit{mente adjuncta}, and if so, it is an additional argument against the genuineness of the weak addition \textit{praetera quaod esset}, which would just serve to turn the edge of the criticism.

\textbf{Parthenides}: see Krische 97—116. The fragments are collected and explained by Karsten (Amsterdam 1835) and Mullach \textit{Frag. Phil.} vol. i. 109—130. As X.'s theology was found in his account of \textit{τὸ δῦ}, any rational investigation of the development of theological thought would have shown us in what respects his disciple's view of the \textit{τὸ δῦ} differed from his; but the Epicurean critic has no eye for anything but names, and finding the word \textit{θεός} occurring frequently in P.'s popular account of the phenomenal world, he confines his attention to this, regardless of the fact that, whether named or not, the idea of divinity is as much involved in P.'s higher philosophy as in that of many of his predecessors, and also forgetting that the cosmical system of Parthenides is in the main taken from Pythagoras and should have been criticized under his name. The doctrine here alluded to is given by Stob. \textit{Eol.} i. c. 22. \textit{Π. στεφάνας εἶναι περιπλεγμένας ἐπαλλήλους, τὴν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ
ārāio (the fine element of fire) τὴν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πυκνοῦ (the gross element, earth,) μικτὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐκ φωτός καὶ σκότους μεταξὺ τούτων καὶ τὸ περίχων δὲ πάσας τείχους δίκην, στερεόν ὑπάρχειν, ύφις δὲ πυρώδης στεφάνη· καὶ τὸ μεσαίτατον πασῶν (is solid also) περὶ δὲ πάλιν πυρώδης· τῶν δὲ συμμετοχὰς τὴν μεσαίτατην (the fiery ring just mentioned which lies in the middle of all the composite rings) ἀπάσας τοκέα πάσης κινήσεως καὶ γενέσεως ὑπάρχειν, ἡσύνα καὶ δαίμονα καὶ κυβέρνητα καὶ κληρονόμους ὄνομαζε, δικὴν τε καὶ ἀνίκητην. From this it is plain that C. is mistaken in ascribing divinity to the orbem qui cingit caelum. It is the innermost fiery circle surrounding the dark globe of the earth which is divine according to P. Probably C. in his haste confused this with the ninth all-embracing sphere of the Somn. Scip. 4 summus ipse deus, arcens et continens ceteros, in quo infiniti sunt illi qui volvuntur stellarum cursus sempiterni. In Ac. π. 118 we read that P.'s first principle was ígnum qui moveat terram quae ab eo formetur, which agrees fairly with Theophrastus quoted in Zeller1 p. 522 δῶο ποιεῖ τὰς ἀργαῖ πῦρ καὶ γῆ, τὸ μὲν ὡς ύλη, τὸ δὲ ὡς άτιν καὶ ποιών. Colotes, one of the leading disciples of Epic., wrote against Parm. as we learn from Plut. M. p. 1113 foll., but there is no resemblance between the criticisms which we find there, and those contained in this passage.

nam : see n. on § 27.

commenticium : see § 18. It suggests the more fanciful character of the tenets here discussed in contrast to the preceding. For efficit we should rather have expected effingit, unless we retain the old reading similitudine (preferred by Sch. Opusc. π. 360) in the sense ‘he makes out a fanciful sort of thing by the help of the similitude of a crown’.

continenteforbem : ‘a shining ring of unbroken fire’, i.e. not composite.

qui cingat. The later editors have followed Ernesti and Heind. in reading cingat required by the or. obl. instead of the cingit of the mss. Sch. Opusc. π. 307 gives many exx. of the interchange of the moods in mss.

in quo—potest. Epicurean polemic: this offends against our assumption as to the human form of the Gods and the impossibility of sensation except through the medium of bodily senses.

multaque—monstra : modi is inserted after ejusdem by most edd. and no doubt the omission would be easy before monstra, which in that case would be the Acc. governed by efficit. The monstra however which follow (bellum, &c.) are hardly ejusdem generis with the στεφάνη; and the recurrence of the phrase immediately below inclines me to adhere to the mss. Ejusdem will then refer to P. and form part of a new sentence, of which monstra will be the subject. On portenta cf. § 18 n.

quippe qui—delentur. This is distinctly stated with regard to cupiditas by Aristotle Met. I 4, where he says that some approach to the recognition of a final cause was made by those who assigned as a first principle ἐρωτα ἡ ἐπιθυμίαν, οἷον καὶ Π. from whose poem περὶ φύσεως he then quotes the line πράσις ῥοταθεών μυτίσετο πάσιν. 

M. C.
Though the contrary principle *bellum* did not play so important a part in P.'s system as in that of Empedocles, yet it may easily have been introduced in the description of the mingling of Light and Darkness, Male and Female, of which the following lines are preserved to us (R. & P. § 151, Mullach *Frag.* 1 p. 127) *evt de mecuro to touto deumov h e panta kumera.* | panta gamy nar synermo tokov kai miouv arkh | pempousa' amreu thelu muqina, evantia d' ai'dia | oun e bplotrevo. A fragment of Philodemus probably refers to this part of P.'s doctrine, as the name *Paremeneidh* occurs just before (p. 65), *tov te prwov theov afvovn povoe, tvov te gennomenvous upo touton tv mou auta tvos paideon tvos perpi anbropos.* From this we may explain the Epicurean polemic in the text: 'if P. deified human passions our experience shows that these are liable to be affected by disease, sleep, old age, &c.'

cetera: e.g. *dike* and *anayke* mentioned in Stob. l.e.

ad deum revocet: 'brings them under the head of deity', i.e. makes them divine, cf. § 119 ad rationem revocatis, *Dir.* ii 66 oentena ad conceptionem revocantur. The later edd. have corrected the Ind. of the vss in accordance with Cicereoniam usage, see Draeger § 491, Sch. Opusc. iii 308.

cademque—omittantur. Parm. is said to have written largely perip *astropov* but we are not told elsewhere that he attributed divinity to them. On the omission of *dierit* (with *eodum*) cf. § 17 n. The reference is to *ad deum revocet.* In alio i.e. in the case of Alcmaeon.

ch. xii § 29. Empedocles: see Kriische 116—130. The fragments are collected and explained by Karsten (very full notes). Mullach and others. Lucretius i 716—733 speaks in a very different tone of 'the glory of Sicily whose inspired verses set forth his discoveries in such wise at rix humanum videtur stigpe ecreas', but we learn from N. D. i 93 that Epicurus and some of his disciples wrote against him. In *De* ii 74 C. says of him *degnissinon rebus ous de quiras loquitur somum fundere videtur.* The numerous fragments of E.'s poem *peri philosew* show how capriciously the authority, whom C. follows, selected his facts. In addition to the four elements, deified under the names of *Zeus* or "*Petaios* (fire), *Hephe (air), Nepsis* (water), *Alphaneis* (earth) E. treats as divine the active principles *Neikos* and *Filologie* (also called 'Aphrodite'), the all-including *Sphere* *Ephais* (το ευθαιμονεστατος θεος Arist. *Met.* iii 4), the supreme Law (*Anayke*), the gods and daemons of the popular religion, the souls of good men. The criticism is equally careless.

peccans: 'among other blunders', cf. § 31.

deurum opinio: obj. gen. 'in his religious belief', so *opin. ejus* below, *divinationis opin.* 'belief in divination' *Dir.* ii 75; but *op. de dis* N. D. iii 11, cf. Draeg. § 203, Roby § 1318.

naturas: cf. § 22 n.

quas et nasci—perspicucum est. Lucretius, who gives what is on the whole a fair criticism of the system of Empedocles in 1 752—802, urges the same objection, but E. himself distinctly asserts the opposite, *phiase ovdies"*
BOOK I CH. XII § 29. 115

ἔστιν ἀπάντων | θνητῶν οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανάτου τελευτή | ἀλλὰ μόνον μέξις τε διάλλαξις τε μυγώνων | ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ μὴ ἐάντων ἁμήναν ἑστὶ γενέσθαι, | τὸ τ′ ἐν ἐξίλωσιν ἀνήγυστον καὶ ἄρρητον | 98—108 Mullach.

sensu carere: the same argument as before: there can be no sensation without a sensuous organism.

Protagoras: see Krische 130—142. The theological views of P. are stated again in §§ 63 and 117, but without the words qualesve sint, which are also omitted by Diog. L. ix 51 peri μεν θεων οὐκ ἐστὶν εἰδέναι οὐδ' ὥς εἰσιν οὐδ' ὥς οὐκ εἰσίν· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ καλῶντα εἰδέναι, ἂ τε αὐθότης καὶ βραχίς ὄν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. The first writer who gives the fuller form is Timon the Sillograph (n. c. 279) quoted by Sext. Emp. ix 57 θεοὺς κατήγαψ' οὖν' εἰδέναι οὐτε δύνασθαι | ὁποῖοι τινὲς εἰσι καὶ οἵτινες ἀθρήσκονται. It is probable that Philodemus reported the doctrine in this form, for though there is no direct mention of Prot. in the existing fragments, yet in the summary at the end of the controversial portion of his treatise, allusion is made to τοὺς ἁγνοστον εἰ τινὲς εἰσι θεοὶ λέγοντα, ἂ ποῖοι τινὲς εἰσιν, p. 89, which can only refer to him.

habere quod liqueat: 'to be able to make up his mind'. Cf. Π 3 εἰ habere aliquid quod liqueret, Ac. Π 94, and the legal Ν. Λ. (Cluent. § 76).

quicquam suspicari: 'to have the faintest idea'.

Democritus: see Krische 142—163, and nn. on N. D. i 120 where his theology is more fully discussed. Epic. is charged with ingratitude towards him § 93. Lucretius though often dissenting from him in points of detail always speaks with respect of that Democriti quod sancta viri sententia poniut.

imagines earumque circuitus = imag. circumuenentes. On the use of hendiadys cf. Zumpt § 741, Seyffert Lael. pp. 191, 198, Draeger § 311, 9. It is a figure often employed by C. in translating from the Greek, and not unfrequently we find a complex idea misinterpreted by being thus broken up into its component parts, see nn. on § 25 (the mentem et aquam of Thales) § 28 (mentem et omne of Xenophanes). Here it is intended to have a burlesque effect.

in deorum numero refert. Heind. followed by Klotz (Adn. Crit. i 5) reads numerum against the mss, as we have ref. in deos Π 34, repono in deos § 38; but the Abl. is the more common construction after repono, e.g. in vestigio reponere § 37, sidera in deorum numero reponere Π 54, so Π 47, 51, cf. Zumpt § 490 on the compounds of pono, Draeger § 298 c. We might make a distinction between the meanings of referto as it was followed by Acc. or Abl. translating the former 'to put him on the list of the Gods', the latter 'to return his name in the list of the Gods'.

scientiam intellegentiamque nostram: again hendiadys = animum nostrum scientem et intellegentem, Sch.

neget esse quicquam sempiternum: i.e. any compound. Atoms and void are of course eternal to D. as to Epicurus, but the former had not thought of saving his Gods from wasting and disturbing influences by
placing them in the *intermedio*. They are therefore mortal, διάφθωρτα μὲν, οὐκ ἄφθωρτα δὲ (Sext. Emp. ix 558) and cannot pass the Epicurean test.

Diogenes (Krische 163—177) distinctly attributed reason to the air, making it the principle of life and understanding in man, and the sovereign of the universe; in his own words quoted by Simplicius (R. and P. § 63 foll.) ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζώα ἀναπαύοντα ζωεί τῷ ἀέρι· καὶ τούτῳ αὐτούτῳ καὶ ψυχή ἐστι καὶ νόησις: ...καὶ μοι δοκεῖν ὑπὸ τούτου πάσα κυβερνάσθαι. We also learn from Theophrastus that he attributed sensation to air (R. and P. § 66) ὁσπερ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν τῷ ἀέρι καὶ τὰς αἰσθήτεις ἀνάπτει, and spoke of ὁ ἐντός ὑπό (the breath or spirit of man) as μερικοὶ μέρον τοῦ θεοῦ. In the Philodemian fragment p. 70 he is referred to in the following terms, Δ. ἐπαινεῖ τὸν "Ομηρον ὡς αὐ μυθικῶς ἄλλ' ἀληθῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ θείου διελεγμένων· τῶν ἄερα γὰρ αὐτὸν Δία νομίζειν φησιν ἐπειδὴ πάντως ἐκδέναι τὸν Δία λέγεις; with which Nannck on Philodemus, in Melanges Grecos-Romaines, St Petersburg, 1-64, compares the interesting passage in the comic poet Philemon (Meincke p. 391) ὅν οὐδὲ εἷς λέλειπεν οὔδὲ ἐν ποιῶν ὁ οὐδὲ ἐν τοιχώ, οὔδὲ πεποιηκός πάλαι ὁ ἐν τοιχώ, οὔτε ἀνθρωπος, οὔτος εἰμ' ἐγώ ἡ 'Αφρ., ὅν ἄν τις ὠνόμασε καὶ Δία.

quem sensum—dei: reiteration of the old polemic, see under Empeodocles, Parmenides, Anaximenes for *sensus*, under Parmenides and Anaximenes for *fīgūram*.

§ 30. *jam*: a transitional particle like *nam*, which some read here: lit. 'by this time' 'next' we come to Plato.

Plato: Krische 181—204. The fact that we have, in this 2nd criticism of Plato, no reference to the former contained in §§ 18—24 is one of the arguments alleged to show that this whole section was inserted as an afterthought. The charge against Plato is (1) inconsistency: at one time he denies the possibility of naming God and forbids us to inquire into his nature, at another he tells us that the heaven, the stars, the souls &c. are Gods; (2) these assertions are not only inconsistent but false in themselves; (3) particularly the assertion that God is incorporeal. With the exception of Sch. all the edd. seem content to understand *inconstanta* of the first two assertions, that God cannot be named and that he ought not to be made the subject of investigation; but as these are evidently quite consistent, Sch. holds that the opposition lies between them on the one hand and the assertion of the incorporeal nature of God (*quod vero—ἀσώματων*) on the other. He allows that the grammatical connexion of the two sentences is very different from what we should have expected if they were intended to have this relation to one another, but offers no explanation or suggestion. It seems to me plain that, as the latter stands, it is impossible to suppose them thus related; and no less plain that the sentence beginning with *idem* (a word constantly employed to mark the coexistence of two apparently inconsistent facts) refers back to the *qui in Timaeo* of the first sentence. The opposition between
the 1st (ms) sentence and the variety of positive assertions as to the Deity in the 3rd (ms) sentence, is much more glaring than the opposition between the 1st sentence and the one negative assertion of the 2nd sentence. Besides the idea of inconsistency runs through the 3rd sentence, whereas it is entirely absent in the 2nd. I think also that the repetition of et is intended to point the contrast, ‘after having spoken as he did in the Timeaeus and Laws, we find him in both asserting not only that we can name God, but that there are any number of substances which we may call by that name’. Taking it then as certain that the opposition lies between the 1st and the 3rd sentences, I have little doubt that the 2nd and 3rd have got misplaced. Compare the transposition in § 5 of the sentences beginning quæ quidem and multum autem, that in § 88 and § 97, and many similar instances in Munro's Lucretius, see his Introduction p. 20 foll. ed. 1, also Müller in N. Jahrb. for 1864, p. 144. In the present case and also in § 5 the transposition may be explained by supposing the misplaced clauses (Sunt vero et Quæ quidem) to have been added on revision by C. himself, but wrongly inserted by the scribe. See below on idem in Timeaeo.

longum est: see § 19 n.

inconstantia: Grote (Plato ii 161) applies this censure more generally. The discrepancy between different dialogues is partly to be accounted for by the change in Plato's own sentiments during the course of a long life, partly by the different aim and style of the particular dialogues, scientific, popular, allegorical.

in Timeaeo: p. 28 c. τὸν μὲν οἶν πατήρα καὶ πατέρα τοῦ τοῦ πατὸς εὑρέων τε ἔργων καὶ εὐράντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγεων, translated by C. Tim. 2 attque illum quidem quasi parentem hujus universitatis invenire difficile, et cum invenire indicare in vulgus nefas. The passage was much quoted by the early Christian writers, e.g. Minucius c. 19 Platonii deus est mundi parens, artifex animae, caelestium terrenorumque fabricator, quem et invenire difficile praemia nimiæ et incredibili potestate, et cum invenire in publicum dicere impossibile praefatur. Eadem fere et istic quae nostra sunt. On the other hand Celsius made use of it against the Christian preaching of the Gospel to the poor, to which Origen (vii 42) replies that the Christians not only affirmed with Plato that it was difficult to discover the Creator, but that it was even impossible for man to do this, except for those to whom the Son revealed Him. Clement of Alexandria, commenting on the words of Plato, says that, in using of the Ineffable such names as ἐν ἦν ταῦτα ἦν νῦν ἦν αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν ἦν πατέρα ἦν θεὸν ἦν δημιουργὸν ἦν κόσμον, we do not profess to name Him truly, but employ various terms as a help to the feebleness of our own understanding, Strom. v 12 83.

in legum—censeat. As we have had occasion to suspect misrepresentation in cases where it was difficult to arrive at complete certainty in regard to the doctrines referred to, it is a satisfaction to be able here to confront the accused with the accuser, and prove the groundlessness of the
charge. The passage alluded to is vii 821, where ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, speaking the author's sentiments, says 'there is something very surprising in our notions about astronomy, τῶν μέγιστων θεῶν καὶ ὀλον τῶν κόσμων φαμέων ὡς τῇ ἐξήνδει τῶν ἐπιτραπεζομένων τὰς αἰτίας ἐγκατάταται: οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅποιον εἶναι, but true piety requires just the opposite. We ought to carry our inquiry into the nature of the celestial deities (the Sun, Moon, &c.), at least so far as to enable us to avoid such blasphemy as men are guilty of, when they call them wandering stars, and confound the rates of their movements'. It is plain that the word φαμέω introduces, not a sentiment of Plato's, but that of the Athenian public, who had banished Anaxagoras and put Socrates to death on a similar charge. Plato's own view comes out still more clearly in bk xii 966, where he argues that astronomy rightly studied is the foundation of true piety.

non censeat: negative used as in ὅσον, cf. Off. 139 Regular captivos reddendos non censeat.

idem et in Timaeo. Assuming that quod vero—comprehendimus has been misplaced in the mss, we may suppose that the present clause was originally connected with the preceding, (jam de Platonis—censeat) either by a cum which has dropped out between qui and in Tim. so as to make idem dicat the apodosis, or simply by the continuance of the Subj. constr. in dicat. The former would be after the pattern of § 121 cum enim optimam naturam dicant esse, negat idem &c. the latter of Off. 184 incerti multis sunt qui non modo pecuniam sed vitam etiam profiendere pro patria parati essent, idem ('but yet') gloriae jacturam ne minimum quidem facere cellent. After the dislocation had taken place, the sentences would naturally be altered so far as to enable them to stand alone.

et mundum—accepimus: see § 18 n. These are all subordinate divinities owing their existence to the good pleasure of the one Father and Creator. So we read (Tim. 31) of the plan pursued by the everliving God in forming the God who was to be (i.e. the world), and in p. 92 this created God is called the visible image of the invisible God. The name οὐρανός is sometimes used of the κόσμος, at other times confined to the starry heavens as opposed to the earth. Beside the passages already quoted, showing the divinity of the stars, see Tim. 40, where the Demiurgus is said to have made the earth, our nurse, the guardian of day and night, the first and oldest of the gods ὁδῷ ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γεγομένη. In the same passage Plato affirms his belief in the deities of the traditional religion (eos quos majorum institutis accepimus) the children of Heaven and Earth, and tells us that they, like the celestial deities, acted as subordinate agents in the creation of man and the other animals, receiving from the Demiurgus a separate divine particle to be the nucleus of each human soul (41 c. foll.) But when C. says that Plato deified animal, he probably alludes to Leg. x. 592 foll. where it is proved that soul, as the self-moving substance, must be prior to body, and then (599 b) the conclusion is drawn that, since soul or souls have been shown to be the cause of all movement, and since they are
ut Graeci dicunt ἀσώματον: there seems no reason for doubting the genuineness of these words, as Heind. and Ba. have done; see n. on physiologiam § 20. There is a special reason for adding the Greek here, as the Latin equivalents were not introduced till later, incorporalis appearing first in Seneca, incorporinus in Gellius. The doctrine that all that is corporeal is in its own nature mortal, γεννητὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν, runs through the whole of Plato (see § 20 n.) and we find the unseen, which is eternal, contrasted with things seen and temporal in Tim. 28; but it is only the Demiurgus who is essentially incorporeal; many of the inferior deities are clothed in bodies.

id—intelligi non potest: ‘a divine incorporeity is inconceivable’, cf. § 27 on Thales. The absence of feeling involved absence of forethought and absence of pleasure, see § 48. C.’s own opinion is given Tusc. i 50, where speaking of those who nequeunt qualis animus sit vacans corpore intelligere et cogitatione comprehendere, he says quasi vero intelligant qualis sit in ipso corpore; and a little further certe et deum ipsum et divinum animum corpore liberatum cogitazione complecti volumus. Again Tusc. i 71 dubitare non possumus quin nihil sit animis admissitum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagentatum, nihil duplex. Quod cum ita sit, certe nec secerni nec dividit nec discerpi nec distrahi potest, ne interire quidem igitur. Plato argues against those who identified matter and existence, ταύτων σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὀριζόμενοι in the Soph. 246 foll. where the term ἀσώματον occurs.

§ 31 Xenophon: see Krische 204—234, Philodemos p. 71 ἐν τοῖς Ξενοφόντος ἀπορίμφευσαι οὐχ ὀράσθαι φησιν τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς μορφῆς ἀλλὰ τάργα. The passage referred to is quoted by Clem. Al. Protr. § 71, Strom. v § 109, and by others among the early Christian writers: it occurs in Mem. iv 3 § 13, where Socrates says that Euthydemos will soon be convinced of the providential government of the world, if he is content to see the Gods in their works without waiting to see them in bodily form, ἐὰν μὴ ἀναμένῃ ἐσοὶ ἀν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἔδησ, ἀλλ’ εξαιρήκη σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὀρῶντα σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς, a very different assertion from that of the Epicurean critic here, who would identify this with the view just before attributed to Plato (deum nominari non posse, anquiri non debere). The next assertion et solem et animum deum is founded upon the same passage of the Memorabilia, where Socrates illustrates our inability to look upon God by the parallel case of the sun, ὁ πάντως φανερὸς δοκῶν εἶναι ἤλιος οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει τοῖς ἄνθρωποις ἐκατόν ἀκριβῶς ὀρῶν, ἀλλ’ εὰν τις αὐτῶν ἀναδωσίς ἐγκεκριμένη ἔθισῃ τὴν ὄψιν ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ τουσ ἄνθρωπον ἢς ψυχῆς, ἡ ἐπερ τι καὶ ἀλλὸ τῶν ἄνθρωπῶν τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχει, οτι μὲν βασιλεύει ἐν ἦμιν φανερῷ, ὀρᾶται δὲ οὐδ’ αὐτῷ. It is unnecessary to say that in neither case does Χ. make the assertion attributed to him in the text. Thirdly it is stated that Χ. speaks of God at one time in the singular, at another time in the plural. This no doubt is true,
not exclusively of X. but of the greater part of the Greek philosophers
(as even of the critic here § 25) both in popular speech (in Plato Epist. 13
p. 363 a it is made the sign to distinguish between the esoteric and exoteric,
the μὲν γὰρ σπονδάλες ἐπιστολῆς θεός ἄρχει, θεός δὲ τῆς ἡπτον) and in their
more scientific treatises, where they speak, now of the Supreme Deity
himself, now of the subordinate gods who are his agents. This distinction
appears in the same passage of the Memorabilia, oί τε γὰρ ἄλλοι ἡμῖν
τίμως διδόντες οἴδειν τούτων εἰς τοιούτας ἱώντες διδάσκει, καὶ οί τῶν ἄλλων
κόσμων συντάγματα τε καὶ συνεχῶν ἀξιότατοι ἡμῖν ἐστίν.

facit Socratem disputantem...eundemque dicere. Either the Inf.
or Part. may follow facio in the sense of ‘to represent’. Of the former we
have an ex. in III 41 quem Homerus conveniri fecit ab Ulice, and 19 con-
struendi mundum fecit; of the latter in Brut. 218 colloquentem fecit; of the
two combined in this passage and in Tusc. v 115 Polyphenenum Homerus
cum aliquo colloquenter fecit ejusque landare fortunas quod quae vellet ingredi
porect; cf. Madv. § 372 obs. 5, Draeg. § 442. 2.

sunt idem in erratis quibus: cf. sunt in varietate § 2 n. For the
emission of the preposition before the relative see Zumpt § 778, Madv.
§ 323 obs. 1, Nägelsb. Stil. § 121. 2, Moser ad Tusc. 1 94, and Heindorf’s n.
here.

ch. xiii § 32 Antisthenes. Krische 234—246. C. is here translating
from Philodemus p. 72 παρ᾽ Ἀντισθένει δὲ ἐν μεν τῷ φυσικῷ λέγεται τὸ κατὰ
ὁμοῖον εἰναὶ πολλάκις θεῶς, κατὰ δὲ φύσιν ἐνα (compare Varro’s classification
of theology as fabulorum, naturale, civile Aug. C. D. vi 5). Before the
decipherment of this fragment, C.’s statement was unsupported by any
independent authority, but we have a saying of Ant. reported by Theodoret
(Graec. Aφ. 1 14) which agrees very well with it, θεὸς ἀπὸ εἰκόνος οὐ γνωρί-
ζομεν, ὁρθάλαμοι οὐχ ὀρᾶμα, οὐδεὶς ἐσκει ἀπὸ πολλάκισ οὐδεὶς εἰκαθεῖν ἐξ
ὁμοίως ὤντας.

tollit vim—deorum: that is, of the anthropomorphic gods of Epi-
curians and of the popular belief.

Spensusippus: cf. Krische 247—258. Spengel and Sauppe in their
editions of Philodemus find an allusion to Sp. in the lines just preceding
the account of Aristotle (Gomp. p. 72) but there is nothing there which
could illustrate the account here given, which is in fact unsupported by
any ancient authority. We know hardly anything of Sp. except that he
modified the teaching of his master in the Pythagorean direction. The
criticism here is as reckless as in the case of Antisthenes.

vim quandam dicens: understand the predicate deum as in § 28 on
Pythagoras.

§ 33 Aristoteles: cf. Krische 259—311. The treatise here referred to
is no longer extant. It is also cited by Philodemus p. 72, but unfortu-
nately the fragment gives no more than the words παρ᾽ Ἀριστοτέλει δὲ ἐν
τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ φιλοσοφίας. Diog. L. v 22 tells us it consisted of three
books; see Zeller3 III p. 58, foll. who shows that Krische is wrong in
identifying it with the books referred to by Arist. An. 1 2 in the phrase ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένοις. Bernays gives a full account of it in his *Die Dialoge d. Aristoteles* pp. 95—114. From this it appears that the 1st book was concerned with the prae-philosophic speculations of the East and of Greece: the discussion respecting Orpheus *N. D.* 1 107 is supposed to have belonged to this. The 2nd book dealt with the earlier philosophers, including Plato; the quotation in *Tusc.* iii 68 is probably taken from it. The 3rd book, in which Aristotle gave his own view, is largely quoted from in the speech of Balbus, *N. D.* ii 42, 44, 95 and without reference in §§ 37, 51, cf. Bywater in *Journal of Philology* vol. vii pp. 64—87, and the fragments as they are given by Heitz in the Paris, or Rose in the Berlin, edition of Aristotle.

**non dissentientes.** Colotes is attacked by Plutarch *M.* 1115 for identifying the doctrines of Plato and the Peripatetics. It was the view of Antiochus and the eclectics, and is often propounded by C. as his own, cf. *Fin.* iv 5, *Ac.* i 17, *Leg.* i 38.

**menti tribuit divinitatem.** In *Met.* xii 6, 7 foll. God is defined as ξυνον αἰδιων ἄριστον, pure incorporeal reason, νόησις νοὐσεως, ever engaged in contemplation of himself, who himself unmoved has from all eternity moved all other things by a divine attraction (κινεὶ ὡς ἐρωμένον, cf. *Gen. et Corr.* ii 10 ἐν ἀπασίν ἀεὶ τοῦ βελτιώνος ὁρέγεται ἡ φύσις). Noble as this view is, it yet presents some points of contact with the Epicurean theology, which might have been taken advantage of, if the critic had had any other object beyond that of depreciating all who preceded his master.

**mundum ipsum deum.** Compare *Eth. Nic.* vii 14 πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἥκει τι θείον; *Cael.* ii 1, where where πᾶς οὐρανὸς is said to be ἄθανατον καὶ θείον, and just below ‘we shall speak most suitably if we regard it as God’; again c. 3, θεοῦ ἐνεργεια ἄθανασια’ ἡστ’ ἀνάγη τῷ θείῳ κίνησιν αἰδιον ὑπάρχειν ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁ οὐρανὸς πασίτοτος (σώμα γὰρ τι θείον) διὰ τοῦτο...κύκλῳ ἀεὶ κυκλίται; also *Met.* xii 8 ‘it has been handed down in mythical form from ancient times that the first mover, and the world which it sets in motion, are Gods, and that all nature is encircled with divinity: but this high doctrine was mixed up with anthropomorphic conceptions. Eliminating these, we shall hold that it was a divine inspiration which led our ancestors to the conclusion θεοες τὰς πρωτὰς οὐσίας εἶναι’. These expressions however are not to be understood in a Stoic sense as though Aristotle identified the world and God. Transcendence is a distinct feature of the Platonic and Aristotelian theology as opposed to the Stoic Immanence.

**alium quendam:** Sch. understands this of the *quinta natura*, the aether of which the heaven itself and the heavenly bodies are composed, but this is the ardor of the next clause: besides, Aristotle never represents it as presiding over the universe or setting it in motion. - Krische is, I believe, right in taking it of the one supreme God, who has been already referred to as mens, but now appears in another character as the First-mover, cf. *Arist. Met.* xii 6 p. 1071 foll. *Phys.* viii 5 διὸ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ὀρθῶς λέγει,
replications: identified with *conversio* by Sch. But Krische is, I think, again right in regarding it as a translation of the term *ανελίξεις* used of the retrograde movement of the planets: see Met. xi 8 where Aristotle explains the apparent irregularity in the planetary movements by assigning to them distinct 'spheres' for the forward and retrograde movements, the latter being called *σφαίρα* *ανελίττουσα* 'the reversing spheres' (Lewis *Astronomy of the Ancients* p. 163 foll.). The same word is used by Plato of the counter-rotation of the Kosmos in the *Politics* 270 d. *ευνεύμονοι τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ανελίξεις τότε ὅταν ἡ τῆς τῶν καθεστηκίων ἔναντι γίγνεται τροπῆ. Of course it is an absurd blunder in C. or his authority to make the motion of the entire universe depend upon this partial subordinate movement, but we have seen too much of the critic to be surprised at any blunders, and the word *replicatio* does not seem to admit of any other interpretation; it means 'folding back', 'rolling back', 'inverse rotary movement'. Freund (Andrews), it is true, translates 'winding up' which to us, familiar with watches, might be suggestive of the action of the First-mover, but could hardly be so to the ancients: moreover a periodical winding up is not consistent with the constant unchanging attraction ascribed to the First-mover by Aristotle. The addition of *quaedam* is perhaps a sign that C. had no very clear idea of what he was talking about.

caeli ardores: cf. § 37 *omnia eingeschlossen ardores quic arter nominatur*, also ii 41, 64, 91, 92. The proof of its existence is given Arist. *Cael. i 2* (cf. *N. D.* ii 44) where it is argued that as it is the nature of earth to move towards the centre and of fire to move to the circumference, so there must be a body which has by nature a circular movement, and that this body must be *θεωτέρα* καὶ *πρωτέρα* than the others because its motion is more perfect. To this eternal celestial substance the ancients gave the name *αἰθήρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ θείου*, but Anaxagoras wrongly identified it with fire and derived it from *αἰθω*. (C's translation *ardor* shows that he followed Anax.) The divinity of *Aether* is proclaimed by Euripides in the verses quoted *N. D.* ii 65. Elsewhere C. speaks of it as a quintum genus *ο>(* *quae*) *essential astra mentemque Ae.* i 26 and *Tese. i 65* *sin est quinta quaedam* *natura*, *ab Aristotele indicata primum, hanc et deorum est et animorum*; but Aristotle (*Gen. Anim. ii 2*), while he allows that in the generation of soul there enters in an element akin to that of the stars, finer and more divine than the other four, adds *λείπειν τῶν νόποι μονόν δύοθ' επεσειαί καὶ θείων ἐνα μόνον οὐθέν γὰρ αὐτῷ τῇ ένέργεια κανονίτι συμπεριβληθείσα* If we take *munda* above to represent *οὐρανοί*, we may understand *ardor caeli* here to represent some such original as *το σφήν καὶ τα ύστερο σώματα*, of which Arist. says *Eth. vi 7* that 'there are many things of a diviner
nature than man, as most evidently those εἷς δὲν ὁ κόσμος συνεστηκεν', and in Phys. ii 4 they are called τὰ θειότατα τῶν φανερῶν. Taking it thus as a collective expression (simplicex ex dispersis membris as is said of Xenocrates) we might find in it an explanation for tot di immediately below, but see n. there.

celeritate: 'like a dancing dervish making himself giddy by his rotations' Lescaloperius in loc. See on § 24.

ubi tot di: Heind. (followed by Sch. Opusc. iii 311) thinks that, as tot cannot apply to the four above mentioned (which in reality are only two, the κινοῦν and κινοῦμενον), something must have been lost from the text; and as Arist. is said non dissertire from his master, he suggests that the lost clause may have corresponded with § 30 quos majorum institutis accipimus. But why may we not give the same meaning to illi tot viz. 'all those many Gods of the popular religion', without supposing an omission? (So Allen.) The Epicurean objection would then be that 'these gods are supposed to exist in heaven, but if heaven itself is God, how can one god live in another'? If we accept Sch.'s conjecture that the lost clause referred to the stars, the objection would merely be a repetition of caelum ma
di esse partem: 'they are already included in caelum, how can they be separate and independent Gods?'

numeramus: similarly iii 40, 43.

semp er se movens: these words are in direct opposition to Aristotle's κινεί λείητος, which is further explained (Cael. ii 12) διόκε τῷ μὲν ἄριστα ἐχομεν υπάρχει τὸ εὖ ἄνευ πράξεως... ἄστι γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸ οὖ ἔνεκα. The Epicurean views of incorporeal substance (sensu privato) have been sufficiently illustrated already.

§ 34 Xenocrates: cf. Krische 311—324 N. D. 172. C. alludes more than once to the compliment paid to Xenocrates by his countrymen in accepting his word in lieu of the customary oath Balb. 12, Att. i 16; he reports his answer as to the aim of his teaching, ut id eam aponte fecerent quod cogere
teretur facere legibus Rep. i 3; and describes his psychology in the words animi figuram et quasi corpus negavit esse, verum numerum dixit esse; cum vis, ut jam ante Pythagorae visum erat, in natura maxima esset. Tusc. i 20. The account in the text omits all that is characteristic in his philosophy: see Stob. Ecl. i p. 62 Σεν. τὴν μονάδα καὶ τὴν διάδα θεοῦ (ἀπεφήρατο) τὴν μὲν ὡς ἄρρενα πατρίς ἔχουσαν τάξιν ἐν οὐρανῷ βασιλεύοντα, ἤνινα προσαγαρεύει καὶ Ζήνα καὶ πέρατον καὶ νόην, ὅστις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεοῦ· τὴν δὲ ὡς θηλείαν, μητέρας θεων δίκην (Zeller notices that Philolaus also gave the name of Rhea to the dyad) τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν οὐρανῶν λήξεως ἡγομένην ('presiding over the middle region or province') θεῶν δὲ εἶναι καὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν, καὶ τῶν ἀστερῶν πυρῶδες Ὀλυμπίων θεῶν, καὶ ἑτέρως ὑποσελήνους, δαίμονας ἀφράτους. Some of these last were of a malignant character, φύτευες ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι μεγάλας μὲν καὶ λιχυράς, διατρόπους δὲ καὶ σκηνωτότας (Plut. Is. et Os. ch. 26 p. 361) whose wrath had to be propitiated by sacrifices. Xen. also gave
nulla species divina: 'no divine form' i.e. no anthropomorphic God.

in stellis nominantur: 'which we name in naming the stars.'

qui ex omnibus—deus: 'whom he would have us believe to be a single uncompounded God made up of all the fixed stars, as of dissevered limbs.' Zeller suspects an allusion in the original to the Orphic myth of Zagreus, which was interpreted by later philosophers of the anima mundi pervading the universe (Plut. M. 389 b). Simplex is an ironical substitution for concretus, to which it is opposed in III 31; cf. also II 11, where it is opposed to cum aliquo juncta atque coenusa. The phrase mundi membra occurs again § 100.

Heraclides: a native of Heraclea in Pontus, pupil of Plato and Spen-sippus and afterwards of Aristotle (Krische 324—336). In the letters to Atticus there are many allusions to the Dialogues of Her. which were distinguished from those of Aristotle by the fact that in the former (as in the X. D.) the author was made a κόσμιον πρώτωσις, while in the latter he was the principal interlocutor (as in the Tusculans). C. speaks of him with respect as et deus in primis (Tusc. v. 8), and quotes from him Dir. i 46 and 130. The views here ascribed to him are common to the Platonic school. We are further told that he held with Ecphantus, the Pythagorean, that all material objects were compounded of atoms, and that the apparent movement of the heavens was caused by the rotation of the earth.

puerilibus fabulis: Plutarch (Camill. c. 22) describes Her. as μυθόδη και πλασματικόν, and the names of the treatises preserved by Diog. L. v 6, 87 are suggestive of a predilection for the marvellous. Like Empedocles, he is said to have been ambitious of being worshipped as a god after his death, Diog. L. v 90.


sensu—vult: a criticism interposed; 'neither pure mind, nor gross matter, such as the stars are composed of, is separately capable of feeling: and to suppose that the moon and planets with their changing phases are divine, is to deny the immutability of the divine nature', cf. Plato Rep. II 381, St James I 17 τοῦ πατρός τῶν φῶν, παρὰ ὦν ἐν παραλλαγῇ ἡ τροπῆ ἀποσκίασμα.

refert in deos: cf. n. on § 29.

§ 35 Theophrasti: see Krische 337—349, Bernays Th. Ueber From-myke, Cie. Fin. v 9 foll. He appears to have carried further his master's investigations upon particular points without diverging from his general principles. C. charges him with assigning too much weight to fortune as an element of happiness, Ac. i 34 and elsewhere. Gomperz thinks that the words ἐγκαμῳφη τῶν θεῶν, found in a fragment of Philodemos p. 73, refer to a treatise of Theophrast's mentioned by Diog. L. v 47.

inconstantia: the charge previously brought against Plato.
divinum: 'such as belongs to a god'. Heind.'s correction divinae is unnecessary.

signis sideribusque: a pleonastic expression 'star-clusters (sidus) (stella) which constitute a sign', cf. n. on § 22.

Strato: (Krische 340—358, Cudworth i 144—153). He succeeded Th. as head of the Lyceum B.C. 287, and changed the theism of Aristotle into a system variously described as pantheistic or atheistic. Cudworth calls him 'the first asserter of hylozoic atheism'; and says that while 'nature according to Democritus was the fortuitous motion of matter, Strato's nature was an inward plastic life in the several parts of matter, whereby they could artificially frame themselves to the best advantage according to their several capabilities without any conscious or reflexive knowledge'; a view which appears closely to resemble the ordinary notion of Evolutionism. Cie. says of him that he is omnino semovendus from the true Peripatetics, as he abandoned ethics, and departed very widely from his predecessors in physics, to which branch he confined himself; again, Ac. ii 121 Strato negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum. Quaecunque sint docet omnia effecta esse natura...naturalibus fieri ponderibus et motibus, but notwithstanding he was an opponent of the atomic philosophy. Similar views are advocated by the Academic Cotta N. D. iii 27.

minuendi: some edd. insert after this inmutandi, a correction of inmittendi which occurs in one or two mss, but it is probable that this is merely due to a careless repetition of the preceding word.

careat—figura: of course from the Epicurean point of view, cf. n. on species § 34; but, as Strato, according to Plutarch ade. Col. c. 14, denied that the world was a living creature, careat sensu is probably correct in this case. Strato's deus seems to have been much the same as Prof. Tundal's Matter 'containing the promise and the potency of all existence'.

ch. xiv § 36. The absence of any allusion to the previous criticism of the Stoic philosophy in §§ 18—24, just as in the parallel case of the Platonic philosophy § 30, is an instance of the carelessness which characterizes the composition of the whole treatise, and particularly of the present (historical) section.

Zeno: (Krische 358—404, Brandis in Dict. of Biog.). He is quoted N. D. pi 57 (definition of nature), 20 (arguments to prove the rationality of the world), also in i 70, ii 63, iii 18, 22, 63.

naturalem legem. Heraclitus was the first who expressly identified the law of nature with the word and will of God; cf. Fr. 91 Bywater, ξυνόν ἐπὶ πάσι τὸ φρονεῖν' ἐν νῷ λέγοντα ἱσχυρίζεσαι χρὴ τῷ ἔννοῳ πάντων, ὁκωπερ νόμο πόλει καὶ πολῦ ἰσχυροτέρως. Τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἐνός τοῦ θεοῦ' κρατεῖ νὰ καὶ τοιοῦτον ὄκωσαν ἐθέλει καὶ ἔδρακεν πᾶσι καὶ περιγινεῖται. fr. 92 τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐκτὸς ξυνοῦ, ξωσομοί οἱ πολλοὶ ὃς ἀπὸ ἐκατοστὶς φρόνισιν. fr. 65 ἐν τῷ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει, Ζηρός οὖν οὐκ. This view, popularized by the Stoics, was passed on by them to the Roman jurists and so to their modern successors. Thus
C. Leg. i 18 lex est summa ratio insita in natura quae jubet ea quae facienda sint, prohibetque contraria; also § 42, and more explicitly II 8, "the wisest have held that law is no device of man, but that it is aeternam quiddam quod universum mundum regeret imperans prohibendique aportientia. Ha principem legem illum et ultimum mement esse diebant omnia ratione aut cogitatis aut reactatis dei;" and § 110 erat enim ratio perfecta a rerum natura...quae non tum denique incipit lex esse cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est; orta autem est simul cum mente divina. Quamobrem lex vera atque princeps, opta ad judicandum et ad vetandum, ratio est recta summi Jovis. Stobaeus Eod. ii 6 p. 204 gives the Greek definition (ο νόμος) λόγος ὁ θεός ἐστι δραστικὸς μὲν ὃν ποιητῶν, ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὃν ὑπὸ ποιητῶν. See Hooker, Eccl. Pol. i ch. 2—6, and Wordsworth, Ode to Duty, where God is regarded as the common source of the natural and the moral law. Probably Zeno would not have objected to a definition of God with which we have been made familiar of late, "a stream of tendency which makes for righteousness."

eamque vim obtinere = évpevyei, 'it (the law of nature) has its force in commanding', 'its function is to command', so vim habere Leg. ii 9 (of law, quae vis est aequalis, 'coeval with', illius caelum atque terras tucentis et regentis dei).

animantem. But the Stoic lays it down as the first attribute of Deity ut sit animans N. D. ii 45. The use of the abstract name Nomos is no more inconsistent with the idea of a living God, than the similar use of the abstract Logos. Compare the misunderstanding of the term πρόνοια § 18.

aethera: the physical, as Law is the moral manifestation of God, cf. § 33 on Aristotle, and below on Cleanthes and Chrysippus, also ii 23 foll.

si intellegi potest: see Sch. Opusc. iii 311, who compares Fam. ix 17 de lucro proprie jam quadrivium vicinum, si aut hoc lucrum est, aut hoc vita. The phrase is properly used when we doubt about the correctness of some expression without questioning the fact stated, as in Juvenal's si rixa est. Its use here is a piece of colloquial carelessness, but there is no need to alter it, as Heind, and others have done. For intel. cf. §§ 25, 27, 30.

qui numquam occurrit: 'never comes across one', cf. §§ 46, 76 foll.

rationem—pertinentem: 'the all-pervading reason' is of course only another name for the lex naturalis. For omnem some edd. have omnium: both forms are found, e.g. ii 36 rerum omnium natura, so Leg. i 61 and ii 16; on the other hand we have naturam rerum omnem, N. D. i 27; cf. Munro on Lucr. ii 646, Sch. Opusc. ii 330 and 361. Pertinentem = διήκοντα as in M. Aurel. v 32 ὁ δὲ τῆς θείας διήκουν λόγος. Virgil gives it a poetical form Geo. iv 220 foll. deum namque ictu per omnes | terrasque trac- tusque maris caelumque profandum, and Aen. vii 724, cf. Heineze Logos p. 85 foll.

vi divina esse affectam. Sch. Opusc. iii 313, doubts the correctness of the phrase, thinking such a use of afficere unfitted to express a natural
attribute; nor is this disproved by the passages quoted by Klotz Adn. Cr. iv 4, e.g. Tusc. v 81, optima quiseque valetudine affectus potest videri natura ad aliquem morbum proclivior. May it not be used here with an intentional impropriety to suggest the impossibility of reason possessing the attribute of divinity?

