This work is written by the principal contributors to the Dictionaries of Greek and Roman Antiquities, and Biography and Mythology, and will complete the series of Classical Dictionaries. The three works will then form an Encyclopaedia of Classical Antiquity. Although, for the sake of uniformity, it is called a Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography, it will be in reality a Dictionary of Ancient Geography including even Scriptural names. The work will, of course, not be confined to a barren description of the geography of countries and of the sites of places; but it will also include an account of the political history, both of countries and of cities. An attempt will likewise be made to trace, as far as possible, the history of the more important buildings of the cities, and to give an account of their present condition, wherever they exist. The Illustrations will consist of plans of cities, districts, battles, &c., and of coins of the more important places. It is intended to publish, at the close of the work, "An Historical Atlas of Ancient Geography," which will be so called, on account of its containing, in many cases, several maps of the same country, in order to give a proper representation of it at different epochs of its history.

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The dictionary is illustrated by numerous wood-cuts, made under the superintendence of the writers of the several articles. They are chiefly representations of costumes, weapons, ornaments, machines, implements, utensils, money, plans of buildings, and architectural embellishments.

Subjoined are tables of Greek and Roman measures, weights, and money: with full indexes, Greek, Latin, and English.

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Edited by William Smith, LL.D. Medium 8vo. 3 vols. 5l. 15s. 6d. Each volume may be had separately.

The period comprehended in this history of remarkable individuals, real or ideal, is from the earliest times to the fall of the Eastern Empire, in 1453. The work is the result of the joint labours of twenty-nine writers, whose names are attached to their respective articles, — the divisions of subjects having been severally allotted to such of the contributors as had made them more or less their peculiar study. Copious accounts are given of the writings of mathematicians, jurists, physicians, historians, poets, philosophers, and orators. The Latin and Greek Christian fathers also occupy considerable space; and the lives of painters, sculptors, and architects, contain details, useful to the artist, of all their works still extant, or of which there is any record in ancient writers. In fact, the work exhibits a view of the whole circle of ancient history and literature for upwards of two thousand years. It is embellished, whenever possible, by wood-cuts, taken from ancient coins. Extensive chronological tables of Greek and Roman history are added; and a table exhibiting at a glance the years B.C. or A.D. corresponding to any given A.U.C. or Olympiad.

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In this work all names have been inserted which a young person would be likely to meet with at the commencement of his classical studies. The quantities have been carefully marked, and the genitive cases inserted. Care has been taken not to presume too much on the knowledge of the reader; the work may therefore be used with advantage by persons unacquainted with the classics. The mythological articles are illustrated by drawings from ancient works of art.

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This work comprises the same subjects as are contained in the well-known Dictionary of Lemprière, avoiding its errors, supplying its deficiencies, and exhibiting in a concise form the results of the labours of modern scholars. In addition to the names mentioned in Classical writers, the most distinguished Greek and Latin Fathers are noticed, and accounts are given of many places referred to in Scripture. It thus forms a most useful help both for the junior student and the general reader.

Lexicon to Aeschylus, containing a Critical Explanation of the more difficult Passages in the Seven Tragedies. By the Rev. W. Linwood, A.M. 8vo. 12s. cloth.

The object of this work, besides furnishing an interpretation of the words and ordinary phraseology of the author, is to explain the difficulties of the text.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝ

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES CRITO ETC
LONDON:
PRINTED BY J. WERTHEIMER AND CO.,
FINSBURY CIRCUS.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝ

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES  THE CRITO
AND PART OF THE PHÆDO

WITH
NOTES FROM STALLBAUM
SCHLEIERMACHER'S INTRODUCTIONS
A LIFE OF SOCRATES
AND SCHLEIERMACHER'S ESSAY ON THE WORTH
OF SOCRATES AS A PHILOSOPHER

Second Edition Revised

LONDON
TAYLOR WALTON AND MABERLY
UPPER GOWER STREET AND IVY LANE PATERNOSTER ROW.

MDCCCLII

1852
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The text of the following edition of the Apology of Socrates, the Crito, and part of the Phædo, is a reprint from that of Stallbaum's. The whole of his notes, which have been translated for this edition by Mr. Gillespie, A.M. of Trinity College, Dublin, are given with a few unimportant exceptions. The notes on the various readings are placed at the foot of the page, and those of an explanatory nature at the end of the volume. The Latin abbreviations used to denote the MSS. are those of Bekker's edition.

It has been justly considered by many scholars that the Apology of Socrates and the Crito might be read with great advantage in the higher classes of our schools, and it has been partly with the view of supplying a suitable edition for such a purpose that I have been induced to edit the following pages. The Apology and the Crito are written in an easy style, and are almost entirely
free from those philosophical discussions, which render the greater part of Plato's writings unsuitable for the use of schools. They also form the best introduction to the study of Plato, from the information they convey respecting the life and character of Socrates, of which it is necessary to have some knowledge in order to understand many parts of Plato's writings.

The extracts from the Phædo, which contain an account of the death of Socrates, are inserted at the suggestion of Professor Malden, in order to give a complete account of the last days of Socrates.

I have to express my obligations to the Rev. Connop Thirlwall for his kindness in allowing me to make use of his translation of Schleiermacher's Introduction to the Apology, which was originally published in the Philological Museum.

William Smith.

London, April 2nd, 1840.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ.
I have already observed, in the general Introduction of this translation of Plato, that the reader is not to conclude, because certain works are placed in an appendix, that by this I mean to deny or to call in question with regard to all of them, that they are writings of Plato. My only reason for assigning such a place to the following work which has been at all times loved and admired for the spirit that breathes through it, and the image it presents of calm moral dignity and beauty, was in the first instance that it contents itself with its particular object, and makes no pretensions to the title of a scientific work. It is true that the Euthyphron likewise has unquestionably an apologetic reference to the charge brought against Socrates; but on the other hand its connection with the notions started in the Protagoras, clearly entitled it to be subjoined to that dialogue. But the
Apology is so purely an occasional piece, that it can find no place in the series of its author's philosophical productions. Yet there is certainly one sense, in which, let not the reader be startled, one might perhaps say that it is not a work of Plato's. I mean that it can scarcely be a work of his thoughts, a thing which he invented and fabricated. For if we attribute to Plato the intention of defending Socrates, we must first of all distinguish the times at which he might have done it, either during his process, or subsequently, no matter how soon or how late, to his execution. Now in the latter case Plato could only have proposed to vindicate the principles and sentiments of his friend and master. But this vindication he, who was so fond of combining several ends in one work, might easily have coupled with his scientific views: and accordingly we not only find detached intimations of this kind scattered over his later writings, but we shall soon be introduced to an important work, one which cannot be denied to be closely enough interwoven with his scientific speculations, in which a collateral object, but one made distinctly prominent, is to place the conduct and virtue of Socrates as an Athenian citizen in a clear light. Now this is intelligible enough: but Plato could scarcely have found any inducement at a later period to compose a work which merely confronts Socrates with his actual accusers. It must have been then during the process that he
wrote this speech. But for what purpose? It is manifest that he could have rendered his master no worse service, than if, before he had defended himself in court, he had published a defence under his name, just as if to help the prosecutors to the arguments which it would be their business to parry or to elude, and to place the defendant in the difficult situation of being reduced either to repeat much that had been said before, or to say something less forcible. Hence the more excellent and the better suited to the character of Socrates the defence might be, the more harm it would have done to him. But this is a supposition which will scarcely be maintained.

After the decision of the cause there were two purposes which Plato might have had, either that of making the course of the proceedings more generally known at the time, and of framing a memorial of them for posterity, or that of setting the different parties and their mode of proceeding in a proper light. Now if we inquire about the only rational means to the latter of these ends: all will agree that the speech should have been put into the mouth, not of Socrates, but of some other person defending him. For the advocate might have brought forward many things, which the character of Socrates rendered improper for him to urge, and might have shown by the work that, if the defendant's cause had only been pleaded by a person who had no need to disdain
resources which many men of honour did not think beneath them, it would have had a very different issue. Now if there were any foundation for an anecdote, not indeed a very probable one, which Diogenes Laertius has preserved from an insignificant writer, Plato's most natural course would have been, to publish the speech which he would himself have made on the same occasion if he had not been hindered.* He would then have had an opportunity of exemplifying those great precepts and expedients of rhetoric, the force of which he had himself first disclosed; and undoubtedly he might have applied them with great truth and art to the charges concerning the new deities and the corruption of youth. And so it would have been far better for him to have used any other person's name for the purpose of retorting on the accusers of Socrates, and to have spoken of his merits in a different tone. Whereas in a speech put into the mouth of Socrates himself, yet different from that which he really delivered, he can have had no other object than to show what Socrates voluntarily neglected or involuntarily let slip, and how his defence should have been framed so as to produce a better effect.

* "See Diog. Laert. II. 41. where it is related that Plato was prepared to defend Socrates, but in the first sentence of his speech was interrupted by the petulance of the jurors, and compelled to descend from the bema. But this anecdote is too little attested and too improbable in itself to build upon."

Schleiermacher.
APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

Now not to mention that this would have been scarcely possible without departing from the character of Socrates, it is evident that the defence we now have was not framed with this view. For how could such a speech have been followed by the address after the verdict, which implies an issue not more favourable than the real one? The only supposition then that remains is, that this work was designed simply to exhibit and record in substance the real proceedings of the case, for those Athenians who were not able to be hearers, and for the other Greeks, and posterity. Now are we to believe that, in such a case and under such circumstances, Plato was unable to resist the temptation of fathering upon Socrates a work of his own art, which in all but the outline was perhaps entirely foreign to him, like a boy who has a theme set him to declaim on. This we cannot believe, but must presume that in this case, where nothing of his own was wanted, and he had entirely devoted himself to his friend, especially so short a time before or after the death of Socrates, as this work was undoubtedly composed, he considered his departing friend too sacred to be disguised even with the most beautiful of ornaments, and his whole form as so faultless and majestic, that it was not right to exhibit it in any dress, but, like the statue of a god, naked, and wrapt only in its own beauty. And so in fact we find he has done. For a critic who should
undertake the task of mending this speech would find a great deal in it to alter. Thus the charge of misleading the young is not repelled with arguments by any means so cogent as it might have been, nor is sufficient stress by a great deal laid on the fact, that Socrates had done every thing in the service of Apollo, for defending him against the charge of disbelief of the antient gods: and any one with his eyes only half open may discover other weak points of the like kind, which are not so grounded in the character of Socrates that Plato should have been compelled to copy them.