**astris:** cf. p. 30 foll.

**annis—mutationibus:** see Zeller Stoics tr. p. 121 foll. who mentions, among other extravagant conclusions drawn from the Stoic axiom ‘all that exists is material’, the statement attributed to Chrysippus that the voice was a body, that qualities are bodies, nay rational creatures (Plut. Comm. Not. 45), that diseases, vices and virtues are bodies (Seneca Epp. 106, 117, and especially 113 animal constat animum esse. Virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodam modo se habens: ergo animal est). He quotes also the words of Chrysippus (ap. Plut. l. c.) in which it is distinctly asserted that night and day, the month and the year, summer and autumn, &c., are bodies, adding that ‘by these unfortunate expressions Chrys. appears to have meant little more than that the realities corresponding to these names depend on material conditions, e.g. by summer is meant the air heated by the sun’.

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**Beoroviar—interpretatur.** The device of allegorical interpretation is naturally resorted to when it is desired to retain old forms which are felt to be inconsistent with new beliefs. As Philo allegorized the Jewish Scriptures in order to bring them into harmony with his own Platonism, so the Stoics allegorized the Hellenic Scriptures (Homer and Hesiod) with the view of hiding the divergence between their own philosophy and the popular religion, cf. Heraclides All. Hom. proem. Ὑμηρος ἡσεῖσαι εἰ μὴ ἗λληγόρησεν, Orig. c. Cels. i 17, iv 48 (where Cels. says the more respectable Jews and Christians take refuge in allegory, being ashamed of the literal sense of their sacred books, to which Or. replies in the following chapters), Lobech Agl. pp. 133, 155 foll., Zeller Stoics tr. ch. 13, p. 334 foll. Plato alludes to the allegorizing process as already rife in his time, Rep. ii 378, Phaedrus 329. For Stoic exx. see below § 41 seq. p. 63 seq.

**usitatas perceptasque:** ‘the ordinary well-understood notions of gods’ = usu perceptas ii 91, Fin. v 3. See Sch. Opusc. iii 314 who defends this reading against Lambinus’ emendation insitas perceptasque.

**neque enim—appellatur:** ‘neither (the actual) Jupiter nor any one who is addressed in that way, i.e. as a person’, [or ‘who bears a name of such a kind, i.e. a proper name’. R.] Davies, followed by Heindorf and Schömann, reads appellatur against the best mss. I understand the Subj. in its ‘limiting force’, cf. Madv. § 364 obs. 2, Roby § 1692.

**significatio—ὐποώνα,** Plato Rep. ii 378, a figure of speech quae plus in suspicione relinquit quam positum est in oratione, Herenn. iv 53, ‘where more is meant than meets the ear.’

**quandam:** ‘a sort of’, Zumpt § 707. [Often used to mark a translation from the Greek. J. S. R.]
§ 37 Aristoi: of Chios (Krische 404—415) represents a Cynic reaction in the Stoic school; he confined himself exclusively to ethics on the ground that logic was a spider's web, curious but useless, and that physics were beyond our faculties: Stob. Floril. 50, 7 πρῶς ἡμᾶς μὲν εἶναι τὰ ἴδικα, μὴ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὰ διαλεκτικά: μὴ γὰρ συμβαλεῖαι πρὸς ἐπανάρθουσι βίον ὑπὸ ἡμᾶς δὲ τὰ φυσικά ἀδύνατα γιὰ ἐγνώσθαι καὶ αὐτῆ παρέχειν χρείαν. It is therefore probably correct, though we have no actual confirmation from other sources, that he denied the possibility of our knowing anything about God. The particular form given to the denial is of course due to the Epicurean reporter.

Cleanthes: Krische 415—433. He is referred to N. D. ii 13, iii 16 (the four grounds of religious belief) ii 24 and 40 (all-pervading heat) ii 63, iii 63 (allegorical interpretation). Cleanthes is more distinguished for moral strength and religious earnestness than for any speculative advance; none of the doctrines here mentioned are peculiar to him: one in fact is wrongly ascribed to him. While holding with the rest of his school that the universe was divine in virtue of the aetherial soul by which it was animated, he placed the source and seat of aether in the sun, and not as the others (agreeing with Aristotle) in the furthest heaven, cf. Lc. ii 126 Zenoni et reliquis fecit Stoicis aether visibilis omnium deus, mente providentia quae omnium reguntur; Cleanthes, qui quasi magorum est gentium Stoicorum, solemn domini et rerum potiri patat; Stob. Ed. i 21 Kl. εὐ τῷ ἡμῖν ἐφθην εἶναι τὸ ἱερὸν ἐπὶ κόσμῳ.

extremum: to be taken predicatively with eingentem, ‘inclosing on the outside.’

qui—nominetur. Heind, prefers the Ind. considering that this is an addition of the reporter’s, and not a part of the speech reported; but the Subj. is an exact translation of such a speech as we find Diog. L. vii 137 λέγει ἦνων ἀνωτάτοι μὲν εἶναι τὸ πόρ, ὅ ἐν αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι, ἐν ὧ πρώτην τίν χρόνου ἀλλαζόν σφαίραν γεννάσθαι, εἰτέ τίν τῶν πλανώμενον. C’s own view is nearly the same Lc. vi 17 novem tibi orbibus concens sunt omnia, quorum unus est caelestis, extimus qui reliquos omnes complectitur, summus ipse deus arcas et continentis exterum.

quasi delirans—voluptatem. The word del. is properly used of dotage, as in Senect. i 16. exeditus stultitia quae dedicatio appellari solet: so unus deliria Div. ii 141, Tusc. i 48. For the tropical use see § 42. Vell. waxes vehement as he thinks of the attack made upon the Epicureans in Cle’s treatise περὶ ἴδιος Diog. L. vii 37, 175.

fingit formam quandam: this probably refers to the anthropomorphic language used by Cle. in speaking of God, as in the grand hymn to Zeus, τῶν ζῆν ὑπὸργον ἀνεκάτοις ἐνι χερσιν ἀμφότεροι, περὶ δὲν, ἀείζωντα κερανον. In such words Cle. gives, as it were (quandam, cf. n. on quadam § 33) a human form (cf. nulla species § 31) to Zeus.

divinitatem omnem: ‘complete divinity’: omnis qualitative, not quantitative.
in animi notione—repone re. Here at last we have the open avowal of the principle on which the criticism is founded; all is false which disagrees with our προληψις. According to Epicurus repeated impressions (sensations) fix a type (προληψις) in the mind, to which we attach a name, and when any new object offers itself, claiming to be called by this name, we must measure it by the type. So Cleanthes said that each perception (φαντασία) made an impression on the soul like that made by a seal on wax; and Cic. notices a theory memoriae esse signatarum rerum in mente vestigia Tusc. I 61: cf. also Orator 19 and 133 (in reference to a speech of Demosthenes) ea oratio in eam formam quae est insita in mentibus nostris includi sia potest, ut major eloquentia non requiritur, and Plato Rep. v 462 ά ἄρα ἃ νῦν διδάσκομεν εἰς τὸ τούτων ιχνῶν ἠμῶν ἁρμότει, quoted in Sch. n. On constr. repone in notione see § 29 n.

Ch. xv. § 38. Persaeus: see Krische 436—443. What is here said of his opinions agrees with the account in Philodemus pp. 75, 76 Περσαῖος δε ἔχει δήλωσ ἡμών...ἀφανίζων τὸ δαιμόνιον, ἢ μηθίεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ γινόσκον, ὅτα ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν θεῶν λάγη φαίνεσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰ τρέφοντα καὶ φέλοντα θεοὺς νενομίσθαι καὶ τετυμηθοῖν πρόσων, κατὰ τὰ ἐντὸ Πραδίκου γεγραμμένα (N. D. I 118), μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς εὑρίσκες ἢ τροφάς ἢ σκέπας ἢ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, ἃς Δήμητρα καὶ Δίωνεσσ. These opinions were common to many of the Stoics, see Π 60—62, ΠΠ 41, Leg. Π 27. C. himself desired to erect a temple to Tullia after her death (Att. xii 36, &c) and frequently asserts his belief in the divinity of the souls of the good, (Consol. fr. 5,) which was indeed a part of the ordinary Roman belief, and is recognized as such in Leg. Π 22 deorum manium jura sancta sunt. Bonos leti datos divos habento. Sometimes C. puts forward opinions closely approaching those of Euhemerus (§ 119) as in Tusc. I 28 quid ἔτοι totem prope caelum nonne humano genere completum est?...ipse illi majorum gentium δὲ, qui habentur, hinc a nobis profecti in caelum reperientur. Quaere quorum demonstrantur sepulchra in Graecia; reminiscere quae tradatur mysteriis: tum denique quam hoc late pateat intelleges.

quo quid absurdius quam: Heind. quotes the foll. exx. of a clause with quam added after a comparative to explain a preceding ablative, Fin. I 19 quod nihilo turpius physicq quam fieri quiequam sine causa dicere (where see Madv.), Orat. I 169 quid ergo hoc fieri turpius potest quam...ita lapis; see also Orat. II 38 and 302, and Allen's n. here. [Ac. I 45 hoc quidquam esse turpius, quam praeccurrere. Parallels in Greek are common. J. S. R.] We have had similar exx. of quod explained by a succeeding clause, § 2 n.

res sordidas. The Stoics, sensible of the mischiefs which might arise from disturbing the religious beliefs of the vulgar, endeavoured to find a place for these in their philosophy, explaining each divinity as a separate manifestation of the one supreme God, and getting rid, as far as they could, of immoral or degrading superstitions by the free use of allegory. But it was scarcely possible to do this with the mass of the inferior deities, Epona, Cloacina, and others such as Augustine sums up, C. D. vi 9, and to

M. C.
which Pliny alludes Δ. Η. 11. 5 gentes vero quaedam animalia et aliqua etiam obscura pro dis habent, ac multa dicta magis pudenda, per vetustas corpor, alla et similia jurantes. A similar charge is made by Clemens Strom. 1 295 c (οἱ Σταυρίῳ) σώμα ὑπά τὸν Θεὸν διά τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης ὑλῆς περιτηκήναι λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς.

honoare afficere: see n. on ei affectam § 33.

reponere in deos: the force of re- is the same as that of ἀπό in ἀποδίδωμι, 'to put them among the Gods as their right', cf. revocet § 28.

quorum—esset futurus: 'dead men, whose worship, if they had been raised to the rank of Gods, must have borne exclusively the character of mourning'. Cf. Plut. Is. 70 p. 378 Σενοφόμης ἠξίωσε τοὺς Αλγυπτίους, εἰ θεοὺς νομίζουσιν, μὴ ἡρμήνευ, εἰ δὲ ἡρμηνεύ, θεοῦς μὴ νομίζειν (told with slight variations by Arist. Ἱθ. τ. 23) and the remarks in the First Philippic 13 on the Supplicatio to Caesar, an me consexit decreturam fuisset ut parentalia cum supplicationibus miserceretur? ut incipientes religiones in toto publicam induceretur? ... adduci non possit ut quaequam mortuam confugerent cum immortalium religiones; ut eujus sepulcrum nusquam extet, ubi parentetur, ei publice supplicetur. The use of mourning garments at a supplicatio was entirely forbidden, see Vatia. 30 foll. During the Ferialia and Lemuria the temples of the Gods were closed, Ov. Fast. ii 563, v 491. The worship of Zagreus, Adonis, and Osiris might fairly be described as a cultus in locu.

§ 39. Chrysippus: (Krische 443—481) called the second founder of the Stoic school, εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐν Ἕρωςποσ, οὐκ ἄν ἦν στοά. His importance is marked by the emphatic ἐκάτω with which the sentence begins. Philodemus says of him (Gomp. p. 77 foll.) ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ Χρυσίσπησ [τὸ πῶς ἐπὶ Διὰ ἀνασφέρων] ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ θεῶν Διὰ φησίν εἰναι τὸν ἀπαντὰ διακουόντα λόγον καὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄλου ψυχῆν, καὶ τῇ τούτῳ μὲν [ὡς πίνατα ᾿ζην]... καὶ τοὺς λίθους, διὸ καὶ Ζήρα καλεῖσθαι, Δία δ’ ὅτι πάντων αἰτεῖ καὶ κύριος: τον τε κόσμον ἐμφυχον εἰναι καὶ θεον καὶ τὸ ἱερομυκρός καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν ψυχὴν... τὸν Διὰ καὶ τὴν κοίνην πάντων φύσιν καὶ εἰράμενην καὶ ἄντιγχρα καὶ τὴν αὑτὴν εἰναι καὶ εὐνομίαν καὶ ἀιδικὸν καὶ ὀμόνοιαν καὶ εἰρήνην καὶ Ἀφροδίτην καὶ τὸ παραλήπτον πῶς, καὶ μὴ εἰναι θεοῦ ἀρρένας μηδὲ θηλείας, ὃς μηδὲ πόλεις μηδὲ ἀρετὰς, ἀναμοίρασθαι δὲ μάον ἀρρενίκος καὶ θηλυκός ταύτα ὑπά, καθάπερ σελήνη καὶ μῆρα καὶ τὸν Ἁρχα κατὰ τοῦ πολέμου τετάχθαι καὶ τῆς τάξεως καὶ ἀντιτάξεως: "Ἡρακτοῦ δὲ πῦρ εἰναι, καὶ Κρώμοι μὲν τὸν τοῦ ὥμιμου τοῦ; Ἑρακλῆς καὶ τὸν ἀθάνατος οὐκ ὑπά τὸν ἅγιον, Ἐρέα δὲ τῆς ἑγαίης, Δία δὲ τῶν αἰθέρα (τοὺς δὲ τὸν Ἀπόλλων, καὶ τὴν Δημητρία γῆν ἦ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ πνεύμα) καὶ παναριωνάς λέγεσθαι καὶ γραφέσθαι καὶ πλάτησθαι θεοῦ ἀνθρωποειδείς, διὸ τὸ ἄρπον καὶ πόλεις καὶ πόταθες καὶ πόλης καὶ Δία μὲν εἶναι τῶν περὶ τῆς γῆς αἰεί, τὸν δὲ δέκτος Ἀθηνῆς, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῆς γῆς καὶ

1 This is the emendation suggested in the excellent article on the Heraclean Fragments which appeared in the Quarterly Review, Feb. 1810. German writers who have referred to this, have attributed it to Elmsley and others. I am informed by the present Editor of the Q. R. that it was really written by that extraordinary man, Dr Thomas Young, and indeed it is so stated by Dean Peacock in his memoir.

2 Sauppe suggests μήν πάντα διαχεῖσθαι, comparing C.'s fusionem universam.
BOOK I. CH. XV § 39.

οθαλάσσης Ποσειδών. καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοὺς ἐνθεοῦς ἄψυχοι, ὡς καὶ τούτους, συνοικεῖοι καὶ τὸν ἤλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀστέρας θεοῦ οἴεται καὶ τὴν νύμον καὶ ἀνθρώπους εἰς θεούς φασί μεταβάλλειν. ἐν δὲ τῷ δεύτερῳ τῷ τε εἰς Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαίον ἀναφερόμενα καὶ τὰ πάρ Ὀρμήω καὶ Ποσειδώ καὶ Ἐυρυτήδη καὶ ποιητὰς ἄλλους, ὡς καὶ Κλεάνθης, πειράται συνοικεῖοι τοῖς δόξαις αὐτῶν ἀπαντά  τ' ἐστων αἰθήριον, ὡς αὐτοῖς ἄν καὶ πατήρ καὶ νόος, ὡς καν τῷ πρῶτῳ μὴ μάχεσθαι τὸ τῆς Ἱέαν καὶ μητέρα τοῦ Δίον εἶναι καὶ θυγατέρα. τάς δὲ αὐτῶν ποιεῖται συνοικεῖοις καὶ τῷ περὶ Χαρίτων, καὶ τῶν Δία νύμον φθείναι εἶναι καὶ τάς Χάριτας τᾶς ἠμετέρας καταρχᾶς καὶ τάς ἀνταποδοσίας τῶν ἑυεργεσίων. τὰ παραπλῆσιά δὲ καὶ τοῖς περὶ φύσεως γράφει, μεθ' ὅν τε παρατείνει καὶ τὸν Ἰνδέκτων συνοικεῖον τινὰ προς αὐτὸν [καὶ μὴν 1] καὶ τῷ πρῶτῳ τῇ Νύκτα θεῶν φθείναι εἶναι προτείσθην ἐν δὲ τῷ πρῶτῳ τῷ κόσμῳ ἐνα τῶν φρανίμων, συνοικεῖοις θεῖος καὶ ἀνθρώπους, καὶ τῶν πολέμοις καὶ τῶν Δια τῶν αὐτῶν εἰναι, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Ἰνδέκτων λέγειν ἐν δὲ τῷ πέμπτῳ καὶ λόγους ἐπήκανε πάντας τὸν κόσμον ζωὴν εἶναι καὶ λογικῶν καὶ φρανίμων καὶ θεῶν καὶ περὶ προνοιας μέντοι τὰς αὐτὰς ἑκτίθησι συνοικεῖας τῇ σεμύνῃ τοῦ παντός καὶ τὰ τῶν θεῶν ωφοματα ἐφαρμοτείς τῆς δραμάτος (C. tæferrimus, cf. Wyttenbach ad Plut. Iect. Aud. Rat. p. 48) ἀποίκων ἀκοιμάτων. Ια. I have given the whole passage as an illustration of the connexion between Philodemus and the N. D. The points of agreement to be marked are (1) the citations. In both, Chrysippus' 1st book, π. θεον, is referred to for the general statement of his theology, and the 2nd book for his explanation of the old poets. (2) As to the subject-matter, all that C. says is contained in the quotation except the contemptuous comments, and the fuller definition of law. On the other hand Phil. goes into greater detail on most points, especially as to the mythological names, e.g. the Charites, the difference of sex among the Gods, and the reference to Euripides and Heraclitus.

cogitatione depingere: 'to imagine'. The same phrase occurs Ac. π. 48, cf. N. D. π. 47 cogitationes fingere.

ejus animi fusionem universam: 'abstr. for concer. = ejus animum ubique fusum', Sch. Ejus i.e. mundi, cf. § 29 imagines earumque circuitus; and for jusio π. 28. Probably this represents some words which have been lost in Philod. I do not think it can stand for διαγείσθαι suggested by Petersen and Sauppe, as that would rather mean 'crumbling away' than 'pervading'. Compare on the 'universal intermingling' κράσις δι' ὀλων, Zeller Stoics tr. p. 131.

principatum = ἡγεμονικὸν π. 29.

universitatemque: Heind.'s emendation for the universam atque of the ms.

fatalem—futuram: a rounded phrase for Philod.'s εἰμαρμένην καὶ

1 So Sauppe fills the gap left by Gomperz.

2 So I propose to read. Gomperz has λόγους ἐρωτατικῶν περὶ τοῦ τῶν, Sauppe and Bicheler ἐρωτατικῶν ποιῶν τῶν, but nothing can be plainer than πάντας in the facsimile: ἐπάγωσα is used in the sense of 'adduce' with μαρτύρα, Xen. Symp. 8, 34, with μέθοδος and δόξας, Plut. π. 975 e. For the use of πάντας cf. πάσας προφάσεις προφασίζεσθε Plato Rep. ν. 475.
άνιγκεν. On the reading see Sch. Opusc. III 362: Swainson (Journal of Philology, vol. v p. 152.) follows Heind. in reading veritatem for the umbram of the MSS, and would transpose the words so as to assimilate the clause to that in § 40. It is scarcely conceivable that this senseless repetition is due to C. himself, who could surely have found some less clumsy way of ridiculing the verbosity of his original. I should be inclined to omit both tam fatoelen...faturarum and universitatemque—continenter, if one could suggest any explanation of their insertion. If they are really genuine it is a strong evidence in favour of Müller's thesis Libris de N. D. non extremam manum accessisse, (Bromberg 1839). Creuzer's ingenious emendation libram for umbram (in allusion to the scales of destiny) cannot be maintained, now that we know there was no such allusion in the original. Madv. suggests normam; Allen thinks umbram may have arisen from a misreading of the Greek ειµαρµένη, added as a gloss from § 55; moeram (μοίραν) is nearer than any of these. [I think Sch.'s vim for umbram is right. The scribe probably wrote naturam by error from the line above, then made the correction vim over it, thus umbram would easily arise. J. S. R.]

fluent atque manarent: when the Present is used in quotations, it may be followed either by the Pres. Subj. as in qui versetur above, or the Imperf. as in appellarent just below: see Madv. § 382 obs. 4, and exx. in n. on § 61. [Many exx. of the Imperf. are given by Motschmann De temporum conceptione ap. Ciceronem, p. 11 (Jena 1875). J. S. R.] The doctrine of the perpetual change or flux of the elements came to the Stoics from Heracleitus, cf. N. D. III 84, Cleomedes Cycl. Th. I 1 (ἡ αὐτία) χευμένη κατὰ τὰς φυσικὰς ἐαυτῆς μεταβολὰς, ἄλλατε μὲν εἰς πῦρ χευμένη, ἄλλοτε δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ κοσμογονίαν ὁρμῶσα, and Stob. Ecl. 10. 16 τὸ δὲ πῦρ κατ ἐξοχὴν στοιχείων λέγεται διὰ τὸ εἳ αὐτῶν πρῶτον τὰ λοιπὰ συνισταθαι κατὰ μεταβολὴν καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ ἔσχατον πάντα χεύμενα διαλυεῖσθαι...πάλιν δὲ ἀπὸ ταύτης (γῆς) διαλυμφείσθαι καὶ διαχευμένης πρῶτη μὲν γίγνεται χῦσις εἰς ὑδωρ, δευτέρα δὲ εἴς ύδατος εἰς ἀέρα, τρίτη δὲ καὶ ἐσχάτη εἰς πῦρ. The last clause shows that there is no reason to put terram after sidera (with Heind.) on the ground that the flux was confined to aquam et aera. Krische thinks that C. touches on this point here merely to make the whole theory more ridiculous, but it is possible that it may have been suggested by the μείματος ὑδαίν of the original, which Kr. explains (p. 465) not of water, but of a sort of chaos out of which the elements were developed.

homines—consecuti: see on Persaenius just above, and II 62 n.

§ 40. Neptunum: see II 71, III 64; so Arist. Gen. An. III 11 p. 762 a γίνονται ὃ ἐν ὑγρᾷ καὶ ἐν ὑγρῷ τὰ ὕδατα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ διὰ τὸ ὃ ἐν ὑγρᾷ ὑδός ὑπάρχῃ, ἐν δὲ ὑδάτι πνεῦμα, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ πνεῦμα θερμὸτροπία ψυχή, ὡστε τρόφου τινὰ πάντα ψυχῆς ἑαυτῷ πληρῆ. Pliny (N. H. II 4) speaks of the air as vitalem hunc aera et per euncta verum meabilum totoque concertum, and ix c. 6 he adduces various arguments to prove the existence of air in water, e.g. the spouting of whales (in aquas penetrare vitalem hunc spiritum quis miretatur, qui etiam
reddi ab his eum cornat?); the fact that fishes hear and smell (super omnia est, quod esse audíatum et odoratum piscibus non erit dubium; ex aeris utrumque materia). In the Times for Sept. 13, 1879 there is a short notice of the investigations made in the Challenger and other expeditions, to determine the amount and composition of the air in sea-water.

terram quae Ceres: cf. ii 67, 71.

legis vim. C. supplements the brief mention of νόμος in the original from his own studies for the De Legibus.

eandemque necessitatem appellat: 'gives to law the name of destiny'. Mr Roby suggests eundem, which seems more appropriate, as Velleius is here dealing with the Stoic misuse of mythological names. [Cf. the parallel passage in Ac. i 29 deum omniumque rerum prudentiam...quam eandem necessitatem appellat. J. S. R.]

sempiternam veritatem: cf. § 55, iii 14, Div. i 125 fatum id appello quod Graeci εμαρμάνη, id est, ordinem seriemque causarum cum causæ causa nexas rem ex se gignat. Ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna; Zeller Stoics tr. p. 141 foll.


accommodare: a translation of συνοικεῖοισα.

qui suspicati sint: Sch. Opusc. iii 310 argues against the Subj. here, but qui is characteristic, not merely connective, 'though they never dreamt of such a thing'.


Diogenes: of Seleucia on the Tigris, pupil of Chrysippus, and afterwards head of the Stoic school (Krische 481—491), called magno et gravi Stoico in Off. iii 51. Philodemus proceeds to speak of him immediately after the quotation given above: Διογένης δ' ὁ Βασιλιάνος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τὸν κόμην γράψει τῷ Διὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν ή περίέχει τῶν Διὰ καλάτερ ἄθρωσιν ψυχῆν: then, after describing how different names were given to different parts of Zeus, he says that the part which was manifested in the aether was called Athene, τούτῳ γὰρ λέγεσθαι τὸ έκ τῆς κεφαλῆς, καὶ Ζεὺς ἄρρην Ζεὺς θῆλος: τινάς δὲ τῶν Στοικῶν φάσκειν ὅτι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν τῇ κεφαλῇ θρύσου γὰρ εἶναι, διὸ καὶ Μέτων καλεῖσθαι. Χρυσίππον δὲ ἐν τῷ στήθει τὸ ἡγεμονικόν εἶναι κάκει τῆν 'Ἀθηνᾶν γεγονείαν, φρύσουσιν ὅσαν, τῶ δὲ τῆν φωνήν έκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐκκρίνεσθαι λέγειν έκ τῆς κεφαλῆς, ὑπὸ δὲ Ἡφαιστοῦ, διὸτι τέχνῃ ἐγένεθ' ή φρονίσεις, καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς μὲν οἷον Ἀθηνᾶν εἰρήσατο, Τριτωνίδα δὲ καὶ Τριτογενεῖα διὰ τῶν τῆς φρονίσεων έκ τῶν συνεστηκέναι λόγων, τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ τῶν θηκῶν καὶ τῶν λογικῶν' καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δ' αὐτῆς προσηγορίας καὶ τὰ φορήματα (e.g. the Aegis) μᾶλα καταχρυσώσει1 τῇ φρονίσει συνοικεῖοι.

disjungit: this form seems more suited to the metaphorical sense than the dejungit of the ms. Müller Adn. Crit. p. iv. cites other passages in

1 So in the facsimile, but, as a compliment to Diog. would be quite out of place, I should emend either καταχρυσώσεις (employed by Sext. Emp. P. II. i 191 in treating of the improper uses of words) or κατακρύεις.
which *de-* is wrongly read for *di-*, e.g. *degrediens N. D. ii 103, demetata ii 110, delabi off. ii 64.

B. b. ii. Erroneous views of the poets and of eastern sages. §§ 42, 43.

Ch. xvi. § 42. The follies of the popular mythology form the subject of the first sixty pages in Compar's ed. of Philodemus. We read there of the adulteries (pp. 10—12) and wars (pp. 28, 32, 40, 45) of the Gods, of their frauds, cruelties, weaknesses, sufferings, their enslavements to each other and to men. Compare Plin. N. H. ii 7 super omnem impudentiam est adulteria interfusae singi, max eitiun jargiu et odia, utque eitiun factorum esse et secuturn numina.

exposui. In similar language, though to very different effect, Minucius begins his 20th ch. (after concluding his summary of the Philodemian section) with the words *exposui opiniones omnium verum philosophorum quibus industrius gloria est, deum unum multis divit designtes nomine nomen, ut quies arbitror aut nunc Christianos philosophos esse aut philosophos fuisse jam tene Christianos.

delirantum: §§ 37, 92, 94. somnia: § 39, Ac. ii 121. Varro Eumenides (ap. Non. s. v. infinis) posternno nemo aegrotus quiequam somniat, tam infandum quod non aliquis dicat philosophus.

fusa: so § 66 oraculum fundo. Sch. quotes Fin. iv 10 poctarum more verba fundere, Div. ii 27 concitatione mentis ed. et quasi fundi. [Add Div. ii 110, De Or. iii 175, 194, Tusc. i 64, iii 42. J. S. R.]


ortus: Philod. p. 31 mentions particularly the birth of Athene and of Dionysus; pp. 7 and 13 he notices the death (interitus) of Asclepius; Minucius i.e. speaks of the alternate deaths of Castor and Pollux.

vincula: e.g. Dionysus bound by Pentheus, Prometheus by Zeus (Philod. p. 39). See Hild v 3-0 foll.

ex immortalis: Davis and Heind. read *immortalibus*; but the Sing. may be taken either indefinitely 'from an immortal', or generically *ex τού τον οὐράνου*. On the general subject cf. Tusc. i 28 foll., Nägelsb. Nachhommerische Theol. pp. 10—13.

§ 43. magorum Aegyptorumque: there is no allusion to the former and very slight to the latter, in what remains of Philod. The Magi ('great ones'; Sans. *magha*, Lat. *magus*) were the priestly caste of Media.
Their religious system was the Zoroastrian dualism of the Iranian conquering race, modified to suit the subject Turanian population. The serpent God of the latter was identified with Ahriman, who was then raised to an equality with Ormuzd, both being viewed as emanations from the absolute first principle, Zerwan-Alkaran, i.e. eternity. In course of time the Magian religion incorporated many polytheistic elements, as the worship of the Planets, of Mithras, and of Mylitta, also known as the Phrygian mother of the Gods. The religion of the Persians was pure Zoroastrianism and, as such, opposed to Magianism, as is shown in the overthrow of the Magi by Darius Hystaspes; but it was confounded with the latter by Herodotus and other writers. See Lenormant Manual of Ancient History, tr. ii 21—47; Rawlinson’s Herodotus i Essay 5, on the Religion of the Ancient Persians; Hardwick, Christ and other Masters, Pt. iv. Medo-Persia. C. speaks of their dislike to inclosing in temples the Gods quorum hic mundus omnis templum esset, Leg. ii 26; and of their skill in interpreting dreams, Dio. i 46, 47. His younger contemporary Strabo (xv 3. 13) describes their manner of worship and tells us that they offered sacrifices to Heaven, the Sun (whom they called Mithras), the Moon, Aphrodite, Fire, Earth, Winds and Water. On the Egyptian religion, see § 101, Juvenal Sat. xv, Herodotus ii 37—76 with Rawlinson’s notes and Append. ch. 3, also Hardwick and Lenormant.

veritatis ignorantia: causal ablative, cf. § 1.

B. c. Epicurean Exposition, xvi § 43—xx § 56.

Universal consent is a sufficient proof of the existence, blessedness and immortality of the Gods. Being such, they must be free from care and passion; and are therefore to be regarded with reverence, not with fear. Testimony and reason both assure us that they are formed like men, but their bodies are of far finer texture than ours. Their life is one of contemplation, not of action.

qui consideret—debeat: ‘whoever (=if any one) should consider this would be bound to pay honour to Ep. and hold him as a God’. On the hypothetical use of qui with Subj. see Madv. § 367, who quotes N. D ii 12 haec qui videat, nonne cogatur confiteri deos esse? (repeated almost in the same words § 41), also Draec. § 493 and Roby § 1558. On the extravagant terms in which the Epicureans spoke of their founder see Tusc. i 48 quae quidem cogitans soleo sacpe mirari nonnullorum insolentiam philosophorum, qui natural cognitionem admirantur, ejusque inventors et principi gratias exultantes agunt eumque venerantur ut deum, liberatos enim se per eum dicunt gravissimis dominis, terrae sempiterno et divino ac nocturno metu; Fin. i 14, 32, 71; In Pis. 59; Lucret. v 8 deus ille fuit, deus, inclute Memmi, | qui princeps vitae rationem inventit cum quae | nunc appellatur sapientia; and iii 15 nam simul ac ratio tua coepit vociferari | naturam
terum, divina mente verta, | displagiant animi terrores; Plut. adv. Colot. 17
(Metrodorus speaks of) τὰ Ἐπικούρου ὁς ἀληθῶς θεόφασα ὄργα; ib. Colotes
kneels and adores Epicurus; Epic. himself writes to a disciple πέμπτε οὖν
ἀπαρχύς ἤμιν εἰς τὸν ᾗτον ἀφόματος θεραπεῖαν. His disciples kept sacred
to his memory, not only his birthday, but the 20th day of every month, in
accordance with the instructions in his will, Diog. L. x 18, Fīn. π. 101,
Zeller Stoics tr. p. 394.

primum esse deos: the 2nd point is given below, ut deos beatos et im-
mortales putamus.

in animis impressisset: this is the usual construction, like insepulcit
in mentibus just below, but we find imprim. with Acc. in Ac. π. 58.

qua est enim gens: universal belief was alleged by the Stoics, no less
than by the Epicureans, as the strongest proof of the existence of the Gods,
see π. 5, 12, Seneca Ep. 117 6 multum dare solenum praesumptioni omnium
hominum: quod nos argumentum vertatius est aliquid omnibus videri: tan-
quam deos esse inter alia sic collegimus, quod omnibus de his opinio insita
est, nec ulla gens usquam est adeo extra leges moreisque projecta, ut non aliquos
deos credat; and so of the immortality of the soul. It is often urged by C.
as in Leg. 1 24 nulla gens neque tam mansuetu, neque tam fera, qua non,
etiammi ignorant quodem habere demum decent, tamen habendum sciat; Tusc. 1. 30
multi de his prava sentiant; id enim vitioso more effici solet; omnes tamen
esse vix et naturam divinam arbitrantur...omini autem in re consensio om-
nium gentium necesse naturae putanda est; and by Plut. adv. Colot. 1125 b.
The same argument is employed in defence of divination Dir. 1 11, and met
in the following book (π. 39) by a reference to the universality of the desire
for pleasure as the chief good, quasi vero quicquam sit tam valde quam nihil
sapere vulgare! Cf. the objections in X. D. 1 62, πι. 11. Aristotle con-
stantly appeals to the common belief in confirmation of his own reasonings:
the justification is given Eth. Πεδ. 1 6 κράπτοντο μὲν πίνακας άνθρώπους φαί-
nesteia συναγωγολογούντας τοῖς μηθησαμένοις, εἰ δὲ μῆ, τρόποιν γέ τινα πίνακας, ὀπέρ
μεταβλητήμενοι ποιήσασθαι ἔχει γάρ ἔκαστος οἰκεῖον τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν... ἐκ
γάρ τοῦ ἀληθός μὲν λεγομένων, οὐ σαφῶς δέ, προεκοῦν ἐσται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς,
μεταλαμβάνουσιν αἱ τὰ γνωριμότερα τῶν εἰσόθων θεοσεβεία συγκεκριμένως.
See on the general subject Hamilton's Reid Supplementary Dissertation A
(On the philosophy of common sense) esp. § vi (Chronological series of testimoni-
acies), II. Spencer First Principles p. 4 foll. (who grants the universality of
religious ideas), and the very fair and able discussion in Jellett's Efficiency of
Prayer p. 70 foll. and App. on General Consent. The analogous ecclesiasti-
cal doctrine formulated by Vincent of Lerins in the words quod ubique,
quod semper, quod ab omnibus credulum est, or in the more sounding phrase
of Augustine necessas judicat orbis terrarum, is of far more doubtful value,
as it refers not to the primitive instincts of mankind, but to abstract
dogmas, received on authority, and often very little understood by those
who professed to hold them.

quoted on § 25; it is defined by Diog. L. x 33 as 'a general conception retained in the mind', 'the memory of what has been often perceived'; 'on uttering the word man, the type at once rises up κατὰ πρόληψιν (i.e. prior to logical analysis) in accordance with our previous sensations'. Hence οὕτε έτεθείν οὕτε ἀποτεθέν άνευ προλήψεως Sext. Emp. Math. I 57 (sine qua... potest), cf. Clem. Al. Strom. II 157. Chrysippus appears to have borrowed the word from Ep. (see § 54), defining it as έννοια φυσική τῶν καθόλου Diog. L. vii 54. In an interesting chapter of Epictetus (Diss. I 22) we read that προλήψεις, general principles, are common to all men, and consistent with each other: differences arise when we attempt to apply them, e.g. all allow that τό έστιν must be preferred to all things, but it is a question between Jews and Romans whether it is έστιν to eat swine's flesh. Education consists in learning to apply τάς φυσικάς προλήψεις ταῖς ἐπί μέρους ουσίας καταλλήλως τῇ φύσει. Prolapse then, whether as understood by the Epicureans (the permanent image), or with a more ideal colouring by the Stoics, corresponds to the Idea of Plato, the Form of Aristotle, the Innate Idea of later times: by some of the Fathers (e.g. Theod. Gr. Aff. p. 16, 9; Clem. L. c.) it was identified with Faith. Besides the terms informatio, praenotio and anticipatio, C. uses for it notio and notitia, which are properly equivalents of the more general έννοια, cf. Ac. II 30 notitiae rerum quas Graeci tum έννοιας tum προλήψεις vocant; Tusc. I 57 (of the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence) nec fieri ullo modo posse ut a puero tot rerum atque tantarum insitas et quasi consignatas in animis notiones, quas έννοιας vocant, haberemus, nisi animus, antequam in corpus intravisset, in rerum cognitione vixisset; Top. 31 notionem appellò quod Graeci tum έννοιας tum προλήψιν dicunt: ea est insita et praecepta cujusque formae cognitione, enodationis indigens; Madv. Fin. III 21, v 59; Bake on Leg. I 26, 30, 59, where inoohatae intellegentiae = προλήψεις.

informatio: 'shaping', 'outline', then 'conception'.
caelesti volumine: entitled περί κρατήρίου ή κανών, 'the test or standard of truth', Diog. L. x 27, Zeller Stoics tr. p. 400 foll. We find it referred to as τούς διαπετείς κανόνας Plut. adv. Colot. 19.

Ch. xvii. § 44. non instituted: so Tusc. I 30 nec enim id (esse deus) conlocutio hominum effect, non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus, i.e. οὐ νόμω ἄλλα φύσει. So Philod. p. 128 (we worship the Gods) οὐ μόνον διὰ τούς νόμους ἄλλα διὰ φυσικάς αἰτίας, Diog. L. x 123 θεοί μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν· εἰαργῆς μὲν γὰρ ἑστὶν αὐτῶν ἡ γνώσις.

ad unum omnium: 'all without exception'.
insitas vel potius innatas: 'implanted or rather inbred'. The two words are often joined to express natural growth as opposed to artificial training, e.g. Fin. iv 4 insitam quandam vel potius innatam cupiditatem scientiae; Ver. iv 48 the belief that Sicily is sacred to Ceres and Libera is so firmly held by the natives ut animis eorum insitum atque innatum esse videatur, also v 23; in Top. 69 the opposite quality is expressed by the phrase adsumptis atque adventiciis. It does not seem necessary to suppose
any error on the part of C. as though he ascribed to Epic. the doctrine of 'innate ideas' in the sense in which Locke (certainly not Plato, for with him the idea was latent till developed by *mawusiky*; nor Descartes, see Huxley's *Hume* p. 83) understood the term. All that is implied is that our religious ideas are not arbitrarily imposed from without, but grow up within as a natural and necessary result of experience. We must understand *innatum* in the same sense in *Plato, Opusc.* IV 345, who remarks that a *principio innasci* is the phrase used (II 34) of what is strictly inborn.

**de quo autem—confitendum est.** [The argument is obscured by the ordinary punctuation. Putting a comma after *habemus* we get the following syllogism: We all have from nature an idea of Gods: what all men's nature agrees about is true: ergo we must admit the existence of Gods. ]

omnium natura = omnem natura, cf. n. on § 36.

**hanc igitur habemus:** resumes *fateamur habere.* For the resumptive use of *igitur* after parenthesis and for the change from Inf. to Ind. cf. Drager § 355, Madv. § 480. A close parallel occurs in *Fin.* II 22 *quid enim merei velis...quid mercaris igitur &c.*

**ut putemus:** explains *hanc,* which has the force of *talem,* cf. § 55 illa ut. § 45. *ipsorum:* the existence of the Gods, as opposed to their attributes.

**insculpsit in mentibus:** so in *animo quasi insculptum est esse deos* II 12.

**quod beatum—essent omnia:** quoted from the *kupiaw dòxai,* an epitome of the ethical principles of Epicurus, which he intended to be committed to memory by his disciples, see § 85, *Fin.* II 20 *quid enim vestrum non edidicit Epicuri kupias dòxai*? Diog. L. x 35. It is preserved by Diog. x 139, and commences with the words here translated *tò makirion kai dèpharion ouste autò pràgmata exei, ouste aliases paríxei, ouste ouste òrgáis ouste xárais synéxetai ev ásthénèi vàp fán tò toucivon,* cf. Philod. p. 123 *kupias òrgêis kai xàriontis ánthropou,* Lucr. II 646 omnis enim per se divum natura necessit | innomortali aere summa cum pace fruentur | somota ab nostris rebus sejunctaque longe; | nam privata dolore omni, privata percellis | ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indigia nostris, | nec bene promeritis capitur, neque taut- igeri.àra. The argument in full is: the Gods are happy; happiness consists in the absence of trouble, whether experienced in oneself or inflicted upon another; therefore the Gods neither feel nor cause trouble; hence the motive of anger, which might lead to their infliction of trouble, and the motive of favour, which might lead to their taking trouble for others, are alike manifestations of weakness, and inconsistent with our idea of the Divine majesty. The answer to which is that (1) the word 'trouble' is unmeaning in reference to our idea of God: if we suppose him to be almighty, thought and action are as easy to him as breathing to us: (2) while it is true that passion and caprice are marks of weakness and, as such, inconsistent with our idea of God, yet a righteous government, rewarding virtue and punishing vice, is a natural corollary to the belief in a
BOOK I CH. XVII § 45. 139

good and powerful God. When Seneca says deos nemo sanus tinet (Benef. iv 19) it is not from any notion of the Gods being indifferent to the actions of men, but he is simply asserting the Platonic doctrine that God never harms any (Rep. ii 379 foll.), that His acting is always for the best both to the universe at large and to each individual in it. In Philod. p. 94 we read that it was charged against the Epicureans, that their doctrine deprived good men of their religious hopes, προσεπιφέροντες δέ καὶ διώτι τῶν ἁγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων παραφούμεθα τὰς καλὰς ἐλπίδας ἃς ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς ἔχουσι, to which it is replied p. 97 that the vulgar ideas of reward and punishment are abandoned by all philosophers, and that many go so far as to deny them any power to hurt, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν ὁφελείν καὶ βλάπτειν εἰρηκότων φιλοσόφων τοὺς θεοὺς, ὅμοια τῶς χυδαίοις (the vulgar) ὑπελεπεν τὰς ὁφελίας καὶ τὰς βλάψεις, πολλοὶ δ' οὐδὲ βλάπτειν ὁλος ἔφασαν αὐτοῖς, but the true and just are rewarded as Polyaeonius has stated in his 1st book: p. 100 ὁφελίαι ἐκ θεῶν τῶν ἁγαθῶν καὶ βλάξεις τῶν κακῶν καταλέιποντες (i.e. apparently the Epicureans): p. 124 καὶ σωτηρίας ἀνθρώποις διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καταλεπτόν ὑπογράφει (i.e. Epicurus) διὰ πλειόνων, ἐν δὲ τῷ τρισκαίδεκατῳ περὶ τῆς ὅικείωτης ἢν πρὸς τινα ὁ θεὸς ἔχει καὶ τῆς ἀλητρωτίτης: p. 125 ‘with the favour of heaven (θεῶν ἱλεων ὤντων) we need not fear war, with the favour of heaven we shall pass our lives in purity’: pp. 86—89 ‘the Stoics deny that the Gods are the authors of evil to men and thus take away all restraint on iniquity and degrade men to the level of the brutes (for who would be balked of the injustice for which he craves, from the fear of air or aether ?), while we say that punishment comes to some from the Gods, and the greatest of good to others’: also p. 145. It is difficult to see how this approach to the common opinion (which goes much beyond what Lucr. allows vi 70) can be reconciled with other positive statements of Epicurus or with his general principles as given in the text. See the Academic, or rather Stoic, criticism in § 121. For the form of expression (nee habere ipsum nec exhibere alteri) we may compare St James i 13 ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἀπειραστότατος ἐστὶ κακῶς ἐπιφάνει δέ αὐτὸς ὁδύνη, Plut. Mor. 1102 ε καὶ φαύλου οὐδὲν ποιεῖν αὐτῷ θέμας, ὕσπερ οὐδὲ πάρσχει, Sen. De Ira ii 27 natura illis (diis) mitis et placida est, tam longe remota ab aliena injuria quam a sua.

sit—essent—essent: the Pres. Subj. is allowable because it is a general proposition having no more reference to the past than to the present: the Imperf. is afterwards used in order to remind the reader that this is a statement made in the past by Epic., not necessarily adopted by the writer; see Draeger § 131, and (on the mixed construction) § 124 B c, where it is pointed out that when there are two subordinate clauses, standing in different degrees of subordination, the more remote subordination is frequently expressed by the Imperf. the less remote by the Pres. Subj. Compare for the corresponding use of the Subj. and Opt. in Greek, Jelf § 800, Arnold on Thuc. iii 22, p. 370.

talia imbecilla: Seneca De Ira i 20 ira muliebre maxime et puerile vitium est, Juv. xiii 190 with Mayor’s n.
si nihil—erat dictum: ‘if we had had no other aim beyond that of piety in worship and freedom from superstition, we might have ended here’. On the Ind. in apodosis see § 19 longum est, n.

cum aeterna esset: we need not (with Draeg. § 151. 3) explain the Imperf. as attracted to the tense of the principal verb (colere). It expresses a consideration belonging to and contemporaneous with the supposed action (colere) and carefully to be distinguished from the new consideration with which we are now occupied (anquirit animus below).

habet venerationem: Nägels. Stil. § 95 quotes this as an example of the way in which the Romans supplied the absence of a Pass., and compares Orat. iii 11, Phil. i 7, Marcell. 26. [cf. αἰσθημα παρέχειν which is the regular passive of αἰσθάνεσθαι. J. S. R.] Sch. in his note cites other phrases in which habeo has the same force, e.g. lactitiam, sper, timorem habeo ‘to inspiri’, like the Gr. ἔχειν=παρέχειν. On the grounds of the Epicurean worship cf. §§ 56 and 116, and Philod. 128 προσεύχεσθαι γὰρ ἐν τῷ περὶ θεὸν φρεα, ὑπὲρ ὀς λυπομένων τῶν θεῶν εἰ μὴ πούσομεν, ἄλλα κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν υπερβαλλόντων (προετάν, quae, quidem excellit, praestantissima natura § 47, naturam excellentem § 56) δυνάμει καὶ στοιχεῖα τοῖς φύσεων. Defective as was the Epicurean conception of God, it was so far right that they could see in Him an ideal perfection worthy of the reverence and imitation of men, see Zeller, Stoics tr. p. 439, Philod. p. 148.

metus a vi: cf. § 42 concubitus cum genere. Allen quotes Liv. xxiii 15 metas a practore, where see Weissenborn, also Malv. § 298. 2, on verbal substantives followed by prepositions. The verbs timeo and meteo are used absolutely with ab.

quibus impedere: on the Inf. with relative in Orat. Obl. see n. on § 12 ex quo exsistit.

vitae actionem mentisque agitacionem: Beier’s correction for vitam et actionem mentis atque agitacionem, see his n. on Off. i 17 and compare actio vitae in § 103, and Div. ii 89; see too Sch. Opusc. iii 315 and 363 and my n. on § 2.