Nothing therefore is more probable, than that in this speech we possess as faithful a transcript of Socrates' real defence, as Plato's practised memory enabled him to make, allowing for the necessary difference between a written speech and one carelessly spoken. But perhaps some one may say: If Plato, supposing him to be the author of this work, did nothing more than record what he had heard: what reason is there for insisting on this fact, or how can it be known, that it was he, and not some other among the friends of Socrates who were present at the trial? Such an objector, if he is familiar with the style of Plato, need only be referred to the whole aspect of the Apology, which distinctly shows that it can have proceeded from no pen but Plato's. For in it Socrates speaks exactly as Plato makes him speak, a manner in which, so far as we can judge from all we
have left, he was not made to speak by any of his other scholars. And this resemblance is so indisputable, that it may serve as a foundation for a remark of some importance. For it suggests the question: Whether certain peculiarities of the Platonic dialogue, particularly the imaginary questions and answers inserted in a sentence, and the accumulation of several sentences comprehended under one, and often expanded much too amply for this subordinate place, together with the interruption almost inevitably arising from this cause in the original structure of the period: whether these peculiarities, seeing that we find them so predominant here, ought not properly to be referred to Socrates? They occur in Plato most frequently where he is imitating Socrates closest; but nowhere so frequently, and so little clear of their accompanying negligences, as here and in the following dialogue (the Crito), which is probably of like origin. All this together renders it a very natural conjecture, that these forms of speech were originally copied from Socrates, and are therefore to be numbered among the specimens of the mimic art of Plato, who endeavoured in a certain degree to copy the style of the persons whom he introduces, if it had peculiarities which justified him in so doing. And any one who tries this observation by applying it to Plato's different works, especially in the order in which I have arranged them, will find it very strongly
confirmed by the trial. The cause why such an imitation was not attempted by other disciples of Socrates, was probably this: that on the one hand it really required no little art to bend these peculiarities of a careless colloquial style under the laws of written discourse, and to amalgamate them with the regular beauty of expression, and on the other hand, it called for more courage to meet the censure of minute critics than Xenophon probably possessed. But this is not the place for entering further into this question.

One circumstance, however, must still be noticed, which might be alleged against the genuineness of this work, and with more plausibility indeed than any other: that it wants the dress of the dialogue, in which Plato presents all his other works, and which he has given even to the Menexenus, though in other respects that, like this, consists of nothing more than a speech. Why therefore it may be asked, should the Apology, which so easily admitted of this ornament, be the only work of Plato that is destitute of it? Convincing as this sounds, the weight of all other arguments is too strong not to counter-balance this scruple, and we reply to the objection as follows. In the first place, it is possible that the dialogic form had not then become so indispensable with Plato as it afterwards was: which may serve as an answer for those who are inclined to set a great value on the dress of the Menexenus;
or Plato himself distinguished this work from his other writings too much to think of subjecting it to the same law. Besides, it would in general be very unworthy of Plato, to consider the dialogue, even in those works where it is not very intimately blended with the main mass of the composition, as nothing more than an ornament arbitrarily appended to them: it always has its meaning, and contributes to the conformation and effect of the whole. Now if this would not have been the case in the present instance, why should Plato have brought it violently in? Especially as in all likelihood he wished to hasten the publication of this speech as much as possible, and might not think it advisable at that time to hazard a public declaration of his sentiments on the issue of the cause, which, if he had clothed the speech in the form of a dialogue, it would have been difficult to avoid, without rendering the form utterly empty and unmeaning.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ.

Cap. I. "Ο τι μὲν ύμεῖς, οἵ άνδρείς Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόθηκατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἴδατε ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῶς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὅλιγον ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην. οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καὶ τοι ἀληθές γε, ὡς ἔποιες εἰπεῖν; οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑβαύμασαι τῶν πολλῶν δὲν ἐξεύσαστο, τούτο, ἐν ἔλεγον, ὡς χρήν ύμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς δεινοὶ οὖντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθῆσονται ἔργοι, ἐπειδὰν μηδ' ὑπωστίουν φαίνομαι δεινὸς λέγειν,


μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα. B τι edit. Bass. and Forster, with the approbation of Heindorf. But although we may say αἰσχύνθηθα, and ἔλεγχῃθα, yet δεῖ appears the true reading. For instead of δ' τι, I doubt not that Plato would have written δ.
τούτο μοι ἐδοξέων αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὐτοὶ λέγειν τὸν τάληθι λέγοντα: εἰ μὲν γὰρ τούτο λέγουσιν, ὅμολογοιν ἂν ἔγογγοι οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ρήτωρ. οὕτωι μὲν οὖν, ὃσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἢ τι ή οὐδὲν ἄληθὲς εἰρήκασιν ὑμεῖς δ᾽ ἐμοὶ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀληθείαν. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί, ὧν ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ἐκεκαυμενένους γε λόγους, ὃσπερ οἱ τοῦτον, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὁνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ’ ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσιν ὄνομασι πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἡ λέγω, καὶ μηθεῖς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλωσι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήποτε πρέποι, ὧν ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, ὃσπερ μειρακίων πλάττοντει λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσίεναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνω, ὧν ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι τούτοι ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρέμεια. ἔτι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούστε μοι ἀπολογουμένου, δι᾽ ὄντερ εἰῶθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἂγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ὑνα ὑμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοθι, μῆτε θαυμάζειν μῆτε θορυβεῖνο τούτου ἔνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὔτωσι. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἦτη γεγονὼς


ἡ τι ή οὐδὲν ἄληθές εἰρ.] So Bodl. P arr. D S T. Vind. 1. Ven. b. a, pr. m. Flor. d. g. h. The rest injudiciously omit ἡ τι ή. δ᾽ ἐμοὶ is Bekker's correction for the common reading δὲ μοι.

καὶ ἐν ἄγορᾷ ἐπὶ τ. τρ.] So V ind. 1. 2. 3. 6. Flor. b. e. i. Coisl. Par. B. and others. Commonly καὶ ἐν ἄγορᾷ καὶ ἐπὶ τρ. See note.

οἱ πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι.] οἱ is wanting in Bodl. V at. Ven. b. Flor. d. g. h. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Par. DS. Compare τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχουσι, C. III.

ἔτη γεγονὼς πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα.] Bodl. V ind. 1. 4. Flor. d.
APOLGY OF SOCRATES.

II. Πρώτον μὲν οὖν δικαίος εἰμι ἀπολογηθασθαι, άδέρες Ἀθηναίοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μου θευνή κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατηγόρους, ἐπειτὰ δὲ πρὸς τὰ υστέρα καὶ τοὺς υστέρους. Ἐμοὶ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατηγοροῦν γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη θερμάτως καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθῆς λέγοντες. οὐς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀντιτος καὶ πάλαι πολλὰς καὶ τούτους δεινοὺς. ἀλλὰ ἐκείνου δεινότερον, δέν ἀνδρεῖς, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παύδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπειθῶν τε καὶ κατηγόρον μένοι ὑστεράν

Nevertheless, I doubt not that it is correctly preserved by the others.

Most books with Bodl. omit τι, which is found in Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

Π. καὶ τοὺς πρ. κατηγ. So almost all MSS. instead of the common reading καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πρ. κ. Immediately afterwards πρὸς τὰ υστέρα is restored from Bodl. Ven. b. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. instead of the common reading πρὸς τὰ υστεραν.

ἐμοὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθῆς.] Bodl. and some others ἐμοὶ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀλ., wrongly.
PLATO.

4

ἀληθές, ός ἐστι τις Σώκρατης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστής,6 καὶ τά υπὸ γῆς ἀπαντα ἀνεξη
tηκός, καὶ τὸν ἦττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν.6 οὔτοι, ὃ
ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαν
tες,6 οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶ μου κατήγοροι οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες
ήγονται τοὺς ταύτα ξητοῦντας οὔδε θεοὺς νομίζειν.6
ἐπειτά εἰσιν οὔτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολλὸν
χρόνον ἥδη κατηγορηκότες, ἢτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ
ήλικία λέγοντες πρὸς ύμᾶς, ἐν ἧ ἀν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύ
σατε,1 παῖδες ὄντες, ἐννοι δ' ύμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτε
χνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες,6 ἀπολογομένον οὐδενὸς.
δ' δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὔδε τὰ ὀνόματα οὗν
tε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἴπειν, πλὴν εἰ τις κωμῳδο
ποίος τυχχάνει ὄν. ὅσοι δ' ἰδὼν καὶ διαβολὴ χρόνο
μενοι1 ύμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δ' δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι


Flor. d. g. Par. D S. Commonly ἀληθής σοφὸς.

τὰ υπὸ γῆς.] So edit. Bas. 2. Bodl., all MSS. except Ven. Ξ
Vind. 2. 5. Flor. c. d. and a few others. Commonly υπὸ γῆν.

Compare C. III. C. X. For ἀπαντα, found in Bodl. Vat. b.
Flor. d. g. h. Vind. 6. Par. D S., the common reading was πάντα.

4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S. Old editions with Bekker καὶ
πολὺν ἥδη χρόνον, although the latter is the usual collocation of
the words, as πολλὰ ἥδη ἔτη a few lines above, and in C. XVIII.
τοσαῦτα ἥδη ἔτη, yet I did not wish to reject the reading of the
MSS., especially since it may be justified by the consideration that
πολὺν χρόνον forms a single notion, the words signifying ‘for a
long time.’

D S. δ' was commonly omitted.

εἰ τις κωμῳδοποῖος τ.] Commonly κωμῳδοποῖος, which is
corrected from Vat. Ven. Ξ. a. b. Flor. d. g. h. Vind. 1. 2. 5. 6.

Zitt. Par. B. See Pierson. ad. Moer. p. 240., who has rightly
judged that the common form ought everywhere to be expelled
from the writings of Plato.
APOLOGY OF SOCRATES. 5

ἀλλοιος πείθοντες, οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοι εἰσὶν" m
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἰόν τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐν-
ταυθόν" οὐδ' ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνώς
ωστερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μη-
δενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. 'Ἄξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὤμεις, ὥστε
ἐγὼ λέγω, διπτοὺς μου τοὺς κατηγόρους γεγονέναι,
ἐτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἀρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἐτέρους δὲ
toὺς πάλαι, οὗς ἐγὼ λέγω. καὶ οὐήθητε δεῖν πρὸς
ἐκείνους πρῶτον μὲν ἀπολογήσασθαι καὶ γὰρ ὤμεῖς
ἐκείνων πρότερον ἥκουσατε κατηγοροῦντων, καὶ πολὺ
μᾶλλον ἢ τώνδε τῶν ύστερον.

Εἶν. ἀπολογητέον δὴ; δ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ
ἐπικειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολήν, ὥστε ἐν
πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλγῇ χρό-
nῳ. Βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἄν τούτο οὕτω γενέσθαι; εἰ
tι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοὶ, καὶ πλέον τι με ποιή-
σαι ἀπολογούμενον οἴμαι δὲ αὐτῷ χαλεπτὸν εἶναι, καὶ
οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἴον ἐστὶν. οἷμος τούτο μὲν ἵτω

diptou mou touz katygorous.] tods is omitted in Ald. Bas. 1.
Steph. against almost all the MSS. A few lines above te after
apologetumon, is wanting in Vat. Flor. d. Par. C. It has been
erased in Par. B. Flor. a. But there is no need of change.

ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε.] Commonly ἔσχετε, which is corrected
from Ven. b. Par. D S. Vind. 1.4.6. Flor. g. h. Afterwards, old
editions, εν οὕτωι ὀλγῇ χρ. But oútw is found in Bodl. Vat.
Ven. b. Vind. 1.4.6. Flor. d. g. h. Parr. B C D S.

toúto mou ἵτω.] Ald. Bas. 1. ἵτω, which form Buttm. rejects
is found in Bas. 2. Stephan., and in the best as well as in far the
most MSS. All the old and modern editions have ὤμος δὲ τούτο μ.
But δὲ is omitted in Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1.4.6. Flor. d. g. h. Par.
D S., nor do I think that any one will desire its restoration.

b 3
III. ’Αναλάβωμεν οὖν εἰς ἀρχῆς, τὸς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστίν, εἰς ἡς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἢ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητος με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. a Ἐξεν. τὶ δὴ λέγοντες διεβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὃστερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνώρικν αὐτῶν. b Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται c ξητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια, καὶ τὸν ἦττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτα ταῦτα διδάσκων. Τοιαύτη τὶς ἐστὶν ταῦτα γὰρ ἐσώρατε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ 'Ἀριστοφάνους κομῳδία, d Σωκράτης τινὰ ἐκεὶ περιερήμενον, φάσκοντα τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, διὸ ἐγὼ οὖν ὑπὸ μέγα βούλετε σμικρὸν e πέρι ἐπαιν. καὶ οὖν

III. τὶς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστίν.] ἐστίν, commonly omitted with Bas. 2., is retained in Bodl. Vat. Ven. a. b. Vind. 1. 6. Florentine and all the rest except Vind. 2. 3. 4. 5.

πιστεύων Μέλητος.] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. Par. D. Flor. b. c. i. Angel., and that which Bekker has marked g. Commonly Μέλητος; why this should be altered, we have discussed, Euthyphro p. 7. But Eustathius, Odyssey v. 106. p. 42. Vol. II. ed. Lips., defends Μέλητος, deriving it from μέλι; but in that case the penultima would be short.

tὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς. ] Ven. Ξ. with Steph. γῆν: the others have the genitive, see C. II. Afterwards Bodl. Flor. g. h. Vind. 6. Ven. b. Vat. καὶ τὰ υφάνια. But ἐπουράνια is to be preferred even on account of the opposition of the words τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς.

ἔλλος ταῦτα ταῦτα διδάσκων.] Commonly ἔλλος ταῦτα διδάσκων, which is changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 4. Flor. h. Par. D. S.

tαῦτα γὰρ ἐσώρατε.] Commonly τοιαύτα, which we have not hesitated to change from Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 3. 4. 6. Flor. d. e. g. h. Par. D. S. ‘Afterwards Σωκράτης for Σωκράτην, Bodl. Vind. 6. Par. D. S., and perhaps Vat.
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IV. 'Αλλά γὰρ οὕτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ γ' εἰ τίνος ἀκηκόατε, ὡς ἐγώ παιδεύειν ἑπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, b οὐδὲ τούτο ἀληθές. ἔπει καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ τις οἶος τ' εἰηνā παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὁσπερ Ἰοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντῖνος, καὶ Πρόδικος οἱ Κεῖος, καὶ Ἱππίας

tosautas dikas phugoumi.]

Commonly φεύγομι, which is changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D. S. g. For Ἀμελῆτου, Bodl., here also, as always, Ἀμελῆτον.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων.] Commonly γὰρ μοι τῶν τοιούτων, which I have changed from Bodl. Par. D. S. In Vat. Flor. d. Vind. 1. 4. 6. is written, Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτων ἐμοί.

μάρτυρας δ” αυτῶς.] Commonly ать, for which, αυτῶς is found in Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D. S.

καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε.] So Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D. S. Commonly τούτου, which Bekker preserves. See note.

IV. oúde γ' εἰ τίνος.] Bekk. has corrected οὕτε γε, contrary to the authority of MSS., and without any necessity.

tou'to γέ μοι δοκεῖ.] Bekk. with Par. S. Vat. a. b. Zitt. γ' ἐμοὶ δ. No necessity, since the emphasis should not be laid on the pronoun. See note on Protagor. p. 342. Α. Κρίτων. Κ. V.

Πρόδικος δ Κεῖος.] Bodl. Ven. a. Ξ. Vind. 2. 5. 6. Flor. g.
ο Ἡλείος. τούτων γὰρ ἔκαστος, ὁ ἄνδρες, οἷς τ' ἐστὶν ίδιν εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἐξεστὶ τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτών προίκα ξυνεῖναι οὐ ἄν βούλωνται, τούτους πειθοῦσε· τάς ἑκείνων ξυνούσιας ἀπολυτόντας σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. ἔτει καὶ ἄλλος ἄνὴρ ἐστὶν Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφός, ὅν ἐγὼ ἱσθομένη ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἄνδρι, ὅς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφίσταις πλείων ἣ ἑξυμπαντεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου. τούτων οὖν ἀνηρμόνη—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο νιέε—Ω Καλλία, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μὲν σού τῷ νιέε πώλω ἢ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἰχόμεν ἅν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι; ὃς ἐμελλέν αὐτῷ καλῷ τε κῶμαθω ποιῆσεν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν· ἤν δ' ἂν οὕτως ἢ τῶν ἱππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν νεωργίκων. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἄνθρώπω ἐστὸν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τής τουαίτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἴμαι γάρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν νιέων κτήσεων. ἐστὶ τες, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἥ οὖ; Πάνυ γε, ἥ δ' ὤς. Τίς, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός; καὶ πόσον διδάσκει; Εὐήνος, ἐφη, ὃ

Coislín. Κίος, as Rep. X. p. 600. C. Protagor. p. 314. C. Aristoph. Ran. 997. οὗ Χίου ἄλλα Κίος. Yet the inscriptions in Broensted. Itiner. N. 7. and 10. plainly have ΚΕΙΟΙ; and Theocrit. Id. XVI. 44. calls Simonides ἄριστω τῶν Ῥητόν: whence the form Κίος ought not to be admitted. See Ast's Comment. ad Protag. p. 44. It may be added, that the old grammarians and the copyists by long understood ει, according to Bastius on Gregor. Corinth. p. 892.; the diphthong, besides, is pronounced something like i.

καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος.] Coisl. καὶ Ἰππίας δὲ ὁ Ἡλείος, which Bekk. adopted.

ὅς τετελεκε χρ.] Commonly τετελέκει: improperly. The perfect is found in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S.
Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνών. Καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Ἑυθυνὸν ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην ἂν, εἰ ἦπιστάμην ταῦτα ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπισταμαί, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι.

V. 'Ὑπολάβοι οὖν ἂν τὶς ὑμῶι ἴσως, 'Αλλ' ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πράγμα; πόθεν οἱ διαβολαί σοι αὕται γεγοναίν; οὐ γὰρ δῆπον σοῦ γε, οὐδένα τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον βραχματευμένον, ἐπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μή τι ἐπράττεσ ἄλλοιον ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ. λέγε ὧν ὑμῖν, τί ἐστιν, ἢν μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζομεν. Ταυτὶ μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κἂν οὖν ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι, τί ποτ' ἐστι τούτο, ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τὸ τὲ ὅνωμα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δὴ, καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξῳ τισῶν ὑμῶν παίζειν, εἰ μέντοι ίστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρωτεῖν. Ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὥς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τούτο τὸ ὅνωμα ἑσχήκα. ποιαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἢπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεῦω ταύτην εἰναι σοφὸς' οὕτοι δὲ τάχ' ἂν, οὐς ἀρτὶ ἐλέγον, μείξῳ τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἰεν, ἢ ἐι ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει.] Commonly ἔχου, which is changed from Par. D S. Flor. d. Afterwards ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει, instead of the common reading ἐμμ. διδάσκοι is found in Bodl. Ven. Ε. b. Vind. 3. Flor. e. g. h. Zitt. Par. D S.

V. 'Ὑπολάβοι οὖν ἂν τὶς] Commonly ἂν ὅτι omitting afterwards ὅνων. The pronoun is found in Bodl. Vat. Ven. a. b. Ε. Vind. all, Flor. a. b. e. g. h. Zitt. Parr. B C D S. g.; but οὖν ὅτι, Vind. 6. Ven. b. On the other hand some have omitted either οὖν or ὅτι.

ἲνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ.] Commonly ἰνα μὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς, against all the MSS.

ἡ ὅσκ ἔγω, τί λέγω.] Commonly ὅ τι λέγω, which is changed
ouk ἔχω, τί λέγω, οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτήν ἐπισταμαί, ἀλλ' ὡστὶς φησὶ, θεύσθαι τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολή τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει.² καὶ μοι, ὡ ἀνδρείς 'Αθηναίοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδὲ αὐτὸν δόξῳ τὶ υμῖν μέγα λέγειν.³ οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρω τὸν λόγον, ὅπερ ἐμὸν λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξίοχρεων υμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἄνοισω. τῆς γὰρ ἔμης, εἰ δὴ τὸς ἀει σοφία καὶ οἶα, μάρτυρα υμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἵστε ποι. οὗτος ἐμὸς τε ἐταίρος ἢν ἐκ νέου, καὶ υμῶν τῷ πλῆθει ἐταίρος τε καὶ κυνεφύγεται τὴν φύγην ταύτην καὶ μεθ' υμῶν κατηλθε. καὶ ἵστε δὴ, οἷος ἢν Χαιρεφῶν, ὅς σφοδρός ἐφ' ὁ τι ὀρμήσει. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τούτο μαντεύσασθαι,⁴— καὶ, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβήσε, ὡ ἀνδρείς. ἣρετο γὰρ δὴ, εἰ τισ' ἐμὼν εὐθ' σοφώτερος. ἀνείλεν οὖν ἢ Πυθίαπ μηθένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων περὶ ἢ ἀδελφὸς υμῖν αὐτοῦν οὕτως μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκε.

VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ, ὃν ἕνεκα ταύτα λέγω. μέλλω γὰρ υμᾶς διδάξειν, οὖν μοι ἢ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταύτα γὰρ εγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμουμένην οὕτωσί, Τί ποτε λέγει ο θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνιττέται; εγὼ γὰρ δὴ from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. Both may be correctly said. See Poppo ad Cyrop. I. 2. 10.

μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδὲ ἢν δόξῳ.] Commonly μὴ θ. μηθέν, ἢν δόξω, which is corrected from Bodl. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Par. D S T. Ven. b. Flor. g. h. γὰρ ἴστε ποι.] Commonly δὴποι, against the authority of the MSS.


VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ, ὃν ἕνεκα.] Commonly δὴ, which is changed from Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Ven. b. Par. D S T.
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Commonly μölis. Mölis is found in all the best and most numerous MSS., and I have no doubt that it ought to be everywhere restored to Plato; see Dorvill. ad Charit. p. 345. The distinction instituted by Thom. Mag. p. 619. is trifling.

Ότι Οὔτος ἐμοῦ σ. Οτοι Οὔτος ἐμοῦ σ. Γέ μου, which Bekker, with Par. C B, has changed into οὗτός γ' ἐμοῦ. οὗτος καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, καλὸν οὐδ' ἀγαθὸν, on the authority of Bas. 2. Bodl. Ven. a. b. all the Vind. and Florentine. In the other MSS. καλὸν κἀγαθὸν.
PLATO.

VII. Metà tâvτ' òùn ἕφεξης ἃ, αἰσθανό-

μενος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς, ὅτι ἀπη-

χθανόμην, α ὡμος δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ

θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι. ἵτεον οὖν, σκοποῦντι

τὸν χρησμὸν τὶ λέγει, ἔπι ἀπαντᾷ τοὺς τι δοκοῦν-

τας εἰδέναι. καὶ νὴ τὸν κῶνα,  ὡς οἱ τρὸν ἄθναῖοι, —

δεί γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τάληθη λέγειν — ἥ μὴν ἐγὼ

ἐπαθὼν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες

ἐδοξάν μοι ὀλόγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεέως εἰναι ἐπι-

τούντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἀλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότε-

ροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἰναι άνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμους ἔχειν.

δεὶ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι, ὥσπερ τό-

νους τινὰς πνοοῦντος· ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαν-

τεία γένοιτο.  Μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἃ ἐπὶ τοὺς

ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυ-

ράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ αὐτοφω-

ρῷ καταληψόμενος ἐρματῶν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄν-

τα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἢ μοι

ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεύσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρότων

ἀν αὐτῶς τὶ λέγοιεν, ἵν αμα τι καὶ μανθάνομι

παρ’ αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὡς άνδρες,

tάληθη ὡμος δὲ ῥητέον. ὡς ἐπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν, ὀλι-

γον αὐτῶν ἀπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἃν βέλτιον ἔλεγον

περὶ δν αὐτὸν ἐπεποημέκεσαν. ἐγνων οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν

VII. ἵτεον οὖν, σκοποῦντι τ. χρ. ] So BoDl. Ven. b. Vind. 1.4. Flor. g h. Par. D S. Old editions, καὶ εἶναι σκοποῦντι. See note. ἐγνων οὖν καὶ περὶ τ.] αἱ, commonly added after οὖν, is omit-
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καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν τούτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖν ἄποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὡσπέρ οἱ θεομάντες καὶ οἱ χρησμοδοι. ἦν καὶ γὰρ ὁ τούτο λέγοντι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἵσασι δὲ οὐδὲν δὲν λέγουσι. τοιούτων τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες. καὶ ἀμα ἑσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποιήσιν οἰομένων καὶ τᾶλα σοφιστῶν εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ὁ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπὸμι σὺν καὶ ἐντεύθεν, τῷ αὐτῷ οἰομένος περιεγενέναι, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ήμαυτῷ γὰρ ἐξυπήδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὡς ἐποίησεν, τούτους δὲ τῇ ἡδειν ὅτι εὐρήσωμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τοιῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐφεύσθην, ἀλλὰ ἡπίσταντο ἐγὼ οὐκ ἡπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλὰ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταύτῶν μοι ἐδοξάζειν ἦχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς

ted in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. e. g. h. Par. DS T g. Bekker, from one MS. alone, Par. S. pr., has given πεποίηκεςαν, without the argument.

ποιοῖς ἄποιοίεν[ ἄποιοῖεν in ed. Steph. is omitted by mistake. τῷ αὐτῷ οἴδαμενος περγ.] Bekk. τῷ αὐτῷ αὐτῶν οἴδαμεν, ex Par. H. g. Angel., which we have been unwilling to adopt. In the preceding word, ἐντεύθεν, there is a latent pronominal signification which renders αὐτῶν unnecessary.

VIII. ἐξυπήδειν οὐδὲν—ἡδειν οὕτω—. All the MSS. as well as the old editions have ἐξυπήδειν and ἡδειν: so that we are ignorant from whence Bekker adopted ἐξυπήδη and ἡδη. Unless, perhaps, he followed Panetius de Platone testimonium in Eustath. ad Odyss. p. 1946. Rom. T. H. p. 305. ed. Lips. Compare Etym. Magn. p. 419. 13. Dawesii Miscell. p. 427 sqq. c. Kidd. Schneider. Praefat. ad Remp. XLII. sqq. We have thought some respect due to the numerous and valuable MSS. which we have collated for this edition.

c
έξεργάζεσθαι ἐκαστὸς ἢξίου καὶ ταλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφότατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτὴ ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνη τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν ὥστ' ἐμ' ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτάν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξιάμην ἄν ὀυτως ὥστερ ἐχῳ ἐχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ἄν τὴν ἐκείνην σοφίαν, μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥστερ ἐχῳ ἐχειν.

IX. Ἐκ ταυτης δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, δ′ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαι μοι γεγονασί καὶ οὐαί χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλάς διαμβόλας ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὅνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται γὰρ μὲ ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτῶν εἰναι σοφὸν, ἄν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, δ′ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τοῦτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὅλγου τίνος Ἴξια ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν


ὁτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ] Commonly λυσιτελεῖ. The optative is found in Bodl. Ven. a. b. Ξ. Vind. 1. 2. 5. Flor. 1. Par. B. H. Angel., which we have followed.

IX. Ἐκ ταυτης δὴ τῆς ἐξ. Commonly ἐκ ταυτης ἡδη, which arose from incorrect pronunciation. The true reading is given in Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 4. Par. T. A little further, Ἀθηναίοι is omitted in Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 6., and others.

φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν. Commonly τοῦτο. Most MSS., and those of the best authority, have τοῦτον. Wolf has correctly given τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν, with the approbation of Hermann. Mus. Antiquit. Studior. p. 149, but Schaefer disapproves of this reading in Lamb. Bos. 705.
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τὸν Σωκράτη, εἰς προκεχρήσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγµα ποιούµενος, άσπερ ἂν εἰ εἶποι, ὅτι Ὠντος ὑµῶν, ὃ ἀνθρώπων, σοφῶτατος ἐστίν, ὥστις άστερ Σωκράτης ἐγνωκεν, ὅτι οὐδὲνος ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθεία πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἐτι καὶ νῦν περιών ξητῶ καὶ ἔρευνῳ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων ἂν τινα οἶµαι σοφὸν εἶναι καὶ ἐπειδὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστι σοφὸς. καὶ ύπ’ οὗτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὐτέ τι τῶν τῆς πύλεως πράξει μοι σκόλη γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν ὁικελῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰµ’ διὰ τῆν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτως οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολοουθοῦντες, οῖς µάλιστα σκολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτοµατοι χαίροντις ἁκόουντες ἐξεταζοµένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐµὲ μιµοῦνται, εἰτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἀλλοὺς ἐξεταζεῖν κάπετα, οἷµαι, εὑρίσκοµαι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰοµένων µὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὀλίγα ἡ οὐδέν. έντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόµενοι ἐµοὶ ὀργίζοµαι,

ΑΣΠΕΡ ἂΝ ΕΙ ΕΙΠΟΙ] εἰ is omitted in the MSS.

ΠΕΡΙΩΝ ξήτω] Commonly ἐπιξήτω which has been changed on the authority of the best and most numerous MSS. A little further, Bodl. Ven. B. Vat. and a few others, read καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων.

Χ. ἁκούοντες ἐξεταζοµένων] Commonly ἐλεγχοµένων, which has been changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Parr. C S T. A little further on the old editions have εἰδέναι τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων: the article is rejected in Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

ὈΛΙΓΑ ἡ οὐδέν] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. Editt. ὃ ὀλίγα ἡ οὐδέν, which Bekker also has retained.
Commonly ὅργιζονται, οὐκ αὐτοῖς. The reading in the text has been preserved in Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. e. g. Par. T. In others it is ὅργιζονται, οὐκ αὐτοῖς.

ὅτι τὰ μετέφερα—] Steph. ὅτι τὰ μ. καὶ τὰ ύπο γῆς ζητεῖ καὶ θεοὶς μὴ νομίζει καὶ τ. ἡ. λ. κρ. ποιεῖ. But ζητεῖ is omitted in Ald. Bas. 1. 2. Bodl. Vat. Nen. a. b. Ε. the six Vindobb. all the Florentine, Coisl. Parr., and others, so that it is impossible to trace its origin. The infinitives are given in almost all the MSS. The common reading is doubtless due to those who did not accurately observe the structure of the words.

καὶ ἥντεταγμένως] Some MSS., ἥντεταγμένως.

καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς δ.] Steph. καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν καὶ σφ., contrary to the authority of the best MSS. In Bodl. the reading is καὶνῦν σφοδρῶς.
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οὕτως ὀλύμῳ χρόνῳ, οὕτω πολλῇ γεγονύιν. Ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὑμῖν, οὗ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναίοι, τάληθι, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὕτω μέγα οὕτε σμικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος. 1 καὶ τοι τοῖς σχεδόν, ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεκθάνομαι. ὡ καὶ τεκμηρίων, ὅτι τάληθι λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμῇ καὶ τὰ αἷτα ταῦτα ἐστὶ. καὶ ἕαν τε νῦν ἕαν τε αὕθις 2 ζητήστε ταῦτα, οὕτως εἰρήσετε.

XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὅν οἱ πρῶτοι μοι κατηγοροῦν κατηγόροιν αὕτη ἐστώ ἰκανὴ ἀπολογία 3 πρὸς ὑμᾶς: πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἁγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, οὕς φησί, καὶ τοὺς υστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογείσθαι. αὕθις γὰρ δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων οὕτω κατηγόροιν, λάβωμεν αὐτήν τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δὲ πως ὅδε 4 Σωκράτη φησιν ἀδικοῖς τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἔτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καίνα. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλῆμα τοιοῦτὸν ἐστὶ· τοῦτον δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἐκαστὸν ἐξετάσωμεν. Φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δὲ γε, ὅ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναίοι, ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι στου- δης χαριντικεῖται, 5 ὅρατος εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστᾶς

ὅτι τάληθι λέγω.] Commonly ἀληθῆ. The true reading is found in Coisl. Ven. Λ Σ. Vind. 6. Par. B O H. Angel. Zitt. Florr. a. b. c. d. e. i. with Bas. 2. In Vat. Flor. d. is read ὅτι καὶ ἀληθῆ λ. 6

XI. αὕτη ἐστω ἰκανή ἀπ.] Commonly ικανή ἡ ἀπ., which is corrected from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. a. e. g. h. Par. B C D S T.

tὸν ἁγαθὸν τε.] This is added from the best MSS.

πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι.] Commonly ἀπολογήσοσθαι. We have adopted the present from Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 6. Flor. g. h. Par. D S T, and the margin of Par. B C. Flor. a. c.

ἐγὼ δὲ γε.] This is added from the best MSS.

c 3
XII. Καὶ μοι δεῦρο, ὁ Ἔλενθης, εἴπε, "Ἀλλο τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὡς ὅσις ὅς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἃσονται; "Εἰγογε. "Ἰδι δὴ νῦν εἰπὲ τοῦτοι, τίς αὐτοῖς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι οἰσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἔξευρον, ὡς φής, ἔμε εἰςάγεις τούτους καὶ κατηγορεῖς τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἵπι εἰπὲ καὶ μήνυσον αὐτοῖς, τίς ἔστιν. ὅρας, ὁ Ἔλενθης, ὅτι σιγῆς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰpecia; καὶ τοι οὐκ αἰσχρῶν σου δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον οὐ δὴ ἐγώ' λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐκ ἔμελήκης; ἀλλ' εἰπέ, ὃ γαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμένους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὅ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἀνθρωπος, ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἴδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὕτω οἱ ᾽Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὁ Ἔλενθης; οἴδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἴδε τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖν; Μᾶλατα. Πότερον ἄπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ; "Ἄπαντες. Ἐν γε νὴ τὴν Ὑραν' λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὕφελοντων, τι δαὶ δὴ, οἴδε ὃ ἀκροταταί βελτίους καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι.] Commonly ὑποδείξαι, probably against all MSS.