Ch. xviii. § 46. admonet: ‘gives a hint’.

speciem humanam deorum: see Cotta’s criticisms § 77 foll.

occurrat. For exx. of such appearances see Or. Met. viii 626 foll., Liv. xxi 62, xxiv 10, Dion. Hal. A. R. ii 68, Nägelsb. N. Theol. p. 2, and mm. on Acts xiv 11. Celsus op. Or. vii 35 says that in the sanctuaries of Amphiaras, Mopsus, and Trophonius ἄνθρωποι ἔστωσιν θεοὺς, οὗ περιόμενος ἄλλα καὶ ἑνάργειας, and (iii 24) that there were many living in his time to whom Aselepius had appeared, and granted healing; again (viii 45) ‘all life is full of such divine manifestations’. Cf. also § 36, II 6 saepe voces excuditae, saepe visce formae deorum, 166, and Luc. v 1161 none quas causa demum per magnum numina gentes peruvlarit et aratum complecterit urbes, ...non est difficile est rationem reddere verbis, quippe demum jam tum divum mortuæ suæ vel egresias animo favere vigilantem videbant et magis in somnis mirando corporis actu | fol]. This
is an explanation of the belief of the vulgar, the absurdities of which are shortly after pointed out: how far Lucretius himself allowed evidential weight to these visions is not clear. In 46 foll. he gives as his reason for discussing the nature of the images (simulacra) the fact that they take the shape of the dead and cause terror by presenting themselves to us both awake and asleep, ne forte animas Acheruntae reamur | effugere aut umbras inter vivos volitare |, and in 722 foll. he shows how such simulacra may arise spontaneously in the air. It seems therefore that these images can only be trusted in so far as they are supported by abstract reasoning. Compare also Sext. Emp. Math. ix 25 (quoted by Munro) 'Επίκουρος δέ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς ὑπνοὺς φαντασίων ἔσται τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐννοιαν ἐσπακέναι θεοῦ· μεγάλων γὰρ εἰδώλων, φησί, καὶ ἀνθρωπομορφῶν κατὰ τοὺς ὑπνοὺς προσκυντῶν ὑπέλαβον καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ὑπάρχειν τινάς τουούτος θεοὺς ἀνθρωπομορφοῦς. The Stoic Balbus is in agreement with Epic. on this point; and Aristotle (quoted by Sextus l. c.) made these appearances one of the two causes to which he traces the origin of religion, ἀπὸ δυσοὶ ἄρχων ἐννοιας θεῶν εἰσερχεῖται, ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν συμβαίνοντος καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετέωρων, the former owing to theos ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοις γεγομένων ταύτης ἑκονωσισμοῦ καὶ τῶν μαντείας· ὅταν γάρ, φησίν, ἐν τῷ ὑπνοιῶ καθ’ ἐαυτὴν γένεται ἡ ψυχή, τόσο τὴν ἰδίαν ἀπολαβοῦσα φύσιν it exercises a prophetic power, just as Homer tells us it does at the moment of death; ἐκ τούτων οὖν ὑπένοησαν οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ εἰσαὶ τι θεῶν τὸ καθ’ ἐαυτὸν ἱοικὸς τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πάντων ἐπιστημονικῶς. See H. Spencer Principles of Sociology ch. x and Taylor quoted below.

primas notiones: answering to natura above. We find the corresponding Greek term used of the πρόληψεις in Diog. L. x 38 ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρόταν ἐννίμα καθ’ ἐκαστὸν φθιγγον βλέπεσθαι καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδείσθαι (if we are to have any standard of reference).

ne omnia—ad primas notiones. The πρόληψεις which arises instinctively from the repeated appearances of Gods is contrasted with the abstract reasons which follow. The Gods must be of human shape, for the most perfect nature must be also the most beautiful, and the human shape is more beautiful than any other; again, happiness cannot exist without virtue, nor virtue without reason, nor reason except in human shape. The former argument is criticized § 77—86, the latter § 87—89.

§ 47. praestantisissimam: ‘we are justified in believing that the most exalted of beings, whether we regard his happiness or his eternity, must be also (aandem) the most beautiful’. It would seem that both here and in § 45 we must explain the causal clauses vel quia and cum et aeterna by a reference to praestans.

figura: the mathematical outline, a matter of fact; species, outward appearance as distinguished from the inner nature; forma (§ 48), the form artistically viewed as symbolizing the inner nature.

vos quidem—divinam: ‘you Stoics at least are wont, in displaying the skill of the divine artificer’, see 11 87 and 134, and for fabr. § 19 n.
modo hoc, modo illud: so (Tusc. v 33) when charged with contradicting what he had said in the De Finibus, C. replies in diem vivimus; quodcumque nostros animos percussit, ille dicitur, itaque soli sumus liberis, cf. Att. xiii 25 O Academiae volatcam ac sui similem, modo hue modo illue, also Div. 1622; and, of the Socratic irony, Lact. 13 qui non tam hoc tam illud, ut in plorhisque, sed idem semper. [Add Ac. ii 121, 134, Tusc. i 40, Att. ii 15, Parad. 14, Div. i 120, ii 145. J. S. R.] For omission of verb, see § 17 n.

§ 48. pulcherrima est: so Madv. Fin. iii 58 in place of the sit of mss, on the ground that quae means quam pulcherrimum esse possi, humanam, not tali ut sit pulcherrima, cf. Sch. Opusc. iii 310.

ratio—hominis figura: cf. καὶ εἰ λογισμὸν οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν ἀληθωρφή δίκαι ὁς ἀνθρώπος, φανερὸν ὡς καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἀνθρωπόμορφον χρῆ καταλείπειν (G) αὐτὸν λογισμὸν τῆς ὑπάστασιν ἐκδ. Vol. Here. vi pt. 2 p. 21 (conjecturally assigned to Metrodorus). Here as elsewhere the Epicurean refused to go beyond his own experience: ἐντὸς τινος μικρον (§ 87) thought apart from a human body, or as it would now be worded, apart from brain.

hominis esse specie. The Gen. is sometimes substituted for the adjective with the AbI of Quality; cf. R. P. ii 26 § 48 (tyrannus) quanquam figura est hominum tamem immaculata vincit belus, Caes. B. G. vi 27 (uir) specie sunt et colori tauri, and Liv. xxii 62 quoted below under nec soliditate. This arg. is criticized in § 89.

§ 49. quasi corpus: like the καίδα of Homer and the ghosts of later times, cf. the interesting chapters on Animism in Tylor’s Primitive Culture esp. vol. i p. 449. The Epicurean Gods are of course material, but they are composed of the finest ethereal atoms, similar to those which constitute the rational soul, and are therefore capable of acting immediately upon it: see the passages quoted in n. on intermündia § 18, and the criticism by Cotta in §§ 71, 75, by Balbus in ii 59. Hirzel (p. 77 foll.) thinks that C. confounded the images which reveal the Gods to us with the actual Gods; and that the latter had more approach to substance than he allows them, as Philodemus (quoted by Zeller Stoics tr. p. 441) speaks of their taking food, and conversing together probably in Greek, cf. also Sch. Opusc. iv 336—339. The subject is discussed below. For the expression cf. Sen. Contr. ii 12 § 11 quasi dissertus es, quasi formansus es, quasi dives es; num tantum es non quasi, vappa (quoted in Roby § 1583), Pl. Stich. 552 foll., Plin. Ep. viii 16 quasi testimonia, quasi cicitas, and the legal fictions quasi possüx, quasi papen &c.

Ch. xix. quivis = διὸ τεχνῆ, ‘every one’.
agnoscere: ‘to feel their force’, Sch. Opusc. iii 315 and 363.
qui viderit: causad relative.
sic tractet ut manu: so R. P. i 115 (of Panactius) qui quae viv conjectura quidam sint possmus suspiciari, sic adhíram ut oculis ex cernere videatur aut tractare plane manu; Brut. 277 cum indicia mortis se compersisse et manu
tenere diceret. Lucretius speaks in equally high terms of his master's speculations, I 74 omne immensum peragravit mente animoque foll.

doctet eam esse vim—aeterna. This extremely difficult passage has been discussed by many writers, esp. by Sch. Opusc. III 315, and Neue Jahrb. for 1875 pp. 687—691, as well as in the notes and app. to his ed.; but the first to give a satisfactory explanation of the whole was Hirzel in his Untersuchungen pp. 46—90. He translates as follows (p. 68): 'Epikur lehrt die Natur der Götter sei der Art, dass sie erstens nicht mit den Sinnen, sondern nur mit dem Geiste erfasst wird, und dass sie ausserdem weder Solidität noch individuelle Identität besitzt, wie die sogenannten ἕτερέμων; vielmehr gelangten wir zur Erkenntnis des Göttlichen (denn das besagen die Worte quae sit et beata natura et aeterna) durch Bilder, die wir wahrnehmen.' &c. I had long taken the same view of the construction of capere, and of the needlessness of Sch.'s emendations cernantur, cumque, beatae natureae. The clue to the right interpretation is to be found (1) in § 105, where the account here given is criticized by Cotta, and (2) in Diog. L. x 139 ἐν ἄλλωσ δέ φησι τού ὁμοίων λόγῳ θεωρητοῦ, οὐς μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστώτας, οὐς δὲ καθ' ὁμοιότητας ἐκ τῆς συνεχείας ἔπροσέχος τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτελεσμένοις ἀνθρωποειδῶς. Philodemus seems to have treated of the subject in his περί εἰσεθείαις, but unfortunately the passages relating to it are too corrupt to afford much help. See p. 110 δύναται γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ομοιότητας (similitudine) ὑπάρχουσα (ἰδιότης) διαισθησών ἥξειν τὴν τελείαν εὐθανομίαν, ἐπειδὴ πρὶν ἡττὸν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἦ τῶν ὁμοίων στοιχείων ἐνόητες ἀποτελεῖσθαι δύναται. Gomperz despair of the passage (see his n. 'dieser mir zum kleinsten Theil verständlichen Columnne') but it would appear to be a comparison between our ordinary modes of perception and the mode in which we arrive at a consciousness of deity; just as in the next page it is said 'if opponents charge Epicurus with denying the existence of the Gods, why might they not on the same ground charge him with denying the existence of horses and men, καὶ πάνθι ἀπλῶς τὰ κατὰ μέρος αἰσθητὰ τε καὶ νοητὰ φύσεων εἴδη;' The same subject is discussed in pp. 132—138, but only occasional phrases are legible, as τὴν κατ' ἀριθμοὺς σύγκρισιν (C.'s ad numerum) in pp. 134 and 138, μήτε γὰρ ἀτόμων νομίζειν τοὺς θεοὺς μήτε συνβείν τὸν π. 136, apparently an exhaustive argument to prove the atheism of Ep. 'his Gods are neither atoms nor compounds of atoms, and what other entities are admitted by him?'

non sensu sed mente cernatur: cf. Lucretius quoted on quasi corpus, and § 105 speciem dei percipi cogitatione non sensu. Sch. points out that while L. speaks of the tenuis natura and Cotta of the species, both referring only to the fine etherial body of the Gods, Vell. speaks more generally of vis et natura. This is because he is about to refer, not merely to the

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1 He calls it locum omnium difficillimum cujus certum omnibusque numeris absolutam interpretationem vix quisquam, ego eอรne hoc tempore proponere non possum.
immediate sensuous impression produced on the mind when its fine atoms are struck by the cognate atoms which constitute the divine imagines, atoms which pass unperceived through the coarser sieve of the bodily senses, but also to the conception of blessedness and immortality to which the mind attains by reflecting upon the impressions it has received. It is the latter process which is properly expressed by cogitatio.

nec soliditate—appellat. At first sight it seems natural to take sol. as an abl. of cause after cernatur; and so Sch. explains it by a reference to the distinction between the imagines thrown off from solid bodies (the στερέμμα), which imagines are described in Diog. L. x 46 as ἀπόφρονα τὴν ἔξοδον θέαν καὶ τάξιν διαφορότας, ἵππον καὶ ἐν τούς στερέμμασι εἶχον, and a finer class of imagines which reveal to us the shadowy form of the Gods. The expression would not be quite accurate, for even the finest images must in the end consist of atoms (since all that exists is summed up under atoms and void, according to Epic.) and soliditas is essential to atoms of every kind; still in popular language (quodam=ut ita dicam) it might be said that the images perceived by the bodily senses were perceived in virtue of a massiveness which was not shared by the images which were perceptible by the mind alone. The objections to this interpretation are (1) that it really adds nothing to what has been already said in the previous clause, though apparently contrasted with it by the word primum, (2) that it is difficult to connect it with what follows, (3) that it is inconsistent with the words of § 105 nec esse in ea (specie) ullam soliditatem, neque candem ad numerum permanere, in which the absence of soliditas is predicated of the divine form itself, not of the image, as distinguished from the form, in virtue of which negative property the image is perceived in a particular way. Accordingly Peter (Commentatio de N. D. Saarbrücken 1861) and Hirzel take soliditate quodam as a predicative Abl. of quality, of which the former cites several exx. (N. D. i 12 veris fulsit audentia tanta similis- dinis, 28 continentc ardore lucis orbem, 81 reliquis deos ea facie novimus, 84 his vocabulis esse deos factumus, 107 imagines ea forma, Liv. xxii 62 in agro Aniterno multis locis hominem specie procul candida vestis visos nec cum ullo congressos, where there is the same accumulation of ablatives as here) and further illustrates by the following parallel in somnis mihi oblatae est imago leonis, ut non oculis sed mente cornertur, neque ingenti corporis magnitudine neque densa juba, sed ferocitate oculorum splendore prodita. Taking soliditate thus as referring to the substance of the deity which has nihil conoceti, nihil solidi in it (§ 75), it is opposed to the previous clause which referred to the mode in which that substance was perceived. It cannot be denied that there is something very harsh in the construction of such an Abl. with cernatur, and I think it possible that sit may have been lost after numerum before ut. The term στερέμματος occurs repeatedly in the fragments of Epic. περὶ φύσεως and in his Epistle to Herodotus preserved in Diog. L. x.

We come now to the more difficult ad numerum, which must evidently
be explained from the fuller expression in the parallel passage *neque eandem ad numerum permanere*, and this again, as Hirzel shows p. 55, is a translation of the Greek ταυτὸν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν διαμένει ‘remains numerically and identically the same’, ἐν or ταυτὸν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν being distinguished from ἐν or ταυτὸν κατ’ ἐίδος ‘the same in kind’; see Arist. *Met.* iv p. 1016 b, π p. 999 b, *Categ.* i 2 with Waitz’s n., Themist. *ad Nat. Quaest.* iv 9, and Whately’s *Logic App.* (on the ambiguity of the word ‘same’). But will κατ’ ἀριθμὸν carry this meaning by itself? For proof of this Hirzel refers to Bonitz’s Index Aristotelicus s. v. ἀριθμὸς, see particularly *Anal. Post.* i c. 5, p. 74 where the phrase κατ’ ἀριθμὸν is used of argument which applies only to a single individual triangle, as opposed to proper geometrical reasoning which deals with the triangle, *qua* triangle, universally. Similarly we have κατ’ ἀριθμὸν υφεστῶρας in the passage already quoted from Diog. L. It is impossible however to suppose that *ad numerum* standing alone could convey this meaning to a Roman; and though it is conceivable that C. may have put an unmeaning phrase into the mouth of the Epicurean advocate, it seems hardly credible that he should, without remark, have supplied the interpretation afterwards through the mouth of the Academic critic. I believe therefore that *eadem* has been lost between *neque* and *ad*, and that the true reading is *neque eadem ad numerum sit*. I postpone to the end of the paragraph the question, how we are to conceive of Gods not possessed of personal identity or individual existence. *Soliditate cannot possibly be an abl. of quality. Soliditate quadam might be taken as such with esse or a substantive, but not with a verb like cernatur. Why not treat it as abl. of cause, (cf. § 105 similitudine cernatur) translating ‘so that it is not perceived by sense or by mind, nor in consequence of any sort of solidity which it possesses, nor numerically, i.e. individually’? A causal abl. gives indirectly what is wanted, a description of the object which is the source of the cause. R.]*

**sed—intelligentiam capere:** the construction is made to depend immediately upon *docet* instead of being subordinated to *ut*. *Sed* contrasts the following positive with the previous negative description of the divine nature.

**imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis:** the sense must be ascertained by a comparison of the parallel passages, § 105 eamque esse ejus visionem ut similitudine et transitione cernatur, § 109 fluentium frequenter transitio fit visionum ut e multis una videatur, and shortly after innumerabilias suppedi tat atomorum; *Diog. L. l.c. οὐ δὲ (σκ. θεοῦ) καθ’ ὁμο- ἔιδιαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιρήμασις τῶν ὁμοίων ἑιδῶν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτελεσ- μένων ἀνθρωποειδῶς; Lucr. v 1175 (men attributed to the Gods) aeternam vitam quia semper eorum | suppedi tabatur facies et forma manebat |. Com-

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1 A. Beeker (*Comm. Crit.* 1865) gives a careful analysis of the passage and strongly condemns Sch.’s interpretation. He proposes to add *permanere* (of which he thinks *primum* a corruption) after *numerum*. Few will follow him in this.
pare also the very similar language used of perception and images generally, Diog. L. x 48 μένις ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων τοῦ ἐπιτολής συνεχής συμβαίνει οὐκ ἐπίδρας αἰσθήσει διὰ τὴν ἀνταναπηλῆρωσιν, Lucr. iv 26 foll. esp. 87 'outlines of shapes flit about so exquisitely fine as each by itself to be invisible', 104, 256 'the things themselves are seen, though the images which strike the eye are invisible', 190 'the images succeed one another like the rays of light', suppeditatus enim confestim lumine lumen, 714 (accounting for the movements of shapes seen in dreams) 'so great is the velocity, so great the supply of things', tantaque sensibili quoque est tempore in uno | copia particularum at posit suppeditata; and see the passages quoted from Philodemus under doct eam esse vim. From these it would appear that the phrase must mean 'when the images have become perceptible through their mutual similarity and their uninterrupted succession'. Any one image would be too fine to attract the attention, but the repetition of similar images ever streaming onwards, produces on the mind the impression of one unchanging object. A familiar illustration would be the rainbow, or the wheel of fire produced by rapidly whirling round a burning stick. I agree with Hirzel in rejecting Sch.'s explanation of similitudo as referring to the likeness between the images and the mind on which they impinge; on the other hand transitio, lit. 'the passing before the eyes' (as in Ovid Rem. Am. 615 multaque corporibus transitione nocent) appears to me to be a translation of the Gr. φάρα, not (as Hirzel takes it) of ἀνταναπηλῆρωσι which is rather suppeditatio. There is a slight inaccuracy here in the use of trans., it is applied as though by an ab extra spectator to a stream of images, not passing before, but coming full into the eyes or the mind.

cum infinita—affluat. Hirzel and G. F. Müller have adopted Brieger's emendation series, which certainly reads more easily with infinita. On the other hand species is the technical term to denote the mental impression produced by the imagines (cf. § 107 fæc imagines esse...species dantaxat objectur; Div. iii 137 nulla species cognitari potest nisi pulsus imaginum; Fast. 43 visum objectum imprimit et quasi signat in animo suam speciem) so that I should have been inclined to keep the old reading, translating 'there rises up a never-ending impression of exactly similar images produced from countless atoms', were it not for the following affluat, which is very suitably used of the series imaginum flowing in upon the mind (cf. Div. l. c.), but less suitably of the species which springs up within the mind itself as a result of the inflowing imagines. Still we have fluentium visionum § 109 where see n.

ex individualis: so § 110 effigies ex individualis corporibus oritur. The images were composed either of the surface atoms of the στρέψιον (Lucr. iv 67 presciret in saevis corpora rebus | multa minuta jaci quae possint ordine codem | quo fuerint et formaere figuram) or of loose atoms floating about in the air (Lucr. iv 129 foll.). Zeller (Eng. tr. p. 443) strangely translates 'pictures emanating from innumerable divine individuals' (göttlichen Individuen in the original).
ad nos: the mss read ad deos which makes no sense; possibly it is due to a comparison of § 114; nor is Manutius' a deo, though supported by the quotation in Augustine Ep. 118, suitable after ex individuis; we want the terminus ad quem, that a quo being already supplied.

mentem intentam infixa
tamque. The independent action of the mind is needed (1) to distinguish particular images; so Lucretius iv 802, explaining how it is that the mind only perceives a small part of the images which throng to it from all sides, quia tenuia sunt, nisi quae contendit, acute | cernere non potis est animus; proinde omnia quae sunt | praeterea percutit, nisi si quae ad se ipsae paravit; (2) to interpret them by meditation (ἐπιβολή Epic. in Diog. L. x 62, lit. 'throwing oneself upon them', as in § 54 se injiciens animus et intentus, Lucr. ii 740 animi injectus and 1047 with Munro's notes). Hence the expressions already discussed cogitatione percipi, λόγῳ θεωρητούς.

intelle
gentiam capere—aeterna: 'comes to understand what that being is which possesses the divine attributes of blessedness and eternity', cf. § 96 praestantissima natura, eaque beata et aeterna, quae sola divina natura est, § 105 beatam illam naturam et sempiternam putet.

To treat now of the whole passage together, it may be thus translated, 'Epicurus teaches that the essential nature of the Gods is such as, in the first place, to be perceptible by the mind alone, not by the external senses; and in the next place, to be without the solidity, so to call it, and the individuality belonging to those bodies to which he gives the name of στερίμμα on account of their hardness: but (his account is) that through the perception of a long train of similar images, when an endless succession of such images forms itself out of countless atoms and streams towards us, then our mind intent and fastened upon these images apprehends with rapture the idea of a blessed and eternal being'. Comparing this with the parallel passage from Diog. L. we shall see that, supposing the latter to be correct, C. here confines his attention to the second class of Gods there mentioned, i.e. Gods who exist for us in

1 A writer in the Rev. de Philologie for 1877, p. 264 keeps the reading ad deos and explains as follows. The atoms fly together 'vers le point où ils constituent eux-mêmes par leur passage continue l'existence des dieux...Les images qui se détachent sans cesse des dieux, après avoir formé un instant les dieux eux-mêmes, sont bien celles qui se rendent ensuite vers nous, et qui nous font connaître.'

2 Sch. altogether objects to the supposition of there being two classes of Epicurean gods, and would accordingly change ὧς μὲν, ὡς δὲ, reading ὧς μὲν (Gassendi's unsatisfactory suggestion) καὶ ἁρμίνοι ὕφεστες, γνωστοῖς δὲ καθ' ὑμεῖς ἐν τῇ συνήχειᾳ ἐπιφάνειᾳ κ.τ.λ. I see no reason for doubting the genuineness of the passage. It simply asserts in definite terms the conclusion which an attentive consideration of C.'s language forces on the reader, viz. that there were two distinct systems of theology recognized in the Epicurean school, one of a more esoteric nature, taken mainly from their great authority Democritus, the other more suited to the popular belief; which two systems have been not unnaturally confounded together by C.
virtue of a continuous stream of images combining to produce in us the impression of a human form. Such a description suits fairly with the account given of Democritus' theology (V. D. i 120) according to which the Gods are nothing more than combinations of ethereal atoms floating about as imagnes; but it is difficult to see how it could be reconciled with the ordinary account of Epicurus' innumerable Gods of the intermundia, far removed from the sphere of those atomic storms which are ever making and unmaking the surrounding worlds. If the imagnes which appear to men are composed of atoms thrown off from the Gods of the intermundia, why may not atoms find their way back again from our world to them, as in fact is asserted by Cotta § 114? How can beings which have no soliditas be continually throwing off those myriad atoms of which the images are formed, especially when we consider the vast distance of the intermundia from the earth, and reflect that, radiation being equal in all directions, there must be the same crowding of divine images at every point of this immense circumference? Again, if the Gods have no separate individuality, how are they capable of conversing together and exhibiting an ideal of the philosophic life, as Philodemus asserted? And how are such Gods in any degree truer to the popular conception than the δέπας καὶ πνεύμαρα which Philodemus charges the Stoics with worshipping (p. 84 foll.)? See Munro on Lucr. v 152. Assuming then, as we apparently may, that either Epicurus himself or some of his followers acknowledged a divinity of a more spiritual type, distinct from those of the intermundia, there is much in the description which is curiously suggestive of a theology with which we are familiar in the present day. When people understand by the name God 'a stream of tendency which makes for righteousness', or in other words, a predominating character in the events of life and the phenomena of the universe which answers to and calls out in us an ideal of goodness (and why not also which answers to and calls out our ideals of beauty and of wisdom?) they do not at first ascribe to God personality or numerical identity, but as they meditate on the impressions which they receive, they become gradually conscious of a unity, shaping itself, for some at least, αἰθητωνοεδοτι, into a human form, in which they recognize the features of the judge, the ruler, the father. Some such idealistic interpretation of the physical formularies of his school was certainly not more difficult to a religious Epicurean than the spiritualization of the myths was to a Stoic, and however far removed from ordinary Epicurean belief, it is not altogether inconsistent with some of the citations from Philodemus given under quod beantum § 45.

§ 50. summa vis infinitatis: suggested by the use of infinita just before. On the way in which Ep. connected the idea of infinity with the distribution of life, see Lucr. ii 522 foll., where he argues that the deficiency of animals, e.g. elephants, in one country is made up for by their excess in another, and that for the generation of any particular kind of animal it was necessary that there should have been an infinity of the atoms which
were capable of producing it by their union; otherwise they could never have met together in the infinitude of space: and since all infinites are equal according to Ep. (no doubt one of the points alluded to in the phrase *magna contemplatione dignissima*) it follows (I. 569 foll.) that the different kinds of atoms are equal in number, and that the elements of production and destruction wage an equal war (Lucr. v 392). Munro finds a further allusion to the law of *isovonia* in vi 542; see his notes, and Hirzel 85—90.

_eam esse naturam—respondeant_: 'such is the constitution of the infinite whole that all its parts are exactly balanced one against the other'. On the repetition of words in distributive phrases see Beier Off. i 53.

_aequabilem tributionem_: 'equal distribution', a very rare meaning of *tributio*. [It is meant to be a literal translation of *isovonia*. R.] See the Academic criticism in § 109, where *aequilibritas* is used to translate *isovonia*. C. is the only authority who formally attributes this doctrine to Ep.; the word is used by Plut. Def. Or. 34 κεπρ οὖν η φύσις ἀπατεῖ τὴν ἰσονομίαν ἐν πάσι, and the equilibrium of positive and negative forces is often referred to in the early philosophers, as Heraclitus and Empedocles; cf. too Plato Theaet. 176 on the necessary existence of an opposite to good, and Pseudo-Arist. De Mundo c. 5, Herac. Alleg. 444, Orig. c. Cels. iv 63 (quoted by Sch.) on the necessary equipoise of the four elements.

_quae interimant—quae conservent_: this is not to be understood of substances or persons, but, as Lucr. π 569 more accurately expresses it, of movements; *nec superare quem motus itaque exitialis | perpetuo necque in aeternum sepelire salutem | nec porro rerum genitalis actuificique | motus perpetuo possunt servare creata*. Since on the whole the destructive and conservative forces are equal, and since the destructive prevail here, there must be elsewhere a region where the conservative forces prevail, and what can this be but the *intermundia*? And, since mortals and immortals are equally balanced, and here experience shows that all is mortal, where can we find these immortal beings but in the Gods? In π 1105 foll. Lucr. describes how a world gradually grows up under the shaping blows of the atoms, and then how, when it has once attained maturity, the destructive movements gain the upper hand, the constituent atoms fly apart, the external blows no longer weld the mass together, but break it down in ruin, a process of which, he says, we may already see the beginning in our earth. It is unkind to touch the card-castle of the Epicurean philosophy, or one might be disposed to ask why there might not be sufficient employment for the conservative forces in the constant building up of new worlds as the old ones perish, without finding a special seat for them in the *intermundia*; and how these *aktuifici motus* are to show themselves in a place sacred from the intrusion of atoms.

_et quaerere_: proceeding to a new topic 'and then', so § 100 et eos vituperabas.
Balbe, soletis: 'your school B. are accustomed'. Sch. compares De Orat. 1 160 quid est? Cotta, quid tacitis? On the general question of the mixture of Sing. and Pl. see below, deorum and iis followed by agit, and so frequently in speaking of the Gods, e.g., § 101 deorum—habet, 106, 114 (recent—cogitaret), cf. 31 n. Madv. Fin. II 22: Davies in loc. gives illustrations from the Greek.

quaé degatur aetas: 'how they spend their days'.

§ 51. nihil agit. See Cotta's answer to this §§ 110, 114, 116, also Seneca Benef. IV 4 quae maxima Epicuro felicitas videtur, nihil agit, Diog. L. x 97 η θεία φύσις πρός τάτα μηδαμή προσαγέσθω ἄλλ' ἀλειτόνγρητος (vacatione munerae below) διατηρεῖσθω καὶ ἐν πάσῃ μακαρίᾳ. That the divine happiness consisted in self-contemplation was asserted by Aristotle Met. xii 1072 b. see n. on § 33. In accordance with this belief the wise man of Epicurus withdrew as far as possible from public life (Zeller Stoics p. 463).


exploratum habet: cf. § 1 n., Draeger § 143, Roby § 1402.

Ch. xx. § 52. sive enim—celeritate: see § 24 n. and the Stoic answer II 50.
	nisi quietum nihil beatum: Ep. held that happiness consisted mainly in ἀραπάσια. Cf. § 24 mens constans et vita beata.

in ipso mundo. According to the natural order this clause should have preceded its correlative, sive mundus deus est; it would then certainly not have had the ipsa, and the force of ipsa in the related clause would have been clearer. As it is, C. has carelessly repeated the emphatic pronoun, which has no meaning here, though there seems no reason for doubting its genuineness, as Sch. has done.

mutationes temporum: cf. § 4 n.

vicissitudines ordinesque: 'hendiadys=vic. ordinatus', Sch.

ne ille est implicatus. Cf. II 1 ne ego incutus. In Cicero's writings ne is always followed immediately by a pronoun, and it usually occurs in the apodosis of a conditional or quasi conditional sentence. [I think that the rule about the pronoun holds good for Latin prose generally. The two passages of Livy formerly quoted for the absence of the pronoun, xxvi 31, xxxiv 4, have both been altered by Weissenborn. The rule as to the conditional has many exceptions, e.g. Att. IV 4 b ne tu emisti, cf. Fleckesi en in Philol. II 61—130. J. S. R.]

§ 53. beatam vitam in animi securitate: Fin. v 23 Democriti securitas, quae est animi tamquam tranquillitas, quam appellavit εὐδαιμιαν... ea ipsa est beata vita.

natura: not in the Stoic sense, but as used by Strato § 35, of a blind force, cf. Lucr. I 1021 foll.

fabrica: see § 19 n. Off. I 126 principio corporis nostri magnum natura ipsa videtur habuisse rationem;...hanc naturae tam diligentem fabricam
imitata est hominum verocundia. It is what the Stoic means by his periphrasis *vim quandam incredibilem artifiosi* operis π. 138.

**innumerables mundos:** Diog. x 45 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ κόσμῳ ἀπειροὶ εἰσίν, εἰδ' ὄρους τούτῳ εἰς ἀνώμοιοι αἱ τε γὰρ ἄτομοι ἀπειροὶ οὐδαί φέρονται πολύτατα, οὐ γὰρ κατηνάλωσιν αἱ τοιαῦτα ἄτομοι εἰς ἀν γένοιτο κόσμος . . . οὔτε εἰς ἕνα οὖτε εἰς πεπερασμένους . . . οὔτε οὐδὲν τὸ ἐμποδίζου ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν κόσμων.

**ut tragici poetae:** copied from Plato Crat. 425 D ὅπερ οἱ τραγῳδοποιοὶ, ἔπειτα τί ἀπορώσοντι, ἐπὶ τὰς μηχανὰς καταφεύγοντι, θεοῦς αἴροντες. So Arist. Met. i 4 p. 985 b Ἀναξαγόρας μηχανῇ χρητι τῇ νῷ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποίαν, καί ὅταν ἀπορίσῃ διὰ τίνις· ἀρχὰν εἰς αὐξήκης ἐστὶ, τότε παρέλκει αὐτὸν, cf. Orelli on Hor. A. P. 191 and Erasmus Adag. on deus ex machina. 'This device was so abused by Euripides that, in nine out of his eighteen tragedies, a divinity descends to unravel the complicated knot', Schlegel Dram. Lit.

**explicare—exitum:** 'to disentangle the issue of the plot' 'bring about the final development', so fabulae exitus, Cad. 65; cf. the δέσις and λύσις of Aristotde, Poet. c. 18.

**potestis:** possunt would be more correct, but C. compresses into one the clause of comparison and the principal clause, by the attraction of the verb of the former into the construction of the latter: the converse attraction is more common in Greek, esp. with οὐχ ὅπερ. In this way a simile passes into a metaphor, as in Hor. Ep. i 10. 42 quoted by Sch.; cf. too Ep. i 1. 2; 2. 42; 7. 74.

§ 54. **non desideraretis:** 'you would not have missed' 'felt to be needed'.

**se injiciens:** see n. on mentem intellectual § 49.

**ita—ut:** restrictive force, 'however far it wanders, is still unable to reach the end.' Cf. Zumpt § 726, Roby § 1704, and my n. on ita si § 3, and ita multa § 4, and the exx. in Sch.'s n. here.

**nullam oram ultimis:** 'no limit of furthest'; Gen. of Definition, sometimes called Expegetic. Sch. compares fines montium 'the boundary formed by the mountains': see Mayor's Second Philippic, index s.v. genitive, Roby § 1302, Draeger § 202. For the thought compare Lucr. i 958 foll., esp. 950 oras ubicunque locaris | extremas, quae auri quid telo denique fiat. | Fiat uti susquam possit consistere finis | effugiumque fugae prolatae copia semper; | also l. 72 and Fin. π. 102.

**vis atomorum:** so v. serpentium § 101, v. auri Tuscan 91, v. ranunculorum Fam. vii 18, v. lacrimarum Rep. vi 14. Cf. the Irishism 'a power of', and the Fr. 'force'.

**follibus et incudibus:** belonging to a fabrica, cf. § 19.

**itaque:** 'by your notions of a creation'.

**imposuumis in cervicibus:** see Zumpt § 490 on the compounds of pono, Draeg. § 298 a and c, and my nn. on § 29 in deorum numero referunt, and § 45 insculpitis in cervicibus.

**timeremus:** on the Imperf. Subj. used after the true Perf. see Zumpt.
§ 514 and my notes on § 3 fuerunt qui censerent, and § 8 profeceris—
vinceremur.

quis non timeat : cf. Acad. II 121 (of Strato who explained the origin of the world from natural causes) ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore. Quis enim potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noxest divinum numen horrere et, si quid adversi acciderit—quod cu non accidit? extimescere ne id jure evenerit? To remove this fear was the professed object of the Epicurean philosophy, as Ep. himself says in Diog. L. x 112 et, nves ait perit, tum meteöra, perm. υποψίαι, honcé, videat in ait tradat, oux òν προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας. Cf. Lucr. I 62 foll., II 1090, III 15, v 1194, vi 35 foll., Virg. Geo. II 490, Mart. Ep. iv 21.

curiosum et plenum negotii deum : a busy prying god'. According to the Epicureans the government of the world was both too small and too great a thing for God, see Lucr. II 1095 foll. quis regere immensi sum- mam, quis habere profundi: indu manu validas potis est moderator habe- nas, quis pariter caelos omnis convertore? vii 68 quaes (i.e. the idea of special providence) nisi respuis ex animo longaque remittis? dis indigna putare alienaque pacis eorum, delibata deum per te tibi numina sancta | saepe obruent, and compare Div. II 105 negant id esse alienum majestate deorum. Seilicium causas omnium introspicere, ut videant quid cuique con- duct, and § 129 deoesse immortales, rerum omnium praeestantia excellentes, concursare circum omnium mortalium non modo lectos, verum etiam grabatos, et cum stertentem aliquem viderint, objicere iis visua quae ausa torta et obscura? Plin. N. H. ii 5 irredendum vero agere eorum rerum humanarum illud quidquid est summum. Anne tam tristi atque multiplivi ministerio non pollui credamus dubitemusve?

§ 55. hinc vobis exstitit. 'The Stoic doctrine of necessity was the direct consequence of the Stoic pantheism. The divine force, which governs the world, could not be the absolute uniting cause of all things, if there existed anything in any sense independent of it,' Zeller Stoics tr. p. 166. Fate is nothing but the will of God, which reveals itself as the reason and law of the universe, cf. § 40 n.

primum : taken up by sequitur more below.

ut dicatis : depending upon and explaining dicitis 'in the sense that'.

aeterna veritate. That which is fated always has, is, and will be true, see Aristocles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xv 14 τὴν δὲ τοῦτον (things past, present and future) ἐπιπλοκῶν καὶ ἀκολουθίαν καὶ εἰμαρμέρην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀδιάβροχαιν καὶ νόμον ἑνώ τῶν δυνών ἀδιάδραστον τινα καὶ ἀφικτον, Stob. Ecl. i 180, Cic. De Fato 17, 29, 37.


aniculis : the stock example of credulity and superstition both among Romans (§ 94, i 5, Div. i 36, 141, Tusc. i 48; anialis N. D. i 70, iii 12,
92, Div. i 7, ii 19) and Greeks (Plato Theae. 176 β δέ λέγομενος γραών θειος, Gorg. 527, Wetstein on 1 Tim. iv 7 γραφεὶς μὴ δούνων). In the treatise De Fato C. gives the academic argument against necessity, agreeing so far with Epic., but he strongly condemns the doctrine of the declinatio atomorum by which the latter endeavoured to disprove necessity, N. D. i 69, 73, Fato. 22.

**haec cui videantur:** 'such a philosophy as this which holds'

**sequitur:** opp. to exstitit primum.

**qua tanta—colendi:** 'through which, if we had been willing to listen to you, we should have been so infected with superstition that we should have had to pay regard to soothsayers, augurs, fortune-tellers, seers, interpreters of dreams': har. (root ghar. hirae hillae ilia, χόλαξ, cf. Curtius and Vaníček) foretold the future from the appearance of the entrails in sacrifices and from the phenomena of nature; aug. from the appearance and movements of animals, esp. from the flight of birds. These two were regarded as scientific modes of divination, in contradistinction to the unscientific, uttered μανομένων στόματι, such as the Sibylline prophecies, and hariolorum et vatum (on this word see Munro Lucr. i 102) furibundas praedictiones, and dreams, cf. Div. i 3, and Marquardt Röm. Staatsv. iii pp. 90, 393 foll. On the meaning and etymology of the word superstition see ii 72 n.

**si vos audire vellemus.** The Stoics strongly maintained the truth of divination, and urged the fact of its existence as one proof of the existence of the Gods, quorum enim interpretes sunt, eos ipsos esse certe necesse est. C. argues against them in his treatise on the subject.

§ 56. **his terroribus soluti:** see n. on § 54 quis non timeat and Zelll Stoics tr. p. 399. Cotta charges Ep. with imputing his own fears to others, § 86.

**in libertatem vindicati:** 'claimed for freedom', cf. Liv. iii 45 fin.; hence the verb by itself acquired the meaning 'to liberate', and the liberating rod was called vindicta.

**nec sibi fingere:** see n. on § 45.

**naturam excellentem:** so Seneca Benef. iv 19 'Epic. worshipped God propter majestatem ejus eximiam singularemque naturam'. See n. on § 45 habet venerationem.

**incohatar:** 'incomplete'. In the Past Part. the verb always has a negative force, 'commenced, but no more than commenced'.

**dicendi ratio habenda fuit:** 'it was my business to hear rather than to speak'.
C. Academic Criticism of the Epicurean Theology,
Ch. xxi § 57—Ch. xlv § 124.

a. Preface. Cotta, while expressing his belief in the existence of
the Gods, refuses to make any positive assertion as to their nature, but
altogether dissents from the Epicurean view. §§ 57—61.

atqui: 'nay'.

nisi dixisses—potuisses: quoted in P. S. Gr.¹ p. 472 as an ex. of the
Subj. of possum in apodosis where the ability to perform the action is
strictly conditioned, and cannot be viewed absolutely, as in the passages
cited in my n. on § 19 longum est. [There is a good ex. of the Subj. in
Quintil. v 11 § 29. R.]

roges—respondeam: 'should you ask me, I should reply'. On the
use of the hypothetical protasis without relative or conjunction see Roby
§ 1552. So just below quaeras—dixam, roges—utter.

aggregiar ad ea: so in iii 7 agg. ad disputationem.

§ 58. familiari illo tuo. Some mss insert L. Crasso, but Madv. (Fin.
1q) points out that a Roman orator (who in De Orat. iii 77 foll. is made to
disclaim any special knowledge of philosophy) would be out of place here,
and that it would have been unnecessary to qualify one so well known by
the addition fam. i. t. He further mentions that one ms gives the alternative
de Lucilio, de Crasso. There can be little doubt therefore that he is
right in considering L. Crasso a gloss taken from De Orat. iii 78, where
the speaker Crassus alludes to Velleius as meas familiaris. The person
here referred to is, acc. to Madv. Phaedrus, whom C. had heard in Rome,
cum pueri esse mus Fam. xiii 1, but the conjecture is chiefly founded on the
supposed fact of Phaedrus being the author of the treatise now attributed
to Philodemus. As the latter appears to have resided in Italy for a longer
time than the former, some might prefer to explain the allusion of him.
I doubt however whether C. would have given such a vague reference to
either, and think it more likely that a name has been lost from the text.
Whoever he was, he must probably have been one who held the same
position in the house of Vell. which Diodotus held for more than 20 years
in the house of C., Antiochus in that of Lucullus, Philodemus in that of
Piso.

togatis: does not necessarily imply a Greek speaker (as Madv. l. c.).
In the Rep. i 36 Scipio speaks of himself as unum e togatis.

videor audisse: 'if I am not mistaken I often heard'. On the omis-
sion of mihi after vid. see Zumpt § 380 and Sch. here.

cum te—anteferret = anteferente. For the apparently intransitive use
of audio cf. De Orat. ii 22 ex soecro audivi cum diceret, Parad. 45 multi ex
te audierunt cum diceres; for the use of de, Brut. 100 audivi de majoribus,
and Draeg. § 286. 2; for the postponement of the cum- clause, see Roby
§ 1722, and for its use as a secondary predicate § 1724, also Draeger § 498, who says that it is usually preceded by sæpe, as in Fin. v 54, De Orat. ii 22, 144, 155. [His exx. are confined to C., add Virg. Aen. iii 623 vidi egomet cum frangeret. R.]

sine dubio. On the substantival use of the Neuter Adj. with prep. see Näg. Stil. § 21, Draeg. § 23 foll.

dilucide, copiose. Similar compliments are paid to the speaker in Fin. iv 1, 7, Ac. i 43, ii 63. As Zeno is praised for the same merits below, and is equally censured for asperity in § 93, it has been supposed that C. intended Vell. to represent Zeno.

quam solent vestri: sc. dicere understood from dictum est. Epic. was as contemptuous of the beauties of composition as Bentham, cf. Fin. i 14 orationis ornamenta neglexit; in Brut. 131 Alcubius (mentioned below § 93) is said to have turned out perfectus Epicurus, minusine aptum ad dicendum genus; in Pis. 70 Philodemus is mentioned as litteris, quod fere ceteros Epicureos neglegere dicunt, perpolitus; Tusc. ii 7 (of the Latin Epicureans generally) quos non contemno equidem, quippe quos numquam legerim; sed quia profientur ipsi illi se neque distincte neque distribute neque eleganter neque ornate scribere, lectionem sine ulla delectatione neglego; also Tusc. i 6, iv 6, Fin. i 26, Zeller Stoiks tr. p. 385.