XII. "Ἀλλο τι περὶ πολλοῦ π." Commonly περὶ πλείστου, contrary to the authority of the best MSS., that is, Βοδι. Βατ. Βεν. β. Βιντ. 1, 4, 6. Φλόρ. d, g, h. Παρ. D S T. Commonly before περὶ was inserted ἥ, which is omitted in the Florentine and others.

τι δαὶ δή; ] Commonly τι δὲ δή; the former is found in Coisl. Βιντ. 3. Φλόρ. e., and also from a correction in Βοδι. Βατ. See Porson, ad. Μεδ. 1908. Hermann. ad Βιγ. p. 848. Further on τι δαὶ οἱ β., I have adopted from Φλόρ. g, h. Βιντ. 3, 6. Κοϊς., and
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ποιοῦσιν, ἢ οὔ; Καὶ οὕτωι. Τι δαὶ οἱ Βουλευταί;1 Καὶ οἱ Βουλευταί. ὉΛΛ ἀρα, ὁ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταὶ, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους;1 ἢ κακεῖνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἀπανταῖς; Κακεῖνοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ὄθηναὶοι καλοὺς κά-γαθοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις; Πάνω σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γ' ἐμοὶ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν.2 καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι ἢ καὶ περὶ ἱπποὺς οὐτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἀνθρωποὶ εἶναι, εἰς δὲ τις ὁ διαφθείρων;1 ἢ τούναντίον τούτοι πάν εἰς μὲν τις ὁ βελτίους οὕς τ' ὁν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ διόγιν, οὗ ἱππικοῦ. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ έάντερ ἱππὸς καὶ χρόνται ἱπποὺς, διαφθείρουσιν; σοὺς οὕτω ἔχει, ὁ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἱππῶν καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων ἤτοι; πάντως δὴ που, ἐὰν τε σοῦ καὶ Ἀνυτος οὐ φῆτε3 ἐὰν τε φῆτε: πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἶν περὶ τούς

from a correction of the Vat. instead of the common reading τὶ δὲ οἱ Β. For Planudes on Bachmanni Anecdot. II. 81., is wrong in contending that τὶ δαὶ cannot be admitted except before a stop, since the verses of Aristoph. Av. 136. 1615. 1676. Ach. 764. Rann. 1454., and elsewhere, prove the contrary; see Elmsley ad Acharn. v. 803

οἱ ἐκκλησιασταὶ.] We have added the article from Bodl. Coisl. Ven. a. b. Vat. Parr. B C D S T. Flor. a. b. c. d. e. g. h. Viind. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Zittav., and others.

κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν.] Commonly ἄτυχίαν, which is corrected from Bas. 2. Bodl. Vat. Coisl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. b. c. d. g. h. Par. C D S T, and others,

εἰς δὲ τις δ ἀδαιρ.] ο is omitted by Steph. with Par. E. A little afterwards, ye was inserted after δ βελτίους in the old editions, which is found in very few MSS.

οὐ φῆτε.] Commonly μὴ φῆτε, which is changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. a. d. g. h. Par. D S T.
nous. ei eis men monos autous diaftheirein, oii de allou ophelouin. alla gar, o Melepte, ikanos epideiknusai, oti oudopisote efrontiasas ton neron, kai saphos apofaines thn santo ameleian, oti oudein sou melemelike peri ou eme eisagnes.

XIII. "Eti de hmin eipte, o prds Aios Mélépte, pótieron estin oikein ameivon en polaitais xhrystois, h ponhrois; o'tan, apókrynain oudein gar tou xalagenton erwtov. oux oii meven ponhroi kakon ti ergazountai tois aei ergumatw eauton ontas, oii de aghadoi aghadoi ton; Pánu ye. "Estin ouy ostitis bouletai upo ton xunonton blaptesthai málloin h ophelieithsai; apokrinyai, o 'yathè kai gar ou nómos kelleive apokrinesthai: eso ostitis bouletai blaptesthai; Oú déta. Fere dé, pótieron eme eisagies deiro ws diafthironta tois neostérous kai ponhrotérous poiouneta ekonta h akonta; 'Ekonta ègyoge. Ti déta, o Mélépte; tosouton su emo souphoteros ei týlikouton ontos týlikosde ou, oisthe su men égnwkas, oti oii

XIII. o prds Aios Mélépte] Ven. a, Vind. 5. 6., and others, prds A. o Mélépte. But compare C. XIV. Sophist. p. 221. D.
oi meven ponhroi kakon ti] aei is commonly inserted after ponhro, which we have omitted with Bodl. Vind. b. Vat. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. In others it is placed after kakon.
kal ponhrotérous poiouneta] Commonly kal toutous pon. p., against almost all the MSS. For the common reading nous, we find neostérous in Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.
Ti déta, o M.] Commonly ti déi potè, which is changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Par. C D S T. Vind. 1. 6. Flor. d. g. h. and others.
Eiste su men égnwkas] Commonly òot' eu µ., which is corrected
APOLOGY OF Socrates. 21

μὲν κακοὶ κακῶν τι ἐργάζονται ἀεὶ τοὺς μᾶλλοντα πλησίον εαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθὸς ἀγαθὸν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἡκὼ, ὡστε καὶ τοῦτ’ ἄγνωσ-, ὡστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακῶν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φής σύ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὁ Μέλητε, οἴμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἄνθρώπων οὐδένας ἂλλ’ ἦν οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ, εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὡστε σὺ ἦν κατ’ ἀμφότερα ψεύδη. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοσοῦτων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεύρο νόμος εἰςάγειν ἐστίν, ἂλλ’ ἵδια λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν. δὴλον γὰρ, ὡς, ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι δ’ ἦν ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ἐνωΓενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἐφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἡθελήσας, δεύρο δὲ εἰςάγεις, οἱ νόμος ἐστίν εἰςάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἂλλ’ οὐ μαθήσεως.

XIV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὁ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν δήλον ἤδη ἐστίν, ὁ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὥστε Μελήτῳ τούτων οὕτε μέγα οὕτε σμικρῶν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὁμοὶ δὲ δὴ λέγει ἡμῖν, πῶς με φής διαφθείρειν, ὃ

from Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 2. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Zitt. Par. D S T.

οἱ δὲ ἀγαθὸς ἀγαθὸν] Commonly ἀγαθὸν τι: but τι is omitted in the best MSS.


τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον] τὸ is added from Par. D. and Flor. h.


ἡ εἰ διαφθείρω] εἰ commonly omitted, is now restored from Bodl. Florr. all the Vindd. and other MSS.
Μέλητε, τούς νεοτέρους; ἢ δὴ λοιπὸν δή, ὅτι β κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν; cf ἢ ἐγράψι, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὐς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καίνα; οὔ ταῦτα λέγειςδ ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνω μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λεγώ. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὁ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, δὲ καὶ τούς ἀνδράσι ποτέ οὐδὲ ταῦτη ἅδικῶ, οὐ μέντοι οὔσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἐτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἐτέρους. ἡ παντάπασι μὲν ψ虬ς οὔστε αὐτῶν νομίζεις θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἀλλούςε ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεοὺς. 'Ο θαυμάστε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; ε μὴ δὲ ἢλιον οὔδὲ σελήνῃ ἡρικε νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὡςπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι; Μᾶ Δι', ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἢλιον λίθον φησίν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. 'Ἀναξαγόροι οὐεὶ κατηγορεῖν, ὃ φίλε Μέλητε' καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τὸν θεὸ καὶ οἰεὶ αὐτούς ἀπέλους ὑγραμμάτων εἰσαῖ, ὡςτε οὐκ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόροι βιβλία, τοῦ Κλασομενίου, γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων. καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτακ παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνοισιν, ἃ ἐξέστων ἐνλοτε, εἰ πάνω πολλοῦ, ἵνα χυμὴς ἑκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας1 πριμάνεοι Σωκράτους καταγελάν, εὰν προςποιήται ἅντιον εἶναι, ἂλλος εἰς καὶ οὐτώς ἄτοπα ὄντα. ἀλλ' ὃ πρὸς Διώς, οὕτωσί σου δοκῶ οὔδένα νομίζειν θεὸν εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δι', οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν. 'Ἀπίστος γ' εἰ, ὁ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὃς εἶοι δοκεῖς, σαντῷ.

XIV, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι] The old editions, except Bas. 2,, omit μέντοι, which is correctly preserved by all the MSS. except
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doi yap dokéi oútosoí, ó ándres 'Athenaiou, pánu éinai ñvrísthns kai akólasitos, kai atexhías thn gra-
fhn tauthn ñbrei tivn kai akólasia kai neótntim grávhasthai. òóike xor óspiter aínugma ëxunthevnti
diapeirwménoí, ð Arape gnwsetai Swkrátiths ñ sofós di émóu xariméntiçoménoí kai énanti émauntô légonntos, ð
ëxpátísiw auton kai toús állous toús akóounntas; óýtos xor émóu fainetai tâ énantiâ légein autós
èautô èn th grafh, òspiter án ei eúpoí 'Adikei Sw-
krátiths ñeòus ou nómiçon, állass ñeòus nómiçon. kai
toi touto èstì paiçontos.

XV. Ëunepiçókëfwsse dh, ó ándres, ð moi fain-
tetai tauta légein' su dé ëmis àptókrinai, ð Mélyte. ëmeis dé, òspeter kath' árkhás ëmas parrethpsámhn, ð
më-
mnsthè moi mi ñh ñórmbein, én án tó eiwnòtì trótpw
tous lógyous poiòrm.

''Estin òstis ánthetaùw, ð Mélyte, ánthetaùpia ñen
nómiçei prágmati' éinai, ánthetaùpous dé ou nómiçei;
àptokrménsth, ó ándres, iai mi állass kai állass ñó-
rubèltw. êstò òstis òppous ñen ou nómiçei, òppinià dé
prágmata; ð àulhtas ñen ou nómiçei éinai, àulhtikà
dé prágmata; ouk èstin, ð àrístte ántheta ñen mi
su ñouleì àptokrínassai, égn soi légoj kai toûs

Veh. Ë. The common reading was èmol ñen xor dokéi; but ñen is
omitted in Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.,
and, indeed, most correctly.

ëxunthevnti diapeirwménoí] Commonly ëxunthevnti kai dia. kai
is correctly omitted in Bodl. Ven. L a. b. Angel. Par. E S T.
Vind. 1. 2. 5. 6. Flor. g. h. i. In others, ð is inserted after
ëxunti.

XV. àulhtas ñen ou nómiçei éinai] éinai is added from Bodl.
Τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ γέ ἀπόκριναι. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τοὺτῳ γέ ἀπόκριναι. ἐσθ' ὅστις δαίμονια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; εἰς ὥς ὄνησας; ὅτι μόρις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκόν δαίμονια μὲν φής με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἰτ' οὖν καὶνὰ εἶτε παλαίως ἀλλ' οὖν δαίμονια γε νομίζει κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταύτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ, εἰ δὲ δαίμονια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δέπον πολλή ἀνάγκη νομίζειν ἐμὲ ἑστίν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δὴ τιθήμι γὰρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι θεοὺς ὡς ἡγούμεθα ἡ θεῶν παίδας; φής ἦ οὐ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκόν εἶπερ δαίμονας ἡγούμαι, ὡς σὺ φής, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινες εἰσὶν οἱ δαίμονες, τοὺτ' ἄν εἰθ' ὦ ἐγὼ φημὶ σε αἰνίππεσθαι καὶ χαριστικοῦνται, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδὴπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγούμαι εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παιδέσ εἰσὶ νόθοι τινες ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινων ἀλλων, ἄν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἄν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παίδας ἡγοίτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ- μή; ὀμοίως γὰρ ἄν ἀτοπὸν εἰθ' ὃςπερ ἄν εἰ τὶς ὑπόπων μὲν παίδας ἡγοίτο [ἡ] καὶ ὁνών τοὺς ἡμίουνοις, ὑπόπους δὲ καὶ ὄνοις μὴ

τὸ ἐπί τοῦτῳ γέ] γε is restored from the best and most numerous MSS.

'ὢς ὅνησας] ὅκνησας, Steph. Injudiciously. Afterwards, for the common reading μῆς, we have restored μῆς from Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Parr. D S T.
kal διωμόσω] Commonly διωμόσω, erroneously.
εἰ δὲ δαίμονα] Steph. εἰ δὲ καὶ δ.
θεοὺς γε ἡγούμεθα] Old editions after. ἡγούμεθα add εἶναι, which is omitted in Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. c. g. h. Par. D S T.
ἡγοίτο [ἡ] καὶ ὁνὼν] I agree with Forster. I. H. Voss. and
APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.
aXk\ w M.ekqre, ovk

r/ryocTO etvai.

ravra

diropcov 6 ri e'yKaXol<i ifiol d\r)9e<i ci^t-

rj

av nva

Se

07r(W<?

KTjfjua'

ccttlv ottco'? <jv

aTroTreipw^evo^ rj/xwv eypdy^co Tr)v <ypa<pr]v

ov'^l

ravT'>]V,

25

e')(0VTa dvdpcoTTcov,

av Kol

ireidoi'i

ecm

icmv,^

fiova'i fMTjTe 6eov<; fiTJre ijpcoa^^ ovSefila fiij-^av^

iyo)

'yap,

OVK dZiKOi Kara

o)

rrjv

dv8pe<;^ 'Adrjvaloi, &)? fiev

MeXijrov

hoKel elvai d7ro\oyia<;,

Xrj<; fjboi

fypacp^v,

dXX

jeyove Kal

on

dX'qOh ian.

ttoWov'?,

7rpo<i

Kal rovr ecrrtv o

ov ttoX-

iKavd kol ravra'

o Se Ka\ iv to?? efiTrpoadev eXejov,
d'rre')(deia

koX

kol av rov avrov ixrjTehal-

8ai/jb6vca Kol Qela rjyeca-dai,

XVI. ^AWd

vovv

a/juiKpov

ov rov avrov \avhp6<{\

&)<?

iToXKrj fiot

lore

ev

ore

i/xe alprjaet^ edvrrep
77 r&y ttoWwv
ttoWou? Kal aXXov^i

ov MiX7]ro<}, ovBe "Avvro<i, a\X'

aipfi,

a

Bia/BoXi] re Kal (^Oovo^.'^

Kal dyadoi)^ dvSpa<i
ovBev Be Betvov,

"lam^

eliroi,

Kal alprjaeiv

olfiac Be

fjprjKev,

iv ifiol

fir]

dv ovv

S'

Sr)

crrrj.'^

rt<;^

Elr ovk

altryyvei^

co

S(OKpar€<;, roiovrov emr'qBevfia einrriBevaa^, i^ ov
KivBvvevei<i vvvl dirodavelv ;

X670V

dvreLTToi/ML,

el olet Belv

'Eyw Be rovrw dv BUaiov

Ka\a)<;

n Kal cr/j,vKpbv 6(pe\6<;

fiovov

aKOTrelv,

Kul ovcev, not

since

'iiriTuiv

it

^ koX

a. d. h.

i.

Par.

CDE

]

Ven.

H T.

tirav TTpoLTrri ti]

redvdvat

a\V

ovk

n, irorepov
For

it

gives a
'/iriroii/

ovoiv,

avSpSs in brackets because

XVI.

ecrnv,"

left out.

dvOpcuTre,

rj

plain that rj/xiSpovs are 7ro75os

is

ws ov rod avTov (avSpSs)
restored from Bodl.

&

^rjv

orav irpdrrr]

ScUeienn. in thinking that ^ ouglit to be

wrong meaning,

is

XeyeK,

kIvBvvov viroXoyi^ecrdaL^ rov

dvBpa, orov
eKelvo

on Ov

ou,

which was generally wanting,

Vat. Coisl. the six Vindb., Flor.

a. b.

Ang. and
it is

others.

But we have put

wanting in most MSS.

Ti has been

D

added from Paris

S. alone,


PLATO.

Forster conjectured ὅ τι ἂν τρ., with the approbation of Wolf. Πράττειν, placed absolutely in this manner, was not in use.

Commonly τὴν δικήν. The article is correctly omitted in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. and others of a higher character.

We have added ἧ from Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. g. h. Par. S T.

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

27


καὶ ἀπεθεῖν] Commonly καὶ τὸ ἀπεθεῖν, against the authority of the best and most numerous MSS.

οὐδέποτε φοβηθῶσομαι.] Commonly, φοβηθῶσομαι, which is changed from Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. e. g. h. Par. D. S.
PLATO.

φεύξομαι. Ὅστε οὖν εἰ μὲ νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφιέτε, Ἄνυτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, δὲ ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἄρχῃν οὐ δειν ἐμὲ δεύρο εἰσελθεῖν, ἢ, ἐπειδὴ εἰς ἤλθον, οὐχ οὖν τε εἰναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτείναι με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὡς, εἰ διαφεύξομαι, ἢ ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ νεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες τὰ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται,—εἰ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποντε 7 Ω Σωκράτες, νῦν μὲν Ἄνυτῷ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφιέμεν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ὅτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν. Εἶ δὲ ἀλώς ἐτὶ τούτῳ πράττων, ἀποθανεῖ: εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἴπον, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφιόμεν, εἴπομ' ἄν μὴν, ὅτι Ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὡ ἂν δρες Ἀθηναίοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πεισόμαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἐωστέρ άν ἐμπνεῶ


Ἡδὴ ἂν ὑμῶν — διαφθαρήσονται. Those who think that ἂν cannot be constructed with the future indicative, retain the common reading, διαφθαρήσωμος. But the indicative is preserved in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. CoisL. Vind. 1. 3. 4. 6. all the Florentine, and also Bekker's MSS., except Ven. E and Vind. T. 2. We have therefore preserved the reading which all the better MSS. supplied. Yet it must not be supposed that ἂν can be joined in such sentences with the future. In Plato, indeed, as far as we are aware, only two more examples of this construction are to be found, Rep. X. p. 615. D. and Phædo. p. 61. D; in one place ἂν is joined with ὑπειράων, in the other with ὁδὲ. And it appears that ἂν is not even in this place to be connected with διαφθαρήσωμος, since we may suppose that the writer, when he had intended to say, ἢ ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ νεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες τὰ Σωκράτης διδάσκει, καί πάντες, παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται, having changed the construction of the sentence, used the participle. Of ἂν, construed with the future, Hermann has treated, De Part. ἂν Libr. I. c. 8.
APOLOGY. OF SOCRATES. 29

καὶ οὗς τε ὅ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ύμίν παρακελευόμενος τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὂτῳ ἄν ἄει ἐντυγχάνω ύμῶν, λέγον οἵπτερ εἰσώθα, ὅτι, "Ω ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖοι ὑιν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἴσχύν, Χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενοι, ὡς σοι ἐσται ὡς πλείστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ἴσχυος, ὡς οὐκ θελήσητε ἐσται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὖν ἐπιφτείζει; καὶ εὰν τις ύμῶν ἀμφίβολητησῃ καὶ φη ἐπιμελείσθαι, οὐκ εὑρήθη αὐτὸν αὐτὸν δὲ ἀπειμα, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἑλέγξω, καὶ ἐὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσαι ἄρετήν, φάναι δὲ, ὁνειδίω, ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταύτα καὶ νεατέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτι ἄν ἐντυγχάνων, ποιήσω,5 καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῳ, μάλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς,6 ὃσοι μοι ἐγγυτέρω ἐστε γένει. ταύτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεὸς, εὕ ὅστε. καὶ

οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φ.] Commonly παύσωμαι, which is changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven. a. b. Ζ, Vind. i. 2. 5. Par. B C H T g. Flor. a. i. Angel. For Dawes's canon respecting the propriety of always rejecting the 1st aorist in constructions of this kind, has long been exploded. A little further, ἐπιμελούμενος, Bodl. Vcn. b. Flor. e. g. h. Vind. i. 4. 6, Zitt. Par. S T g., which is not approved by Atticists. But see the observations of Buttm. Ausführl. griech. Sprachlehre §. 114. under μέλω; compare Protag. p. 326. A. Phaedo p. 115. B., and elsewhere. The common reading was ἐπιμελούμενος.