§ 59. Zeuonem: cf. § 93, a native of Sidon born about 150 B.C. Atticus and C. attended his lectures at Athens 78 B.C. (Fin. i 16, Tusc. iii 38). In the latter passage, where he is called acriculus senex istorum acutissimus, C. maintains a particular interpretation of the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure on the strength of his recollection of Z.'s lectures. Philodemus made great use of his writings, see Introduction on the sources of the N. D., and Hirzel p. 27 foll.

coryphaeum. Κορυφαῖος, from κορυφή (itself used metaphorically like vertex and apex), has the general sense of 'a leader' in Herodotus; but in later writers is commonly employed in the narrower sense of 'leader of the chorus' (the ἔξαρχος of older poetry), cf. Donaldson Theatre of the Greeks pp. 29 and 215. From this special meaning the word again passes to a wider metaphorical sense, and is used of philosophers by Plato Theaet. 173c, of Demosthenes by Dion. Hal. Rhet. i 8 (τοῦ τοῦ ἡμεδαποῦ χοροῦ ηγεμόνα τε καὶ κορυφαίον), of St Peter and St Paul by the ecclesiastical writers, cf. Erasmus Adag. pp. 485, 1079, 1497, Suicer s.v. Πέτρος. The Latin form does not seem to occur elsewhere in the Classical writers.

cum Athenis essem. Though C. introduces himself to us at the beginning as an impartial auditor (§ 17) and though at the end (iii 93) he says that his sympathies are more with Balbus than with Cotta, yet it is to the latter that he ascribes his personal experiences both here and in §§ 79, 93. So we learn from Att. xiii 19 that he had some thought of transferring to Cotta his own part in the Academica.

audiebam: 'attended lectures'.

et quidem—Philone: 'and in fact on P.'s own recommendation'.
usu venit: cf. Roby §1238.

bona venia me audies. A wish is here implied by the Fut. Ind. as in the English idiom; cf. Roby §§1589, 1590.

§ 60. maxime in physicis. It will be remembered that this includes theology.

quid non sit—dixerim: cf. Lact. Inst. II 3 falsum intellegere est quidem sapientiae sed hominum: verum autem scire divinae est sapientiae. Ita philosophi quod summum fuit hominum sapientiae assecuti sunt, ut intellegenter quid non sit: illud assequi nequiverunt ut dicerent quid sit.

Ch. XXII. Simonides: the lyric poet of Ceos, B.C. 550—470, one of the illustrious circle (including Pindar, Epicarmus, Aeschylus) whom Hiero tyrant of Syracuse (d. 467 B.C.) attracted to his court. In Xenophon's Hieron Sim. is introduced as conversing with H. on the advantages and disadvantages of tyranny. Some of his gnomic sayings are discussed in Plato's dialogues, e.g. Protag. 339 B, Rep. I 331 E. Minucius (c. 13) reports the story correctly, but Tertullian carelessly assigns the words to Thales in answer to Croesus (Apol. c. 46, Ad Nat. II 2). On the general subject see Arnob. III 19 quidquid de Deo dixeris, quidquid tacitae mentis cogitacionem conceperis, in humanum transitum et corrumpitur sensum...unus est homini intellectus de Dei natura certissimus, si scias et sentias nihil de illo posse mortali oratione depromi; and the ref. in Church's n. on the famous passage of Hooker II 2 'our soundest knowledge is to know that we know him not as indeed he is, neither can know him'; also the catena on Docta Ignorantia in Hamilton's Discussions p. 634 foll. But this assertion that the Cause of all things passes understanding is not (as H. Spencer, for instance, maintains First Principles p. 101) inconsistent with the further assertion that he is possessed of certain attributes. A cause may be unknown in itself, but if we know its effects we can argue back from their qualities to its qualities, with a confidence proportioned to the number and variety of its ascertained effects. A child may be incapable of forming a general estimate of his father's character, but he is not thereby precluded from trusting and loving him as faithful and good. The opposite view leaves men helpless victims to any superstition, agnosticism being merely an exceptional and superficial phase, possible in the study or laboratory, impossible to retain and act upon amid the trials and difficulties of real life.

doctus—traditur: sc. fuisse. On such ellipses cf. Draeger §116, P. S. Gr. p. 346, and Reid's Lael. index under 'ellipse'.


dicit—esset. This apparent exception to the Sequence of Tenses is generally explained on the principle that dicit=dixit, as in § 39 fluenter (where see n.), § 40 appellarent, Fin. III 71 verissime defenditur quidquid aequetm esset id honestum fore with Madv.'s n., Drake §152 1, Krueger's Unters. II 49 foll. Should it not rather be treated as a case of suppressed
protasis, 'which, if it had been used, would have been unworthy of a man of ordinary understanding'?

**non modo philosophia sed prudentia**: 'such as would have beseeemed, I do not say, a philosopher, but &c.' See *Div. I* 124 *non modo plura sed etiam pauciora* with Allen's n. and Roby § 2240. For exx. of *non modo* in the 2nd clause cf. Mayor's *Second Philippic* § 107.

**dificile est negare.** Compare for a similar objection similarly met *Div. II* 70, where C. the augur, is arguing against auspices *dificilis auguri locus ad contra dicendum*. *Marso fortasse, sed Romano facilemminus.*

**credo si in contione**: 'I grant you it would be if the question were put in a public assembly, but in a party of friends, such as this, it is easy'. Cf. *Div. II* 23 *solii sumus, licet verum inquirere sine invidia, mihi praesertim de plerisque dubitanti, i.e. we may inquire whether divination is a reality without being called impious*; also *Varro* *op. Aug. C. D. vi 5*, where, after giving the famous division of religion into mythical (of poets), natural (of philosophers), political (of statesmen)—a division which we may compare with Gibbon's language 'the various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true, by the philosopher as equally false, and by the magistrate as equally useful'—he goes on to say of the 2nd *faciliius inter parietes in schola quam extra in foro ferre possunt aures*. So Torquatus is challenged to assert the doctrines of Epicurus *in conventu aut, si coronam times, in senatu Fin. II* 74.

**ego ipse pontifex.** Besides representing the academic doctrine, Cotta, if we may judge from such passages as *III* 5, 43, is intended to express the opinions of an older *pontifex*, Q. Mucius Scaevola, the friend and patron of C. and the author, according to *Aug. C. D. iv 27*, of the triple division of theology given above. While condemning the vulgar (mythical) theology as immoral and degrading, he preferred that the philosophic view should be held as an esoteric truth only, not communicated to the mass for whom stronger stimulants were necessary, which were to be provided in an innocent form by the State-religion. *Varro* describes it as follows, * tertium genus est quod in urbibus cives, maxime sacerdotes, nosse atque administrare debent. In quo est quos deos publice colere, quae sacrar et sacrificia facere quemque par sit*, *Aug. C. D. vi 5*. But as Augustine shows, it was impossible to purge this of the evils charged against the vulgar belief without entirely altering its character, a task which was beyond the power of any magistrate to effect. In the *De Divinatione* C. has the same rôle as Cotta here, and puts forward political expediency and popular belief as the reasons for upholding religion, *retinetur et ad opinionem vulgi et ad magnas utilitates reipublicae mos, religio, disciplina, jus augurium, collegii auctoritas*, *Div. II* 70. It was the policy of the Empire, introduced by Augustus on the advice of his minister Maecenas; cf. the speech put into the mouth of the latter by Dion. Cass. *LII* 36, where the maintenance of the national religion and the prohibition of strange rites are recommended as the best protection against political revolution or conspiracy. But the attempt to retain religion simply as an
instrument of police has never succeeded. Without belief it is too weak to be of service; with belief it is too powerful.

**ego—is.** On the use of *is* in reference to the First and Second Persons see Draeg. § 40.

**non opinione sed ad veritatem:** ‘not as a matter of faith merely (lit. ‘in the way of belief’, Abl. of Manner, Roby § 1236, or possibly Abl. of Instrument ‘by means of belief’) but in accordance with the actual truth’, cf. the opposition of κατὰ δόξαν and πρὸς ἀλήθειαν συλλογιζεται Arist. Anal. Post. i 19 p. 81 b.

**nulli esse:** ‘not to exist at all’. So § 65 quae nullae sunt, § 97 nulla esse dicamus, cf. Madv. § 455 obs. 5.

**§ 62. placet mihi deos esse.** So we read of the Sceptics εὑρεθήσεται ὁ Σκεπτικὸς κατὰ μὲν τα πάτρια ἑθη καὶ τοὺς νῦμους λέγων εἰναι θεοὺς καὶ πάν τὸ εἰς τὴν τοῦτων θρησκείαν καὶ εἰσέβειαν συντεῖνον ποιών, τὸ δὲ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ ζητήσει μηδὲν προπιτεινάμενον, Sext. Emp. Math. ix § 49. The Academic’s acceptance of the traditional creed ‘on the authority of our ancestors’ (majorem nostri etiam nulla ratione credita credere debeo, N.D. iii 6) reminds one of Hume’s scoffing patronage of Christianity against ‘those dangerous friends who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason’. ‘Our most holy religion’, he says, ‘is founded on faith not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it, to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure’. There is a natural affinity between the extremes of scepticism and of authority, as there is between democracy and despotism.

C. b. **Weakness of the argument derived from universal consent:** negatively, such consent is unproved; positively, many have held a contrary opinion, ch. xxiii §§ 62—64.

**Ch. xxiii. equidem—deorum sit.** The question whether religious belief is universal, is very fairly considered in Tylor’s *PrIMITIVE Culture* vol. i p. 377 foll. He gives the following as the result of his investigations, ‘as far as I can judge from the immense mass of accessible evidence, we have to admit that the belief in spiritual beings (termed by him ‘animism’) appears among all low races with whom we have attained to thoroughly intimate acquaintance’ p. 384. The doubtful nature of the facts alleged by Sir J. Lubbock, in favour of the opposite view, is conclusively shown in Flint’s *Anti-theistic Theories* ch. vii. See too Roskoff *Das Religionswesen der rohesten Naturvölker*, and cf. n. on § 43 quae est enim gens. Simplicius on Epict. p. 222 and Porphyrius *Abst.* ii 8 quote from Theophrastus περὶ εἰσεβείας (see the fragments collected by Bernays p. 56) an account of a ‘pre-Hellenic Sodom and Gomorrah’, the Thoes of Thrace who were swallowed up by the earth in punishment for their atheism; but Simp. says this is the only exception to the universality of belief. Cotta’s classification of atheists agrees with that given by Clarke *Being and Attributes* ch. i, ‘Atheism arises from stupid ignorance’, i.e. from
stunted development, moral and intellectual (gentes effera
tas of C.); ‘or from gross corruption of manners’, i.e. from abnormal moral development (sacrilegis of C.); ‘or from false philosophy’, i.e. from abnormal intellec
tual development (Diogoras, &c.): Plato Leg. x 886 A foll. assigns the
two latter causes for the educated unbelief of his time, (1) akrateia ηδονων
te καὶ ἐπιθυμιών ἐπί τῶν ἀσθηθίδων ὡς ὑμᾶς τὰς ψυχὰς, (2) ἀμβλα τις μᾶλα
χαλεπτῆ, δοκοῦσα εἶναι μεγάστη φράσσεις; he further states that though he
had known many who had professed atheism in youth, he had never met
with one who retained this opinion in old age.

suspicio deorum: cf. opinio deorum § 29 n.
immanitate efferatas: ‘so utterly barbarous’, lit. ‘run wild in savage
ness’. The words are often combined, e.g. ii 90 terram immanitate belva
rum efferatam, Tusc. iv 32 efferata et immania.

§ 63. Diogoras: cf. §§ 2, 117, iii 89. He was a native of Melos (hence
the epithet ὁ Μήλαιος=atheist, used by Aristophanes of Socrates Nub. 830),
a disciple of Democritus, resided in Athens for several years, but fled from
it to avoid an action for impiety in 411 B.C.; a price was set on his head
for divulging the mysteries, cf. Schol. on Arist. Ar. 1073 and Stahr’s Art. in
Dict. of Biog. Philodemos p. 85 maintains that he was a better theist than
the Stoics, and says that any supposed writings of his which appear to show
the contrary are either spurious or mere e eur d’ esprit; in proof of this he
quotes the following from his genuine poems, θεός, θεός πρὸ παντὸς ἔργων
βρατείου νομᾶ φρένα ὑπερτάταν καὶ δαίμονα καὶ τέχναν τα πάντα βροτά
σων. Sext. Emp. Math. ix, § 53 says that he lost his faith after this was
written, ἀποδημηθεὶς ἐπὸ τῶν ἐπιφράσαντος, see Fabricius in loc.
Theodorus: see Introduction under Aristippus, Zeller’s Socrates tr.
pp. 342, 376 foll. and Dict. of Biog. Many striking sayings of his are
recorded, as that on his banishment from his native country, κακῶς ποιεῖτε
Ἀνδρεῖς Κυρηναῖοι ἐκ τῆς Διμήνης εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα με ἐξορίζοντες Diog. L. ii 103,
and his answer to Lysimachus who threatened to crucify him, ἰστίς θανακι
ista horribilia minitare purpuratis tuis; Theodori quidem nihil interest
humine an sublime putrescat (Tusc. i 102). He is said to have been saved
through the influence of Demetrius Phalereus from being cited before the
Areopagus, circ. 310 B.C.

nam Abderites: cf. § 27 n. Expressed in full the thought would be
‘I need not ask the question about Prot. for he was condemned on that
ground by the Athenians’. On Prot. cf. § 29.

neque ut sint neque ut non sint. The Greek is given by Diog. L.
ix 51 περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι οὐθ’ ὡς εἰσίν οὐθ’ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν. πολλὰ γὰρ
τὰ καλῶστα εἰδέναι, ἦ τε αἰδηλότης καὶ βραχὺς ὡς ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, cf.
Plato Theaet. 162 b. According to the ordinary use of words, C.’s transla
tion could only mean ‘I am unable to say either how they exist or how
they do not exist’, which is of course not the sense of the Greek. Are we
to consider it a mistranslation, or a forcing of the usage of the language in
order to give a closer representation of the Greek? The latter is the view
BOOK I CH. XXIII § 63.

taken by Sch. in loc. and by Draeg, § 408, who calls it ‘ganz vereinzelt’ but classes it with such essentially different uses as pugnare ut N. D. i 75, retinendum esse ut 95.

habeo dicere. This construction instead of the usual habeo quod dicam is said (Draeg. § 413) to be found only in Cic. Suet. and Fell., but Allen quotes Hor. Epod. xvi 23 melius quis habet suadere, Ov. Trist. i 1. 123 plura mandare habebam, [to which add Metam. ix 658 dare habebs, Pont. iii 1. 82 laedere habeat, Lucr. vi 711 dicere habebam. J. S. R.] See N. D. iii 93 haec dicere habui de natura deorum (compare with haec habui quae dicerem, Lael. 104; Cato 85), and other exx. in Draeg.

Atheniensium—combusti. So Diog. l. c. dia ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ συγγράμματος ἐξεβλήθη πρὸς Ἀθηναίων' καὶ τὰ βιβλία αὐτοῦ κατέκαυσαν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, see the nn. in Hübner’s ed. We find the same names mentioned by Sext. Emp. Math. ix 51 foll. in a list of atheistical philosophers, but he adds Prodicus, Euhemerus and Critias, all of whom are introduced, the last without name, by C. in § 117 foll. where see nn. Fabricius in his note on Sext. l. c. mentions several other philosophers against whom the same charge was brought. Clem. Al. Protr. 2 p. 7 Sylb. gives a similar list, but will not allow the justice of the charge: ‘the true θεοὶ are not those who deny false gods, but those who deny the true and worship the false’. This is a retort upon the heathen, whose name for the Christians was θεοὶ, but Clemens fails to distinguish between the denial of what was false in the heathen religions, and the denial of religion in itself. There can be little doubt that in some cases, e.g. that of Theodorus, the denial was of the latter kind.

§ 64. quippe cum—potuisset: ‘seeing that in the case of P. the mere expression of a doubt had been punished’.

Tubulus: (L Hostilius) cum unum ex omni memoria sceleratisseum et audacissimumuisse accepinus, Scaur. 15; Cui Tubuli nomen odio non est? Fin. v 62; cum praeter quaestionem inter sicarios exercuisset, ita aperte cepit pecunias ob rem judicandum ut anno proximo P. Scævola tr. pl. ferret ad plebem vel lentem de ea re quaer. Quo plebiscito decreta a senatu est consuli quaestio Ca. Caepioni; profectus in exilium Tubulus statim, nec respondere ausus; erat enim res aperta, Fin. ii 54; N. D. iii 74; Gell. ii 7.

Lupus: Horace (Sat. ii 1. 68) and Persius (i 114) also speak of a Lupus satirized by Lucilius. He is generally supposed to be L. Cornelius Lentulus Lupus, Aedile b.c. 163, Consul 156, Censor 147, but Munro has shown that this can hardly be the case (Journal of Philology vol. viii p. 217). In the first book of his Satires Luc. made the Gods hold a council concerning his death, Serv. ad Aen. x 104.

Carbo: (C. Papirius) the partisan of the Gracchi who suddenly changed sides after the death of C. Gracchus, and defended his murderer Opimius; cf. Fam. ix 21 is et tribunus plebis seditionis et P. Africano vim attulisse existimatus est. Accusante L. Crasso cantharidas sumpsisse dicitur. In the
same letter C. says that with one exception all the Carbos had shown themselves bad citizens.

**Neptuni filius**: cf. Gell. xv 21 praestantissimos virtute, prudence, viribus, Jovis filios poetae appellaverunt, ut Aecum et Minoa et Sarpedona; ferocissimos et immanes et alienos ab omni humanitate, tamquam e mari genitos, Neptuni filios dixerunt, Cyclopa et Cercyona et Scirona et Laestrygones; Serv. ad Aen. iii 241 alii dicens Harpyias Neptuni filias, qui fere prodigiorum omnium pater est, ... sic et peregrinos Neptuni filios dicimus quorum ignoramus parentes; Cornutus 22 piantas eis biaious kai megalyptboious genovinov, o's ton Kiklopa kai tous Lainagynol kai tous 'Alaidas, Poseidwos emibethivan ekayoous eyov. Welcker Göttlerlehr 27 668 adds the names of Procrustes, Sinis, Amycus, Antaeus, Busiris, and refers to the various sea-monsters of fable: he also cites the phrase Neptuni nepos used of the Miles Gloriosus l. 15, and the reproachful words of Patroclus to Achilles, γλαυκη δε σε τηκε θηλασα, | πετρα δ ηλιαταο, δι τοι νιος εστιν ἀπηνης | II. xvi 34. Mr Gladstone (Juventus Mundi 241—251) connects this with his theory of the Phoenician origin of the worship of Poseidon, and suggests that there may be some allusion to 'the rough manners of a sea-faring and buccaneering people'. For the form of expression we may compare fortunae filius, ζογραφων παιδε, and the Hebraistic υιοι φωρός &c. (Winer's Gram. p. 298 ed. Moulton.)

**Lucilius**: on the date of his birth see Munro l. c.; the best ed. of his fragments is by L. Muller, 1872, who has also written on his Leben und Werke 1876.

*explorata*: 'clearly made out,' §§ 1, 51.

C. c. The atomic doctrine is opposed to science: if it were true, it would be inconsistent with the immortality of the Gods. When Epicurus, by way of evading the difficulty, speaks of quasi-corporeal Gods, he becomes unintelligible. xxiii. 65—xxvii. 75.

§ 65. *unde*: their origin from atoms; *ubi* their abode in the intermundia § 103 foll.; *quales corpore* human shape § 76 foll.; *animo* perfection of rationality and virtue § 87 foll.; *vita* a blessed and everlasting repose, § 102, 111. The confused order of the book is shown in the repetition of these queries § 103.

**atomorum regno et licentia**: 'the lawless rule of the atoms', referring to their capricious and irregular movements, cf. § 69, and Fin. r 20 'if some atoms swerve, while others keep the direct line, primum erit hoc quasi provincias atomis dare quae recte quae oblique ferantur', so Fatt. 46 num sortiantur inter se quae declinet, quae non? For the headiado's cf. § 29 imagines earumque circuitus n.; for the use of licentia § 107 a Democrito omnis haec licentia, § 109 at quam licenter, Div. ii 127 ista designandi licentia 'arbitrary apportionment', also 150, and Fatt. 15.

M. C.
in solum venit: 'turns up', 'is brought on the tapis'. The origin of the phrase is doubtful: Manutius, in his n. on Fac. ix 26 in conicío loguer quod in solum, ut dicitur, suggests that it refers to chance-sown weeds, but I think the word solum would be more naturally used in reference to what comes from above than from below; perhaps it may be connected with the legal res soli 'whatever comes on the ground' (counts as real property). [May not the phrase mean literally 'meets the foot', ἱπποδῶν γόρτεια? Cf. quidquid in buccam, in mentem venit. J. S. R.]

quae primum nullae sunt: 'for in the first place there are no such things as atoms', cf. § 61.

 nihil est enim—corporis. Lambinins saw that some words must have been lost between enim and quod, and the gap has been supplied as follows by Sch. (partly from the parallel passage in Ac. 1 27) quae primum nullae sunt: nihil est enim 'in rerum natura minimum quod dividit negotium', to which he adds deinde, ut sit, moteri per inane non possunt, siguladum id dicis inane quod vacet corporis, thus providing an intelligible meaning for enim and primum, see his Orpt. iii 287. Primum however might correspond to § 68 concealum—quid ad rem? And the antem which follows corporibus (unless with Heind. we read enim instead, according to one of the Codd. Eliens, so as to give a reason for moteri non potent) would suit better with some such context as this, moteri nisi per inane non possunt; inane antem id dicis esse quod vacet corporis; corporibus antem, &c. On the existence and indivisibility of atoms see Lucr. i 483—635; on the existence of void as essential to motion 329—397. For the views of Leucippus and Democritus cf. Introduction and R. and P. §§ 79, 80.

Ch. xxiv § 66. physicorum oracula fundo: 'in this I am merely the mouthpiece of our scientific oracles'. On orac. cf. Orat. i 200, donum juris consulti oraculum, Plin. Nat. Hist. xviii 6, and 8 (of the precepts of Cato and other writers on agriculture), cur non videantur oracula?...ex oraculo solictet...iude illa relia oracula; Quintil. xii 11 (of the help which a young orator might receive from an experienced pleader) jurenes rerum dicendi viam velat ex oraculo potent; x i § 81 (of Plato). On fundo cf. § 42 pectorum vocibus fundi. C. gives the same report as to the views of the natural philosophers in Fin. i 20 ne illud quidem physici (est) credere aliquid esse minimum, Fat. 24 physici quibus inane esse nihil placet, Ac. ii 125 tane aut inane quiquam putes esse, enim ita completa et conforta sint annia, ut et quod mox exhibitor corporum celatum, et quae quidque cesserit aliud ilico consequatur? The majority of the ancient physici followed Aristotle in (1) affirming the infinite divisibility of matter, Phys. vi i πάν ςυνεχής διαρρητῶν εἰς τε διαρρητικές, Cael. iii 4 (of Democritus and Leucippus) ἀνάγκη μᾶχεσθαι ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ἅτωμα σῶματα λέγοντας, Gen. et Corr.

1 'The Platonists however showed some tendency towards atomism; compare the indivisible triangles of Plato, the ἄτομοι γραμμαί of Spensippus, and the δικαικλις of Heraclides'. J. S. R.
I 2 ὀστὲ ἑστὶ καὶ διάκρισιν καὶ σύγκρισιν ὀλλ’ οὖν εἰς ἄτομα καὶ ἐξ ἄτόμων, πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ ἄδυνατα: καὶ (2) denying the existence of vacuum, Phys. iv 6—9 (where the conclusion is given in the words οὖν ἀποκεκριμένον κενὸν ἐστὶν, οὔθ’ ἀπλῶς, οὔν’ ἐν τῷ μαφί, οὔτε δύναμι, i.e. void does not exist either separately or inclosed in bodies as a cause of rarefaction), see also Cleomedes i 1. The Stoics held that the world was a plenum, but that outside of it there was an infinite vacuum Diog. vii 140, Zeller Stoics tr. p. 185—192. Dr Whewell (Scientific Ideas p 48—63) while allowing the value of the molecular hypothesis as an instrument of discovery, points out many difficulties which stand in the way of our accepting it 'as a philosophical truth respecting the constitution of the universe'; cf. also Veitch Lucretius and the Atomic Theory and Clerk Maxwell's Art. on 'Atom' in the Encyc. Brit. As to the existence of vacuum the results of modern science are thus stated, 'the undulatory theory of light supposes the whole of the celestial spaces to be filled with the luminiferous ether. The astronomical argument therefore in favour of absolute vacuum has fallen; but the views of the constitution of matter which have grown with the rise of the molecular sciences of chemistry, light, heat, electricity, &c., have supplied its place with much more effect. The inference to which the modern philosophy would give the greatest probability is that all space is occupied by particles of matter with vacuous interstices, showing all degrees of density'. English Cyclopædia under Vacuum.

vera an falsa nescio. In the Introduction reasons are given for believing that Cotta's speech is borrowed from a Stoic source, but C. adds clauses like this to impart to it an Academic colouring.

flagitia: 'atrocities'; so just below and III 91, cf. the use of monstra, portenta, &c. § 18 n.: one may excuse such scurrilities in the mouth of the Dogmatists, but they are scarcely appropriate for an Academic. The construction is resumed in hanc opinionem.

sive etiam ante Leucippi. C. expresses himself doubtfully because Epicurus denied that Leucippus had ever existed, Diog. L. x 13, Hirzel p. 184.

corpuscula—adunca. Lucretius ii 333 foll. shows how the qualities of bodies are derived from the various shapes of the constituent atoms, some levia and rotunda, some asperea and hamata, mucronibus unca or angelliis prostantibus; cf. Theop. Caus. Plant. vi 6 (quoted in Mullach's Democritus p. 217) Δημόκριτος δὲ σχῆμα περιτείς ἐκάστω γλυκύν μὲν τὸν στρογγύλην καὶ εὐμεγέθη ποιεῖ, στρυφών δὲ τὸν μεγαλόσχημον τραχύν τε καὶ πολυγώνιον καὶ ἀπεριφερῇ, ὡς δὲ τὸν ὄξυν τῷ ἁγκῷ καὶ γνωσεῖδῃ καὶ καμπύλων κ.τ.λ.; Cic. Ac. ii 121) fr. 28 (where uncinatus answers to adunca here), Lactant. De Ira x. In Pseudo-Plut. Ploc. Phil. i 28 p. 877 it is denied that the atoms were ἀγκιστροεῖδη μίτε τριαννεῖδη μίτε κρικοεῖδη, ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ σχῆματα εὐθραυστα εἶναι, αἰ δὲ ἄτομα ἀπαθεῖς ἐβραυστοῦ; but Aristotle (Frag. 202 p. 1514) distinctly says that, according to Democritus, the atoms were τὰ μὲν σκαληνά, τὰ δὲ ἀγκιστροεῖδη, τὰ δὲ κολά, τὰ δὲ κυρτά, τὰ δὲ ἀλλας ἀναφέρουσ
έχουσα διαφόρας, a point in which he differed from Epic, who made the atoms infinite in number, but limited the variety of shapes, see Lucr. l.c. The text here is extremely doubtful. Heind., who re-writes the sentence, pertinently asks what is the force of quasi before a simple word such as 

Adunca. Ang. and pyr. are both ãr. leg.

quaedam—alia—partim—quaedam: cf. § 103 Tusc. v 38. Similarly we have modo and tum irregularly combined for the sake of variety in § 34. [I think it is necessary to insert another alia before locia. Quaedam merely marks the unfamiliarity of corpusculum to translate átomos (so first used by Amafinius, see Ac. I 5). Also the pause seems to come after quaedam. J. S. R.]

nulla cogente natura, sed concursu quodam fortuito. This is a correct statement of the theory of Epicurus, but is inapplicable to Democritus, who spoke of chance as the fiction of human inconsiderateness (άνθρωποι τύχει εἰδολων ἐπιλάσαντο πρόφασιν ὑδρος αὔτους Mullach p. 167) and said that nothing was made at random (οὐδεὶς χρῆμα μάτην γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης Mullach p. 226). So Arist. Gen. An. v 8 Δημάκριτος δὲ, τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα αὐτές λίγειν, πάντα ἀνάγει εἰς ἀνάγκην οἷς χρῆται ἡ φύσις, and Π 6; though he elsewhere censures him for naming no cause, Phys. viii 1 ad fin. διὸς δὲ τὸ νομίζειν ἀρχήν εἶναι ταύτην ἱκανήν, δι’ αἰεὶ ἧ ἐστιν οὕτως ἡ γίγνεται, οὐκ ὀρθὰς ἔχει ὑπολαβζέιν, εἰ’ δ’ Ἰμ. ἀνάγει τὰς περὶ φύσεως αἰτίας, ὡς ὀρτὸ καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἴγειρο, which (in Phys. ii 4 and 5) he treats as equivalent to making τὸ αὐτόματον the cause. While C. uses the word fortuitus of the atoms of Democritus in Tusc. i 22, 42, Ac. i 6, as well as here; in the De Fato 23 and 39, he more correctly connects the universal perpendicular movement of the atoms with the doctrine of fate, id Democritus acierere malit, necessitate omnia fieri, quam a corporibus indiciduis naturales motus arellere, cf. § 69 below.

hanc tu. So in Dív. ii 73 the apodosis commences with hoc tu auspicium.

priusque te quis—dejecerit. The indefinite quis is rarely found except in connexion with conjunctions or relative pronouns or with the verb dixerit, see Zumpt § 708, Draeg. § 44. [It is not easy to say whether dejecerit should be classed as Subj. or Ind., see Gr. §§ 1540, 1541. I am inclined to take it as Ind. cf. Liv. vii 40 vos príns in me strinvereris ferrum quam in vos ego, Verr. iv 59 dies me citius dejecerit quam nomina, Planc. 79 sed me dies fidius multo citius mea salutem pro te abjecero quam Cn. Plancri salutem tradidero contentioni tuae. The comparative adverb is frequent in these sentences. R.]

vitae statu: a common phrase in C., e.g. Verr. ii 10 ‘the lamentations of the Sicilians made me abandon my rule of never taking part in a prosecution’ (de vitiae meae statu deducercet ut ego istum accusarem). Dejecerit de statu (Orator 129) is a metaphor borrowed from the ring ‘to knock a man out of his attitude’. ‘It would be easier to make you change your whole posture of life than to stop you from following his teaching’.
ante enim—amittere. Cf. n. on § 17 libero judicio, and Zeller Epicureans, tr. p. 394, where many passages are quoted in illustration of the rigid dogmatism of the Epicurean school. Thus the last words of the founder to his disciples were τῶν δογμάτων μεμψήθαι Diog. L. x 16; any divergence from the dogmas was looked upon as παρανόμημα, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀσέβημα, καὶ κατέγνωσται τὸ καινοσμηθὲν, Euseb. Praep. Ev. xiv 5; and Philodemus (quoted by Hirzel p. 107) says that Epicureans who are guilty of schism οὐ πάντων μακρὰν τῆς τῶν πατραλοίων καταδίκης ἀφελείας. Hirzel however has shown (pp. 98—190) that there was more of movement and variety in the Epicurean school than has been generally recognized. Quintilian xii 2 says the same of philosophers in general, haec inter ipsos qui, velut sacramento rogati vel etiam superstitione constricti, nefas ducant a suscepta semel persuasione discedere.

§ 67. quid enim mereas: 'what would tempt you to abandon the system?' lit. 'what would you take as pay, what bribe must one offer you?' Sch. quotes Fin. ii 74 quid merearist ut dicam te omnia voluptatis causa facturum? Verr. iv 135 quid arbitramini Reginos merere velle ut ab ipsis marmoreo illa Venus auseratur? cf. also Phil. i 34 putasne illum immortalitatem mereri voluisse ut proper armorum habendorum licentiam metueretur, where see var. nn. It is a colloquial phrase and occurs not unfrequently in Plautus.

nihil—deseram: 'nothing would tempt me to forsake happiness and truth'.

ista—est veritas: for the attraction of istud see §§ 77, 122, and Roby § 1068.

nam de vita—langueat: 'as to happiness I make no objection; your system may be productive of that inactivity which you call happiness'. Plane otio langueat: 'absolutely dying of ennui', cf. § 7.

sed ubi—fingentibus: 'can unchanging truth exist in those ever-changing worlds, or in senseless atoms?'

mundis innumerabilibus: cf. Fin. i 21 innumerables mundi qui et orientur et interciant cotidie and my n. on § 53. Epicurus defines the term in his epistle to Pythocles (Diog. L. x 88) κόσμος ἕστι περιοχὴ τις ὁμοροῦ ἀστρα τε καὶ πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα περίεχοσα, ἀποστομή ἔχουσα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου. Worlds are infinite in number, of all shapes and sizes, and perish, not as Democritus said from collision with other worlds, but from their own perishable nature (Diog. 90, cf. Lucr. v 235 foll.).

omnibus minimis: so ii 141 omnes minimos frigoris appulsus, iii 86 in regnis omnia minima curant, cf. Madv. on Fin. iii 3.

nulla moderante natura: apparently contradictory to § 53, where Vell. says the world is natura effectum: but there natura is opposed to an intelligent agent, here it is used rather in the Stoic sense and opposed to the capricious movements of the atoms, cf. Sch.'s n. here and my n. on § 65.

liberalitatis: his promise in § 62 to pass over all that was common to
Ep., with other philosophers, including therefore his atomic doctrine so far as it was the same with that of Dem., cf. Fin. 1 18 sed hoc commune vitium (the general atomic doctrine), illae prorpiae Epicuri ruinae (the declination).

[tecum uti: 'employ in my dealings with you', cf. hoc tecum oro Pi. Bacch. 491, docte atque astu mihi eoptandum est cum illo Most. 1055 with Lorenz's n. Ussing on Asia. 655, and my Gr. § 1885. R.]

§ 68. sint sane—ante quam nati. For the ellipse of the verb with aesterni, nulli dei, and especially in the subordinate clauses quod ex atomic, si natum, see Draeg. § 116, (who compares ut tu Velleius and quot hominum linguae § 84) and Roby § 1443, who cites § 110 sine virtute certe nullo modo foll.

paolo ante—disputabas: see § 20. To avoid this palpable inconsistency, some Epicureans appear to have introduced a third principle, besides atoms and void, in the òmuotptes, otherwise called òmuoméreiai or σταυχεία, Plut. Plac. Phil. p. 882 λ, Stob. Edl. p. 66; but if we arrived at a right conclusion in our discussion of § 49, this 3rd principle consists only of a subordinate class of atoms composing the divine images which are always streaming in upon the soul. It might be argued that these have nothing concreti about them, but merely produce an impression of a continuous form by their ceaseless repetition; that they have never coalesced into an actual whole, and are therefore in danger of no dissolution. It is doubtful how far such a defence could apply to the images; in any case it is not applicable to the ordinary Epicurean Gods of the intermundiu. The considerations which seem to have been urged for the immortality of the latter by the disciples of this school are (1) the equilibrium described in §§ 50, 100, (2) the preservative influence of goodness alluded to in Plut. Def. Orac. p. 420, where the Epicurean argues against the demons of Empedocles on the ground òs ou δυνατόν ἐστι φαίλονοι καὶ ἀμαρτητικοῖς ὅντας μακριάς καὶ μακράωνας εἶναι, πολλῆν τυφλότητα τῆς κάκιας ἐξούσιας καὶ τὸ περιπτωτικὸν τοῖς ἀμαρτητικοῖς ('susceptibility to destructive influences'). To which it is replied that goodness has nothing to do with the duration of the bodily organism, ὅδεν οὐκ εὖ τῷ θεῷ τὴν ἀμαρτίαν παύοισιν ἐκ φυλακής καὶ δισκούσος τῶν ἀμαρτητικών.

quod cum efficere vultis: 'for when you would prove this' (that the divinity is possessed of such attributes).

in dumeta correpitis: 'you hide yourself in the thickets'. Cf. Ae. Π 112 cum sit ca?n campus in quo exsultare possit oratio, cur cam tantas in angustias et in Stoicorum dumeta compellimus? So often spinae and spinosus with a slightly different force, of the perplexing arguments of the Stoics.

ita: explained by the following infinitival clause, as in Fat. 24 ita dicimus, vello aliquid sine causa, Tusc. 1 71 ita diobat, duas esse aetas, Π 3 1 4 ita—laetitiam esse, see Madv. Fia. Π 13, 17, Π 53, ν 77; and compare the use of the epexegetic clause after a demonstrative or relative, Draeg. § 484.
Ch. xxv § 69. *hoc persaepe facitis—possit*. Three examples follow, (1) the declaration of atoms, (2) the denial of the disjunctive judgment (§ 70 *idem facit contra dialecticos*), (3) the assertion of the infallibility of sensations (§ 70 *omnia sensus veri nuntios*), all preparing the way for (4), with which we are here concerned (§ 71 *idem facit in natura deorum*). The same points are criticized elsewhere by C. e.g. (1) in *Fin. i* 19, *Fat. 22, 46*; (2) in *Ac. ii 97, Fat. 18* foll.; (3) *Ac. ii 79*, see the following notes.

*ut satius fuerit*. *Satius est* being used in the Ind. like *aequius est*, *melius est*, where we might have expected the Subj. (see n. on *longum est* § 19), *satius fuit* would mean ‘would have been better’. It is here subordinated to *ut*, like *molestum sit* in § 2.

*si atomi—suopte pondere*. This was the only natural and necessary movement of the atoms according to Dem.; but since the larger and heavier atoms overtook the smaller and lighter in their downward descent, by striking against them, they initiated a secondary movement, which might be in any direction, but which resulted finally in the creative vortex. The authorities on which this account rests are given by Zeller, who points out that some of the ancient writers neglected to notice the original movement, and made Dem. assume as his first principle, either the motion of mutual impact, *πληγή* (as Cic. *Fat. 46* aliam quandam *viam motus habebant* (atomi) *a Democrito impulsionis, a te Epicure gravitatis et ponderis*), or even the resulting vortex, *δινη* (e.g. Diog. *L. ix 44* *φέρεσθαι εν τῷ δύο δινομένας τάς ἀτόμους*).

*nihil fore in nostris potestate*. Epicurus ap. Diog. *L. x* 134 speaks of the blessedness of the man who has learnt that necessity, to which others assign a despotic power, is only a name for the results of chance or of man’s free will, *ἐπεὶ κρείστων ἡν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μυθός κατακολουθεῖν ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἰσαρμένῃ δουλείαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραιτήσεως ὑπογραφεῖ θεον διὰ τιμῆς, ἢ δὲ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην*. The same reason is assigned for the introduction of the *clinamen* in *Fat. 22* foll. (cf. 46 foll.) *Epicurus veritus est, ut* si semper atomus gravitare ferretur naturali *ac necessaria, nihil liberum nobis esset, cum ita moveretur animus ut atomorum motu cogeretur*, to which the Academic disputant replies (1) that the single downward movement does not necessarily involve the doctrine of necessity, and (2) that in any case the supposition of the *clinamen* would not avert such a consequence. Philedomus, in his treatise *περὶ σημείων* (Gomp. p. 44), allows that this movement cannot be proved from the fact of free will, unless it is consistent with our experience on all points, *οὐ χικανὸν εἰτι προσδέξασθαι τὰς ἐπὶ ἐλάχιστον παρεγκλίσεις τῶν ἀτόμων διὰ τὸ τυχήραν καὶ τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς (causal use of παρά) ἀλλὰ δεὶ προσεπείδεξη καὶ τὸ μηδαμὸν ἐτέρῳ μήκοςθαι τῶν ἐναργῶν*. Accordingly we find another reason given in *Fin. i* 19 viz. that as all atoms move at the same rate *ἐν ταύτι* (οὔτε γὰρ τὰ βαρέα βάττον αἰσθήσεται μικρῶν καὶ κούφων, ὅταν γε ἔτη μιθην ἀπαντᾷ αὐτοῦ Diog. *L. x 61*)—a point in which Ep. corrected the erroneous doctrine of his predecessor—there was no possibility of one overtaking the other, but all must move.
downwards in parallel lines without any meeting or collision. Both reasons are combined in Lucr. ii 216—293.

nihil fore—quod esset: in direct speech, nihil erit quod est.
declinare paululum = κατά παράγκλισιν Stob. Ed. p. 346; cf. Fut. 22 cum declinat atomus intervallo minimo, id appellat διάχοιτον. [Similarly Fin. i 19 declinare atomum perpaulum, quo nihil fieri possit minus; Lucr. ii 219 paulum, tantum quod momen mutatum dicere possis. J. S. R.]

§ 70. hoc dicere turpis est: cf. Fin. i 19 ait enim declinare atomum sine causa; quo nihil turpis physico, quam fieri quiescum sine causa dicere, and Fut. 18.
dialecticos. The word διαλεκτική, used by Plato for philosophical discussion and then for philosophy itself, was restricted by Aristotle to the Logic of Probabilities, while he gives to Formal Logic the name ἡ ἀναλυτική or ἀποδεικτική ἐπιστήμη. By the later schools (excepting the Stoics who gave a wider meaning to λογικὴ λογική and διαλεκτική) were used indiscriminately for the science of reasoning generally, as in Fin. i 22 in altera philosophiæ parte, quae est quaecendor et disserendi, quae λογικὴ dictur, iste vester (Epicurus) plane inermis ac nudus est; Fut. i tota est λογική, quam rationem disserendi voco; De Orat. ii 157 videam Diogenem furisce qui diceret artem se tradere bene disserendi et verum ac falsa judicandi, quam verbo Graeco διαλεκτικὴν appellaret? cf. Fin. ii 17 foll., where we find also the term dialectici used of logicians in opposition to rhetores; so in Div. ii 11 it is opposed to physici, see Zeller Stoics tr. p. 69 foll.
disjunctionibus, in quibus aut etiam aut non poneretur. Cf. Ac. ii 95 fundamentum dialecticae est, quidquid enuntietur—id autem appellant ἁξίωμα—aut verum esse aut falsum; § 97 etiam cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et conteninit et irridet, non impetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita efigiatur aut vivet etiam aut non vivet, cum dialectici sic statuant omne quod ita disjunctum sit, quasi aut etiam aut non, non modo verum esse sed etiam necessarium; (vide quam sit catus est quem isti tardum putant. Si enim, inquit, alterutrum concessero necessarium esse, necesse erit erat Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere. Nulla autem est in natura verum talis necessitas)—cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id est Antiochus et Stoici; totam enim evertit dialecticam. Nam si c contrariis disjunctio (contraria autem ea dico cum alterum ait alterum negate) si talis disjunctio falsa potest esse, nulla vera est; Top. 56 dialecticorum modi plures sunt qui ex disjunctionibus constant: aut hoc aut illud: hoc autem: non igitur illud. Itemque, aut hoc aut illud: non autem hoc: illud igitur. Quae conclusiones ideo vero rate sunt, quod in disjunctione plus uno verum esse non potest. It is the principle now known as the Law of Excluded Middle (see Hamilton Logic: vol. i pp. 83, 90 foll., Ueberweg Log. tr. pp. 235—284, Mansel Prod. Log. p. 208 foll., Arist. Met. iii 7 p. 100, Prantl Geschr. d. Log. i pp. 143, 403, 449 foll.), and upon it is grounded the dichotomic or bifurcate division so
much favoured by Plato (e.g. Sophist. p. 282 foll.) and in later times by Bentham. For an account of the Disjunctive Judgment see Mansel Proil. Log. p. 236 foll., Hamilton 1 239. The Stoics, who prided themselves on their logical refinements and were especially distinguished by the name dialectici, called it διέξαμα διεξεγεμένον, thus explained by Diog. L. vii 72 διεξεγεμένον ἕστιν ὁ ὑπὸ τοῦ “ἡτοι” διαζευκτικὸν σύνδεσμον (‘disjunctive conjunction’) διεξευκται, ὥσπερ “ἂν ἤμερα ἔστιν ἡ νῦς ἕστιν.” ἔπαγγέλλεται δὲ ὁ σύνδεσμος οὗτος τὸ ἑτέρων τῶν ἀξιωματικῶν ψεύδος εἶναι. For aitón cf. Madv. § 45 (on affirmative and negative answers).

pertimuit ne—fieret necessarium. The Stoics held that their principle of Necessity was involved in the Disjunctive judgment applied to future events, as may be seen argued at length in Fat. 20 foll., e.g. Since it is absolutely necessary that a man now living must at a given date in the future be either dead or alive, whichever of the two proves eventually to be true must be now a necessary truth though unknown to us; or, more shortly, his existence or non-existence at that date is a necessary truth; which of the two it is, will be made apparent by the event. Aristotle discussed the point in his treatise De Interpretatione ch. 9 foll. ‘in regard to the present or past, affirmative or negative judgments of existence are necessarily true or false; but it is not so with regard to the future, otherwise all future events would be fixed by necessity (ὡστε εἰ ἐν ἀπαντὶ χρόνῳ οὕτως εἶχεν ὡστε τὸ ἑτέρων ἀληθεύεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον ἃν τοῦτο γενέσθαι) which is contrary to our own experience of deliberation and action.’ He then solves the difficulty as follows, τὸ μὲν οὐν εἰναι τὸ ὃν ὅταν ἔι, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν μὴ εἰναι ὅταν μὴ ἔ, ἀνάγκη οὗ μὴν οὔτε τὸ ὃν ἀπαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὃν μὴ εἰναι...καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος: εἰναι μὲν ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἀπαν ἀνάγκη, καὶ ἔστεσθαι γε ἢ μὴ οὔ μέντοι διελάβεται γε εἰπεῖν βάτερον ἀναγκαῖον (i.e. the necessity belongs to the compound judgment not to its parts taken separately); λέγω δὲ οὕτω ἀνάγκη μὲν ἐστεσθα μαναμάχω καὶ μὴ εἶναι, οὗ μέντοι εἶναι γε αὐρίον μαναμαχίαν ἀναγκαίον οὖδε μὴ γενέσθαι. In the De Fito 21, C. says that he would rather accept the teaching of Epicurus et negare omnem enuntiationem aut verum esse aut falsam than allow that all things happened by necessity, but he cites Carneades to prove that no such consequence as necessity is really involved in the Disjunctive Judgment. In reality Epicurus seems to have taken much the same view as Arist., see Fat. 37 nisi forte volumus Epicurorum opinionem sequi, quibus enuntiationes nec veras nec falsas esse dicitunt (i.e. not yet corresponding to fact but only capable of becoming so) aut, cum id pudet, illud tamen dicitunt, quod est impudentius, veras esse ex contrariis dijunctiones, sed quae in his enuntiata essent, eorum neutrum esse verum et cf. Zeller Stoics tr. p. 435, and Ueberweg Lc., who points out the qualifications required in applying the Disjunctive Judgment. Johan. Sicelota, quoted by Prantl p. 360, says that Epicurus instanced the famous riddle ὁρίῳ καὶ οὐκ ὁρίῳ ἐπὶ ξύλον καὶ οὐ ξύλον καθημίην λίθῳ καὶ οὐ λίθῳ βαλὼν διώκειν as contravening the principle of Contradiction.
negavit. For the asyndeton after pertinuit cf. the next sentence urgetbat Arce
tus—timent Epicurus—dicit, and § 106 motum dico esse inanem, tu imaginis remanere quae referuntur—hoc idem fieri, § 121 cum dici—negat idem esse—tollit id. The effect is to give rapidity and energy to the sentence and to heighten the antithesis.

Arce
tion see § 12 n. Ac. i 40 foll., π 79 foll.: the controversy between Arc. and Zeno is constantly referred to in the Academica. [Strictly taken, the text misrepresents A. since he did not say omnia falsa esse, but omnia non magis falsa esse quam vera. But possibly Cie, uses the word falsus in the sense of ‘fallacious’, as often in the Academica. J. S. R.]

omens sensus veri nuntios. Cf. Madv. Fin. i 22, Ac. π 79 e.o rem deni
tit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli unquam esse credendum; Zeller Stoics tr. p. 402 foll. ‘to avoid doubt we must allow that sensation as is always, and under all circumstances, to be trusted; nor ought the delusions of the senses to shape our belief; the causes of these deceptions not lying in sensation as such, but in our judgment about sensation’. Lucretius iv 463 after instancing a number of optical illusions, says that they seek in vain to shake the credit of the senses quoniam pars horum maxima fallit (propter opinatit animi quos addimus ipsi) pro eis ut sint que non sunt sensibus cisa. Here too Ep. might quote Arist. on his side, cf. De Anim. iii 3 § 3 η μην δισθησι των ιδιων αι ιδηθη, διανοιασι δι ενδεχεται και ψευδως. To the same effect Augustine (quoted by Lescaloperius in loc.) says sensus non est falsus inter
nuntios sed falsus judex.

nihil horum nimis callide. This is Allen’s emendation, put forward in his ed. 1836, for the nisi collide of the mss. The same emendation was made by Sch. Opusc. III pp. 317 and 364. For the use we may compare our ‘not over cleverly’. In the comic poets nimis often occurs in the sense of valde, which is substituted for collide in some of the mss here, but in later writers it can only bear this force when combined with a negative. [For the form of sentence, cf. Orator 82 nihil horum parum audacter, Moser ms.]

plagam accipiebat: so Fat. 21 (of the denial of Disjunctive Judgments) cum plagam potius accipiam quam fato omnia fieri comprobem.

§ 71. dum individuorum—tanquam sanguinem. This is not quite the same as the reason assigned for the quasi-corpus in § 49. There it was used to explain the fact that the Gods were not objects of bodily sensa
tion, but perceptible only to the mind. In a treatise, conjecturally assigned to Metrodorus, which is contained in vol. vi pt. 2 of the first series of Hereulencnia, we find both reasons conjoined (p. 35) δια τουτο γαρ ουδεν αισθητω ιδινατον, η πυκνως γαρ αντικατε προς τουτο δεχουσιν πληγας ισχυρας. Sch. in his n. and also in Opusc. iv 342 maintains that concretio here must be taken in a narrow sense = nulla solidior et crassior atomorum
condensatio, 'because all the ancient writers (except Lactantius De Ira x 28 who was no doubt misled by the ambiguity of C.'s words in this passage) agree that the Epicurean Gods were corporeal and compounded of atoms'; and he defends his interpretation by the use of concretus in such passages as Π 42, 101, Div. i 130. I do not think we can argue from the use of the Past Part. concretus, which implies the completion of the process, to the verbal, implying the process itself; and besides, the reference is plainly to the sint sane ex atomis of § 68, where it was shown that any such compound must be liable to interitus: to avoid this danger Ep. had recourse to his quasi-corpus § 69: then came the parenthesis illustrating hoc persuepe facitis, and now in § 71 the subject is resumed in the words ind. corp. concr. fug. 'he tries to escape from the aggregation of indivisible particles (with its consequences as above pointed out)'. The only concretio implied in the Gods of § 49 was that of the images, involving superficial area but not depth, cf. monogrammas Π 59. The tamquam sanguis was probably suggested by the Homeric ichor, II. v 340 ἰεῖ δ' ἀμβρόσιον ἀίμα θεοῦ, | ἵψορ, οὗς πέρ τε ῥεῖ μακάρεσσι θεοίσιν | οὐ γὰρ σίτων ἔδουσ', οὐ πίνουσ' αἴθοπα ἄφων' | τούτων' ἀνάρσεις εἰσι καὶ ἕβανατοι καλέονται.

sed tamquam corpus: supply dicit esse from the preceding negat, and see n. on nolo § 17.

Ch. xxvi. mirabili videtur—viderit. This saying of Cato the Censor (Div Π 51) was probably inspired by a feeling of contempt for the Tusci ac barbari, as they are styled by the jealousy of a Roman augur N. D. Π 11. Cic., who prided himself so much on being a member of the augurial college, is indignant when a haruspex is admitted into the Senate, Fam. VI 18. In the De Divinatione Π 28 foll. he states the Academic argument against haruspicina, in answer to his brother Q. who, as a Stoic, was bound to defend every kind of divination.

si in ceris fingeretur. If the reading is correct, the sense and construction require that fing. should be taken metaphorically 'if such a body were fancied in the case of waxen figures': otherwise the literal sense is suggested by fictilibus and ceris (used as in Juv. VIII 19, where see Mayor's n. and ceris fingendis oblectari Justin XXXVI 4). I am inclined to think however that the true reading is si in ceris dicetur 'if the phrase were used in connexion with wax figures', cf. dicemus in Venere Coa just below. The repetition of cer explains the omission of the letters in brackets, and the remaining letters would be taken for si fingeretur, which would be likely to maintain its ground against the true reading, even after the insertion of in ceris from another text. Plin. N. H. XXXV § 4 speaks of the expressi cerum vulvus which were used in funerals, and in § 147 of modelling in clay, fingere ex argilla similitudines.

ne tu quidem: 'no, nor you either'. The phrase occurs in this weaker sense § 110 ne beatus quidem, § 113, Π 87, III 23, 43, 47, 49, 68, 86, see Madv. Fin. Exc. III p. 816.

§ 72. quasi dictata redduntur: 'you repeat your lesson like parrots'.
 Cf. Fin. 11 95 ista vestra 'si gravis brevis, si longus levitas', dictata sunt; Fin. iv 10 isdem de rebus semper quasi dictata decantare neque a commentariolis suis discude; Fin. 11 20 quis vestrum non edidit Epicuri copias hujus? Juv. v 12 2 peragunt dictata magistri, with Mayor's n. The letters of Ep. preserved by Diog. L. abound in admonitions to his disciples to commit to memory what they had heard from him, see esp. x 35. [See also Fin. i 27, l.c. ii 8. J. S. R.]

oscitans: cf. Orat. ii 144 istam oscitatem et dormitantem sapientiam Scacwolarum et ceterorum beatorum (jurists as opposed to pleaders) otio concedamus.

halucinatus est: (connected with hariolor by Vaniček, but the meaning seems to suit better the old etymology connecting it with ἀλω), properly used of a mooning dreamy state, as in Col. vii 3 ne fur aut bestia halucinatam pastorem decipiet, then of idle random talk as here and (without blame) Q. Fr. ii 11 epistulae nostrae debent interdum halucinari 'descend to prattle'; Seneca uses halucinatio of silly abuse, Vit. Beat. 26.

cum quidem glorietur: 'boasting all the time'. Cf. Fam. x 32, Nep. Thras. 2 ad fin., and see Roby §§ 1722, 1732, Draeg. § 570, also § 497 D 3 on the Ind. with cum quidem.

se magistrum habuisse nullum: cf. Diog. L. x 13 τούτων Ἀπολλάδαρος ἐν Χρυσοκλίνα Ναυσίφανος ἀκούσαί φησι καὶ Πραξιφάνως αὐτὸς δὲ οὐ φήσιν, ἀλλ' ἁντοῦ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Εὐφρίδοκον ἑπιστολῆν...Δημήτριος δὲ φήσιν ὁ Μάρτυς καὶ Σιννεράνως αὐτὸν ἀκούσα. Plut. M. 1100 A.

et non praedicanti. Baier and Müller accept Klotz's emendation of ei for et, in obedience to Valla's dictum that et is never used in the emphatic sense (= etiam) by C., but, if we allow any weight to MSS, we must admit the use not only here, but in § 83 age et his vocabulis, in Tusc. iii 28 et illa laudantur, Leg. i 33 ergo et lex, Fin. iii 27 ergo et probandam, Dict. i 34 et auctoritatem. See further Draeg. § 312 (some of whose exx. however are more properly examined on the principle of anacoluthon treated of in Madv. Fin. Exe. 1), Roby § 2198, Moser on Tusc. i. c., Munro's Laev. ind. under et, Dumesnil on Leg. i 33, and a copious list of exx. in Kühnast's Lib. Synt. p. 371 foll.

nihil olet ex Academia: 'he has not the slightest flavour of the Academy'. Sch. Opusc. iii 365 defends and illustrates the construction against Klotz. Compare the similar uses of redoleo, sapio, odor (urbanitas Orat. iii 161, dictaturae Att. iv 11), and Gr ὀξω.

puerilibus disciplinis: the ordinary school lessons, ἐγκύκλιος παδεία, consisting of Reading, Writing, Arithmetic (included under γράμματα) Poetry and Music (included under μουσική), see Becker Charidès tr. p. 231 foll. On the view of Ep. cf. Diog. L. x 6 (the words of Epicurus to a disciple) παθεῖαν δὲ πάθαν, μακάρε, φεύγε, with the notes in Huebner's ed., and Athenaeus xiii 588 there quoted, 'Επ. ἐγκύκλιον παθεῖας ἀμύητου ἄν ἑμακάριε ἔκ τοις ὁμοίως αὐτῷ ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν πανερχομένους'. Fin. i 26 vellem ejusdem aut ipse doctrinæ sui instructō est enim non satis politus ii
artibus, quas qui tenent eruditi appellantur) aut ne deterruiisset alios a studiis, with Madv.'s n. and ib. 72 where Torquatus defends his master's neglect of puerile studies; also Zeller Stoics tr. p. 397 foll., and Dünning Metrodorus p. 64 foll. on the esteem in which the Epicureans held the poets. Cassendi in his treatise De vita et moribus Epicuri examines at length the charges here made against Ep. and endeavours to show that they are mere slanders of rival philosophers. In dealing with such a question, there are two points which should be borne in mind, (1) that knowledge which has been systematized and authoritatively taught is liable to a sort of ossification in the hands of formalists and pedants, and (2) that, as each fresh advance in knowledge bears more or less the character of a revolt against knowledge established and authoritative, a certain amount of self-confidence and want of appreciation for previous knowledge is not unusual in reformers or discoverers. So Hobbes boasted of the smallness of his acquaintance with preceding writers, declaring that if he had read as much as other men he should have been as dull of wit as they were', Whewell Lect. on Mor. Phil. p. 43. We may therefore excuse Ep. if he condemned too severely the artificial poetry, the frivolous rhetoric, and the hair-splitting logic of his time. If he spoke contemptuously of these as of no use for life, he has done no more than the Stoic Seneca in his 88th epistle, unum studium vere liberale est quod liberum facit: cetera pusilla et puerilia sunt; and again, quid quod ista liberalium artium consecratio molestos, verbosos, intempestivos, sibi placent facit, et ideo non discentes necessaria quia supervacua didicerunt? as he shows in detail in the same epistle. That the 'liberal arts' were not entirely neglected by the followers of Epicurus appears from the large number of treatises on rhetoric, music, poetry and dialectic, which have been found among the Herculanean papyri. But Philodemus, to whom most of them are assigned, shares his master's contempt for a profession of universal knowledge (such as was made by Hippias), comparing the 'polyhistors' of his time to the Homeric Margites, see his De Vitis x col. 20 Using p. 55, Rhetorica Gros p. 52. See more under inscitia loquendi § 85, dialecticorum—norit § 89.


credo plus nemini. On this use of plus (= magis) see Madv. Fin. 1 5.

agripeta: 'settler', one of the κληροῦχοι sent from Athens after the conquest of Samos by Timotheus 366 B.C. cf. Grote ch. LXXIX vol. x p. 406, Boeckh Publ. Econ. of Athens, Bk. III ch. 18. The word is apparently peculiar to C., who uses it (Att. xv 29, xvi 1) of the soldiers of Caesar to whom lands were assigned in Epirus after the Civil War.

ludi magister fuit: 'turned schoolmaster'. I do not remember any other instance of this particular use of fuit, but it may be compared with such cases as Att. x 16 commodum ad te dederam litteras, cum ad me bene
mane Dionysius fauit, and the somewhat doubtful esse in potestatem, for which see Roby § 1962 n. Does not Timon’s epithet for Epicurus γραμμο-

διδασκαλίδης (Diog. L. x 3) refer to the calling of the father, not of the son only (as the lexicons and translations take it), ‘a pedagogue by descent’? [Weissenborn (Lat. Gr. § 182 n. 2) quotes, for faui = ‘ich bin geworden’, Liv. xxxiv 21 locupletior indies provincia fauit, Sall. Cat. 20 § 7 vulgos finium sine gratia, and compares the Fut. Perf. in Fam. xiv 7 fundo Arpinati bene poteris uti si annona carior fuerit. This use of faui has been most commonly discussed in connexion with the past participle. Madvig (Opusc. ii p. 218) denies that latus faui = latus sum except in Plautus, &c. Neme (vol. ii p. 352 ed. 2) has a discussion on the same point; and Brix on Mil. Glor. 102 legatus fauit, quotes exx. where the sense would be naturally expressed by the Eng. ‘became’. But in reality faui merely denotes past time absolutely, and the notions of attainment, continuance, completion, &c. are only developed from the context, cf. my Gr. §§ 1451 and 1454, 2. We may compare the use of ἐβαρίλεψα ‘I became king’; I doubt however whether it would be possible to find Marcus consul faui similarly used. R.]

§ 73. in Nausiphane tenetur: ‘he is convicted (cannot free himself) in the case of N.’ Sch. quotes Caccin. c. 2 facile honestissimis testibus in re perspicuam tenetur: when thus used, ten. is often followed by a Gen. of the crime. Some explained Ep.’s depreciation of education by his dislike for Naus. πολλοὺς γὰρ τῶν νέων συνείκε, καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων σπουδαίως ἐπεμε-

λείτο, μάλιστα ἐς ῥητορικής γεγομένος συν τοῦτο μαθητής ὁ Ἔπ. ὑπέρ τοῦ δοκεῖν αὐτοδιδάκτος εἶναι καὶ αὐτοφυὴς φιλόσοφος, ἡμεῖσθ ἐκ παϊὸς τρόπου, τὸν τε περὶ αὐτὸν φήμην ἐξελείφειν ἐσπενδὲ, πολὺς τε εἰμῖντο τῶν μαθημάτων κατήγορος, Sext. Emp. Math. i p. 216. It was also asserted that the ‘canon’ of Ep. was copied from the ‘Tripod’ of Naus. Diog. L. x 14.

Democriteo. Elsewhere (Diog. L. ix 64, 69, Sext. Emp. l. c.) he is called a disciple of Pyrrho, who was however himself reckoned among the followers of Dem.

vexat contumeliis: cf. Diog. L. x 8 πλεύμωνα (‘a mussel’, Plat. Phileb. 21 c) αὐτὸν ἐκάλει καὶ ἀγράμματον καὶ ἀπάτεων καὶ πόρνον, also § 7 and Sext. Emp. l. c.

si—non audisset, quid audierat: ‘supposing he had not heard these lectures, what other teaching had he received?’ (to make him so well ac-

quainted with the doctrines of Dem.)? The connexion of thought is very much broken. Heind. following Davies proposed to improve this by reading enim after quid. Hermannus, ap. Diog. x 2, says that his philosophical interest was aroused, not by hearing the lectures of Naus. (hac Democritum), but by reading the actual books of Dem. περίτεχνα τοῖς Δημ. βιβλίοις ἐνι φιλοσοφίαν ἅγα. See below, § 93 n.

quibus—continetur: ‘which form the subject-matter of natural philo-

1 So Hirzel p. 110 n.
istuc quasi corpus—quid intellegis: ‘What do you understand by this phrase?’ For the construction see exx. in n. on spatio tamen § 21; and Fin. π 50 quid intellegit honestum? Parad. 42 quem intellegimus divitem, quoted in Sch.’s n. here.

§ 74. cum quidem semel dicta sunt. A continuation of the previous abrupt and disjointed style. There seems no reason for Heindorf’s supposition that the text is corrupt.

quid est, quod Velleius intellegere possit, Cotta non possit? ‘Once spoken, what reason is there why one should understand them better than another?’ For the asyndeton cf. § 20 cuius principium n., and for the particular opposition (possit—non possit) Plin. Ep. π 16 § 1 potestis enim efficiere ut male moriar, ut non moriar non potestis and Corte on Lucan 1 200; for quid quod § 3 n. and § 117; for the thought, Fin. π 12 hoc frequenti dixerit solet a vobis, non intellegere nos quam diectar Ep. voluptatem... egone non intellegam quid sit ἡδονή Graece, Latine ‘voluptas’? utram tandem lingquam nescio? Deinde qui fit ut ego nesciam, sciant omnes quicumque Epicurei esse voluerunt? also § 15 and § 21.

tu me celas, ut Pythagoras: a reference to the mystical and esoteric character of the teaching of P.; see Diog. L. viii 16 with the nn.

consulto tamquam Heraclitus. The same assertion is made π 35, Fin. π 15vide ne, si ego non intellegam quid Ep. loquatur, sit atque culpa ejus qui ita loquatur ut non intellegatur. Quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si au de industria facias, ut Her. cognoimento qui κοπεινός perhibetur, quia de natura nînis obscura memoravit, aut, &c., Diog. ix 1 § 6 ἐπιτηδείους ἀσαφέστερον γράψαι δόπω τι δυνάμενο προσίειν αυτῷ καὶ μή ἐκ τοῦ δημόδους εὐκαταφρόντων ἢ, Lobeck Agl. p. 160 foll. The real cause of his obscurity is the difficulty experienced by all early writers in attempting to give an outward form to philosophical ideas before the formation of a philosophical language, and the special idiosyncrasy of Her., his depth and fulness of thought, his strong imagination, his love of proverbal, enigmatic and metaphorical expressions.

quod inter nos licet: ‘let us use this freedom towards each other’ cf. Ter. Haut. v 2 20 here licetne? and Liv. vii 13 si licet (for se licet, Madv. emend.); the fuller phrase licet dicere occurs § 80 and Att. π 4. Klotz Adn. Crit. π 8 points out the error of Hand’s interpretation ‘entre nous’, and defends the ms reading licet, which he explains to mean qua de re inter me et te nulla dubitatio sit. We had a similar apologetic phrase § 59 bona venia me audites. [I incline to licet as contrasting with the preceding celas and occulte. J. S. R.]

Ch. xxvii § 75. illud pugnare ut: ‘the point you fight for is’, ‘your contention is this’: so Fam. iii 10 illud pugna et enitere, Rosc. Am. 3 hoc solum pugnatur ut, and (without an object-clause) N. D. iii 1 videtur Epicurus de dis immortalibus non magno opere pugnare. In this sense it is used with an Inf. by the poets. We have had it used in an opposite sense
in § 62. Cf. the similar metaphorical use of vincio and repugno. For the Acc. of Extent (illud) see Roby § 1094.

**species ut sit:** an abbreviation for *ut probes esse speciem*, cf. Madv. Fin. i 14 illud quidem adduci eis possum ut videantur and N. D. i 95 retinendum hoc esse deus ut beatas sit, Draeg. § 408.

**nihil concreti—eminentis:** *Nothing compact or firm, nothing that stands out in prominent relief*, cf. Off. iii 69 justitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus: umbra et imaginibus utinam, Tuse. iii 3 consecutur nullam eminentem effigiem virtutis sed adumbratum imaginem gloriae. *Est enim gloria solidus quaedam res et expressa, non adumbrata.* The use of the Gen. eminentis is allowable, as it is joined with adjectives of the 2nd declension, see Roby § 1299, Niëgelsb. § 21.

**conc.** properly used of that which has grown together, crystallized; so water is said *concrecere pruina* ii 26; *expr.* of that which has had a pattern stamped upon it, as opposed to a flat surface; so Quint. viii Pref. 19 speaks of *corpora luctvris expressa* (cf. Tennyson *arms on which the standing muscle sloped, as slopes a wild brook o’er a little stone*); *em.* of any protuberance which breaks an even line, as the circle is said to have *nihil eminens* ii 47. [So eminentia is used to express the foreground in a picture, as is opposed to umbra, Ac. ii 20; cf. the Gr. *εἰσοχαῖ* and *ἐξοχαῖ.* J. S. R.]

**sitque perlucida:** *but free from gross admixture, volatile, transparent*, so in Dir. ii 40 the Gods are called *perlucidos et perlucubiles.* For the adversative force of *que* see Draeg. § 314 10.

**dicemus—quod in Venere:** cf. Orat. ii 248 *idem in bono servo divi solet*, Roby § 1978, and Niëgelsb. Stil. § 123 3. For the ellipsis of *divimus* cf. Draeg. § 119 3 b3. The following sentence (*corpus—similitudo*) is in apposition to *quod.*

**Venere Coa:** the *Ἀφροδίτη ἀμαθομείνη* painted by Apelles for the temple of Aesculapinus at Cos, afterwards removed by Augustus to Rome and placed in the temple of Divus Julius. Apelles left unfinished a second Venus Coa, which was intended to surpass the first. Allusion is made to it in Off. iii 10, where see Beier’s n. The masterpiece of Apelles is mentioned here, of course, only as a typical painting, as in Dir. i 23; cf. *in ceras* above.

**non res—esse:** *nothing real but only a semblance of reality*. The change from the direct to the indirect construction after *dicemus* marks the difference between the actual and the supposed description.

**adumbratorum:** *shadow-deities*: so *σκιαραφία* ‘a silhouette’, see Cope on Arist. Iliet. iii 12 and quotations under *nihil concreti* above.

C. d. **Weakness of the argument in favour of anthropomorphism.** If the Gods only present themselves to our minds in human form, that is because our ancestors, whether from superstition or policy, established that belief amongst us; elsewhere the case is different. If that form
seems to men the most beautiful, that is merely the prejudice of race. If it is said that experience shows rationality to be confined to that form, on the same ground we might attribute all the properties of man to the Gods; but reason shows the danger of drawing negative conclusions from our limited experience, and it shows also that a body which is suitable for man is unsuitable for such a being as God is supposed to be. Ch. xxvii § 76—xxxvii § 102.

§ 76. hoc loco—velitis: 'here you are at no loss for arguments by which you would fain make out', cf. quò loco § 13 n.

primum quod—occurrat humana: cf. § 46. 'Such is the shaping of our minds (i.e. the πρὸς τὴν προσφάτημα), cf. §§ 43, 45, 100) that in thinking of God a human form presents itself to us':

nec essē—pulchriorem: for the loose infinitive after non deest copia rationum cf. res esse after dicemus just above; the infinitive clause here represents a parenthetic clause in the original direct sentence, thus humanae sunt formae, quod ita est informatum...quod forma esse pulcherrima debet (pulchrior autem humana nulla est). This argument is given § 47.

domicilium mentis: cf. § 48; and, for the phrase, § 99 domicilia vitae.

§ 77. primum quicque: 'each in turn', lit. 'as it comes to the front'; cf. iii 7, Ac. i 49 with Reid's n., Madv. Fin. ii 105; most mss have the archaic quicquid, which is used by Lucretius in this sense, see Munro's n. on i 389.

arripere—vestro jure rem nullo modo probabilem: 'you act as if none could dispute your right to snatch up an hypothesis which is in no way to be allowed'. Arr. stronger than sumo in § 89: Lucr. uses corripio in the same way ν 247  ἰλλυ καὶ ν anov quod terram atque ignem mortalitatem sumpsit, which Munro illustrates from Sext. Emp. Hφρ. i 90 πρὶν ἀρξαθεὶ τῆς κρίσεως τὰ φαινόμενα συναρσάθουσιν, ἢ τούτοις τῆς κρίσις ἐπιτρέποντες. The phrase suo jure (nearly equivalent to suo arbitrio) means properly 'of his own right', i.e. on his own authority, without asking leave or being liable to be called to account by another, and then, uncontrolled, without hindrance, as in Florus i 17 in subjectus suo jure detonuit, where see var. nn.

species istas—converterent. So Arist. Met. xi 8 p. 1074 b. (of the origin of religion) τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μνημικῶς ζήδη προσφέκται πρὸς τὴν πειθά τῶν πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τῶν νόμων καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρήσιν ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τὸ γὰρ τούτους καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐκεῖνοι ἐκεῖνοι τινὶ λέγουσιν, and Critias quoted on § 118. No one in the present day, theist or atheist, would assign an artificial cause for so primitive and general a phenomenon. The highest personality being involved in the idea of God, it was natural to attribute to him the form in which personality was most clearly shown, more particularly if Mr Herbert Spencer is right in supposing that ancestor-worship was the earliest form of the heathen religions, cf. Sociology, p. 440.

M. C.
ut essent simulacra. The second explanation of anthropomorphism is no better than the first. The images which bring the Gods near need not be in human shape, witness the Gods of Egypt referred to in § 82.

deos ipsos se adire: cf. Leg. ii 26 (religion is felt most strongly in temples) est enim quaedam opinione species deorum in oculis, non solum in mentibus; Sch. compares the complaint of the Sicilians in Verr. Div. 3 see jam ne deos quidem in suis urbisibus ad quos confugiant habitae, quod eorum simulacra sanctissima C. Verres e delubris religionissimis abstulisset; Plut. M. p. 379 reprobrates those who thought the images to be not ἀγάλματα καὶ τιμᾶς θεῶν ἄλλα θεῶν. See Nägelsb. Nach-Homerische Theol. p. 5.

auxerunt...opifices: cf. Quintil. xii 10 9 (of the Zeus of Phidias) cujus pulchritudo adjecisse aliquid etiam receptae religioni videtur, quoted by Nägelsb. l. c. p. 6. Poets and artists in giving expression to the popular conception of divinity, added to it clearness, elevation and refinement, but they did not change its nature.

erat enim non facile—servare: 'It was not easy to give a consistent representation of divine activity under any other form than that of man.'

accessit...quod ..videatur. The Subj., which is found in all the mss, is changed into videatur or videbatur by the later editors. May it not be explained on the same principle as dixerit in § 20? where see n.; 'perhaps too the idea to which you referred (§ 48) may have contributed to this result, I mean man's belief in his own superior beauty'. Videretur would have been more regular after accessit; the Pres. is used in order to denote that the proposition is of general import, not limited to the time of its original utterance. For the pleonasm with opinio cf. Nägelsb. Stil. § 186 2.

physice. So Metrodorus, in the ep. alluded to § 113, addresses his brother as ὁ φυσιολόγος, and Timon (ap. Diog. L. x 3) styles Epic. ἤστατος αὐτῷ φυσικῶν καὶ κύστατος. The Epicureans prided themselves on their physica as the Stoics on their dialectics, see § 83, ii 48, Fin. ii 102, i 63 in physice plurimum posuit Ep., Plut. Def. Or. p. 434 ἔπεικουρεῖς διὰ τὴν καλὴν δὴ φυσιολογίαν ἐνβρίζοντα, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, τοὺς τούτους (oracles); Zeller Stoics tr. p. 300, and esp. Hirzel p. 157 foll.

quam blanda—lena: 'What an insinuating go-between, or pander, if I may say so, of her own charms.' Cf. Sest. 21 (alter) erat hominum opinione nobilitate ipsa, blanda conciliatricula, commendatus; Lael. 37 conciliatrix amicitiae virtutis opinio; Ob. A. A. iii 315 res est blanda canor, discent cantare puellae, pro facie multis vox sua lena fuit; Acad. fr. 34 quasi lenocinante mercede; X. D. ii 147 corporum lenocinia.

an putas—delectetur? So Epicharmus ap. Diog. L. iii 116 θαυμαστὸν οὖν ἐστὶν με ταῦτα ἄνω λέγειν, | οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων αὐτῶν καὶ δοκεῖν | καλῶς πεφύκειν καὶ γαρ ἄκοιν κυκτί | καλλιστον ἐσφενταί, καὶ βοῦς βοὶ | ὁνος δ' ὧνο καλλιστὸν ἐστιν, ὃς δ' οὖν. beluam: apparently used synonymously with bestia, cf. § 78, 97, and esp. 101, and ii 100 (of shellfish).

contrectatione: properly 'stroking' 'caressing'; for its force here cf.
eam esse causam—putaremus. Modv. thinks that this clause was added by a reader who misunderstood the construction mirum si (?) and it has accordingly been bracketed by later editors. The objections as stated by Sch. Opusc. iii 317 foll. are (1) that it is superfluous in sense; we had already been told that man’s self-admiration was one of the grounds of anthropomorphism; (2) that in reading the sentence, we naturally take si as depending on mirum, and it causes an awkward surprise when we find that it is intended for the protasis of the sentence; (3) that the sequence of tenses is violated by putaremus after esse. Kl. (Adn. Crit. iii 7) defends the mss reading, and I am inclined to think he is right. The clause may be superfluous in reference to what precedes, but if we look to the following sentence, we shall see that it is needed in order to explain the introduction of si ratio esset. Cicero is seeking to prove that the reason why man attributes his own form to the gods whom he worships, is because he, in common with other animals, loves his own form best; and he proceeds to argue that this common incident of animal nature would, if acted upon by reason, lead the other animals each to glorify (plurimum tributuras) his own nature in like manner, cf. the passage from Xenophanes quoted below. If there is any corruption in the text, one might suggest the loss of a sentence referring to the 3rd reason for anthropomorphism (domicillum mentis). At present this is passed over without notice, and C. returns to the first reason in §§ 81—85, only introducing the 3rd in § 87 mixed up there with another argument from experience. As to the 2nd objection, there is no doubt a slight awkwardness in separating si from mirum, but this is certainly not a fatal objection to the correctness of the sentence. Or it might be possible to take si as depending on mirum, and then to suppose the construction broken, eam esse causam being introduced as a sort of expository clause, also dependent on mirum. Such a change of construction might be compared with that after facit § 31 facit Soc. disputantem eundemque dicere, after dicemus § 75 illud non est...sic rem esse, after docere § 76. Thirdly the tense of putaremus is attracted to praescripti, as in Lael. 2 memini...quanta esset quereda, where the tense is attracted to an intermediate Imperf., see Draeg. § 151 5 c, and Roby § 1517. For the attraction of the pronoun (eam for id) see § 67 and Roby § 1068.

Ch. xxviii § 78. quid censes...non tributuras fuisse? An abbreviated expression for quid censes? nonne censes? cf. § 82 quid igitur censes? Apin &c., Zumpt § 769, Beier on Off. ii 25. On the thought cf. Xenophanes (Zeller i p. 490) ἄλλ’ εἶτιν χειρὰς γ’ εἴχον βόσε η’ λέωντες, | ἢ γράφας χειρεσία | καὶ ἔργα τελέιν ἀπερ ἀνδρεῖς, | καὶ κε θέαν ἱδέαν ἐγράφων καὶ σώματ’ ἐποίουν | τοιαῦθ’ οίον περ καυτοὶ δέμας εἴχον ὀμοίων, | ἵπποι μὲν θ’ ἵππουι διότι δὲ τε βουσίν ὀμοίας. In the Herculanean treatise De Sensionibus ascribed to Metrodorus (II. v. vi pt. 2 col. xiii) we find the same objection

12—2
referred to, 'a lion has courage, God has courage, therefore God should be in the shape of a lion.' [Quasque is used not quamque, because it is equivalent to quodque genus. R.]

at mehercule: et would be more suitable here; if we retain at it must refer back to the last sentence but one.

taurus—Europam. This was the subject of a statue by Pythagoras the sculptor, see Varro L. L. v 351 and Müller Ancient Art § 351. A painting of the same is described by Achilles Tatius at the beginning of the Leucippe.

ingenius—orationibus: the plural of the concrete is often used for the abstract, see Nägelsb. Stil. § 12, and compare Div. ii 55 conjectura ingeniiis diducitur 'by man's ingenuity,' Arch. 17 celeritatem ingeniorum (of Roscius). I suppose orat. here to mean the faculty of speech, but I cannot cite a parallel. [Mr Roby would prefer to translate it 'by our intellects or modes of articulation'. But the general tenor of the passage requires that the comparison should lie between man, on the one side, and all other animals, on the other; whereas, if we give the ordinary force to the plural, it seems to me that the use of the word nostris here draws our attention to differences existing amongst men themselves. Also the following singulars specie figūraque suggest a singular force for the preceding plurals.]

quodsi—velimus. Quod is connective not adversative, Madv. § 449, 'and then if we choose to (go further and) invent and combine forms for ourselves'.

natantibus invehens beluis. Triton was represented with a human body ending in a fish's tail; sometimes the legs are replaced by two fish-like bodies, between or upon which the man appears to ride, as in the beautiful painting at Herculanenum (Roux Ainé Recueil Général vol. v 36, M. Borb. viii 10). It is to the latter form that C. alludes, and also Apoll. Rh. iv 1608—1614 αὐτὰρ ὑπαλγόνως δικραίρα οἱ ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα | κήτεος ὥλκαίν ὑπόκεντε, &c. Cicero would be familiar with the Triton which formed a vane on the top of the horologium of Cyrrhestes, 'the tower of the winds', at Athens, cf. Müller Anc. Art § 402. For the intransitive use of the participle cf. R. P. iii 14 invehens alium anguium curru, Phil. iii 32 (Antonius) in me absentem invehens, Brut. 331 per melius laudes quasi quadrige velentem (but invehens se Liv. xxxi 11, xxxi 35, curru invent R. P. vi 11); so vertas, volvens, rotans, and the Pres. Part. in Deponent.

nolis esse. I think Sch. is right in taking this interrogatively, so carrying on the argument of the sentence at mehercule, &c. 'I dare not call myself more beautiful than Europa's bull; if you could be metamorphosed into a Triton, would you refuse?' Otherwise surely the opposition must have been more strongly marked, 'and yet one would object to a change even into the still more beautiful Triton'. As to construction, I think quælïs refers to the preceding formas, and that we must supply talis forma with esse.

difficili—versor: 'I am on ticklish ground, I confess'. 
**BOOK I. CH. XXVIII § 78.**

**Homo nemo**: 'no one who is a man', not simply = nemo or nullus homo, § 79. *et quidem*: 'yes, and ant like ant'. This formula is often used to express an ironical acceptance of an opponent's argument, professing to carry it further but really showing that it is applicable in an opposite sense to that intended by the user; cf. Div. II 114 (in answer to an argument for divination) nonne ea praeclamit quae facta sunt? *Ile vero*; *et ea quidem quae omnes timebamus*; *N. D. I 100* (against the argument for anthropomorphism from innate ideas) habebam informationem quandam dei. *Et barbari quidem Jovis*; *Fin. I 35* (to prove that Torquatus was not forgetful of expediency) torquem detraxit hosti. *Et quidem se textit, ne interiret*, (see Madv. in loc. and Emend. p. 90 foll., Moser on Tusc. III 48, Draeg. § 311 13). It is used to emphasize without irony in §§ 55, 59, 82 *et quidem alia*, 83 *et quidem laudamus*, 89 *et libenter quidem*. The ironical meaning is also found in *quidem* alone, as III 82 at Phalaris, at Apollodorus poenas sustulit. *Multis quidem ante necatis et cruciatis*; and in et alone, as III 27 at enim quaerit Xenophon unde animum arripuerimus. *Et ego quaero unde orationem*; also in *sicdeet et* Lucr. I 809, VI 574; see Draeg: § 341, Bake and Dumesnil on Leg. II 24.

**Formica**: allusion is again made to the ant in II 158, III 21; similarly Celsus *ap*. Orig. compares it with man as affording an instance of civil life (iv 77, 81), and of foresight (ib. 83), and argues that in the sight of God the two must be much on a level (ib. 85).

**Quotus quisque**. As tertius *q.*, quartus *q.* mean 'each third', 'each fourth man', so *q. q.* means strictly 'each how-many-eth', i.e. 'one out of how large a number', 'what a small fraction'.

**Athenis cum essem**: probably referring to 79 n.c., when C. attended lectures there in company with Atticus and other friends; so in § 59 and § 93 he ascribes his own experience to Cotta.

**E gregibus—singuli**: 'scarce one in each company' (the συστρέμμα numbering about 15 privates, see Dumont *Essai sur l'Éphélée Attique*), so Tusc. v 77 *adulescentium greges Lacedaemoni vidimus ipsi incredibili contemplatione certantes*. An Athenian was strictly ἐφησος from the age of 18 to 20, during which time he had to serve as *πείρισος*, but the term was loosely used of youths after 16, when they commenced their regular training in the gymnasium. Hermann Gr. Alt. I § 170 speaks of the increased importance attached to the organization of the Ephèbi after the loss of liberty and under the Roman power. The Latinized form is freely used by Varro and the comic poets. *Græx* here just corresponds to the Cretan ἄγλη; it is technically used of a company of actors.

**Arriseris**: 'you smile at the confession of my weakness'.

**Concedentibus—delectamur**. Compare the partly ironical and playful professions of admiration which abound in the Platonic dialogues, e.g. Charm. p. 154 c, *Lyris* 204 b; and see Thompson's *Phaedrus App. I*, Zeller *Socrates* tr. p. 75 foll., *Tusc.* iv 70 foll. *philosophi sumus exorti, et autore quidem nostro Platonem, qui amor r auctoritate tribucercum, Fin. III 68.
where Madv. quotes Diog. L. vii 129 καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι τῶν σοφῶν τῶν νέων τῶν ἐμφανύντων διὰ τοῦ εἴδους τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφυίαν, ὡς φησὶ Ζήρων... καὶ Χρύσιππος... καὶ Ἀπολλοῦρος, εἶναι δὲ τὸν ἔρωτα ἐπιζολὴν φιλοσοφίας διὰ κόλλου εμφανύμενον, καὶ μὴ εἶναι συννοιαί, ἀλλὰ φιλίας. [Cf. the very similar passages in Stob. Eth. §§ 118, 238, Sext. Emp. Math. vii 239 and Sen. Ep. 123 § 15 illos quoque nociere nobis existimo qui nos sub specie Stoicae sectae hortantur ad vitam, seq. J. S. R.]

naeus—Alcaenum. Alc. of Mitylene fl. 600 B.C. canebat Lyceum nigris oculis nigroque erine decorum Hor. C. i 328; Cic. says of him fortis vir in sua re publica cognitius, quae de juvenum amore scribit Alcaenum! Tusc. iv 71. The name Λύκος occurs in one of its fragments (58 B.), where Bergk proposes to emend this passage by inserting Λυκι before πουρι. As it stands, it is a broken hexameter, which might be completed by reading amantem for Alc. Probably C. altered the verse to suit his context, as in § 13.

illi—lumen: 'the mole seemed to him a beauty', cf. P. red. in Sen. 8

Lentulus hoc lumen consulatu sui fore putavit, si me rei publicae redilidisset, Q. Fr. ii 10 illorum praediorum sito mili victum Marium lumen esse, 'the neighbourhood of your friend M. gives a new charm to my fields', Senec. 35 lumen civitatis with Reid's n.: for its rhetorical use see Piderit's index to the De Oratore s.v. On the general subject see Plato Rep. v 474 B αὐχ οὐτω ποιεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς; ὢ μὲν, ὅτι σιμός, ἐπίκαιρος κληθεῖ τινιδ' εἰτανθήσαται, foll., Lucr. iv 1154—1170, Hor. Sat. ii 3 38 foll., Or. A. A. ii 657.

Catulus. Both the father, Q. Lutatius Q. F., and the son, Q. Lutatius Q. F. Q. N., were highly respected members of the party of the Optimates and special objects of C.'s admiration. The former was a colleague of Marius in the consulship and joint-commander in the war against the Cimbri B.C. 102. His death in the Maran proscription (B.C. 57) is mentioned N. D. iii 80. His uprightness of character is witnessed to by the saying (Orat. ii 173) hoc verum est, dixit enim Q. Catulus, and C. continually praises his purity and elegance of both in Greek and Latin (Or. ii 28, Brut. 132). He is one of the speakers in the De Oratore, where some of his witty sayings are reported (Orat. ii 220 and 278). Gellius xviii 9 quotes with extravagant praise a jaw-breaking epigram addressed by him to the beautiful youth Theotimus. The younger Catulus was a warm supporter of C. against Catiline and was the first to salute him as pater patriae. He died B.C. 60. He was one of the interlocutors in the 1st ed. of the Academia, but Atticus persuaded C. that the subject was too technical to suit him, and C. took his part himself in the 2nd ed. See Reid's Introd. to the Acad.

hujus: used of time, not of place, 'now living'. Sch. compares ii 6 avus hujus adolescentis and Off. iii 66 Cato, hujus nostri Catonis pater; so N. D. i 107 hoc Orphicum carmen, 'the hymn which now goes under the name of Orpheus', his moribus, 'in the present state of morality'. [Add De Or. ii 270, Cato M. 50. J. S. R.]

municipem tuum. Vell. and Rosc. were both natives of Lanuvium, an ancient and famous municipium, situated to the south of Alba and often
mentioned by C. Milo was its chief magistrate or 'dictator', and was going there to offer sacrifice and consecrate flamines to Juno Sospita when he met and killed Clodius. In his speech for Murena, who was also a Lanuvian (§ 90), C. makes his appeal to the jury, nolite a sacris patriis Junonis Sospitae (for which see below § 82) cui omnes consules facere necessse est, domesticum et suum consulem assidere. It continued in a flourishing condition down to a late period of the Empire, and was the residence of Antoninus Pius and his two successors, see Duct. of Geog. In Div. i 79 and π 66 we read of the prodigies which announced the future greatness of Roscius, quid? amores ac deliciae tuae, Roscius, num aut ipsa aut pro eo Lanuvian totam mentiebatur? qui cum esset in cunabulis educareturque in Solonio, qui est campus agrì Lanuvii, noxu lumiére apposito, experrecta nutrit animadvertit puerum dormientem circumpraticatum serpentis amplexu. Quo aspectu exterrita clamorem sustulit. Pater autem Rosci ad haruspices ret tulit; qui respondunt nihil illo puero clariss, nihil nobiliss fore. Atque hanc speciem Pasiteles caelavit argento, et noster expressit versibus Archias. Cic. received instructions from R. in his youth and always speaks of him in the highest terms, e.g. Orat. i 130 videtisque quam nihil ab eo nisi perfecte, nihil nisi cum summa venustate fiat, nisi ita ut debeat, et uti omnes moveat atque detectet? Itaque hoc jam diu est consecutus, ut, in quo quisque artificio excellerent, is in suo genere Roscius diceretur. Pro Quint. 78 cum artifex ejus modi sit (Roscius) ut solus dignus videatur esse qui in scena spectetur; tum vir ejus modi est ut solus dignus videatur qui eo non accedat. In 68 B.C. he was engaged in a law suit connected with the profits of his teaching and was defended by C. in the speech which is still extant: he died in the year 62 B.C.

Auroram salutans. On the habit of praying at sunrise see Plato Leg. x 887 ε ἀναστλοντός τε ἡλιο και σελήνης και πρὸς δυσμας υἱτων προκλιτεσ ἀμα και προσκυντεσ ἀκούοντες τε και ὄρων Ελλήνων τε και βαιράδων πάνων εν συμφοραις παντοιαις ἐχομενων και εν εὐπορίαις, and the account given of Socrates in the Symp. 220 'he remained standing there till sunrise, then άλτετ άποι προσευχόμενος τον ἡλιο, Lucian De Salt. 17 ἦπε άραν άτιε άτομ αναστάτες προσεύχονται τὸν Ἠλιον, οὐχ ἄσπερ ἡμείς τὴν χεὶρα κύσατες ηγούμεθα ἐντελῆ εἶναι τὴν εὐχήν, (while they salute his appearances with dances); Tertull. Apol. 16 plerique vestrum (the heathen) affectatione aliquando et cælestia adorandi ad solis ortum labia vibritatis; also the saying of Pompeius to Sulla, 'more worship the rising than the setting sun', Plut. P. 14; but Tacitus speaks of it as a peculiarity of Oriental, Hist. iii 24 orientem solem (ita in Syria mos est) tertiani salutavere. We have a survival of this solar worship in the orientation of churches and the practice of turning to the East at the Creed, see Tylor i 260—271. For saluto in the sense of 'worship' cf. Rosc. Am. 56 deos salutatum venerint, Cato R. L. i 2 pater familias ubi ad villam venit, ubi larem familiairem salutavit, fundum circumcat, Seneca Ep. 95 § 47 vetemus salutationibus matutinis fangi et foribus assidere templorum: humana ambitio istis officiis capitur.
a laeva exoritur: 'Roscius dawns upon me from the propitious quarter, fairer than the god of day.'

liceat dicere: cf. § 74.

huic—pulchrior: sc. visus est.

perversissimis oculis: 'a villainous squint'.

salsum et venustum: 'piquant and charming'; cf. Att. xvi 12 de 'Hrakleidō Varro' nisi negota salsa me quidem nihil unquam sic delectavit.