D 3
Commonly μήτε χρ. πρότερον μήτε ἄλλου τινὸς οὕτω σφόδρα, which is changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

καὶ τάλλα ἄγαθα] So almost all the MSS., except Par. E., which has with Steph. καὶ τάλλα τάγαθα. Instead of the common reading ἡ ἄφιετε γίγνεσθαι. I have written, omitting the article, ἄφιετε γίγνεσθαι, as in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b: Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ ΟΙΣ ΣΟΚΡΑΤΟΣ. 31

toiou'ton onta, o'ion eγω λέγω, o'ik eme mei'xo blâphi'te
h' umas auitous. eme men gar ou'den an blâphi'vne
o'ute Me'li'tos ou'te 'Aνυτος. ou'de ga'p an dûnaito'
o' gar o'jmai the'mu'ton ei'nai, amei'nou an'dri up'o
che'rovo bllâp'tesba'i. âpokte'lwe me'n' an i'so's, h'
exelâseiv, h' atimâseieiv. allâ ta'ta ou'tos men
isos o'jta'i kai al'los tis pon megâla kaka, eγω d'
o'k o'jmai, allâ pol'â ma'lllon poi'ein kai ou'tos wu'ni
poiei, an'dra a'dikos epixe'irein apokti'nui'na. vin ou'n,
d an'dres 'Athna'oi, po'llou de'w eγω a' up'er e'mau'tou
apolo'geisba'i, wos tis an o'jito. all' up'er um'w, 
mh tì âxamârti'te perì tìn tòu theou dòsin um'men emou
kata'psi'nisâmenoi. e' eva' gar eme apokte'lni'te, ou' ra-
di'wos al'lo'v toiou'ton eûri'hte'te, âte'chn'wos, e'i kai yelo-
ôteron eîpe'in, proskêmi'nevo tì pi'olei f' up'to tòu theou,
ôsper up'pôr megâla me'n kai gen'nalw, up'to me'gye'hou
de no'vesté'ro kai de'o'mênô e'ge'fre'sba'i up'to mu'wto's
trimos' o'jou di' moi doke'i o' theos eme tì pi'olei pro-
tede'kenv toiou'ton tina,' de' um'mas e'ge'rfon kai pe'ido'n
kai o'nedi'zou' ou'va ekâstou ou'den pa'jmai tìn h'mera'n

XVIII. ou'den an blâphi'vne] So the best MSS. The common
reading is ou'den blâphi'.
ou' gar o'jmai] Commonly o'jmai, against the best MSS.
ou'tos me'n i'so's] Commonly me'n was wanting, but it is uni-
formly retained by the best MSS.
mu' tì âxamârti'te'] Commonly tì was wanting, but it has been
restored from the best MSS., as Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 4.
eva' gar eme apokte'lni'te'] So the better MSS. correctly read
for me.
Parr. D S T. Commonly nô'ôsté'ro, which arose from interpreta-
tion. The Grammarians at least consider nô'ës as more commonly
used by the Attic writers.
PLATO.

ολην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ γάρ ὡς ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὁ ἄνδρες, ἄλλ' ἐὰν ἔμοι μένεις δ' ἔσσος τάχ' ἂν ἄχθόμενοι, οὕσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες αὖ με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτω, γάριω σὰν ἄποκτενατε, εἰτα τὸν λοιπὸν βλον καθεύδοντες διατελοῦτ' ἂν, εἰ μή τινα ἄλλον ο ἥθες ὑμῖν ἐπιτέμψειες κηδομένοι ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὡς τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἐνθένει ἂν κατανοήσατε. οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἐπικεκτείνει τὸ ἔμε τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκεών ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἡδη ἔτη, τὸ δ' ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἀεὶ, ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ προσίόντα, ὦσπερ πατέρα ἡ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πειθόντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἄρετης. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυνοι καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκαλεύομην, εἶχον ἂν τινα λόγον νόν ὡς ὄρατε δὴ καὶ αὐτὸι, ὅτι οἱ κατηγοροῦ τάλλα πάντα ἀναίσχυντος οὔτω κατηγοροῦντές τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷοι τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῇσαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγὼ ποτὲ τινὰ ἡ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἡ ἤτησα. ἰκανῶν γὰρ, ναὶ, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενιάν.

XIX. Ἰσως ἂν οὖν δοξείειν αἴτοπον εἴναι, ὅτι δὴ

 τὸν λοιπὸν βιον] Commonly τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον, which is changed from Bas.2. Vat. Ven.b. Vind.1.4.6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D H S T., and others. Bodl. has χρόνον interlined.

eἰχον ἂν τινα λόγον.] Commonly εἶχεν, which is changed from Bodl. Ven.b. Flor. g. h. Vind. 6. Par. D S T.

ἀναισχύντως οὕτω] Commonly οὕτως ἀναισχύντως, which is changed from Bodl. Ven.b. Vind.1.4.6. Flor. g. h. Par. D S T. ἀναισχύντως certainly is the emphatic word.
APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

εγὼ ἰδία μὲν ταῦτα ἐμβουλεύω περιών καὶ πολυπραγμονῷ, δήμοσια δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τῷ ὑμέτερον ἐμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. Τούτου δὲ αὐτίων ἐστὶν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θείον τι καὶ δαμόγιον γίγνεται [φωνῇ], δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἑπικομῳδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο.ᵃ ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνὴ τις γιγνομένη, ἥ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου, δὲ ἄν ἡλιοῦ πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ ὑποτε. τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦτα τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι εὖ γὰρ ἵστε, δὲ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναίοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχειρήσα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἀν ἀπολόληκ καὶ οὐτ' ἄν ὑμᾶς ὀφελήκη οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἄν ἐμαυτόν,ᵇ καὶ μοι μὴ ἀχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθη' ὢ γὰρ ἐστίν ὅτις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἀλλωπλήθει οὔτεν γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακολύνων πολλὰ ἤδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γλύγνεσθαι, ἄλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ἔστι τὸν τῷ δντι μαχούμενον

ΧΙΧ. καὶ πολυπραγμονῷ] So Bodl. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. g. h., and some others; the rest have πολυπραγμονῶν.

γίγνεται (φωνῇ) ] This φωνῇ, although retained by all MSS., is nevertheless so needless, that it has been deservedly considered as a gloss.

παγκάλως γέ μοι] δὲ μοι in the old editions, against almost all the MSS.

ἀπολάλῃ—ὡφελήκῃ] Since this form of the Past Perfect, which is common in Plato, is here given by Bodl., and appears in a correction of the last syllable in Ven. b., we have not hesitated to adopt it instead of the common ἀπολάλειν and ὡφελήκειν. Compare c. VIII. at the beginning.

τὸν τῷ δντι μαχούμενον] τὸν, commonly omitted, is inserted on the authority of the best MSS.
XX. Μεγάλα δ' ἐγὼ γ' ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγοις, ἀλλ' ὁ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἐργα. ἀκούσατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἢν ἐιδήτε, ὅτι οὔδ' ἂν ἐν ὑπεικάθομι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἀμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικά μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δὲ. Ἐγὼ γὰρ, οἱ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, ἀλλήν μὲν ἄρχην οὐδεμίαν πῶς τοίχον ἰρξα b εὖ τῇ πόλει, ἐβουλεύεσα δὲ. καὶ ἐτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλή Ἀντιοχίς κρυπτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τους δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβουλεύεσθε ἀδριόνς κρίνειν, d παρανόμως, ὅς ἐν τῷ υστέρῳ χρόνῳ πάσιν ὑμῖν ἠδοξὲ e τὸ τ' ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἤναντιώθην f ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην καὶ ἐτοιμῶν ὄντων ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥήτωρον, g καὶ

XX. ἀκούσατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβῆ. Commonly ἀκούσατε, δὴ μου τὰ ξ., which is changed from Bodl. Ven. b. Flor. h. Par. D S T. A little further on the old editions have ὑπείκομι, which is found only in Flor. e. Ven. ξ. On the form adopted by us, see Mœris, under the word. Ruhnck. ad Tim. p. 87. Hermann ad ÓEd. Col. 1019.

ἀμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην. Commonly ἀμα καὶ ἀμι ἀν ἀπολοίμην. The MSS. disagree much. The reading which we have adopted with Bekker is found in Vind. 2. 3. Flor. b. e. i. Coisl. Angel Ven. ΛΣ. Par. E H. and pr. Ven. 6. Par. B. Fischer defends the common reading in vain.

ἐβουλεύεσθε]. Commonly ἐβουλεύεσασθε, which is corrected from Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥ. Commonly ὑπάγειν, which is corrected from Bodl. Vat. a. b. six Vindobb., all the Florentine, and most others. See note.
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υμῶν κελευντον καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ὄμην μᾶλλον με δείν διακυνδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ύμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα δεσμόν ὠ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἢν ἐτί δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως. Ἑπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο οἱ τριάκοντα αὐτοὺς μεταπεμψάμενοι με πέμπτον αὐτοῦν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἄγαγες ἐκ Σαλαμίνος Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἦν ἀποθάνον ὁ λῃ καὶ ἀλλοις ἐκείνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλήσαι αἰτίῶν. τὸτε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὐ λόγω, ἀλλὰ ἔρχομαι αὖ ἐνεδείξαμην, ὅτι ἐμὸν θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἄγροικότερον ἢν εἰσεῖν, οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἀδικοῦ μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πάν μέλει. ἕμε γὰρ ἐκείνῃ ἡ ἄρχη οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν, ὡστε ἀδικὸν τι ἐργάζασθαι, ἀλλ' ἑπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέταρτες ψυχοντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἦγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ψυχόμην ἀπιῶν οἶκασε, καὶ ἦσος ἀν' διὰ ταῦτ' ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἄρχη διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη. καὶ τούτων υμῶν ἐσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

XXI. Ἀρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴσθε τοσάδε ἐτη διάγενέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἄξιος ἄνδρός ἄγαθος ἐβοήθησον τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ, ὥσπερ χρή, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; τοῦτο δὲ, ὥς ἄνδρες ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία.] Heind.; without necessity, conjectures δὲ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία.

θανάτου μὲν μέλει ] So Bodl. Ven. b, and all the better MSS. for the common reading μὲν θ. μ. A little further, Bekker omits ἦν with Par. E.

XXI. Ἀρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴσθε ] ἂν, commonly omitted, is restored from Bodl. Ven. E b. Coisl. Vat. Vind. 1. 3. 4. 6. Flor. e.g. h. Par. D S T.
XXII. 'Ἀλλὰ διὰ τό δή ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρονσιν


ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκούειν.] So Bodl. Coisl. Ven. a. b. Par. A B C D E S T. six Vindobb. Flor. a. b. e. g. h. Zitt. Commonly ἐπιθυμοῖ, which Bekker has retained. Socrates speaks as referring all those things to the present time; whence he proceeds, further on, oúde λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι.


πώποτε ἢ μαθεῖν.] Commonly πῶποτε ἢ μαθεῖν, which is corrected from Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. DST.

XXII. 'Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δὴ ποτε] Commonly διὰ was wanting, contrary to the best MS.
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τινὲς πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; Ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι: πᾶσαν χρόνον τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ ἐπικούρεσθαί σοις οὐκ ἐπικούρεσθαί σοις ἐν αὐτῷ σοφοῖς, οὕτως δὴ οὐκ ἐστὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἀγής. εἰμι δὲ τούτῳ, ὅστις ἐγὼ φημὶ, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ εἴς ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ πράττων, ὥσπερ τὲς ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῦρα ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὅτιον προσέταξε πράττειν. Τάυτα, ὦ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστι καὶ εὐδελεύκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐγὼ ζῆν τὸν νέον τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διεσθαρκα, χρήν δῆποι, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἐγνώσαν, ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακόν πώποτε τι ξυνεβουλεύσα, νυν αὐτοῖς ἀναβαίνοντας ἔμου κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἴθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ’ ἕμοι τι κακὸν ἐπετόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμνησθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταῦθα; οὐς ἐγὼ ὅρω, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὔτοις, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβουλί οὐδὲ πατήρ καὶ εὐδελεύκτα.] So Bodl. Vat. Ven.b. Vind. 1.4.6. Flor. d.g.h. Parr. D S T. Old editions εὐδελεύκτα.


ἐμοὶ τι κακὸν ἑπ.] Commonly κακὸν τι, which is changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven.b. Coisl. Vind. 1.3.4.6. Flor. d. e.g. h. Par. D S T. A little further, old editions, οἱ αὐτῶν οἰκεῖοι, which we have also changed from all the best MSS.