Ch. xxix § 80 ecquos—arbitramur: 'do we actually suppose that there are any of the gods who, if not quite a match for Roscius, have still a slight cast of the eye?' For the use of the Ind. where we might have expected the Subj. cf. § 83 facimus n., § 91 putamus, Roby §§ 1600, 1611, and Dumesnil on Leg. i 56 quamquam igitur sententiam dicimus? (the Ind. is 'lebhafter als das Fut. oder Conj. dub. mit dem Gedanken dass die Entscheidung unzweifelhaft und unverzüglich gefällt werden könne'). [Add Lael. 24, verr. iii 156, and the rare censemus Lael. 14. J. S. B.] On the difference between st. and p. cf. Hor. Sat. i 3 44 strabonem appellat pater, Ov. A. A. ii 659 si pater est, Veneri similis (vocatuir). Other ref. to the Venus pater will be found in the lexicons: so used the word implies a side-long, languishing glance, what was called 'pink-eyed' by the older writers. For tam Heins. on Ov. l.c. suggested jam.

silos—capitones: with 'snub noses, flat ears, beetle-brows, big heads'. The anonymous translator, Lond. 1683, is not behind the Latin in his racy vernacular 'shooing-horn-nosed, bangle-eared, bangle-nolled, bittle-browed'. It will be noticed how many Latin names are borrowed from personal defects, cf. Roby § 851 a, b.

quaer sunt: '(defects) which are found amongst us men'. Sch. compares ii 21 omnia have meliora, referring to sapientia &c. involved in the preceding sapientem. For instances of this loose connexion between the relative and antecedent see n. on § 89 quaer, Reid on Lael. 14, Madv. § 317. It is more common in Greek than in Latin.

aliam alia pulchriorem: 'there must be degrees of beauty among them'.

una—necessa est. The ground of the Academic scepticism was that every true sensation has side by side with it a false one indistinguishable from it. 'One who has mistaken P. for Q. Geminius could have no infallible mode of recognizing Cotta', Ac. ii 83; cf. § 55, where the Academician borrows an argument from the innumerable identical worlds of Democritus, and asks why there may not be as many individuals undistinguishable from each other. Arnobius, who has paraphrased this passage in his 3rd book, has fallen into the same error of supposing that perfection can only be of one kind, and therefore that variety can only arise by way of defect, c. 14.

§ 81. Cic. now reverts to the 1st ground of anthropomorphism mentioned in § 76, and shows that there was no such thing as a general consensus in regard to the appearances or names of the gods.
tamenne: so *Flacc. 21, Ac. p. 26* and without *ne, Fam. ix 19*; see Lewis and Short s. v. *ii c*; for the position *Div. in Caec. 21, Att. iv 16.*

ea facie novimus: Abl. of Quality, cf. § 49 soliditate quadam cernatur (according to Hirzel’s interpretation). In such cases we supply in thought some part of the verb substantive.

at non Aegyptii. So Xenophanes, according to Theodoret *iii p. 49,* τοῦς Αιθιοπας μέλανας καὶ σιμοῖς γράφου  ἠφασε τοὺς οἰκίσκοι θεοίς, όποιοι δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ περφόκασι τοὺς δὲ γε Θρίακας γλαυκοῦς τε καὶ ἐρυθροὺς καὶ μύστης καὶ Μῆδους καὶ Πέρσας σφίσιν αὐτῶς ἐκκότας, καὶ Αἰγυπτίους ὀσάντως. Cf. Tylor *Prim. Cult.* p. 278 ‘the South-African, who believes in a god with a crooked leg, sees him with a crooked leg in dreams and visions’ (quoted from Livingstone); ‘when the Devil with horns, hoofs and tail had once become a fixed image in the popular mind, of course men saw him in this conventional shape’.

barbaria: ‘the uncivilized world’, a collective name like our ‘Christendom’, cf. *Fina. ii 49 non solum Graecia et Italia sed etiam omnis barbaria.*

opiniones de bestiis: ‘beliefs in certain brutes’, cf. 29 n.


fando auditum: ‘none have heard tell’, cf. Roby § 1239, Pref. lxv.

crocodilum. See more in § 101 and *iii 47* and compare *Tusc. v 78* Aegyptiorum nomen quis ignorat? quorum imbutae mentes praeventis erroribus quamvis carnificinam prius subierint, quam ibim aut aspidein aut fuelem aut canem aut crocodilum violent, quorum etiamsi imprimentes quippiam fecerint, poenam nullam recueant, Herod. *ii 65* τó δ' ἄν τις τῶν θηρίων τοίων ἀποκτείνη, ἢ μὲν ἐκών, δίων γὰρ, ἢ δὲ ἄκων, ἀπετέινε ξιμήν τὴν ἄν οἱ ἑκές θάζονται: ὃς δ' ἄν Ἰβίν ἢ ἄκων ἢ ἄσκον πρῶτον ἦν τὸ ἄκων, τεθάνως ἄνγκτην. Cambyses is said to have taken advantage of this superstition, and placed dogs, sheep, cats and ibises in the van of his own army, *Aignptiou de βαλλοντες ἐπιτάχνατο, φοβος του πληβαλ των ἱερων ζωων,* Polyaeus *vi c. 9.* See also Diod. *i 83* and the quotations from the comic poets in Athen. *vii 55*, esp. that from Timocles, which is given also in Philodemus p. 86. Different animals were counted sacred in different parts of Egypt as appears from Juvenal *Sat. xv*; see the very full notes, and reff. on the Egyptian religion generally, contained in Mayor’s *ed.*, and for the crocodile, his *n. on crocodilon adorat.* In Wilkinson’s *Ancient Egyptians* (ch iv. small ed.) there is a list of the sacred animals, mentioning where they were worshipped—what with what deity each was associated. The later mythology explained this animal-worship by the transformations which the Gods underwent in their fear of Typhon, cf. *Ov. Met.* v 325 *hac quoque* (to Egypt) *terrigenam venisse Typhonem narrat—et se mentitiss superstes colisse figuras, Jupiter in the ram, Mercury in the ibis, &c. For the modern views see Tylor *P. C.* ii 208—224.
ibim aut faelem: see § 101 n.

violatum. Unless C. contravenes usage in making faelem common, we have here an ex. of agreement with the more remote word, as in Leg. 1 1 locus ille et have quereus aegnoritar lectus, where see Dumesnil. For the omission of esse see n. on doctus § 60.

quid censes—nonne deum videri? For the form of sentence cf. § 78 n. For Aapis see Dict. of Biey.

illam vestram Sospitam. The temple of Juno Sospita or Sispita, 'the Saviour', at Lanuvium, was one of peculiar sanctity, being visited annually by the consuls like that of Jupiter Latiaris. Livy often speaks of prodigies occurring there, and C. (Dict. 1 99) tells us that the outbreak of the Marsic war was signified by mice gnawing the shields suspended there. It was rebuilt in obedience to a vision B.C. 90 (Dict. 1 4). For the special ceremonies belonging to it see Art. on Lanuvium in Dict. of Geog., and Preller Röm. Myth. p. 2462. For the attraction quam Sospitam instead of quam Sospita videitur cf. § 86 tam aperte quam te, and Zumpt § 603 b.

cum pelle—repondis. Preller l.c. quotes an inscription relating to a priestess quae in aede Junonis Sospitae Matris Reginae scutulum et clypeum et hastam et calceos rite novavit votto. The Goddess appears in this garb on the coins of the Rosci and other families connected with Lanuvium. See Müller Anc. Art. § 353. The goat-skin, which Preller considers to be a symbol of fertility, and connects with that worn by the Luperci, covered the head and breast; the scutum was oblong as opposed to the round clypeus; an engraving of the shoe with the upturned toe, calceolus repandus (pandus), is given in Rich's Comp. to Dict. p. 99; I think the diminutive implies a low shoe, not (as Rich) one worn by a female, as we read of calcei muliebres in Varro L. L 8 x 29 and elsewhere; the hasta marks protection, it was also borne by the Juno Curitis. Moser (ms.) notices the recurrence of the termination-am seven times in ten words.

alia nobis: is added by Ursinus, and seems required if the preceding sentence is right, but Sch. Opusc. III. 287 denies the existence of a Romana Juno distinguished as such by special attributes, and thinks that nec Romana may have been added by some reader who stumbled at the omission of any reference to the Juno Capitolina. On the other hand Klotz Ado. Crit. 1 6 proposes to insert alia Romanis between Argive and alia Lanuvinis. It seems to me that et quidem (on which see § 75 n.) comes in very naturally with a repeated alia nobis, and the fact of the repetition facilitates the omission in the first instance. In speaking of the Juno Argivae C. no doubt had in his mind the famous statue by Polycleitus, the contemporary and fellow-pupil of Phidias. It was made of ivory and gold, and represented the goddess seated on a throne, her head crowned with a garland, on which were worked the Graces and the Hours, the one hand holding the symbolical pomegranate, and the other a sceptre, surmounted by a cuckoo, a bird sacred to Hera, on account of her having been once changed into that form by Zeus (Pausan. II 17 quoted in Dict. of B.). It does not appear that
there was any single type known under the name of Juno Romana; C. probably refers to the general difference between the Greek Hera and her Roman counterpart; cf. Müller A. A. § 120.

Ch. xxx § 83. physicum: see § 77 n. and Wilkins on Orat. i 217, where the Gk. form is used.

venatorem: cf. the metaphorical use of ὑπερέπευμ in Plato, and especially the 'view-hollo' on the discovery of justice, Rep. iv 432 c; so Hume 'there cannot be two passions more nearly resembling each other than hunting and philosophy', Huxley's Hume p. 141.

consuetudine imbutis: Bacon's idola tribus. See N. D. ii 45.

laudamus Athenis Vulcanum: 'yes, and at Athens we admire' i.e. 'there is a statue of V. at Athens'; cf. Mayor on Juv. v 42 praeclara ille laudatur iapis who quotes Fin. iii 63 illa quae in concha patula pinna dicitur, and compares (index s. v.) the poetical construction with καλεῖσθαι = εἶναι, as in Soph. Trach. 639.

Alcamenex: a pupil of Phidias and one of the greatest of Greek sculptors. A list of his works is given in Sillig's Dictionary of Artists. Some of these have been lately discovered at Olympia, casts of which may be seen in the Fitzwilliam Museum at Cambridge. The Vulcan is thus described by Val. Max. viii 11 tenet visentes Athenis Vulcanus Alcamenis manibus fabricatus. Præter cetera enim perfectissimæ artis in eo praecurrentia indicia etiam illud miratur, quod stat dissimulatae claudicationis sub veste leviter vestigium repraesentans, ut non exprobans tamquam vitium, ita tamen certam propriamque dei notam decore significans.

age et his—facimus: passing on to the names of the Gods, 'do we suppose (are we such fools as to suppose?) cf. n. on arbitramur § 80) that they have also the same names as those by which they are known to us'? The first Abl. is that of Description (Roby § 1232) the second that of Manner (Roby § 1234). On age Orelli quotes from Madv. Op. Ac. ii 40 'de "age" interrogationi praeposito, cf. ii 120 Tusc. iii 49 Phil. v 28'; see Roby § 1609. On the adverbial use of et see § 72 n., and Hand ii 513, 517, Kühner on Tusc. iii 28 referred to by Sch. Many exx. are given by Dumesnil on Leg. i 33. The argument as to names is added as a sort of corollary to the previous argument on the appearance of the Gods. That was a fair enough criticism on the prolepsis, and this, though, at first sight, a mere reductio ad absurdum, is to some extent justified by the Epicurean doctrine that names existed φύει οὐθεὶς.

§ 84. quot hominum linguæ: sc. sunt; ut tu Velleius: sc. eris; cf. §§ 68, 90, and Dræg. § 116.

idem Vulcanus: 'you are always Velleius, but Vulcan (i.e. the God of fire) does not bear the same name in Italy as in Africa or Spain'. Four different Vultans are distinguished in iii 55, one of whom is the Egyptian Phthas, but we have no information as to a Spanish Vulcan, though it is natural to suppose that there may have been a god of mining in a country so rich in metals.
in pontificis, sc. libris, cf. the similar ellipse with annales. The pontifical records included nine different kinds of books, according to Marquardt Hb. d. Röm. Alt. vi p. 287: one of these consisted of indigimentos, forms of prayer, of which Augustine says C. D. iv 8 nomina deorum aut deæram, quae illi granilibus voluminibus vic comprehendere potuerunt, singulis rebus propriis dispertinentes officia nominum. Sch. quotes Serv. ad Georg. i 21 nomina hasce nominum in Indigimentos inventur, id est in libris pontificialibus; qui et nomina deorum et rationem ipsorum nominum continet (e.g. Oculator, Servitor, Sterculinius).

innumerabilis: i.e. in the Epicurean view, cf. §§ 49, 50 and 53. So Philod. p. 84 ‘The Epicureans believe that the gods οὐ μόνον ὅσους φασίν οἱ Πανέλληρες ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείωνας εἶναι.’

istud—ita: Sch. quotes Div. ii 21 quod certe volvis ita dicendum est. and refers to Hand. Turs. iii 485. See also Madv. Fin. ii 17 and quod ita just below. Ita is not merely pleonastic but adds precision; indeed in this place I should prefer to give it a more defined force ‘that doctrine of yours (una facies § 80) requires such a corollary (sine nominibus), for what is the good of a multitude of names, where there is but one form’? [We sometimes find eodem modo used as ita is here, e.g. § 77, Div. i 29; so isto modo Tusc. v 23; cf. Plato Phileb. 20 B ἐπειδὴ τούθι οὗτος εἰςεῖς. J. S. R.]

quam bellum erat: ‘how much prettier it would have been’, see n. on longum est § 19.

confiteri nescire: ‘If the subject in an Acc. with Inf. is a personal or reflexive pronoun referring to the subject of the principal verb, this pronoun is sometimes left out with verba declarandi et putandi esp. when one Inf. is dependent upon another having the same subject’ Madv. § 401, cf. Roby § 1346 Krüger Unters. iii 337 foll. who quotes N. D. i 109 pudet me dicere non intellegere; the same construction is found with confiteror, Rosc. Am. 61.

[nescire, quod nescire: of Ac. ii 106 liget per vos nescire quod nescio? J. S. R.] Tusc. i 60 nec me pudet, ut istos suteri me nescire quod nesciam.

nauseare: Forcellini and Freund take this to mean ‘to utter’: the former compares Phil. v 20 orationem ore impurissimo evanuit, and Fam. xii 25 violentum furor omnem esuberet. As both passages refer to Antony, (of whom nausea is also used in its literal sense 2 Phil. 84, and Fam. i.e. quem ego ractatam et nauseasentem conjeci in Octaviani plagas), there is some excuse for violence of language there: here, in a quiet discussion with a friend, such a use of the term (even if possible elsewhere, which I doubt), seems almost beyond Roman bad taste. May it not mean ‘to feel disgust at having to utter such nonsense’ as Epicurus puts in your mouth? So Heind. takes it, and would even omit the following words as a gloss. Phaedrus iv 6 25 has si qui stulte nauseant of over-critical readers who are disgusted with everything, which Lewis and Short wrongly translate ‘to cause disgust’; (the reading is however doubtful).

sibi disiplicere: the change to the 3rd person is allowable, as the use of
the 2nd person was merely indefinite ‘to confess one’s ignorance’: cf. for a similar change from the 1st to the 3rd, § 122 utilitatum suarum.

an—sapientia: ‘Or (am I mistaken in supposing you to be dissatisfied with your position?) do you really believe God to be a man like you or me? That is impossible. Then am I to call the sun or moon God? But you Epicureans have yourselves shown that the divine attributes of happiness and wisdom are incompatible with such deities’.

trunco: ‘a senseless block’, contrasted with man’s powers of feeling and motion, as in Lael. 43, where see Seyffert, and Juv. viii 53 trunco Hermæ with Mayor’s n.

haec vestra: this may refer to such passages as the criticism on Zeno § 36 rebus inaninis et mutis.

§ 85. visu: cf. § 12 n. and Ruhnken on Paterc. ii 94. On the omission of the verb, see § 63 n.

tali aliquo: if the reading is right, this must refer to the heavenly bodies just mentioned, but I prefer Heind.’s alio aliquo.

quod—ita: see above on istud—ita.

hoc loco: see § 13 n. and § 76. It is equivalent here to the in hujus modi sermone of § 61.

omnia sigilla: ‘even the least images’, not merely statuettes, but emblems on rings or other ornaments.

Epicurum—deos sustulisse: this is asserted by Posidonius below § 123, cf. Plut. M. p. 1102 n, 1112 d.

reliquisse: tollere is regularly opposed to relinguere in the Academica, as αὐαπείν to ἀπολείπειν in Sext. Emp., Philodemus and elsewhere. verbis—re: cf. § 16.

itaque: the particle properly refers to the sentence beginning in haec ita exposita, to which this should have been subordinated. For exx. of similar looseness of construction, which makes two separate and independent sentences out of the protasis and apodosis of a compound sentence, and yet leaves the original introductory particle in the protasis, see etenim § 91, nam § 93, and Madv. Fin. ii 18, where censet enim properly refers to itaque attulit in the next sentence.

κυρίας δύος ‘articles of belief’ see § 45 quod beatum n. In Fin. ii 20 C. gives, as an explanation of the title, quasi maximo ratus, quia gravissimae sint ad beate vivendum breviter enuntiatae sententiae.

Ch. xxxi inscitia loquenti: cf. §§ 58, 72 nn. Diog. L. x 13, says that he employed words in their strict literal sense (λέξει κυρία), and that his style was blamed by Aristophanes the grammarian as being ιδιωτάτη, (does this mean too much given to the use of οἶδα οὖν ὡματα? or ‘a marked individual style’? or should we read ιδιωτικωτάτη, ‘an untrained style’?) σαφῆς δ’ ἢν οὖνος ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἀξιοὶ μὴ δέν ἄλλο ἢ σαφῆνειν ἀπατεῖν. Rhetoric he called κακοτεχνία Amm. M. xxx 4, and said that φώς ἐστιν ἡ κατορθοῦσα λόγους τέχνη δὲ ὀνειρία, Val. ad loc. Elsewhere C. allows the merit of perspicuity, Fin. i 15 oratio me istus philosophi non
offendit; nam et completitur verbis quod vult, et dicit plane quod intellegat, and Seneca speaks of a nobilis sententia, apertior quam ut interpretanda sit, et diisertor quam ut adjicanda. Ep. 21. Gellius II 9 defends his style from some attacks of Plutarch. [Theon the rhetor blamed Epic. for an excessive attention to rhythm, see Blass Die Attische Beredsamkeit, p. 52. J. S. R.]

**hominem minime vafro:** cf. Tusc. II 44 venit Epicurus, homo minime malus vel potius vir optimus; tantum monet quantum intellegit. In R. P. III 26 the Epicureans are described with the same contemptuous good-nature as il qui minime sunt in disserendo malii, qui non sunt in disputando vafri, non veteratores, non malitiosi, and in Tusc. III 50 as viri optimi, nam nullum genus est minus malitosum.

§ 86. **an si quid sit.** There is the same ambiguity in the original τὸ μικάρμων as in C.'s translation quod beatum est; both assert that ἀπηγγε-σίν is a necessary accompaniment of blessedness and immortality, without positively asserting the existence of a blessed and immortal being. The apodosis omitted after si quid is of course id nec habere—negotium. The ms reading id esse immortale is an attempt to supply the apodosis by a reader who misunderstood the sense, see Sch. Opusc. III pp. 318, 366.

**non animadvertunt hic—sed:** 'they do not observe that, though he speaks ambiguously here' &c., cf. the use of μὲν and ὁδὲ, and see nn. on § 20 opus principium, § 23 ut ea sapientis.

**Metrodorum:** see § 93 n.

**quam—te:** the correct construction tu locutas es is subordinated to animadvertunt, see § 82 n.

**ille vero:** 'no, no! he is a believer'. The argument is 'Ep. is eager to do away with religion because, he says, it inspires such overwhelming terrors; but experience does not show these terrors at work in ordinary men; Ep. must be judging others from himself'.

**quibus mediocres—perterrítas.** For the feeling as to religious terrors among Epicureans and others see §§ 45, 54, 56, Tusc. I 10 non te illa terrent? triceps apud inferos Cerberus?...Adone me delirare censes ut ista credam?...Atqui pleni sunt libri contra ista ipsa dissentium. Inope saepe; quis est enim tam excors quem ista morcant? Tusc. I 48 liberatos se dicunt (Epicurci) gravissimis dominis, terrore sempiterno et diurno ac nocturno metu. Quo terror? quo metu? Quae est unus tam delira quae timeat ista quae vos videlicet, si physica non diicissetis, timentis? foll.; Fin. I 64 e physicis et fortitudo semitur contra mortis timorem, et constantia contra metum religions, et sedatio animi, omnium rerum occulturarum igno-ratione subdata, et moderatio, natura expeditatun generibusque earum explicatis; Lucr. I 62, 102, 110 aeternas quoniam poemas in morte timendum, 146 foll.; above all the very interesting discussion on the nature and effects of religious fear in Plutarch's treatise, Non posse suaviter véri sequum Epicureos, pp. 1101—1107, of which the purport is given in the following, βελτίων γὰρ ἐνυπάρχειν τι καὶ συγκεκριμένα τῷ περὶ θεῶν δοξῆ κομοῦν αἰδώς καὶ φόβου πάθος, ἣ τούτω φείγοντας μήτ' ελπίδα μήτε χάριν ἐαυτοῖς μήτε
BOOK I  CH. XXXI  § 86.  191

βίορος ἄγαθῶν παρώντων, μὴ τινὰ δυστυχεῖσιν ἀποστροφὴν πρὸς τὸ θεόν ἀπολεἰπέσθαι.

fana compilant: for the robbing of temples cf. III 83 and above §§ 63 and 82.

credo: ironical.

religionis: it seems better to take this as an objective Gen. like mortis; the sacrilegious do not fear the religionem templi any more than robbers fear death, cf. Fin. 1 64 quoted above. Religiones, the reading of most mss defended by Klotz (Adn. Crit. II 11), would be rather awkward after the Sing.

§ 87. cum ipso Epicuro loquar: see § 67 n.

in deorum numero ponere: for const. see § 29 n. Numero is Walker's corr. for natura of mss [written nā in U and therefore easily confounded with nó. J. S. R.].

numquam vidi—figura: see § 48 and § 76.

quid ? solis—vidisti? C. has made a mess of his argument. Ep. says 'I do not believe in the existence of reason apart from human shape, for I have no experience of it.' The answer is 'You have never seen any thing like the sun and stars moving in regular order, therefore you must disbelieve their existence'. Of course the cases are entirely unlike: in the latter case the senses, which (acc. to Ep.) always tell truth, assert the existence of the sun; in the former they assert nothing, and we have to proceed by general reasoning from analogy. What C. was really aiming at may be gathered from the remarkable treatise of Philodemus, περὶ σημείων καὶ σημειώσεων, where we find it stated (p. 37 Gomp.) that 'the opponents of Epic., in arguing that there may be unique existences in the unseen world, are employing the Epicurean argument from analogy', and (in p. 19) that 'Epicureans allow that ἡλιος εἰς ἑστιν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ σελήνη καὶ πλῆθος ἄλλων ὑπάρχουσιν ἰδιότητοι (e.g. the magnet as contrasted with other stones), but they hold that when certain properties have been found constantly united, where one exists the other will exist, μηδένος ἄνθελκαντος'. The anti-Epicurean argument therefore must evidently have been of this nature, 'there may be rational beings without human shape, though our experience presents no parallel, for many things in our experience are unparalleled, and, on this principle, would have been incredible prior to experience'.

quince errantium: so Milton speaks of 'five other wandering fires', viz. Mars, Venus, Mercury, Jupiter, Saturn, see N. D. II § 52 foll.

sol duabus—conficit: 'the sun completes its annual revolutions, confining his motion within the limits of the ecliptic at either solstice' (lit. 'by the two extreme points of one circle'), cf. II 49, 50, 101 foll.

hunc: 'under similar limitations'; see II 50 in lunae quoque cursu est et brunae quaedam et solstitii similitudo.

lustrationem: cf. the use of lustro in II 53, 106.
a terris: the plural is unusual in this sense, though in Agr. ii. 62 we find in terris, meaning 'the whole world'.

ab isdem principiis: 'starting from the same point they finish their course in longer or shorter time'. For the Pl. cf. Orat. i 121 exulbescam in principiis diecendi.

numne: found also in Lael. 36, where see Seyffert.

§ 88. ergo: 'on this principle of experience we must disbelieve everything unusual in history or science'.

ita fit: 'it follows from this', cf. §§ 37, 121.

medierranei: Verr. v 70 homines mediterranei are opposed to homines maritimi just before.

quae sunt tantae animi angustiae: 'what an excess of narrow-mindedness is this'? cf. § 90 quis iste tantus casus? and Virg. Geo. iv 495 quis tantus furor? Heind. following Davies and Walker took quae as the relative and joined these words to the following sentence, but the exclamation is more Ciceronian here, and the connexion tantae ut putares would be very harsh, especially coming after the comparison as to the mediterranei.

ut—non crederes: 'in like manner (lit. just as), supposing you had been born in Seriphus and had never seen any animal larger than a fox, you would never have believed in the existence of lions’. Sch. compares ii 86 ut, si qui dentes natura dicit existere, Div. i 86 ut, si magnetem lapidem esse dicit, and refers to Madv. Fin. iv 30 ut...si vita juvunda addatur, where other exx. are given.

Seriphi: one of the Cyclades, used as a place of banishment under the Empire, proverbial for its insignificance and the borne tone of its inhabitants, cf. Mayor on Juv. x 170, Ael. H. I. III 37, Plato Rep. 1 329 (the famous story of Themistocles and the Seriphian, which is also given by C. Senect. § 8).

(§ 97) an quicquam—vidimus. I have followed Bake (Mem. 11 4 p. 414) in transposing this passage, which comes in very inappropriately where it is placed in the mss, separating two sentences which clearly belong to each other, and having itself no proper connexion with what precedes; while here, on the contrary, it serves to round off what was previously abrupt, and makes an easier transition to the new topic introduced in et tu quidem Vellei. Connecting it thus I understand an to refer to quae sunt angustiae? 'is it not narrow-mindedness) or (still to press the same point) can we imagine anything more childish than to deny the existence of the animals which inhabit the Red Sea'? an implying 'the needlessness of the preceding remark', Roby § 2255.

quae gignantur: there is no occasion for reading the Ind. with Sch., or for any elaborate explanation, such as Miiller gives Adn. Crit. p. vi: the Subj. is that which naturally belongs to a subordinate relative clause in Orat. Obl. For nullaesse cf. § 61.
rubro mari Indiave: a sort of hendiadys for the ἐρυθρὰ θάλασσα of the Greeks, which comprehended the Indian Ocean together with the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. The allusion is probably to the whales, of which Pliny says (N. H. ix 2) plurima et maxima in Indico mari animalia, e quibus balaenae quaternum jugerum, pristes decemun cubitorum; and further on, speaking of Cadara, rubri maris paeninsula ingens, he says that hujus loci quiete ad immobiled magnitudinem beluae adesseant; so Strabo xv 2 12 mentions among the difficulties experienced by Nearchus, in his voyage from the mouth of the Indus to the Euphrates, the shoals of enormous whales (φυτηρῶν); he continues λέγουσι μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ νῦν πλέοντες εἰς Ἰνδοὺς μεγεθη θηρίων, 'which are however frightened by shouting and the sound of the trumpet'.

curiosissimi: used in a good sense as of Chrysippus, Tusc. i 108, in omni historia curiosus.

tam multa—quam sunt multa quae existunt: this somewhat verbose expression is intended, I suppose, to give greater prominence to the idea of multitude, cf. Orat. 108 nemo orator tam multa scripsit, quam multa sunt nostra. For the substantival use tam multa is more common than tot, which is so used however in Cael. 66 tot unum superare possent.

negemus esse, quia numquam vidimus: cf. Locke's story of the King of Siam, who refused to believe the Dutch Ambassador's description of the ice in Holland; and the controversy on the value of experience, as opposed to testimony, between Hume, Campbell and others. In Ep.'s argument against the Stoics, who are here speaking through the mouth of Cotta (see Introduction), the point debated is the value of particular experience as opposed to general reasoning. 'The universe', said the Stoics, 'exhibits the working of what we call reason (this is shown at length in Bk. 11), therefore it must be animated by a rational soul' : 'no', replies the Epicurean, 'experience shows that a rational soul can only exist in human form'; which the Stoic meets by a reference to the limited nature of our experience, and the vastness of the universe, pointing out the erroneous conclusions which would necessarily flow from the assumption that there can be nothing in the infinite unknown but what is a repetition of the infinitesimal known. In point of fact the Epicureans did not themselves adhere to this principle; their doctrines of atoms, of images, of the gods, of the origin and growth of the world, were anything but matters of ordinary experience (as Lactantius points out De Ira 10 quia illa vidit umquam? folli); nor did they care about their scientific truth, except in so far as it offered an escape from the acknowledgment of a divine government of the universe.

§ 89. et tu quidem: 'yes, and you Vell. have gone further and given us a syllogistic proof of anthropomorphism'; see this in § 48.

non vestro more, sed dialecticorum. Cf. § 70 n. Hirzel p. 177 foll. argues that Zeno is here alluded to, and that there was an important section of the Epicurean school, commencing with Apollodorus ὁ κατοικοῦρανος, who set a
higher value on logic and on literary culture generally than Epicurus did; he thinks these are referred to by Diog. L. x 25, when he speaks of those disciples oüs oi γνήσιοι Ἐπικούρειοι σοφιστάς ἀποκαλοῦσαν. It is certain that C. (Fin. i 30 foll.) contrasts the procedure of Ep. himself, who held that his doctrine of pleasure was self-evident and needed no proof (negat opus esse ratione necpe disputatione, quamobrem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit; sentiri hoc putat ut calere ignem), and that of some of his followers who, having regard to the criticisms of other schools, non existimant oportere nium nos causae confidere, sed et argumentandum et accurate disserendum et rationibus consiatis de voluptate et dolore disputandum putant.

quae agrees with the neuter dialectica, implied in the preceding masculine. The neuter is also found Off. i 19 al.: elsewhere we have the feminine, both in a Gr. form, dialectice, and in the Latin, see Fin. ii 17 dialecticam pugni similem esse dicebat, III 41 &c. Sch. illustrates the construction from Tusc. i 4 in Graecia musici flowerunt discebantque id omnes, cf. also ib. iv 48 gladiatorium id quidem; quamquam in usis videmus saepe constantiam. N. D. i 50 egubos silos—quae, Brut. 112 ad senatorium sententiam, ejus (sc. senatus) erat ille princeps, (optum videbatur), Fin. i 17 Democritia dicit...ille, v 16 Carolinea divicio est—ille (where see Madv.), and a remarkable instance in Sull. Cat. 18 antea conjuravere Bauice: in quibus Catilina fuit; de qua dixim, where see Dietsch. [Perhaps however it is better, as Mr Roby suggests, to refer quae to argumentis, translating 'and you V., deviating from the custom of your school, have logically stated your opinion in arguments of the Dialecticians, totally unknown to your tribe'; though it must be confessed there is some harshness in the position of the relative.]

gens vestra non novit: cf. § 70 nn., Ac. ii 97, Zeller Stoics tr. p. 399. C. goes more into detail Fin. i 22 (Epicurus) tollit definitiones, nihil de dividendo ac partiendo doct, non quo modo efficatuar concludaturque ratio tradit, non quo via captioea solvantur, ambiqua distinguishant ostendit. According to Seneca Ep. 89 the Epicureans at first made philosophy consist of Ethics and Physics only, but afterwards cum ipsis rebus cogerunt ambiqua scernere, falsa sub specie veri latentia coarguere, ipsi quoque locum, quem de judicio et regula appellant (N. D. i § 43) alio nomine rationalem indixerunt; sed cum accessionem esse naturalis partis existimant. We may take Gellius' statement (ii 8) that Ep. inverted the order of the syllogism, as a sign that he had treated the subject with his usual independence and originality of thought; and the treatise of Philodemus peri σημείων καὶ σημειώσεων shows that the Inductive Logic at any rate was deeply studied by some of the later Epicureans. gens vestra 'your people' is used, like natio (cf. ii 74 salem istum, quo cunct vestra natio) and εἶδος, for a set or class of people: similarly familia, of a philosophic sect, Div. ii 3.

argumentis sententiam conclusisti. Most ms have argumenti, but this could only mean 'the general sense of the argument,' which does not
suit the context. What is wanted is a phrase to express strict logical procedure as opposed to a mere statement of belief, and I think this is better expressed by the Abl. than by Sch.'s argumenta (or summam) sententiae, see his Opusc. III 289 and 328. Madv., it is true, denies the possibility of this reading, see his note on Fin. i 30 Latine 'rationem, argumentum concluere' dicitur, etiam 'aliq id concluere' ut accusativus pronominis addatur; 'sententiam rem non magis 'concludere' dicimur quam 'rem negare' aut 'veritatem rei'. But negative statements of this kind are to be received with very great suspicion even when made about the writer's own language, and the correctness of the expression is, I think, shown by the citations in Muller Adn. Cr. v, e.g. Ac. i 32 itaque tradebatur omnis dialecticae disciplina, id est, orationis ratione conclusae, which Reid translates 'speech drawn up in syllogistic form'; cf. too Div. i 82 quam (divinationem) esse re vera hac Stoicorum ratione concluditur, where we might surely have had quae sententia rat. concludit. The phrase occurs in the more general sense of 'rounding off' in Brutus 34 ipsa natura circumscriptione quaedam verborum comprehendit conclusitique sententias, so Quintil., sensum numeris concludere.

Ch. xxxii. beatos esse—hominis figura. This is an example of the composite or chain syllogism (see Hamilton Logie i pp. 366—385), also called the 'sorites', though that term is confined to the synonymous sophism by C., unless we except the doubtful passage in Fin. iv 50. The simple syllogisms of which the sorites is composed are as follows, (1) All that are blessed are virtuous, the gods are blessed, therefore the gods are virtuous; (2) all that are virtuous are rational, the gods are virtuous, therefore rational; (3) all that are rational are in the shape of man, the gods are rational, therefore in human shape.

et libenter quidem: cf. §§ 82, 83 and n. on § 79.

conveniant—necessse est: 'we cannot but agree to that.'

quam—datum. The Epicureans no doubt would answer, not perhaps with the French materialist, that thought was a secretion of the human brain, but that experience told us nothing of the operations of reason except as contained in a human body; and so in fact we find it stated in a Herculanean treatise, quoted on § 48.

opus erat: so bellum erat § 84 n.

sumpisses tuo jure: Madv. on Fin. ii 35 gives this as an example of the jussive use of the Subj., on which see Roby § 1604 and my n. on dedisse III 76. Thus taken it would mean, 'if reason were confined to human shape, you should have assumed the doctrine of anthropomorphism on your own authority' (without all this reasoning). Otherwise we might take it as an ordinary apodosis after si ita esset, 'you would have been justified in assuming it'. Sch. suggests that it is equivalent either to debebas or to poteras sumere. The second no doubt gives the most natural sense, 'you might have assumed it on your own authority, without asking
any one's leave'; but, though the Inf. with poteram sometimes stands where we might have expected the Plup. Subj., is there any instance of the converse? On tuo jure see § 77 arrripere vestro jure n.

quid est istuc gradatim: 'what do you mean by this phrase of yours?' In the mss these words stand before sumpisses, and Walker followed by Davies and Ernesti omitted them as an expression of bewilderment on the part of some ignorant frutenterus, but gradatim is not a particularly puzzling word; and the clause comes in quite naturally with Faccolati's transposition. The emendation qui (Sch. Opusc. III p. 325) is unnecessary; it only expresses in a literal prosaic way what is implied by quid; cf. N. D. III 21 cum mundo neges quicquam esse melius, quid dicis melius? (Allen).

praecipitare istuc quidem: 'that is not a step, but a plunge', 'herabstürzen nicht herabsteigen', Kiihner; cf. Ae. II 63 sustincens est omnis assensio, ne praecipitet si temere processerit. On the fallacy known as the satus or hitus in demonstrando see Hamilton Logie II p. 51. For the form of expression cf. Tusc. II 30 optare hoc quidem est, non docere (Heind.). The Nom. and Acc. N. both in S. and Pl. of the archaic istic are found in C., cf. Ae. I 13 istue quidem considerabo, Dir. II 35 istue quidem dicunt, Att. xiv 1 non posse istue sic abire.

§ 90. deos hominum similes—quam homines deorum. Cf. the language in which C. speaks of the anthropomorphic gods of the poets, fingebat hanc Homerus et humana ad deos transfigurat; divina mullem ad nos. Quae autem dicina? vigere, sapere, inventire, meminisse, Tusc. I 65.

esse illud huic: Orat. Obl. in loose dependence on dices implied in quaeris.

video: 'I see your point', almost equivalent to 'granted'.

formae figuram: 'the outline of their shape', see § 47 n. If this is a genuine phrase, and not a gloss for formam, its precision was probably intended to prevent the misapprehension of formam in the sense of 'beauty'. Sch. quotes Lucr. IV 67 formam seereque figuram, and Of. I 126 formam nostram reliquamque figuram in qua esset species honesta, where see Holden.

nati numquam sunt. Immortality was the most universally accepted of the divine attributes, but this was not understood to mean eternity. On the contrary, detailed accounts of the birth of the reigning gods of Olympus were to be found in the poets, and even the primeval gods were supposed to have sprung from Earth and Chaos. Yet we find traces of the higher doctrine, as in the oracle of Dodona reported by Pausan. X 12 5 Zeus  ἕν, Zeus ἑπτα, Zeus ἑπτὰτα, ὁ μεγάλε Ζεῦ; and Plut. Stoic. Rep. 38 p. 1051 treats this as the universally accepted opinion, ἐφαρμοῦνα καὶ γενετῶν αὐθεῖς, ὃς ἐπος εἶπεν, διανοεῖται θεόν (Nigg. N. Hom. Theol. pp. 9, 71).

siquidem aeterni sunt futuri: 'that is, if they are to be eternal' (as you Epicureans hold, cf. §§ 45, 49, 107, 109). The Fut. Part. is used because the question whether the gods are in future to be called aeterni
would be decided by the fact of their having been born in the past, cf. § 103 n.

ante igitur—immortales. Bake’s reading caque, adopted by Baiter, seems to me to give the thought rather awkwardly, as though the human form were something self-existent, and happened to be also an attribute of the gods. If an alteration is needed, I should prefer to insert a second di immortales before humana forma, translating ‘so the gods existed in human form before men existed in that form which belonged to the gods’. With the present reading, humana forma must be Nom.; ea is also so taken by Moser and Seibt, and, if one may judge from the punctuation, by Schömann, but this seems to me extremely harsh; the only possible construction is quam homines ea (forma erant) qua erant forma di.

nostro divina: on the difference between this and the Christian doctrine, that man is made in the image of God, see below § 96 virtus quam figura, n.

hoc quidem: sc. esto, cf. §§ 68, 84.

ut voletis: cf. Phil. 118 with Mayor’s n.

illud: ‘that other point’, used, like ἐκείνο, of that which follows, Madv. § 485 b.

sed tamen: ‘however, not to dwell on this’. On this resumptive use of the particle after digression see Madv. § 480, and cf. De Orat. II 365 and Heind. on Hor. Sat. 1 1 27.

quis iste tantus casus: ‘what is the nature of this chance which you tell us can produce such results?’ cf. § 88 quae tantae angustiae, n.

§ 91. seminane deorum decidisse: cf. Ov. Met. 1 78 natus homo est, sive hunc divino semine fecit | ille opifex rerum, mundi melioris origo, | sive recens tellus, seductaque nuper ab alto | aethere, cognati retinebat semina caeli, | quam satis Iapeto mistam fluvialibus undis | finxit in effigiem moderate rum cuncta deorum; Leg. 1 24 extitisse quandam maturitatem serendi generis humani, quod sparsum in terras atque satum divino auctum sit animum munere, cumque alia quibus cohaerent homines e mortali genere sumpserint, animum esse ingeneratum a deo, ex quo vere vel agnatio nobis cum caelestibus vel genus vel stirps appellari potest. It is in a different sense that the Epicurean poet says denique caelesti sumus omnes semine oriundi, Lucr. II 991. The enclitic interrogative, when it is not attached to the principal verb, is often expressive of surprise, and suggests a negative answer (Madv. § 451 a), as here seminane, and omnesne below.

putamus: cf. § 80 arbitramur, § 82 facimus n.

deorum cognationem agnoverem: cf. § 1 ad agnitionem animi, n.

et nunc: ‘and after such absurdities as this’. Other examples of this exclamatory, or pathetic, use of et (= eīra) are found § 93 et soletis queri, § 100 et uituperabas, Div. II 121 totas noctes somniamus, et miramur ali quando id quod somniavimus evadere? (where Allen cites Liv. II 38 et hanc urbem diceitis, III 19 et vos prius signa &c.) Div. II 69 et negant historici, where Allen cites other passages; Tull. IV 42 et miramini (with Beier’s n.).
BOOK I  CH. XXXII  § 91.

Tusc. 192 et dubitas, III 35 et tu oblivisci jubes, Phil. 119 et vos acta Caesaris defenditis, see Draeg. § 311 11.

*tam facile vera invenire*: see §§ 57, 60 with nn. on *quid non sit* and *Simonides*.

Ch. XXXIII. *etemim* commences the refutation, showing how easy it is *falsa convincere*. Like *itaque* in § 85, its force spreads over to the sentences which follow.

*memoriter*: ‘exactly’=μνημονικός in Plato Polit. 257 B; see Rost and Palm’s *Lex.* Madv. in his n. on *Fin.* 1 34 shows that this is the only proper use of the word.

*admirari liberet*: Heind. takes offence at the phrase as implying that wonder was a matter of choice, and Cobet (*Var. Lect.* p. 461) proposes, with Moser, to read *sibierte* =στρ’ εμονε θωμαζεν επιλθεν*; but perhaps we may translate ‘I was fain to express my wonder’ (referring to § 58 *dilucide*, *copiose* &c.), see n. on *admirabor* § 24.

§ 92. *omnesne—delirare visi*: ‘do you mean to say that you thought them all out of their senses?’ Almost the same thing is said in § 94. See above on the use of *ne* and cf. *istisne* § 93. On *delirare* see § 42 n. and *Ac. fr.* 34 Orelli, *roga Vovc Stoicam quis sit melior, Epicurusne, qui delirare illum clamat, an Academicus.*

*qui—decieverint*: ‘for deciding’; even without this causal force, *qui*, being indefinite, would naturally be followed by a Subj.

*ne hoc quidem vos movet considerantes*: ‘when you reflect on the special conveniences and adaptations of the limbs in man, are you still unconvinced (lit. does not even this incline you to judge) that the gods have no need of human limbs?’ *Hoc* is explained by *considerantes*, the participle here taking the place of an infinitive or noun in apposition. The same thought (does non egere membri) appears in the *Timaeus* c. 6, where the formation of the world by the Demiurgus is described, *nec enim oculis egubat, quia nihil extra, quod cerni posset, sed quia erat, nec avibus, quia ne quod audiretur quidem...nee manus afixit, quiumiam nec capiendum quicquam erat, nec repellendum, nec pedes aut alia membra, quibus ingressum corporis sustineret.*

*ingressu*: ‘the act of walking’, so in § 94; *incessus* is used *Off.* 1 123.

*discriptione*: see § 26 n.

*nihil supervacaneum* occurs also in § 99, 11 121; the form *supervacanus* is more common in later Latin.

*itaque nulla ars—potest*: ‘and so (since there is nothing without a reason in nature) no art can approach the cunning of her handywork’. The sentence comes in awkwardly, and Heind. proposed to read *ut—possit* for *itaque potest*: *Stumm (De N. D. interpolationibus, Vratislav, 1873)* thinks it is an interpolation from 21 81 (naturam) *cujus sollertiam nulla ars, nulla manus, nemo opifex consequi possit imitandi; cf. 142 quis vero opifex praeter naturam, quia nihil potest esse callidius, tantum sollertiam persequi potuisset in sensibus.* So Aristotle contrasts nature with art, *Part. Anim.*
§ 92.  

Hebes of the treatise by Philodemus περὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν εἰστοχωμένης διαγωγῆς κατὰ Ζήμωνα (Herc. vol. vi, Naples, 1839) we read that the gods λέγονται μὴ πολὺ διαφεροῦντας κατά τάς ἀρθρώσεις χρήσιμαι φωναῖς, καὶ μόνον οίδαμεν γεγονότας θεῶς Ἐλληνιδὶ γλώττη χρωμένους, quoted in Zeller Stoics tr. p. 422. From the fact that the author here followed by C. takes for granted that the gods are not enuded with the faculty of speech, and that Carneades (ap. Sext. Emp. ix 178) introduces the idea of their speaking either the Greek, or any other language, as an absurd consequence which would flow from the assumption of their having such a faculty\(^1\), Hirzel (p. 172) argues that the dogma reported by Philodemus must have been a late development in the Epicurean school, and that it may possibly have been suggested to Zeno by the very argument which Carneades directed against the attribution of speech to the gods.

§ 93.  

**istisnε—dixerunt:** ‘Was it in such dreams as these that they put their faith when they spoke against Pythagoras &c.? ’ For somnia cf. §§ 39, 42.

**Metrodorus:** the most distinguished of the disciples of Epic. d. B. C. 277. His fragments have been collected by Duening (Teub. 1870), cf. § 113.

**Hermarchus:** of Mytilene, the successor of Ep., cf. Madr. Fīn. II 96. Diog. L. mentions writings of his περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους, πρὸς Πλάτωνα and πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην. ‘Porphyry (Astit. i 26) speaks of a treatise in which he controverted the vegetarianism of the Pythagoreans’. Sch.

**Leontium.** ‘Opponents charged the Epicureans with gross impropriety because they admitted not only women, but women of loose morality into the philosophic circle’, Zeller Stoics tr. p. 384. To judge this matter fairly we must remember (1) the strict seclusion imposed upon Athenian matrons, (2) the esteem in which such a man as Socrates held the Hetaeræ Aspasia and Diotima, (3) the slanderous pens of controversiasts and anecdote-mongers, which left no philosophical reputation unassailed, and

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1 His words are εἰ φωναῖν ἔστι (ὁ θεός), φωνῇ χρῆται καὶ ἔχει φωνητικὰ ὀργάνα, καθάπερ πνεῦμα καὶ τραχεῖαν ἀρτηρίαν γλώσσαν τε καὶ στόμα. τῶν δὲ ἀτοπον καὶ ἕγγει τῆς Ἐπικούρου μεθυλογίας. τότῳ ῥήτεων μὴ υπάρχειν τῶν θεῶν, καὶ γὰρ δὴ εἰ φωνῇ χρῆται, ὡμελεῖ· εἰ δὲ ὡμελεῖ, πάντως κατὰ τινὰ διάλεκτον ὡμελεῖ. εἰ δὲ τούτο, τί μᾶλλον τῇ Ἐλληνιδῇ τῇ βαρβάρῳ χρῆται γλώσσῃ; καὶ εἰ τῇ Ἐλληνιδῇ, τί μᾶλλον τῇ Ιαδίᾳ τῇ Αἰολίδῃ τῷ τῶν ἄλλων; It is strange that Hirzel can have read the argument of Carneades, as given in the 9th book of Sext. Emp., and yet have believed that Cicero’s critique on the Epicurean theology was borrowed from him. Carn. is impartially destructive; his opponent is welcome to choose any view, and he will show that on that view, whatever it may be, the existence of a deity is impossible: Cie. on the contrary is fundamentally Stoical with a slight Academic varnish.
which, if we may believe Diog. x. 3, were especially venomous in the case of Epicurus. Among the female members of the school were Themista, wife of the Epicurean Leontes, to whom C. jestingly alludes as a sort of female Solon in his speech against Piso, lect Themista sapientior sis, and Leontium, the mistress of Epicurus, here mentioned. Her attack on Theophrastus is noticed by Plin. iv. ii. prof. 23, who also mentions two portraits of her by distinguished artists (xxxv 36 36 and 40 19).

*scito illa—sed tamen*: ‘in neat Attic style it is true, but still’ (meretrice contra Theophrastum, what a piece of impertinence!) Cf. the ellipse with ἐς Plato Parm. 137, ἀλλ' ἐς Arist. Ath. 956.

*tantum—licentiae*: ‘such was the freedom of speech in which the Garden indulged’: tantum often sums up, or gives the moral, like *adeo* in Juvenal.

*et soletis queri*: ‘and then (after abusing others so freely) you complain (if you are attacked yourselves)’, cf. § 91 n. on *et una*.

*litigabat*: Demetrius Magnes, a contemporary of C. (who alludes to his writings Att. iv. 11, viii. 11) stated in his treatise Piερε Ὠμονίμου that Zeno was successful in prosecuting Theotimus, who had attacked Epic., Θεότιμος δὲ ὢ γραφῖς τὰ κατ᾽ Ἐπικουρὸν βίβλια ἐπὶ Ζήρωνος ἐμαυτήρεις (cf. Eur. Or. 1657) ἀπηρίθη, Athen. xiii. p. 611. It is supposed that ‘Diotimus’ should be read for ‘Theotimus’, as we are told that a Stoic of the former name fathered spurious letters on Ep. with the view of discrediting his moral character, Diog. L. x. 3. For Zeno see § 59 n.

*Albucius*: prator in Sardinia B.C. 105, condemned on a charge repetundarum in B.C. 103, after which he retired to Athens, where he had been educated, and devoted himself to philosophy. His name often occurs in C.’s writings, e.g. Brut. 131 doctus etiam Graecis T. Alb. sed potius parce Graecus... fuit autem Athenis adolescentis, perfectus Epicureus eceasarat; Prov. Cons. 15 where he is called Graecus homo ac levis; Tuse. v. 108 T. Alb. nonne animo acquisitius Athenis eexd philosophabar? His Greek tastes were satirized by Lucilius, who makes Scævola address him as follows Graecum te, Albuci, quam Romanum atque Subilum | ...maluisti dici; Graecus ergo praeor Athenis, | id quod maluisti, te, quom ad me adversis, saluto; | χαίρε, inquam, Tite; victores, turma omnis coloresque; | χαίρε, Tite! hinc hostis mi Albucius, hinc inimicus | (quoted in Fin. i. 9); also his affected style Orator 149.

*nam Phaedro—sed stomachabatur*: ‘then as to Phaedrus, though nothing could be more refined or courteous, still he used to lose his temper’. Cf. Ac. i. 11 Antiochus, homo matura lenissimus, stomachari tamen coepit. On *nam*, as a particle of transition, see § 27 n.; on the attachment to the first clause, of a particle which properly belongs to the second, § 85 *inde* n.; on coordination of contrasted clauses § 20 n.

*Phaedrus*: president of the Epicurean school, d. B.C. 70; C. says of him Fam. xiii. 1 nobis cum prori essens, auteprum Philoem cognominas, valde ut philosophus, postea tamen ut vir bonus et suavis et officiosus probabatur.
This was at Rome about B.C. 88, but in 79 C. in company with Atticus attended lectures at Athens by Zeno and Phaedrus, Fin. i 16 cos cum Attico nostro frequentier audier, cum miraretur ille quidem utrumque, Phaedrum autem etiam amaret, cf. Fin. v 3, Leg. i 50, and see Introduction.

cum—Aristotelem vexarit: ‘and yet Epic. attacked Α.’; cf. Roby §§ 1730, 1732. We find vexo similarly used in § 78 and Tusc. ν 25 vexatur Theophrastus et libris et scholis omnium philosophorum. Diog. L. gives specimens of the abusive language which, he says, was falsely imputed to Ep. (memnha de oüto x 9) ; Plato and his friends he styled Διονυσιοκάλακας, Aristotle ἄσωτον, Democritus Ληρόκριτον, &c. x 8' ; cf. Plut. M. 1086 (speaking of Ep. and Metr.) τά εν ἀνθρώποις αίσχυτα ῥήματα, βωμολογίας, λυκυθυμοίς, αλαζονείας, . . ., sensory words, 'Aristoteloues καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Προταγόρου καὶ Θεофράστου καὶ ᾿Ηρακλείδου καὶ ᾿Ιππάρχου, καὶ τίνος γὰρ οὐχί τῶν ἐπίθενων κατεσκέδασαν ; similarly Plut. (M. 1108) describes the treatise of Colotes, entitled περὶ τοῦ ὅτι κατὰ τὰ τῶν φιλοσόϕων δόγματα οὐδε χάριν ὅσιν, as a πίνακα περίτων, consisting of parts of sentences wrested from their natural signification and spiced with rudeness and buffoonery. Even C., though far from mealy-mouthed, makes a protest against the abusiveness of Greek controversy, Fin. ii 80 sit ista in Graecorum levitate perversitas, quœ malodictis insegnatur cos a quibus de veritate dissidentio.

Phaedoni—male dixerit: Ph. was a well-born native of Elis, taken prisoner and sold as a slave in Athens B.C. 401, where he attracted the notice of Socrates and was ransomed by one of his disciples. He was present whilst Soc. uttered the famous discourse on immortality which is known to us as the Phaedo. Some time after his master's death he returned to Elis, and founded the Elean school of philosophy, which appears to have been closely allied with those of Eretria and Megaris. We read of a treatise of Epicurus which bore the name of διαπορίαι πρὸς τούς Μεγαρικούς, and it is possible that Phaeo may have been criticized in this. The epithet turpissime refers, we may suppose, to the degradation he underwent as a slave, as Diog. (Π 105) tells us of another opponent who taunted him with this misfortune, cf. Zeller, Socrates p. 279 tr.

Timocratem: a disciple of Ep. described as fickle (Diog. x 6) and hot-tempered (Philod. De Ira Gomp. p. 48), who left him in consequence of a difference of opinion as to the grounds of happiness, cf. § 113. Duening (Metrodorus p. 23) thinks that the quotations there given are from a treatise by his brother Metrodorus περὶ τοῦ μείζων εἶναι τὴν παρ’ ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τῆς ἑκ τῶν πραγμάτων, and that Metr. is not there contrasting bodily and mental pleasure, but pleasure which originates ab intra with that which originates ab extra, but see Hirzel p. 165 foll. Other grounds of quarrel are mentioned by Duening p. 24. After this breach Timoc. seems to have used every effort to injure his former associates, charging them with debauchery of every kind in his Euphranta, as well as inveighing against them in public, cf. AEH. Ep. II 210 τῖ ποιεῖς, 'Επικουρέ; οὐκ οὖν ὁτί διακαμώδει σε Τιμοκράτης ἐπ’ τούτοις ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐν τοῖς
To these attacks Ep. and Metr. published replies (Diog. L. x 24, 27, 136 and Plut. Col. p. 1126). The Timocrates mentioned by Ep. in his will is probably a distinct person, Zeller Stoics, tr. p. 387, Duen. p. 25.

conciderit: exactly answering to our 'cut him up'.

in Democritum—ingratus: see above on Aristotelem, and §§ 29, 69, 73, Plut. M. 1101 f, also Fin. i 21 Democritum, landatum a ceteris, ab hoc qui cum unum secutus esset, nollem vitaeperatum. Both Metr. and Ep. wrote against Democ. but this was probably to make it evident where their system differed from his, as opponents charged them with being mere plagiarists (Due. p. 36). Plutarch, in reporting the charges brought against Democ. by Colotes, mentions that Epicurus long called himself a follower of Democ., and that Leontceus, one of his most distinguished disciples, tēmāthi phēsì tōn Δημόκριτον ὑπὸ 'Επίκουρον, while Metr. ἀντικρυς εἰρήκεν ὥς εἰ μὴ προκαθήγησατο Δημ. οὐκ ἄν προῆλθεν 'Επί- κουρος εἰς τὴν σοφίαν.

Nausiphanem—male acceperit: cf. § 73 n. and Epicurus' own words recorded by Sext. Emp. Math. i p. 216 πῶς ἡρμὸς ἁδρωτὸς ἐν καὶ ἐπιτη- δευκῶς τοιαῦτα ἐξ ὧν οὐ δυνατὸν εἰς σοφίαν ἠθέων. I agree with Kühler in rejecting Pearce's addition of non before nihil. Ep. spoke of the Pyrrhonist Naus. just as Vell. speaks of the Academic Philo in § 17, where see n. Nothing could be more inane than non nihil, which adds nothing to magistrum, and in fact rather suggests an excuse for the slighting terms in which Ep. speaks of his master. According to the true reading, C. ironically repeats the words of Ep.

tam male acceperit: 'treated so badly'; a colloquial expression frequent in the comic poets.

Ch. xxxiv. Apollodorum. It is doubtful who is meant, but it is more likely to be Apollodorus the Stoic mentioned in Diog. L. vii 39, than Zeno's own teacher, ὁ κηποτύραννος, on whom see § 89 n.

Silum. The reading is very doubtful. In Diog. l.c. the name Ap. is followed by ὁ "Εφ'Λος, corrected by the edd. into καὶ Ξύλος from this passage. Hcind. on the contrary supposes some corruption of a nomen gentile here, but ceteros comes in more naturally after the mention of two distinct persons, as it is often used to close a list, cf. § 92. Krische's suggestion 'Syronem', the name of an Epicurean contemporary of C. and Virgil, is far from plausible.

scurrum Atticum. Cf. Brut. 292, where Ep. is said to have found fault with the irony of Socrates. Zeno, in addressing his Roman pupils, seems to have used the more expressive Latin for the Gr. γέλωτοτοῦτος, cf. Kr. pp. 25, 26. Colotes, who was reputed to surpass all other disciples of Epicurus in his powers of abuse, κομίδη διαγελα καὶ φλαυρίζει τῶν Σωκράτην in the treatise (ὁμοῦ πρὸς ἀπαντας as Plutarch styles it) in which he endeavoured to show that οὐδὲ ὡς ἔστω on any other system than the Epicurean, cf. Plut. Col. p. 1118.
**BOOK I CH. XXXIV § 93.**

**Chrysippam.** The nickname was probably pointed at the verbosity and prolixity of his innumerable treatises, see Galen *Plac. Hipp.* iii p. 339, ‘Chrys. himself confessed that some of his writings might seem to be the compositions γραμματιστὸν τινος ὡς γραφεῖ αδόλεσχονς’, Zeller *Stoicus* tr. p. 47, and cf. the phrase γραμματική γραφολογία Sext. Emp. *Math.* i 141; so Zeno is styled λυχνίουργος by Timon ap. Diog. L vii 15.

§ 94. *tamquam senatum—recitares*: ‘like the censor when he reads out the list of the senate, cf. Liv. xxiii 23, xxix 37, *Pro Domno* 84’. Sch. *[Recitatio*, the roll-call, is to be distinguished from lectio, the act of selection, which was the proper duty of the censor, cf. Liv. ix. 30. J. S. R.] Here C. returns from his digression to the point touched on in § 91.

**ista—commenticia:** reverting to § 93 *istis somnis*.

**lucubrationes anicularnum:** ‘hardly fit to amuse old women at their evening work’. Wytt. quotes Liv. i 57 (*Lucretiam*) inter lucubrantes anicillas sedentem invent; cf. § 55 n.

**suscienda:** ‘must be admitted’, so in § 98 and *Fat.* 18.

**omnis cultus—oratio** repeats what had been said in § 92. We have a similar list in *Off.* i 128 status, incessus, sessio, accubitio...manuum motus. These objections are noticed in the Herculanean *De Sensionibus* (II. V. vi pt. 2, col. xii) φασιν γὰρ ὡς εἶ διὰ τὸ λογισμὸν ἐξελ ανθρωπόμορφοι ἑστιν, καὶ τὴς ξύπνησος κοινῆς οὕσης συνάπτωμεν αὐτῷ καὶ πολλὰς ἄλλας κοινώτητας μορφῶν, ὁπερ καὶ χρείας καὶ δαπάνας, and col. xiv ‘if God has the eyes of a man he will be liable to the diseases of the eye’. The same objections are urged by Arnobius, bk iii, esp. c. 12 foll.

§ 95. *retinendum hoc esse—ut.* See § 75 *pugnare ut sit*, and *Leg.* ii 11 *assentior ut sit* with Dumesnil’s n.

**beatitas—beatitudo:** cited by Quintil. viii 3, and i 5. Sch. gives exx. of similar double forms which continued in use, necessitas, necessitudo, claritas, claritudo, and others in Gell. xiii 3. Of the two forms offered by C. the latter won the day, *beatitas* being only found in Macrobr. *Soma*. *Scip.* i 8, and Apul. *Dog. Plat*. ii 10, but both writers take care to use the preferable form within a few lines of the other; see Nägels. *Stil.* § 33 n. In § 100 we have *beatum* used to express the same idea. [*Beata vita is C.’s usual equivalent for εὐδαιμονία.* J. S. R.]

**omnino—sed:** see § 12 n.

[**usu mollienda:** cf. *Ae.* ii 18 *visum—jam enim hoc pro favraosía verbum satis hesterno usu trivimus.* J. S. R.]

**verum:** resumptive after parenthesis, Madv. § 480.

**quaecumque est:** ‘however you like to call it’.

**in solem—cadere:** ‘why is it incongruous with yonder sun?’ Cf. § 19 n. The Stoic origin of Cotta’s speech betrays itself here, as in § 87.

§ 96. *sescenta.* It is supposed that this numeral came to be used for a round number generally, in consequence of the cohort having originally consisted of 600 men.

quae sola divina natura est: ‘for this blessed and eternal nature alone possesses the attributes of deity’. Cf. § 49 quae sit beata natura. Sch. in loc. (and opus, p. 319) strangely takes quae as a neuter plural predicate, and sola divina natura as feminine singular subject. Can there be a doubt that quae is Nom. Sing. referring to the preceding beata et aeterna natura, and forming the subject to the divina natura following, which is also Nom.?


ut animi, item corporis. So Xenophanes (R. and P. § 133) eis theis

in te theoisi kai anathropoisi megistos, | ou ti demas thetoisin omoios oudhe

vomia.

accedebat. The Imperf. refers back to the time marked by ratio
docuit above, cf. Draeg. § 136, similarly videbas § 98, habebam § 100.

virtus quam figura. So Leg. 125 virtus evidem in homine ac deo est,

est autem virtus nihil aliud nisi perfecta et ad summum perfectione natura.

Est ipseur hominem cum deo similibus. This was a Stoic doctrine contested by the Academics and Peripatetics, see III 38 n. So Origen against Celsus vi 63 ‘if man resembles God, it cannot be in the inferior part of his compound nature (i.e. the body) nor in both parts, for then God too would be compound, but in the inner man pevnikite gynneisata kai eikona tou

kthesis, according to the words miyma tov theou gynesei’.

Ch. xxxv. § 97. ipsa vero—similitudo: ‘how little to the point is
even the argument from likeness of which you make so much’; ipsa

contrasts the general theory with the special instance in dispute, viz. the resemblance between man and God. I understand here a reference to the Epicurean logic of induction, cf. mn. on 70, 87, 89.


Top. iii 2 where A. discusses the Topic of Comparison (one ground of

preference between two things compared is the degree of resemblance to a

third object surpassing both of them; to which it is objected that the

resemblance may be of the nature of caricature, as the ape is nearer to man

than the horse, but is not therefore more beautiful), also Herakl. fr.

xviii, xxix Byw. pithkou o kalhtos aichrois altlo gevei synballein...

anathropou o sofatois proos theos pithkos fanetia kai sofia kai kallke kai
tou alou syn. [And Pindar Pyth. ii 131 kalos tou pithon parapataiin,

alei kalos. J. S. R.]

sunt quidem ita vulnere motaque corporis vasti atque agrestes; 117 vastum

hominem; Orator 153 cester ‘Alexilla’ ‘Ala’ factus est fovea literae vastioris (the awkward x).

§ 98. moribus paribus. I think Klotz’s suggestion paribus is better

than simillinis, which is usually supplied, not only because it would be
more easily lost after moribus, but because it makes a better antithesis to similimis disparis.

suscipimus: cf. suscienda § 94.

quo serpat: 'what it leads to', so III 51 illa quae tu a caelo ducebas, quam longe serpent; Nägels. Stil. § 129.

quodsi—obsistis: 'if you are proof against all these inferences (lit. hold your ground in all these cases), why should you be shaken by the figure only? i.e. why allow that inference to weigh with you?

his adjunctis—videbas: 'you never saw human reason except in connexion with these qualities'.

sortiri, quid loquare: 'to toss-up what you should say'; cf. Fat. 46 num (atomī) sortivmtur inter se quae declinet, quae non? and Xen. Cyrop. I 6 46 ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἴδε τὸ ἀριστον αἰρείσθαι ἦ εἴ κληρον-μενος, ὅτι λάχνοι τούτο τις πράττοι.

§ 99. nisi forte—obstare: 'unless indeed you have never noticed that whatever is superfluous is mischievous' (in that case you may have considered, though to little purpose). For the ironical nisi forte cf. § 117.

uno digito plus: 'a single finger too much', Abl. of Measure. Cf. II 92 sol multis partibus major quam terra, Liv. II 7 uno plus Etruscorum cecdit, Roby § 1294. We may understand quam satis est, as often, for the second member of comparison.

quia nec—desiderant: 'because the five leave no need for (lit. do not miss) another, either in respect of beauty or utility'.

capite—cruribus: repeating § 92.

si, ut immortalis sit: 'if he has these limbs (v. subaud. from redundat as from quaeres § 90) in order to make him immortal'; cf. for omission of verb after si, Draecg. § 119 i 3 b, and my n. on § 22.

illa: as usual, of what follows (cerebrum &c.), which are afterwards referred to as haec.


oris habitus: 'the general set of the face', Fin. III 56 hab. oris et vultus.

vitæ firmitatem: 'vitality', so we find firm. joined with corporis, capitis, valetudinis.

Ch. xxxvi § 100. et eos vituperabas. The reference is to § 53. For the 'et' indignantis cf. et nunco § 91 n.

terras, maria: see § 22 n.

horum insignia: 'their decorations', so Lucr.-v 700 calls the sun radiatum insigne dicas.

suspicati essent. The Ppf. is used because the action is conceived as anterior to that denoted by the governing verb vituperabas.
aberrant a conjectura: 'miss their aim'. This is the reading of all the mss, but Sch. following Walker omits the preposition, and translates 'go wrong in their guessing'. In his Opusc. iii 321 and 367 he stoutly maintains (against Wopkens, Heind. and Klotz Adn. Crit. ii 12) that the other reading makes nonsense; and he would therefore correct 12 Phil. 23 nunc, quaebo, attendite num aberret a conjectura suspicio periculi met, and Att. xiv 22 veroor ne nilnil a conjectura aberram, where Wesenberg keeps the preposition. I have myself very little faith in these a priori reasonings as to the impossibility of a word acquiring any particular use. It seems to me more improbable that the scribes should in several passages have inserted the preposition, without any inducement that I can see, than that conjectura should come to mean 'hitting the mark', as in fact Quintilian says iii 6 30 conjectura dicta est a conject, id est, directione quodam rationis ad veritatem, just as consequor has come to mean 'I attain', as the corresponding συνίμη means 'I put things together rightly', as conjector itself means an 'interpreter' or 'seer'. Kl. quotes Plin. Ep. iv 28 ab imitatione aberrare.

quid sequantur: 'what leads them to their conclusions', cf. 12 n. Here again we see the Stoic.

quod opus tandem. So we find tandem separated from the Interrogative in Leg. i 9 quod tibi tandem tempus, where see Dumesnil.

et barbati quidem: 'yes and of a bearded Jupiter', cf. § 78 n. This is a repetition from § 83.

§ 101. quanto melius. For the ellipse of fucit see Roby § 1441. It is especially common with words like bene, as in § 121 quanto Stoici melius, Orat. iii 221 quo melius nostris senes; also with Acc., as in Hor. Sat. i 2 90 hoc illi recte.

qui tribuant: 'in assigning' = ὀφείλεις.

qui irridentur Aegyptii: cf. §§ 43, 82, iii 47. Plut. M. 379 d says that the Egyptians have made religion ridiculous by their worship of animals, and that, in consequence of this, men have fallen either into an irrational superstition or into atheism.

beluam: cf. § 77 n.

ob aliquam utilitatem: Herod. (ii 75) asserts this of the ibis; Diog. L. (procm. 11) of animals generally, τὰ ἐξήρητα τῶν ζῴων θεῶν ἐθάλασσαν; Diodorus i 86 foll. gives various explanations of the worship of animals, e.g. that their images had been originally used as standards in war, but he appears to consider utility the main cause; Plut. l.c. laughs at the story of the transformation of the gods in fear of Typhon, and says the real causes are τὸ χρεώδες καὶ τὸ συμβολικὸν, ὅν ἐνα ματίρον, πολλὰ δὲ ἄρματα μετέσχηκε; as an example of symbolism he notes especially the scarabaeus, and argues that the living symbol, though the resemblance may sometimes be fanciful and far-fetched, is no worse than the mystical emblems of the Greek religion or of the Pythagoreans. So Celsus ap. Orig. iii 19 'the Christians deride the Egyptians, but their worship embodies a deep meaning (ἀνώγματα), ἐπὶν ἰδεῶν ἄιδιων, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς δοκοῦσιν οἱ πολλοί, ζῷων ἐφημερίων τιμᾶς εἶναι
CH. Herodotus brought another see the 2 and see Plut. Subj. Herod, see cf. being 207 see the the coming crocodile prevented tells covers ichneumon-worship, vastitas eastern, This south-west may and avert ing to kill an ibis, and that Cuvier found the skin of a snake in the stomach of a mummied ibis. Plut. l. c. mentions another reason for gratitude to the ibis, to which C. also alludes π 126.

vim serpentium: see § 54 n.

cum sint: ‘being tall birds’, &c., explains how they were able to kill the snakes, Roby § 1728.

cum—interficium. The Pres. and Perf. Ind. are used with cum to express ‘identity of action’ (Roby § 1729). In killing the snakes they are averting the plague.

volucres angues: Herodotus (l. c. and π 107 foll.) tells wonderful stories about the winged snakes, which guard the frankincense of Arabia and invade Egypt every spring, but are met and killed by the ibises. Sir G. Wilkinson (in Rawlinson, p. 124) discusses what amount of truth there may be in his account.

ex vastitate—invectas: ‘brought from the Libyan desert by the south-west wind’ (or more strictly W.S.W. blowing from Carthage to Sicily). This is in disagreement with Herod. and others, who represent them as coming from the east; Aelian H. A. π 38 makes the black ibis guard the eastern, and the white ibis the southern, frontier. On the use of the abstract vastitas for concrete, see Draeg. § 8.

possom: see n. on longum est § 19.

ichneumonom: the ‘mangouste’ or ‘herpestes’, see Art. in Eng. Cyc. under the latter heading; and Rawlinson’s Herod. π 67 n. Its utilitas was to destroy the eggs of the crocodile, which led to frequent quarrels between the people of Heracleopolis, the principal seat of the ichneumon-worship, and Crocodilopolis where the utilitas of the crocodile was similarly honoured. Extraordinary tales are told about it, as that it covers itself with a cuirass of mud before attacking the asp (Arist. H. A. ιξ 6), and that it enters the mouth of the sleeping crocodile and devours its heart and entrails (Strabo, xvii 39).

crocodilorum: see Herod. π 68 foll. with Rawlinson’s nn. Diodorus tells us that the reply made to the question why creatures so injurious to men were worshipped, was that they formed a rampart to the country, and prevented invaders from crossing the Nile; another answer was that a crocodile had rendered a service to one of their ancient kings; Plut. on the other hand explains their worship as symbolical; the crocodile is μύημα θεοῦ as being ἀγιωσσός and therefore silent, and as watching his prey,
himself unseen in the water, ὄντε βλέπειν μὴ βλεπόμενον, ὥ τῷ πρῶτῳ θεῷ συμβίβασκεν, Isid. c. 75, p. 381.

faelium: see Herod. ii 66, 67 with the notes in Rawlinson’s ed. and the exhaustive note in Mayor’s Juvenal, xv 7. The word appears to be used for a kind of weasel in Varro and Columella, but in other writers it stands for the Gr. ἀλπορος, the tame cat of the Egyptians; see the graphic description in Plin. N. H. x. c. 94 juvenis qui similitudinem quae lepus est, but the phrase obreptum arctum! quam occulte speculatiae in muscosos excidit, vacuam suam effossa obruvat terra. Even the Greek word is ambiguous, for though it is plain from the mummies and pictures that the sacred animal of Egypt was our cat, yet Plut. Isid. p. 381 A calls it γαλή, on the other hand Dio. i 87 describes the ἀλπορος as useful πρὸς τᾶς ἀστιας διανύσις ἡμάθειας καὶ τάλα ἀκάτω τῶν ἔρπετῶν. The statement that it killed snakes is probably due to some confusion in the mind of Dio., but Sir G. Wilkinson (Birch’s ed. Vol. ii 106, iii 289) mentions that it is even now held in great favour by the Egyptians because it destroys scorpions and other reptiles. According to the old paintings it was employed as a retriever (ib. ii p 106).

longus: ‘tedious’, for the personal use cf. Quint. v 7 26 longus testis, and x 118.

tamen belas. Fully expressed the thought is ‘ridiculous (irrisidentur above) as those animal gods are, still there is more to be said for them than for the Epicurean gods’. For a similar elliptical use of tamen = ‘at any rate’ Sch. compares Div. ii 80 Etrusci tamen dabant auctorem disciplinae. Nos quem? with Giese’s n.; Verr. Act. ii 1 2 si retiecat et absit, tamen impudentia sue prudentem exitum quaessisse videatur; see also Munro on Lucr. ii 859, iii 553, iv 952. So δῆμος in Greek. For the position of tamen cf. § 81 n.

§ 102. nihil habet negotii: cf. § 45, and on the change from pl. deorum, to sing., § 50 Balbe solitius, &c.

quasi pueri delicati—existimat: ‘like spoilt children, thinks nothing better than idleness’. It is not essatio however but otium, which is the proper contrary of negotium, and Ep. did not deny that activity might be essential to human happiness, cf. Plut. Transq. e. 2, p. 465.

Ch. xxxvii. exercitazione ludica: ‘some active game’, see Madv. Fin. i 69. [Is it not rather some game which simulates real life? J. S. R.]

deum—possit: in or. rect. this would be deus sic torpet ut, si se commoverit, beatas esse non possit ‘such is the nature of the divine inertia that movement would destroy the happiness which is of the essence of deity’. In order that this may be stated as an opinion, not a fact, columnus is added to the 1st clause, and cereamus to the 2nd, but the latter is improperly made the governing verb, so as apparently to give the measure of sic, whereas it ought to have been introduced parenthetically (quem ad modum nos cereamus), cf. Roby § 1746, Madv. § 357 obs. 2, and my n. on dixerit § 20, for examples of similar confusion. For exx. of adversative asyndeton
§ 103. domicilium—sedes—locus: proceeding from less to more general, 'home, habitat, region'. ['What is his home? where is he living? At any rate where is he? How does he spend his life? What are the sources of the blessedness you attribute to him?']

C. e. Even if we grant that there are such images as Epicurus describes, what ground have we for assuming that there is any reality corresponding to them? And how is happiness, i.e. pleasure of sense, possible to his gods? Ch. xxxvii § 103—Ch. xlii § 114.

§ 103. domicilium—sedes—locus: proceeding from less to more general, 'home, habitat, region'. ['What is his home? where is he living? At any rate where is he? How does he spend his life? What are the sources of the blessedness you attribute to him?']

actio vitae: cf. § 2, n. § 45.

id quod vultis: i.e. beatus, cf. Madv. § 315 b.

[utatur—fratur: perhaps an allusion to the legal usus fructus; he who is to be blessed must not be a mere owner, but have the present use and enjoyment of his goods.]

naturis quae sine animis sunt: 'the material elements'. According to Aristotle each of these has its natural place, to which it naturally moves, cf. II 44 n., III 34, Tusc. I 43, and Zeller3 III 439 foll., Whewell, Hist. Ind. Sci. I 35 foll.

infimum: i.e. the centre, cf. II 84, 116 (medium infimum in sphaera est), Arist. Cael. iv 4.

inundet: more commonly used of excessive floods.

superior aeri, aetheris: Müller's excellent emendation leaves no doubt as to the origin of the ms reading: the eye of the scribe passed from the eri of superior to the same letters in the following word. On the if. aeth. cf. II 101 foll.

reddatur: 'given as its right', Gr. ἅπαθεν ὑμεῖς.


quae igne nasci potentur. Sch. quotes a passage from Seneca Q. N. v 6, which illustrates both the sense and construction, ignis, qui omnia consumit, quaedam etiam creat; et quod videri potest non simile veri, tamen verum est, animalia igne generatur; so we find caelo natus, Nilo natus, spuma procreata, Nilo orta, III 55 and 59. Aristotle is the first authority for this statement. He believed in spontaneous generation (Gen. An. iii 9, Hist. An. v 19) and reports that in Cyprus οὐ ἡ χαλκίτες λίθος καίεται, γίγνεται θηρία εἰν τῷ πυρί, τῶν μεγάλων μυκῶν μικρῶν τι μείζονα υπόπτερα, ἀ διὰ τοῦ

M. C.
BOOK I CH. XXXVII § 103.

πυρὸς πηδά καὶ βαδιζεί; then to prove that some animals can exist in fire he refers to the salamander, αὐτὴ γὰρ, ὥσ φαινε, διὰ πυρὸς βαδιζουσα κατασβένοντα τὸ πυρ. Pliny (N. H. xi. 42) calls this fire-born creature pyreusta or pyrralis: he has many wonderful stories about the salamander (x 86, xi 116, xxxix 23) but never speaks of its being produced from fire, while Aelian expressly denies it (N. A. ii. 31), ἡ σαλαμάνδρα οὐκ ἐστὶ μὲν τῶν πυρὸς ἐγγόνων, οὔτε εἴ αὐτοῦ τίκτεται, ὡσπερ οἱ καλοφιέναι πυρίγονοι, διαφε τῇ αὐτῷ, &c.

In π. 42 the stars are said to be the denizens of aether.

§ 104. naturae accommodatum = oícéov. On this Stoic doctrine cf. Madv. Fin. iii 16, v 24 (omni animali illud quod appetit positum est in eo quod naturae est accommodatum), Exc. iv, Ac. ii 38, N. D. iii 33.

denique—postremo: so Agr. ii 62 regna denique, postremo etiam evecigalia, Cat. ii 25 denique aequitas, temperantia certant cum iniquitate, postremo copia cum caestato... bona denique spee cum desperatione, N. D. iii 23 omni denique doctrina eruditis, postremo philosophus eit mundus.

uleus est: 'it will not bear handling', is 'unsound'; uleus like vulnus is often used metaphorically, as in Pro domo 12 unguis in ulcere (of a fresh irritant added to previous discontent), Ter. Phorm. iv 10 ulcus (al. vulnus) tangere 'to touch a tender spot'.

ita male—exitum reperire: 'reasoning which starts from such insecure premises can come to no result', so Orat. 116 in omnibus quae ratione docentur et via, primum constitutendum est quid quidque sit; nisi enim inter eos qui discipitant, concinit, quid sit illud de quo ambiguitur, nec recte disseri, nec unquam ad exitum perveniri potest (see Schütz Lex.), also N. D. iii 36 videmus exitum, i § 107 exitum reperitis, § 53 explicare argumenti exitum. [Add Ac. ii 35 exitum non habebunt. J. S. R.]

§ 105. sic enim dicebas: cf. § 49 with the notes.

speciem dei: in the parallel passage vin et naturam deorum.

neque deficient umquam ex infinitis corporibus similium accessio: cf. § 49 cum infinita simillimarum imaginum series ex innumerabilibus individuis existat.

Ch. xxxviii si—ad cogitationem valent: 'if they are of force only for the production of mental (as opposed to visual) images' (lit. only for the thinking faculty).

ceminentiam: see n. on eminentis § 75.

Hippocentauro: prose writers usually employ the compound form both in Lat. and Gr.; thus we find ἰπποκένταυρος used by Plato and Xenophon, ἱππ. by Pliny and Quintilian. It is a stock word for a non-ens, see ii 3, Sext. Emp. Math. ix 49, 123, Hirz. p. 42.

conformationem animi: cf. Top. 27 (of intangible things there is nevertheless) conformatio quaedam insignita et impressa in intelligencia, quam notionem roco, Herenn. iii c. 20 vel totius imaginem conformabimus, 'we will imagine the whole scene'; the word informatio is more common in this sense, cf. §§ 43, 76, 101.

§ 106. ut igitur Ti. Gracchum—intellegatur. I am disposed to agree with Klotz (Adn. ii 15) as against Madv. ap. Orelli (who is followed by Sch. Baiter and Müller) and should translate the passage as follows: ‘In the same way then as, when I imagine myself to see Gracchus in his speech presenting the voting urn about (to decide the case of) Octavius, I at the time assert this to be a mere groundless fancy, while you on the contrary assert that the images of the two men continue to exist, and after arriving in the Capitol are then carried on to me,—so (you assert it to be) in the case of God, whose recurring likeness strikes upon the mind and leads it to recognize the divine blessedness and eternity’. The simple framework of the sentence would be ut Ti. Gracchum cum videor videre...motum animi dico esse inanem, tu autem imaginis ad animum meum referris; sic in deo sic nobis ego motum inanem fieri, tu crebra facies pellic animos, but C. after giving both the Academic and Epicurean views in the compared case of Gracchus, omits the former, as obvious, in the case of the gods, and so confuses the construction. Madv. omits igitur, which connects the special application with the general principle, takes ut=velut, as in § 88 ut Seriphi, and changes percenerint into percenerim, making hoc fieri a sort of corollary depending on dicis understood, instead of the apodosis of the sentence. Sch. (N. Jahrb. 1875, p. 691) points out that there is no occasion for percenerim, the scene might be imagined without going to the Capitol, though it is true a visit there might suggest it; on the other hand the vagrant images of G. and O. may be supposed to attach to themselves images of the Capitol by their visit there, cf. Div. ii 137 ista igitur me imago Marii in campo Atinato persequabatur? The incident referred to is as follows. In 133 b.c. the passing of the Agrarian law of Ti. Gracchus was stopped by the veto of Octavius his colleague in the tribunate: after a vain attempt to induce him to desist from his opposition, G. proposed his deposition by the tribes. When 17 out of the 35 tribes had voted for the motion, G. once more urged O. to yield, but he answering ‘complete what thou hast begun’, the voting was continued and O. deposed.

in Capitolio. We read of the Comitia Tributa being held in the Capitol in Liv. xxxv 3 cum dies advenisset, conciliumque tam frequens plebis adesset ut multitudinem area Capitolii vic caperet, sitella lata est ut sortirentur ubi Latini suffragium ferrent, xxxiii 25 ca rogatio in Capitolio ad plebeum lata est, lxxiii 16 ex Capitolio ubi erat concilium (plebis) abit, xlv 36 cum in Capitolio rogationem tribunus plebis ferret, xxxiv 53 ca bina comitia Cn. Domitius praecon urbano in Capitolio habuit, App. Bell. Civ. i 15 (Gracchus) κατέλαβε τοῦ Καπητϊλίου τῶν νεῶν, ἑπότα χερσοναύσον κέμαλος, Plut. Ti. Gracch. 17 προῆγε δὲ ὅμως ἦν, τὸν δημον ἠθεοίησεν περὶ τοῦ Καπητϊλίου πυρανόμον. Cf. Lange Röm. Alterth. p. 442, and Burn’s Rome p. 84, ‘The Vulcanoal must have been close to the Senaculum.
on the slope of the Capitol. It seems to have been originally an open space used for public meetings, especially those of the Comitia Tributa. The Comitia Tributa were also held in the Campus Martius (Flum. vii. 30), and the Circus Flaminius (Liv. xxvii. 21) as well as in the Forum.

sitellam: (dim. of situla ‘a bucket’) an urn filled with water (υδρία) in which were placed the wooden lots to determine the order of voting of the tribes. The neck was made so narrow that only one lot could come to the surface, see Dict. of Ant.


quae referantur. We might have expected the Infinitival construction to be continued in the relative clause, as also in enjus pellantur below, but see n. on § 12 ex quo existit; perhaps too quae has more than a connective force here, implying a result ‘so that they are carried to me’.

pellantur—ex quo—intellegantur. More simply pulsæ animi beatos intellegendi. For the pl. beati after s. deo cf. § 50 Balbe solitis n.

intellegantur: for the personal, instead of the more common impersonal use, cf. Roby § 1353.

§ 107. fac imagines—quaedam: ‘suppose that there are such images impinging on the mind, that is merely the presentation of a certain form’.

num etiam cur: following objicitur by a sort of zeugma, cf. § 99 si ut n., Zumpt § 775. The answer to this objection would be, according to § 49, that the idea of eternity was suggested by the never-ending stream of images, and further confirmed by the doctrine of ισωνομία (§ 109); and the idea of happiness by the delight afforded in their contemplation.


nec vos exitum reperitis: ‘you cannot find your way out’, ‘arrive at any satisfactory conclusion’, see § 104 n.

tota res vacillat et claudit: ‘it is a lame and halting theory altogether’, ‘has no sure footing’. The lexx. supply many instances of the metaphorical use of these words.

quid est quod—fuerunt: ‘what is more improbable than that the images of all men, Homer &c., should be coming in contact with me, yet not in the shape which they had when alive?’ I have here accepted the emendation quem before omnium, but the reading of the ms is tenable if we put a mark of interrogation after possit, and take omnium incidere as an exclamatory Inf. This would justify the rather exaggerated omnium, which is placed in sharp contrast with me: there is no excuse for Baiter’s feeble hominum. In denying the resemblance between the image and the object, C. anticipates the result of the reasoning which follows: ‘we see the images of that which is non-existent, and impossible, of scenes and persons unknown to us; and these images differ for different people;
BOOK I CH. XXXVIII § 107. 213

therefore there can be no resemblance’. As the actual Epicurean view is that the image exactly resembles the reality, cf. § 81 foll., Zeller Épic. tr. p. 432, Lucr. iv 51, I was at one time disposed to read et quidem ea for nec ex of MSS; to the same effect is Mr Reid’s emendation given in the note below. Mr Roby thinks the ex forma of MSS may be retained in the sense ‘not cast by the form’.

quo modo illi ergo: sc. inciderunt, ‘how then (if there is no resemblance between the images and their originals) did the originals come into my head?’

et quorum imagines. Allen considers the passage corrupt, as it has been already stated that the images are those of Homer &c. I think it may be defended as asking for a nearer definition of the omnium above, and so preparing the way for the question which follows: ‘when you say omnium do you include, not only men now dead such as Plato, but imaginary characters such as Orpheus, or impossibilities such as the Chimaera?’ [Perhaps better as Mr Roby takes it: ‘Cicero says, if images which you say are Homer’s &c. come, but are not like Homer’s real form, then two questions arise, 1st how do the originals come to you at all? 2nd whose are the images which do come? They are copied from some real form, whose was that form? ’]

Orpheum—fuisse. Cf. § 33 n., Bernays’ Dialoge d. Arist. p. 95, Lobek Aglaoph. p. 339. The reference is to the lost De philosophia, but it is quite in accordance with the manner in which Arist. elsewhere alludes to the Orphic poems, e.g. τὰ καλοῖμαι Ὀρφιῶς ἔπη Αἰν. i 5 15 with Trendelenburg’s n.; in commenting on which passage Philoponus says that A. speaks doubtfully as to the authorship of the poems, ὅς καὶ αὐτός ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λέγει: αὐτὸν μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὰ δόγματα ταῦτα δὲ φησιν Ὀρφανο-κριτων ἐν ἔποιε κατατείνα. This differs from C.’s account, in recognizing the existence of Orpheus and attributing certain doctrines to him, but there seems no reason to doubt that C. is here correct.

hoc Orphicum carmen—Cercopis. Philop., as we have seen, names Onomacritus, but, if Bernays is right in supposing that the 1st book of the Περὶ φιλοσοφίας contained a general examination of the Orphic theology, it

1 [Accepting quam I would read omnino for omnium (a very common corruption). Then the ex of MSS is evidently a mere doubling of the ex in nec. For nec ex I would read sedum, which is very frequently written needum in MSS. The meaning would be ‘what is more improbable than that phantoms of Homer etc. should strike on my senses at all, to say nothing of their retaining just the shape those persons had when alive?’ Then for illi I should read illae, referring on to Orpheus Scylla, etc. The e would be easily dropped before ergo, and the unintelligible illa would be altered to illi which the scribes referred to Homer etc. wrongly. Thus the argument rises from one stage of difficulty to another, ‘putting aside the cases of Homer etc. all of whom we admit to have once existed, what have you to say about persons and places which never existed at all?’. It is quite in Cicero’s style to break the continuity of the argument by the insertion of quid quod—tuam. The De Finibus contains many things of this kind. J. S. K.]
is probable that different treatises may have been cited in it, some of which were attributed to Onom as the Χρησμοί and Τελεταί, and some to Cercops as the 'Ιερός Λόγος and (Ὀρφείος) κατά ήμείς εἰς Ἵθνη, see Clem. Strom. i 397 and Suidas quoted in Lobeck l.c. On the Orphic doctrines generally, and on the connexion between the Orphic school and the Pythagoreans, compare Lobeck l.c. Zeller i p. 71 foll. Döllinger Gentile and Jew i bk. 3, p. 125, tr. Herod. ii 81 (on the prohibition of woollen garments) ὁμολογήσαι δὲ ταῦτα τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς καλεομένοις καὶ Βαυκχικοῖς, ένσε δὲ Λυγυπτίους καὶ Πυθαγορέως. The mass of what has come down to us under the name of ‘Orphica’ is probably later than the Christian era, but some fragments may be as old as Onomaecritus, see Hermann’s ed. Cicero’s friend, Nigidius, the Pythagorean, referred to the Orphic theogony in his treatise De dis (Serv. ad Verg. Ec. iv 10).

hoc Orphicum carmen : cf. hujus § 79 n. and Krische p. 20.

§ 108. quid, quod ejusdem—Chimaerae : cf. ii 5, and Dir. ii 138 istae imaginēs ita nobis dicto audientes sunt, ut, simul atque velimur, accurrent? etiamne carum rerum quae nullae sunt? quae est enim forma tam invisita, tam nulla, quam non sibi ipse fingere animus possit? ut, quae nunquam vidimus, quae tamen innotescere habeamus, oppidorum situs, hominum figurās? nunc igitur cum aut noscos Babylonis aut Homeri fuciam cognito, imago illorum me aliqua pellit? omnium igitur, quae volumus, non nobis esse possunt. Lucretius iv 752 meets these and similar arguments. Centauros itaque et Scyllarum membra videmus | Cercopesque carum ficies simulacraque corum | quorum morte ebīta tellus amplexititur ossa: | omne genus quoniam possim simulacra feruntur, | partim sponte sua quae sint acer in ipso, | partim quae variis ab rebus cumque recedunt, | et quae confiant ex horum facta figurās, | as the Centaurs from the mingling of human and equine images.

quas nunquam vidimus : this argument, of which Sch. failed to see the force, is more fully stated at the end of the passage from the De Div. given above.

simul ac mihi collibitum est. So Lucr. iv 779 quaeritur in primis quae, quod cunque ibido | venerit, extemplo mens cogitēt ejus id ipsum. | to which he answers that quorēs in tempore quaeque | praeesto sint simulacra locis in quisque parata. | but because they are so fine, the mind can only see those which it strains itself to see, 802; cf. Fum. xv 16.

ad dormantem : Lucr. iv 757.

invocatae : a compound of the negative in and vocatus, occurs also Nep. Cim. 4 quos invocatos vidisset, omnes devoraret, Ter. Enn. v 8 29, Plant. Capt. 1 1 2 (with a play on the double sense of the word); compare the similar case of immutatus, infectus, indigitus, and even indicēs: the verb ignoscere forms an exception to the rule that the negative in is only compounded with adjectives, adverbs and participles. [It is probably ἄνωτες ἐπιμαίνον in C. though it occurs in a letter of Cælius, Fum. viii 8. J. S. R.]

negatoria: ‘it is a piece of humbug from beginning to end’; so negatōr means ‘a humbug’, in the sense of playing upon other people.
inculcatis: 'you cram these images into our minds as well as into our eyes', cf. Fat. 6 quid attinet inculcere factum, cum sine fato ratio omnium rerum ad naturam fortunamve referatur? Cotta in his jaunty way treats this quite as a new idea, but it has been assumed throughout the discussion; cf. § 105 intenta mens, ad cogitationem, adventum in animos, pelluntur animi &c. It is one of the many marks of haste which disfigure the book.

impunitas garriendi: 'so little you care what you say'.

Ch. xxxix § 109. quam licenter: 'what extravagance it is!' cf. § 65.


visionum: here=imaginum the thing seen (as in Div. ii 120 animos externa et adventicia visione pulsari), in § 105 the process of seeing.

dicere non intellegere: for the omission of the subject cf. § 84 confiteri nescire.

quo modo aeternae: the omission of sunt makes the change of construction unusually harsh.

suppeditat: 'there is an endless supply of atoms'.

inquit: 'quotha', this reading is better supported than inquis. Bentley, on Hor. Sat. i 4. 79 (cited by Creuzer on N. D. i 100), compares the use of φησί, and says percutia formula est, ubi aliquid ex adverso nobis objici et opponi fingimus, sive id ab uno seu pluribus, sive ab absente seu praesente fiat, adding many exx.

num—sempiterna: 'do you mean to say then that everything will be eternal for the same reason?' The infinity of the atoms is given by Vell. l. c. as an explanation of the continuous stream of images, and apparently as suggesting the eternity of the Being revealed to us in them; so Philod. p. 110 'the divine individuality (ιδιότης) having its origin in the resemblance of the images may exist in perfect blessedness for ever'. Sch. denies this, and says that the Epicurean argument for the eternity of the Gods is (1) the πρόληψις (2) ισονομία. But the πρόληψις is simply the unconscious effect of experience, i.e. of the impression of the images on the mind, and ισονομία is mentioned in § 50 as the ground of the infinite number, not of the infinite duration, of immortal beings. It is probable however, as stated in the note there, that C. has wrongly spoken of beings instead of forces, and we may therefore allow ισονομία to stand as one of the arguments. A third argument (denied by Sch.) was the fineness of the atoms of which the Gods were composed, see § 71 n.

aequilibratatem: cf. § 50; the word appears to be ἀπ. λεγ. though Vitruvius uses aequilibris.

isto modo—sint aliqui immortales: 'according to that, since men are mortal, some would be immortal'. Sint is the ἀπόλοσις to a protasis contained in isto modo=sì hoc iu situ.

et quia sunt—sentio: 'and since there are destructive forces, there are also (or reading sint with some of the best mss., 'let there be also')
conservative forces. By all means, but let the conservative forces be exerted on what is actually in existence. I don't perceive that your Gods do exist.' So Davies, Madv. Sch. Opusc. 1v p. 343; others take ea as subject of conservent ("let the conservative forces be such as really exist themselves") implying that the Epicureans identified these forces with their Gods; whereas the Epicurean Gods were confessedly free from the toils of superintending the universe. Still this is not conclusive, as the disputants in C.'s dialogue are quite capable of forgetting or passing over any point which might be inconvenient. The reference is to the words of Vell. § 50 si quae interiman imnumerabilia sint, etiam ea quae conservent infinita esse debeb.

§ 110. omnis tamen—oritur: 'however (to leave the Gods and return to the question asked in § 107), how do you explain the origin of your object-pictures generally out of the atoms?' effigies oritur is a loose expression for effigiatus (or efficiat). ft.


Ch. xli. de beato. Cic. prefers to use the neut. adj. instead of his invention of § 95, so we find Tusc. v 45 ex bonis, quae sola honesta sunt, efficiendum est beatum, Fin. v 85 (virtutem) in quae sit ipsum etiam beatum.

sine virtute—vita: for the omission of the verb in these short clauses see § 68 n. That virtue is essential to happiness is asserted by Vell. § 48, and by Ep. himself in the 4th quinm dūxa, Diog. L. x 140, ouk ēstw hēdōs zēn āneν τον φρονίμων καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως. The Academic disputant in ili. § 38 endeavours to prove that we cannot ascribe to God any virtue known to us.

actuosa: but elsewhere C. recognizes the Aristotelian division of the moral and intellectual virtues (Part. Or. § 76) est igitur vs virtutis duplex: aut enim scientia cernitur virtus, aut actione. Nam quae prudentia...appellatur, haec scientia pollet una: quae vero moderandis cupiditatis regendi regique animi motibus laudatur, ejus est minus in agendo, and it is the former virtue only which belongs to divinity, according to Aristotle, τό δή ζωτικόν τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρομένων, ἢτι δὲ μάλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λειτουργεῖ πλήν θεωρία; ὥστε η τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριώτητι διαφέρουση, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἶ, E. Ν. x 8.

et deus: Mr Roby proposes to read at (which might easily lose its vowel after actuosa, and change into et) as it introduces a minor premiss in a quasi-syllogistic argument. But where one syllogism is subordinated to another (as in this passage virtus autem—igitur represents the minor premiss in the syllogism of which sine virtute nullo modo is the major, and ne beatus quidem the conclusion) it is not uncommon to omit the signs of opposition between the propositions of the subordinate syllogism: thus, A, none are happy without virtue; B, but virtue is active and your God inactive, therefore not virtuous; C, therefore your god is not happy.

ne beatus quidem: 'not happy either' (wanting in happiness as well as in virtue), cf. § 72 n., and § 113.
§ 111. quorum tandem — pertinentium: ‘what possible goods? pleasures, I presume; that is, of course, bodily pleasures’.

profectam a corpore: so Fin. i 55 quamquam et laetitiam nobis voluptas animi et molestiam dolor afferat, corum tamen utrumque et ortum esse et corpus et ad corpus referri, see Madv. in loc. and on π 7 and 92, also Plut. M. p. 1089 τὸ μὲν ἡδόμενον τῆς σαρκὸς τῷ χαίροντι τῆς ψυχῆς ύπερείδοντες, αὔτὸς δὲ ἐκ τοῦ χαίροντος εἰς τὸ ἡδόμενον τῇ ἠπίδι τελευτάντες quoted by Zeller Epic. p. 452 tr.

quos pudet: most of the editors spoil the irony of the passage by inserting non. Cotta is complimenting Vell. on his superiority to the scruples of the weaker brethren (called imperitos Fin. i 55) who think that there may be pure mental pleasures entirely unconnected with the body; cf. Fin. π 7 (Epicurus declares) ne intelligere quidem se posse, ubi sit aut quod sit ut tum bonum praeter illud, quod cibo et potionem et aurium deductione et obscena voluptate capiatur. An hæc ab eo non dicuntur? to which Torquatus replies quasi vero me pudet istorum, aut non possim quemadmodum ea dicatur ostendere! C. rejoins that there is no reason why te pudet sapienti adseri; also § 21 ille non pertinuit, § 28 est tanti philosophi audacter sua decreta defendere, i 69 sunt quidam Epicurei timidiore contra vestra convicția. Just in the same way Socrates compliments Callicles on his freedom from false shame Gorg. 492 and 483.

Klotz Adn. Cr. π 16 points out that if Vell. were ashamed of the doctrine referred to, there would have been no propriety in calling upon him to justify and explain it, as is done in the following sentence quem eibum īgitur &c., also that his recognition of these doctrines is stated below, annuere te video § 113.

delicatis et obscenis: ‘the pleasures of the voluptuary and sensualist’, cf. Epic. περὶ τελοῦν quoted by Diog. L. x 6 and more fully by Athen. νπ p. 280 où γὰρ ἐγὼν ἔχω τὸ νουσὸν τάγαθον, ἀφαίρει νῦν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς, ἀφαίρεῖ δὲ τὰς διὰ ἀφροδισίων, καὶ τὰς διὰ ἀκμοσίων καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῶν, which is translated in the Tusc. iii 41, see Fin. π 29, Ac. π 17 with Reid’s n.

§ 112. perfundas voluptatibus: ‘to steep them in pleasure’, cf. Tusc. iv 20 (the pleasures of sense) sunt omnes unius generis ad perfundendum animum tanquam illique factae voluptates.

ut poetae—comparant. I see no reason for changing the ut of the MSS into ac or et; ‘as the poets indeed do’ is a very natural continuation of the question as to food and drink; quidem of course points the contrast to τῶν autem. On the other hand there is great harshness in the MS reading nectar ambrosiam before epulas. It can hardly be taken either as an instance of asyndeton, or of apposition (as Klotz Adn. Crit. π 18), while it would be a very natural gloss for a scribe to add. Omitting it, we must throw the stress of the sentence on the following clause, referring to the beautiful cup-bearers, otherwise the mere mention of epulas would scarcely add anything to what has been said before. For comp. ep. cf. iii 68 funestas epulas comparans and comp. convivium Verr. A. π 1 65. For
the general sense cf. Tusc. i 65 non enim ambrosia does aut nectar aut Juventate pocula ministrante lactari arbitror, nec Homerum audio, qui Ganymeden ab his raptum ait propter formam ut Jovi bibere ministraret. 

§ 113. at has—sensibus: ‘your answer is that you count these as inferior pleasures which merely tickle the sense’. Titill. is C.'s translation for Epicurus' γαρ καταλαμπνον σώματος (CLEONEOLDS CYCL. THEOR. II 1 91, Athen. xii 516); he uses it always with the apologetic quasi (Fin. i 39, Tusc. iii 47, Off. i 63, Senec. 47); in Leg. i 47 he employs the phrase duceco hace ct scabies (= pruritus), see Dunecniil ad loc.; Luer, also has titillare sensibus 429.

quouque—scriptae: ‘when will you cease your mockery? (it must be such) for Ph. too could not stand Epicureans affecting to repudiate effeminate pleasures; he would quote verbatim many sayings of Ep. to the same effect’. For Ludis cf. § 123: nam refers to pronuntiabat in the second clause, the first clause taking the place of some such form as indignatus, cf. n. on itaque § 55. Etiam implies ‘I am not the only one to feel impatience at this shuffling’. For Philo see § 6, 59.

Metrodori: cf. § 93 and Duening pp. 47—51, where the following fragments occur, perur γαστέρα γάρ, ὃ φυσιολογεῖ Τύμακρατε, τὸ ἀγαθὸν (Plut. M. 1008 D), περὶ γαστέρα, ὃ φυσιολογεῖ Τύμ., περὶ γαστέρα ὃ κατὰ φύσιν βαδὶζων λόγος τὴν ἄπασαν ἔχει σποδήν (Athen. vii 280, xii 516), τὰ καλὰ πάντα καὶ σοφὰ καὶ περιπτὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εξευρῆματα τῆς κατὰ σάρκα ὕδωρπον ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς ἐλπίδος τῆς ὑπὲρ ταύτης συνεστάναι καὶ πῶν εἶναι κεχόμενον, ὃ μή εἰς τούτο κατατείνει (Plut. M. 1125 D), ὃς καὶ ἐχάρην καὶ ἐθρασσόμην, ὅτι ἐμαθὼν παρ' Ἐπικούρῳ ὑφίστασαν γαστρὰ χαρίζεσαι (Plut. M. 1098 c), οὐδὲν δέι σοφὲν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὁδ' ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ στεφάνων παρ' αὐτῶν τυγχάνειν, ἀλλ' ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ὀίνον, ὃ Τύμακρατες, ἀβλαξῶς τῇ γαστρὶ καὶ κεχαρισμένος Plut. M. 1125 D, also Plut. M. 1087, 1108, and Hirzel p. 165, Tusc. v 27, Fin. ii 92.

collega sapientiae: so Fin. ii 92 puene alter Epicurus. The two were often represented in a double bust.

dubitet—metiri: ‘hesitates to measure by the standard of the belly’, cf. Demosth. Cor. p. 324 τῇ γαστρὶ μετρούντες καὶ τοὺς αἰσχροὺς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. Allen quotes Varro ap. Non. i 273 quidem modulus est vitae culina. Dubito in this sense is generally followed by the Inf. in a negative sentence, more rarely in a positive sentence; Draec. (§ 424 8 d) cites Curtius as the earliest instance of the latter, but, besides the present passage, Reid on Lael. i quotes Sall. Cat. 15. [See also Att. x 3 a, venire dubitari quoted by G. Müller, Progr. d. Gymnas. zu Görlitz 1878. R.]

ne beatos quidem: ‘wanting in happiness also’ (as well as pleasure), cf. § 72.

Ch. xli § 114. abundantem bonis: cf. omnibus bonis aulacens § 50.

cogitat: on the sing. following pl. vacant cf. § 50 Balde solutis n.

mihi pulchre est: a colloquial phrase ‘how jolly this is!’ cf. Mvr. 26 praetor interea, ne pulchrum se ac beatum putaret, Hor. Sat. ii 8 18 qvis cenuntibus una pulchre fuerit tibi, nosse laboro; Allen cites Mart. xii 17 9, Catull. xxiii 5. The reference is to § 51.
non vereatur—ne intereat. Klotz Adn. Cr. π 19 has well defended this reading (supported by the quotation in Aug. Ep. 118) against Madv. and Ba. whose emendations are inconsistent with the general purport of the argument, viz. to prove that the Epicurean God is not beatus, it having been already shown (§ 110) that he is not immortalis.

pulsetur—semperitera: cf. Or. c. Cels. IV 14 οί τοῦ Ἐπικούρου θεοί, σύνθετοι ἐξ ἀτόμων τυχύποντες, καὶ τὸ ὁσιὸν ἐπὶ τῇ συστάτῃ ἄκλπτον πραγματεύονται τὰς φθοροποιοὺς ἀτόμους ἀποστείεσθαι, and my n. on § 49. The argument is fatal to the Gods of the intermundia (see Lucr. v 351 foll.), but there was in all probability a party among the Epicureans who had accepted a modification of the less vulnerable Democratian theology (§ 120). This latter is apparently the view propounded in § 49, but the criticism here is directed against the former.

ex ipso imagines affluant: cf. Lucr. vi 76 nec de corpore quae sancto simulacra feruntur | in mentes hominum divinae nuntia formae, &c.

C. f. The Epicurean principles, if accepted, are fatal to religion. What inducement is there to worship beings without activity and without benevolence? XLI § 115—XLIV § 124.

§ 115. at etiam—everetrit: ‘but (you reply) Ep. wrote a work on piety. Yes, but how? In a manner entirely inconsistent with his general theory, so that you might fancy yourself listening to C. or S.’ Diog. L x 27 mentions a treatise of Ep. peri ὅσιότητας, and Philod. often refers to his teaching on the subject, as in p. 104 οτι μὲν ὅρκους καὶ θησων ἐπιφρήσεως ἐδοκίμαζον χρήσασθαι, γελοίων ύπομνημάσκειν, ἀναμέσαν τῆς πραγματείας τῶν τοιοῦτων ὁμοῖα, p. 118 περὶ τε γὰρ ἑορτῶν καὶ θυσίων καὶ πάντων καθόλου τοιούτων ὡς ἀκολούθου ἐπραβεύν οἵς ἐδοχάμιτον...αἰ Ζήμων γενόμενα συναγωγαί διασαφφίουσι, p. 120 (Ep. laid down the plain rule) οτι δει πάντα πείθεσθαι τοις νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἐθικοῖς ἐως ἀν μή τι τῶν ἁσβῶν προστάτωσιν, p. 125—132 (writing to Phryson he bids him to sacrifice according to the laws, as he himself observed the feast of Choes and the Mysteries, offering prayer, not only as a duty enjoined by law, but as a natural offering to beings surpassing in power and goodness).

Coruncanium: the first plebeian Pont. Max. 252 B.C. compared for his wisdom with Lycurgus, Solon, Cato, &c. (De Orat. III 56), noticed as especially beloved by the gods (N. D. π. 165), as an authority in religious matters (III 5).

Scaevolam: P. Mucius Sc. (father of C.’s friend and patron the Pont. Max. Q. Mucius Sc.) was consul in B.C. 133, the year in which Tib. Gracchus lost his life, succeeded his brother Mucianus in the Pontificate B.C. 131, so famed for his knowledge of law that he is called one of the founders of the Jus Civile, cf. III 5.

Book I: Ch. XLII § 115.

*HOMINES NON COLANT:* for the play on words cf. Ov. *Met.* viii 724 *cura pii dis sunt et qui coluerat coluntur*; Sch. quotes Plaut. *Poen.* v 4 14 Juppiter qui genus colis alique hominum; *aizetai* has a similar reciprocal use in Aesch. *Prom.* 545 ἑυατὸς ἄγαν σίζει.


*CUIUS NULLUM MERITUM SIT.* The reason for this relative clause being prefixed to the antecedent, is probably to give it greater emphasis, as the climax.

*pietas justitia adversum deos.* There is a great resemblance between this passage and Sext. Emp. *Math.* ix 123 where the existence of the Gods is argued from the fact of *eiuszetaia* and *oixotη;* the latter being defined as δικαστήν τις πρὸς θεοὺς. καὶ μὴν εἴπῃ καὶ ἡ δικαστήν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιπλοκήν τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τε ἄλληλοι καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς εἰςήκται, εἰ μὴ εἰσὶ θεοί, οὐδὲ δικαστήν συντήρεται. The definition is attributed to the Stoics by Stob. *Ecl.* ii 124, but it occurs (amongst others) in Plato *Euthyphro* 12, where τὸ *euszetia* καὶ *oixona* (they are not distinguished) is explained as that part of justice (righteous dealing) which is concerned with τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεράπευαν, cf. *Protag.* 331. So we frequently find τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄνθρωπους δίκαιa contrasted with τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ὁσία. If one may venture to say so, C. seems to have been unfortunate in his translation of the Greek terms: *pietas* is certainly nearer to *eiuszetaia* than to *oixotη;* but he makes it stand for the latter both here and in 1 3, 115, cf. Or. *Part.* 78 *justitia erga deos religio;* we find a different definition in *Pro Domo* 107 nec est utra erga deos pietas nisi honesta de numine corum ac mente opinio, cum expect nihil ab ipsis, quod sit injustum atque indigentem, arbitrae, which approaches more to Epictetus’ definition of *euzetaia.* *Lec.* 31, ορθὰ ὑπολήφεις περὶ θεῶν ἐχειν, ὡς ὅταν καὶ διωκοῦτως τὰ ὀλα καλὸς καὶ δικαίος.

*HOMINI—COMMUNITAS.* In the *De Lejibus* i 21 foll. three grounds are mentioned for this *communitas* (1) the benefits received from God; (2) the common possession of reason, *inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio est communis.* Quae cernit lex, leges quoque consociati homines cum dis putandi sumus, and so we arrive at the grand Stoic description of the world as the *civitas communis deorum* atque *hominum* § 23; (3) their common kinship, *ut homines deorum a natione et gentes teneantur,* see Dumesnil in loc.

*sancititas—deorum:* so Sext. Emp. l.c. *εἰς τὰ γὰρ εὑσzetia ἐπιστήμη θεῶν θεραπείας,* a Stoic definition, as we learn from Stob. l.c. and Diog. l. vii 119, borrowed however from Socrates, see Xen. *Mem.* iv 6 4 ὁ ἀρι σερὶ τοὺς θεοὺς νυμμα εἰδως ὁρῶς ἄν ἦμιν εὑσzetis ὁρασμένοις εἰη, and Plato *Euthyphro* 14 (οἰκοτή) ἐπιστήμη τινὰ τοῦ θείου τε καὶ εὑσzetia. The explanation of this rather inappropriate definition must be sought in the Socratic and Stoical identification of virtue and knowledge (Zeller *Socr.* p. 143 tr., *Stoics* p. 239). In the *Plane.* 80 Cic. asks quin sancti, quin religio omnem coletes nisi qui meritam dis immortalibus gratiam justis honoribus et memori mente persolvent.
Ch. xlii § 117 quid est quod: see § 3 n. and compare the Fr. qu'est que c'est que.

videmus: Madv. Fin. ii 15 says expectabam 'videamus', as we have actura sit in § 116 and videantur in § 55; but in both those passages the relative is general or indefinite, meaning 'of such a kind as'; here there is no reason why we may not take quae as the simple relative referring to a particular known case.

nam. Its force seems to be as follows: 'What reason is there for adoring the gods when you leave nothing adorable in their nature? For in doing away with the divine attributes, you do away not only with superstition but with religion itself'.

quod—soletis: referring to the following liberari. For the matter see nn. §§ 54 and 56.

Diagonum aut Theodorum: see on § 63.

Protagoram: see on § 29.

cui neutrum licerinit: cf. quod ligueat § 29, so deliguesco makes delicui, Ov. Met. iv 253, vii 381.

superstitionem—continetur. On the difference between superst. and rel. see ii 72 n. and cf. Plat. M. 1110 c dei μὲν γὰρ τῆς περὶ θεῶν δόξης, ὡσπερ ὤνεος λήμμα, ἀφαρείν τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, μὴ συνεκκόπησην μηδὲ τυφλοῦ τὴν πίστιν, ἢ οἱ πλεῖστοι περὶ θεῶν ἔχοντες.

§ 118. ii qui dixerunt—sustulerunt. Sext. Emp. (Math. ix 51, cf. 14 where Critias is alluded to without being named) giving a list of atheistical philosophers, mentions Diagonas, Theodorus, Protagoras, Prodicus and Euhemerus, as C. does here, and goes on to say that Critias, one of the Thirty, must be classed among them, as he held that oii παλαιοι νομοβείται ἐπίσκοποι των τῶν ἄνθρωπων κατορθωμάτων καὶ ἀμαρτημάτων ἐπιπλαςα τῶν θεῶν, ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδένα λάθρα τῶν πλησίων ἀδίκειν, εὐλαβοῦμεν καὶ τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν τιμηρίαν. In proof of this he quotes from the Sisyphus (a δράμα Σατυρικών attributed by others to Euripides, cf. Plat. M. 879 e) ἔσεθαι ἐπειδὴ τὰμαφανεὶ μὲν οἱ νόμοι οἳ ἄργον αὐτοῦς ἔργα μὴ πράσσετι βία, | λάθρα δ' ἐπρασσοῦν, τυνικαύτα μοι δοκεῖ | τυκνός τις ἄλλος καὶ σοφὸς γνώμην ἀνὴρ | γεγονείναι, ὃς ὑπνοῖσθ' ἔξωρων ὅπως | ἐκ τ' ἰδίᾳ τοῖς κακοῖς, κἂν λάθρα | πράσσουσιν ἣ λέγασιν ἢ φρονώσι τι, ἵν τε λέγασιν τὸ ἔξωρον, ἢν ταύτα εἰσηγήσατο | and placed the Gods in the region of storms and lightning in order to make them more terrible. Plato alludes to this theory of religion Leg. x 889 ε, θεοὶ εἶναι πρῶτον φασίν οὗτο τέχνη, οὐ φύσει ἄλλα τινὰs νόμοις, καὶ τούτουs ἄλλος ἄλλος, ὡς ἐκαστὸς λαυτοῖς συνομολόγησαι νομοβείτωμενοι καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ φύει μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, νόμῳ δὲ ἔτερα.

Prodicus: see Introd. and Art. by Brandis in Dict. of Biog. His name appears in the fragments of Philod. pp. 112 and 76 (quoted in n. on § 38), cf. also p. 71 and Sext. Emp. Math. ix 18 Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος, ἡλιος, λαμπρός, καὶ σέληνος καὶ σταματέως καὶ κρῆσας καὶ καθόλου πάντα τὰ ὁφελεία τῶν βιων ἡμῶν oι παλαιοι θεοις ἐνόμισαν διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ὀφέλειαν, καθάπερ Αἰγύπτιοι τῶν Νείλου, καὶ διὰ τούτο τῶν μὲν ἄρτον Δήμητραν νομοθέτην καὶ Ἰακώβαν, καὶ διὰ τούτο τῶν μὲν ἄρτον Δήμητραν νομοθέτην.
Fel. c. 21. Persaeus (§ 38) and other Stoics had the same belief (p. 60, Plut. M. 378).

habita: referring to the time when the worship was introduced.

§ 119. fortes ad deos pervenisse. It has been already stated (§§ 38, 39) that Persaeus and Chrysippus held this view, which is also maintained by Balbus (p. 62), cf. Zeller Stoics, p. 330, Döllinger Gentle and Jew 1 p. 343, p. 32, 165 foll.; but it would seem that C. has wrongly identified with theirs the doctrine of Euhemerus, who acc to Sext. l. c. supposed this worship to have been instituted during the life-time of its founders, aí pericgenomai taw ãllow ìschi kai sunnèsei, óste prõs tà ëp autwv kelenô-
mevna pánvta bìnv, spoudâíontes meiçovnas thwmatomov kai sevmoftov toçxew, ànepìsazan peri autwv ùperzallonstàv tivn kai theian dûnavm, eyvèn kai tois pollôs évomlêsthasan theoi.

Euhemerus: fl. 300 B.C., sent on an exploring expedition to the Red Sea by Cassander, the results of which he professed to recount in his ‘Sacred Records’ (tevà ìanagraphe). In this he gave a long account of an island named Panchea, lying towards the south, in which there was a temple of Zeus Triphylius, adb ìaurum columnam positum esse ab ipso Jore titulus indicat; in qua columna gesta sua perscrpsit ut monumentum esset posteris verum suavum, Lact. 11. Euhemerus is the chief representative of the pragmaticizing or rationalistic mythologists, but traces of the same tendency may be seen in Hecataeus and Herodotus, and much more in Ephorus, and Dionysius of Miletus, whose Atlantis is described by Dio. n. 51, 55 foll. Cf. Keightley Mythol. c. 2, Döllinger l.c. l. 345, Zeller Soc. p. 343 tr.

interpretatus—Ennius. The fragments (in Lactantius’ prose version) are given in Hessel’s ed. of Ennius p. 312 foll., in Vahlen’s p. 169 foll. As exx. we may cite fr. 13 Venus artem meretricium instituit, autorsque mulicribus in Cypro fuit uti vulgato corpore quaestum facerent (Lact. 1 c. 17), fr. 12 ‘the tomb of Jupiter is shown in the Cretan Chosus, and on it is inscribed in ancient characters ZAN KPONOY’ (Lact. 1. 11). The influence of Ennius’ work is seen in Virg. Aen. vii 47, 177, viii 353, Geo. ii 139. It is constantly referred to by the early Apologists.

sepulturae deorum: cf. previous n. and iii 53. It is of this that Callimachus wrote Κρήτης αεὶ ψεύτασαι, καὶ γὰρ τάφον, ὁ ἄνα, σεῖο | Κρήτης ἐτεκέρνυτο σε ὃ αὐτώ δίνειε, ἵσταν γὰρ αἰτί, quoted by Or. c. Col. iii 43.

penitut susstulisse. Though Euhemerus is often charged with atheism, as by Sext. l. c. o ἐπικληθεῖς ἄδεος, and Plut. M. p. 300 λ, πάλαν ἀδεκχητὰ κατακεκλάνναι τῆς οἰκονομῆς, τοὺς νομοζορίους θεοὺς πάντας ὑμᾶλως διαγρά-
φοι, εἰς δυνάμα στρατηγῶν καὶ καυμάχων καὶ βασιλέων ὡς δὴ πᾶλαι γεγονότων, κ.τ.λ., yet he appears to have admitted the existence of the elemental gods, the sun, the heavens, &c. (Euseb. Pr. Ev. ii 2) and to have represented Zeus as offering sacrifice to Aether (Lact. 1. 11).

omitto Eleusinemi. As there is nothing corresponding to this in the parallel passage of Sext. Emp, who passes on at once from Prodicus
§ 18 to Democritus in § 19, Schwencke (p. 61) thinks that C. here departs from his author (as he often does where he wishes to enliven the discussion by a quotation) perhaps through a reminiscence of Tusc. I 20 quaere quorum demonstrantur sepulcrum in Gracia, reminiscere, quoniam es initiatus, quae tradantur mysteriis, where the tombs of the gods are also brought into juxtaposition with the mysteries. On the general subject of the mysteries, see Döllinger L. c. 130—200, and Lobeck Aglaoaphanus.

sanctam illam et augustam. C. and Atticus were initiated, as we learn from Leg. ii 36, where the beneficial influence of the mysteries is thus spoken of: nam mihi cum multa eximia divinaque videntur Athenae tuae peperisse atque in vitam hominum attulisse, tum nihil melius illis mysteriis, quibus ex agris immanique vita exculti ad humanitatem et mitigati sumus, initiaque ut appellantur, ita re vera principia vitae cognovimus, neque solum cum lactitia vivendi rationem accipimus, sed etiam cum spe meliore morendi; and in the preceding paragraph, discussing the prohibition of nocturnal worship, he asks quid ergo aget Iacchus Eumolpidaeque nostri et augusta illa mysteria, si quidem sacra nocturna tollimus? On the special force of the word augustus see Ov. Fast. I 609 sancta vocant augusta patres, augusta vocantur | templum sacerdotum rite dicata manu | ; it is joined, as here, with sanctus in ii 62, iii 53.

ubi initiatur—ultimae. It is not known from whence this iambic line is taken. Orarum is the Inclusive (partitive) Genitive after ultimae, which I take as Nom. Pl agreeing with gentes, not (as Sch. apparently) as Gen. Sing. It is loosely added, like locorum, terrarum, &c., to define the meaning of ult. With regard to the admission to the mysteries, Isocrates Paneg. 42 mentions that barbarians were not allowed to be initiated, but the rule seems to have been relaxed in later times, as in the case of C.; indeed Lobeck considers that any one already initiated was at liberty to introduce a friend of whatever nationality (p. 28 foll.), so that the word μυσταγγαγος came to mean no more than cicerone. But the form of initiation was always preserved, the uninitiated could only enter the temple at the peril of their lives, as is shown by the fate of the two Acarnanians whose death led to the war between Athens and Macedonia b.c. 200 (Liv. xxxi 14).

Samothracia.—Lemni: these islands together with Imbros were the seat of the Cabiric worship, on which see Düll. l. c. p. 164 foll., Lobeck Agl. p. 1109—1329, Preller Gr. Myth. I 660—673. Herodotus II 51 is the first who mentions the Samothracian mysteries. Preller thinks that these were not of much importance till after the Persian War, and that they were partly copied from the Eleusinia. Aristophanes (Pax 278) speaks of the Samothracian initiation as a safeguard in danger; especially at sea, as we learn from other sources, cf. N. D. III 89. Under the Macedonian and Roman rule (partly owing to the supposed connexion of Rome with Troy) these mysteries were continually growing in importance. See Liv. xliv. 5, Galen De usu part. xvii 1, Juv. iii 144 jures licet et Samothracum et nos-
trorum aras. Lobeck denies that there was any difference between the Samothracian and Lemnian mysteries. The latter are only mentioned here and in another passage from the Philoctetes of Attius quoted by Varro L. L. vii 11 Lemnia praeisto | litora rara, et celsa Cabirum | delubra tenes, mysteria quies | pristina cistis consaepta sacris | Ribbeck Frag. Lat. p. 173.

nocturno—densa: analectic dimeter followed by the versus paroemiacus; probably a quotation from the Philoctetes of Attius: ‘those rites which are celebrated at Lemnos in nightly procession, deep shrouded in their leafy covert’ (silvestribus saepibus densa a sort of hypallage for densis silvis saepta).

quibus explicatis—deorum. Compare iii 63 on the allegorizing of the Stoics. The mysteries themselves appear to have been a kind of miracle play illustrative of the story of Demeter and of other deities, such as Zagreus, who were in later times associated with her. It is doubtful whether the symbolical action was accompanied by any authorized interpretation, but philosophers and moralists sought to explain the mysteries in such a manner as to recommend their own views. While the ordinary spectator, satisfied with the splendid and impressive scenes which passed before his eyes, carried away with him no distinct ideas beyond the suggestion of a future life of happiness which was in store for the initiated, the Stoics (as Döllinger says, p. 198) regarded them as symbolizing the truth that the gods were merely a portion of the material universe; the Peripatetics as showing that God had laid the foundation of civilization in agriculture; the Euhemerists that the objects of worship were only deified men; the Pythagoreans and New Platonists that the secret of all religions was contained in the ancient theology of Egypt and the East. Plutarch expressly says that he who would rightly understand and profit by the mysteries must take with him λόγον ἐκ φιλοσοφίας μυσταγωγών (Is. c. 68). For exx. of the ‘physical interpretation’ here referred to by C. cf. Lobeck l. c. p. 136 foll., who quotes Themistius Or. 29 for the view of Prodicus that the mysteries only referred to the operations of agriculture; similarly Cornutus c. 28, and Varro (ap. Aug. C. D. vii 20) V. de Eleusininis nihil interpretatur nisi quod attinet ad frumentum; Proserpinam dicit significare fecunditatem seminum, quae cum defuisit tempore, exortam esse opinionem quod Cercis filium Oeaeus abstulerit, &c., ib. vii 28 V. Samothracum mysteria sic interpretatur; dicit se ibi multis indiciis collegisse in simulacris alium significare caelum, alium terram, alium exempla rerum, quas Plato appellat ideas; caelum Jovem, terram Junonem, ideas Minervam ruij intelligi; somewhat different is the account given by the same author in Ling. Lat. v 58, terra caim et caelum, ut Samothracum initia docent sunt Dei Magni et hi quos dixi multis nominibus; so Plut. (et ap. Delph. p. 389) speaks of the Zagreus myth as symbolizing the divine soul of the world which is ever clothing itself in new shapes.

1 See on the other side, Döll. p. 170.

Ch. XLIII § 120. Democritus: cf. §§ 29, π 76. His fragments have been edited by Mullach.

vir magnus: so Ac. II 73 quem cum eo conferre possimus non modo ingeniis magnitudinis sed etiam animi? where see Reid.

hortulos irrigavit: playing on the word, cf. § 93 and, for the metaphor, Ac. I 8 (I recommend my friends to study the Greek philosophers themselves) ut ea a fontibus potius hauriant quam rivos consecutentur.


tum enim censet: see Sext. Emp. IX 19 Δημ. ’deo eidola τινά φησιν εμπελάξειν τούς ανθρώπους καί τούτων τά μέν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιά, τά δὲ κακοποιά. ένθεν καί εἴχεται εὐλόγων τυχεὶν εἰδόλοι. εἶναι δὲ ταύτα μεγάλα τε καί ἰππεμεγέθη, καί δισφάρια μέν, οὐκ ἀθάνατα δέ, προσημαίνειν τα τά μέλλοντα τούς ανθρώπους, θεωρούμενα καί φωνάς δήμενα, and ib. 42 τὸ δὲ εἰδόλα εἶναι εν τῷ περιέχοντι ὑπέρφυν καί ἀνθρώποιειδές ἔχοντα μορφές παντελῶς ἐστι δυσπαράδεκτον. Cf. Plut. M. 361 of the demons of Xenocrates. ‘It will be obvious’ (says Mosheim in his excellent note on Cudworth II p. 644) ‘from a comparison of these passages, that one and the same opinion of Dem. is here broken up into several tenets by C. Perhaps here, as in other cases, he has designedly perverted the opinion of this philosopher in order with better effect to confute him’. The principia mentis are the fiery particles of which soul is composed; these coalesce and constitute the imagines which float around us, and which, when they enter into our consciousness (itself composed of the same divine particles), are recognized as divinities. Democritus attributed to them vast size, a lengthened but not everlasting existence (see Plut. Def. Or. p. 415 ὁ δὲ Ἡσίοδος οἴεται καὶ περίοδοι τισι χρόνων γίγνεσθαι τοῖς δαίμοσι ταῖς τελευταίς, thus the Naiad’s life is ten times as long as that of the phoenix, which is itself nine times that of the raven), benignant or malignant influence, in order to agree with the popular theology: and for the same reason, we may suppose, he considered them to be perceptible by the lower animals (as Athene by the dogs in the Odyssey), cf. Clem. Strom. V 590 c, τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεποίηκεν εἰδώλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις προσπηπτοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἄλογοῖς ὡφεὶς ἀπὸ τῆς θείας οὐσίας.

mundum complectantur. This absurd exaggeration probably arose from a careless reading of the Gr. quoted above, εν τῷ περιέχοντι ὑπέρφυν.

sint—solaent. Sch. (Opusc. III 308, 365), in accordance with Heindorff’s suggestion, changed the Ind. of the MSS for the Subj., stating an opinion, not a fact, and has been followed by the later edit.

animantes: for the adjectival use cf. §§ 23, 123, π 22, III 11.

patria Democriti. Abdera in Thrace had a reputation like our Gotham, cf. Juv. X 50 (Dem.) cuius prudentia monstrat | summos posse

M. C.
vivis et magna exempla daturos, verocum in patria crassique sub aere nasci
with Mayor’s n.; the first instance of its proverbial use is in Cic. Att. iv
16 § 6, hic (Rome) Abdera non tuente me, and vii 7 § 4 id est 'Δρβδρητικον.
Hirzel (in Hermes. xiv p. 492) thinks that Abdera got its character from D.’s
habit of ridiculing the follies of his neighbours; thus we have several
fragments (Mullacht 16, 31, 51—56) commencing with αναφορεσ, e.g. ‘fools,
though they hate life, wish to live from fear of Hades’, ‘fools learn nothing
all their life long’, &c. He thinks that the reproof had reference rather
to inconsistency (nauta) than stupidity.

§ 121. dis—gratian sustulit. There seems no need for Ba.’s inser-
tion of in before dis: the dative is simply ‘for the gods’, ‘as far as they are
concerned’, cf. Att. xii 6 nibi quidem omnia habitationem tolleret. So
we find a dative with anfero, eripio, extorqueo, absolvo (Verr. ii 2 § 22
Dionen Veneri absolvit, sibi condemnat ‘releases D. from his obligation to
Venus’). The reference is to the κυρια δοξα quoted on § 45. Aristotle
while allowing that God took care of men (Eth. N. x 8 ει τις επιμελει των
ανθρωπων υπ’ θεον γίνεται, ασπερ δοκει), denied that there could be any
friendship between God and man, both on account of the inequality, and
because God has no need of a friend, Eth. N. viii 9, Eth. Eth. vii 12, M.
M. ii 11 άτοπον γαρ άν εις ει τις φαινει φιλει των ∆ια.

cum enim—naturae: ‘while asserting the perfection of the divine
nature, he at the same time (idend, cf. § 30) denies to it the attribute of
kindness, and thereby does away with that which is the essential character-
istic of a perfect nature’. Heind. reads dicit after Walker, but that would
imply the identity of the two actions, ‘in asserting he denies’. For the
asyneton, cf. § 70.

quid praestantius bonitate: a Stoic utterance, as we learn from
Plut. M. 1075, ου γαρ αδινατοι και μακρους μονον, αλλα και φωλανθρωπον
και κηδεμονιαν και ωβελιων προλαμβανεσθαι και νοιεθαι των θεων.
amari: used of the feeling, diligi of the judgment.

Ch. xlv. consent autem: so δε sometimes, where we might expect
γαρ, giving a sort of side explanation instead of a reason; ‘they hold, you
know’. Erain is reserved to give the proof of melius.
sapientes sapientibus—amicos. Schwencke (p. 60) quotes Stob. Ed.
ii 204 παντας τοις σπουδαιοις ωβελιων αλληλους, ουτε φιλους οντας αλληλων
παντως ουτε ευνους...παρα το μητε καταλαμβανεσθαι μητε εν τωτω κατουκεων
topio, ενοπτικοις μειτογε προς αλληλους διακεςαθαι και φιλικωι, cf. Sext.
Emp. ix 131, Zeller Stoics, p. 298 tr., on the Stoical view of friendship,
nihil est—diligetur. So Lael. 28 nihil est enim amabilis virtute, nihil
quod magis allocit ad diligendum, quippe cum propter virtatem et probatatem
cos etiam quos numquam vidimus quodam modo diligamus with Seyffert’s n.
who quotes Ennip. Fr. ap. Porson Adv. p. 27 σοφων γαρ άνδρα, καν έκας
ναιη χρονον, καν μητοτ έστων εισιδω, κρινω φιλω. Cf. Off. i 55, ii 17.
quid mali datis: ‘what mischief you cause’ (=mali quid affert ista sententia? Tusc. 1 82), a colloquial expression, so hau taterum istae dedisti Ter. Adelph. III 4 4, and malum dare frequently.

§ 122. in imbécillitate ponitis. Cf. Diog. L. x 77 οὐ γὰρ συμφωνούσι πραγματεῖαι καὶ φροντίδες καὶ ὄργαι καὶ χάραις μακραίνῃ, ἄλλ' ἀσθενεία καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προσεδέσθε τῶν πλησιά ταῦτα γίνεται, Lael. 29 quam (benenientiam) si qui putant ab imbécillitate proficisci, ut sit per quem assecurat quod quīsque desideret, humilem sine relinquunt et minime generosum, ut ita dicam, orte amicitiae.

vim et naturam deorum: little more than a periphrasis for τὸ θέιων as in § 32, cf. Nagelsb. Stil. § 3 2 d, Beier on Off. 1 18 honesti naturam viniquire; ‘setting aside the Gods and their attributes’.

ne homines quidem: ‘do you think that even in the case of men it is true, that they would have been devoid of kindness, if it had not been for their weakness?’

 nisi essent — futurosuisse: orat. obl. for the direct nisi essent — fuisset, see Roby § 1784, Madv. 381, 409.

ista amicitia: on the attraction (ista for istud) cf. § 67.

mercatura—suarum. Cf. Zeller Stoics, p. 465 tr., on the Epicurean view of friendship, who quotes Ep. ap. Diog. L. x 120 τὴν φιλίαν διὰ τὰς χρείας γίνεται, δειν μέντοι προκατάρχεσθαι, συνιστάσθαι δε αὐτὴν κατά κοινωνίαν ἐν ταῖς ἠδονάις, Fin. I 66, II 78. In the parallel passage of Lael. 31, we read neque enim beneficium feneramur sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus, where Seyffert quotes Fin. II 117 (kindness done from interested motives is a feneratio not a beneficium), Sen. Ep. 9 ista, quam tu describis, negotiatio est, non amicitia. On the change of person, where the subject is indefinite (nos—suarum), see § 84 sibi disiplvore.

§ 123. at etiam liber est: recurring to § 115.

ludimur: cf. § 113, III 3.

non tam faceto: cf. II 46 hic quam volet Ep. jocetur, homo non aptissimus ad jocandum, II 74 salem isticum, quo caret vestra natio, irridendis nobis nolitote consumere foll., Div. II 40 deos jocandi causa induxit perducidos.

familiaris—Posidonius. He was sent as ambassador from Rhodes to Rome b.c. 86; Cic. attended his lectures at Rhodes b.c. 78, where Pompey also visited him on two occasions. Cic. in vain urged him to write a panegyric on his consulship. The fragments have been collected by Bake.

invidiae detestandae: ‘deprecatng odium’. So Cat. I 27 ut a me patriae querimoniam detester et deprecer, lit. ‘to call the Gods to avert’.

tam desipiens fuisset. Strictly speaking this should have been expressed in the Inf. as a part of the argument of P. See Madv. Fin. III 50.

exilem: ‘emaciated’.

omnino: summing up, ‘in a word’.

quid enim—propitius sit: ‘for why should I offer the usual prayer?’ Cf. the formula in Cato R. R. 141 Mars pater, te precor quaeque, uti sies colens propitius mihi domo familiaeque nostrae.
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