νῦν μεμνησθαι.] Commonly καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι is added, which does not appear in Vind. 2.3. Flor. a.b.c.e.i. Zitt. Par. B C E H. g. Coisl. Aug. Ven. Δ.

πολλὸν ἐνταῦθα] Some MSS. incorrectly have ἐνταῦθα.
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ἔπειτα Αὐσανίας ὁ Σφῆττιος, Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατὴρ. ἔτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφίσιεὺς οὐσίς, Ἐπυγένους πατὴρ. ἅλλοι τοῖνοι οὗτοι, ὃν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ εν ταῖτη τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασι, Νικόστρατος, ὁ Θεοδότιδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος τετελευτήκεν, ὡστε οὐκ ἀν ἐκεῖνος γε αὐτοῦ καταδεικνύει, καὶ Πάραλος ὤδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὐ ἦν Θεόγνης ἀδελφὸς· ὤδε τε Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, οὐ ἀδελφὸς οὗτοι Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὐ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὦδε ἀδελφὸς. καὶ ἅλλοις πολλοῖς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὡν τινα ἔχον μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθητο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἰ τι ἔχει τούτου. ἅλλα τούτοι πάν τούναντιον εὑρήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακά ἑργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασὶ Μέλητος καὶ Ἀντιφων. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ

Aἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατὴρ.] Commonly τοῦτον against Ven. b. Par. D S T. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. e. g. h. and Bodl.

ἐτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφ. ] Commonly ἐτι δ᾽ Ἀντ., I wonder Bekker preserved this against the authority of Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S.


ὅδε τε Ἀδείμαντος] Commonly δέ, which is changed from Bas. 2. Vat. b. Vind. 4. Flor. a. Par. B C.

Αἰαντόδωρος ] Ald. Bas. 1. Steph. Αἰαντόδωρος, against almost all MSS. A little further on, old editions, οὐ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ ἀδελφὸς, which is rejected by all the good MSS.

ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν] Commonly ἐγὼν ἔχω, against the authority of Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

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diephvarμενοι τάχ', ἀν λόγον ἐχοιεν βοηθοῦντες: ἡ δὲ ἀδιάφαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἡδή ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσίκοντες, τίνα ἀλλον ἐχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ', ἢ τὸν ὅρθον τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὤτι ἐξυνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἄληθεύοντι;

XXIII. Εἶεν δ' ὁ ἄνδρες; ὁ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ' ἀν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἱσωσ τοιαῦτα. Τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσεις ἀναμνησθεὶς ἐαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἐλάττω τουτοῦ τοῦ ἀγώνος ἀγώνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα τι μάλιστα ἐλεηθεθῇ, καὶ ἄλλος τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλούς, ἐγώ δὲ οὕτων ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κυνυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δέξαμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ', ἂν οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδεστερον ἀν πρός με σχοίη, καὶ ὄργισθεις αὐτοῖς τούτως θεῖτό ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς τὴν ψήφον. εἰ δ' τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἐχει,—οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼγε·


ἐμοὶ δὲ ἄληθεύοντι] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. g. h. Par. D S T. Old editions, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἄληθη λέγοντι, which is a gloss.

XXIII. σχεδὸν ἐστι ταῦτα] Commonly σχεδὸν τί ἐστι, against the best MSS.


παιδία τε αὐτοῦ] Steph. wrote αὐτοῦ, which is unnecessary in this narration.

καὶ φίλων πολλούς] Commonly καὶ φίλως πολλούς, against the best MSS.
ei ὅ ὅν, ἐπιεικὴ ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λόγον, ὅτι Ἔμοι, ὃ ἄριστε, εἰσὶ μὲν ποῦ τίνες καὶ οἰκεῖοι. καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὠμήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὃστε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοι εἰσὶ καὶ νεῖσις γε, ὃ ἀνδρέες Ἀθηναίοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ἣδη, δύο δὲ παιδία. ἀλλ' ὃμως οὔδεν αὐτῶν δεύρῳ ἀναβιβασά
μενος δέχομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. Τῇ δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τοῦτον ποιήσω; Ὁ
ύκ ἀνθιδιζόμενος, ὃ ἀνδρέες Ἀθηναίοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀρραλέως ἐγὼ ἐχὼ πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μή, ἀλλος λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη τῇ τόλῳ οὖ
μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ἄντα καὶ τοῦτο τούνομα ἔχοντα, εἰτ' οὖν ἄληθές εἰτ' οὖν ψεύδος· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ
ἐστι τὸν Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώ
πων. εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἰτε σοφία
eίτε ἀνδρεία εἰτε ἀλλη ἥττινοιν ἄρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἐσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἄν εἰτ' οἶουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις εἴρωκα τινας, ὃταν κρίνονται, δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ

πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λόγον, ὅτι—] Commonly πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν, λέγειν, ὅτι κ. τ. λ. The present reading is supplied by Ven. b. from a correction Vind. 4. Flor. a. h. Par. D S T.

καὶ νεῖσις γε] Γε is omitted in Bodl. Ven. b. Par. D S T. Vind. 1.4. 6. Flor. d. e. g. h. h. Zitt.


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...
nōmus. οὖκον χρή οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἑθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπισκέπτειν, οὔθ ὑμᾶς ἑθίζεσθαι οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὔσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιούτει δ' με, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τοιαύτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πρᾶττειν, ἃ μῆτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μῆτε δίκαια μῆτε ὀσία, ἀλλὰς τε πάντως νη Δία, μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ ἄσεβελας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτοῦ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείθομι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δείσθαι βιαζόμενον ὁμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροῖν ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ, ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεὶ οὗτος ἔχειν νομίζω τε γὰρ, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὡς μέλλει ἐμοὶ τε ἀριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψυχήσασθε, ἀλλὰ τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὖν ἀνέλπιστον μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονός τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἐκατέρω τῶν ψῆφων τῶν γεγονότα ἀριθμοῦ. οὐ γὰρ ὄμην ἔγογε οὗτο παρὸ ὀλίγον ἐσεθαί, ἀλλὰ παρὰ

XXIV. οὖκον χρῆ] Commonly οὐκοῦν, which is corrected from Par. D T. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6.

μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ ἀσ. φ.] Commonly ὀσία, μάλιστα πάντως, νη Δία μέντοι καὶ ἀσ. φευγ. The MSS. disagree. I have given what Bekker has collected from them.

σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν] ἂν is added from Bas. 2. Bodl. Vat. Ven. a. b. Vind. 1. 2. 4. 5. 6. Fl. a. b. g. h. i. and others.


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τολύ· νῦν δέ, ὡς ἐοικεν, εἰ τρεῖς μόναι μετέπεσον c τῶν ψήφων, ἀποτεφεύγη ἄν. Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποτεφεύγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποτεφεύγα ἄλλα παυτὶ δῆλον τούτῳ γε, ότι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη 'Ανυτος καὶ Δύκον d καθηγορησοντες ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὄφελε χιλιάς δραχμᾶς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων,e

XXVI. Τιμᾶται δ’ οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. a Εἰεν. ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ύμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, δ’ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι; ἡ δῆλον, ὡς τῆς ἁξιός; b τι οὖν; τι ἁξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἡ ἀποτίσαι; c ὁ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὡς ἡσυχίαν ἵγγον, ἀλλ’ ἀμελήσας δὲν περ οἱ πολλοὶ, d χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγίων καὶ δήμουργον καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσίων καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγανομένων, ἥγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὑπντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἡ ὡστε εἰς ταῦτ’ ἰόντα σώξεθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἵα, e οἱ ἐλθὼν μῆτε ύμῖν μῆτε ἐμαυτῷ ἐμελλον μηδὲν ὅφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἠδα ἢκαστον ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι.


XXVI. ἡ δῆλον] Commonly ἡ δῆλον, against the MSS.

ἐνταῦθα ἦν, ἐπιχειρῶν ἐκαστὸν ὑμᾶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἐαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἐαυτὸν ἐπιμεληθεῖν, ὅταν ὡς βελτιστος καὶ φρονιμότατος ἐσοῦτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως· τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὦν; ἀγαθὸν τι, ὁ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναίοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἄξιαν τῇ ἄλλῃ αἰτὶ τιμᾶσθαι καὶ ταῦτα γε. ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον, οὐ τιν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἄνδρι πένητι εὐεργέτην, δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύει; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον, ὁ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναίοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, τούτῳ τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτῆσεως.

XXVII. Ἡσυς οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταῦτα λέγων παραπλησίως δοκὶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολῆς, ἀπανθαδιέζομενος: τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγώ ἐκὼν εἰμὶ ἁμαρτέαν ἀθικῶς ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τούτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλήγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλους διεῖλεν·

ei δεῖ γε κατὰ τ. ἀ. ] So Coisl. Vind. 3. Flor. b. Commonly ei δή γε. In many MSS. is found ei δε γε. Further on, for τιμᾶσθαι, which is also restored from Coisl. the old editions give τιμᾶσθε.

timomega, εν πρω. σιτῆσεως.] Commonly timomega, τῆς εν πρ. σιτῆσεως. The article is omitted in Bodl. Vat. Coisl. Ven. A a. b. Ang. Par. C E H. Vind. 1. 2. 4. 5. 6. Flor. a. b. c. d. g. h. Zitt. Further on, the old editions again have ἀπανθαδιέζομενος, which is changed from many MSS.
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μεθαὶ ἐπεῖ, ὃς ἐγόμαι, εἰ ἢν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὡςπερ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μη μιᾶν ἡμέραν μόνον κρίνειν, ἄλλα πολλάς, ἐπείσθητε ἂν νῦν δ' οὐ βαδίων ἐν χρόνῳ ὄλγος μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύεσθαι. πε- πεισμένος δὴ ἔγω μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτόν ἕως ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτὸν ἑρείν αὐτός, ὡς ἄξιός εἰμὶ τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιοῦτον τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ. τῇ δεῖσα; ἢ μῆ πάθω τούτῳ, οὐ Μέλιτός μοι τιμᾶται, ὦ φῆμι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὐτ' εἰ ὕγαθόν ούτ' εἰ κακὸν ἔστιν; ἀντὶ τοῦτον δὴ ἐλωμαί ὃν εὗ ὤδε ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων, τοῦτον τιμησάμενος; πῶτερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τῇ με δεῖ ξῆν ἐν δεσμοπηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένη ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἐνδέκα; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἐως ἄν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ ταύτων μοὶ ἔστιν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὅποθεν ἐκτίσω. Ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσομαι; ἵσως γὰρ ἄν μοι τοῦτον τιμήσατε. πολλὴ μὲντ' ἂν μὲ φιλοψυχίᾳ ἔχοι, ὦ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναῖοι, εἰ οὔτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμὶ, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν οὕτως πολῖταί

XXVII. ὡςπερ καὶ ἄλλοισ] Commonly ὡςπερ, against all the MSS.

μιὰν ἡμέραν μόνον] Commonly μιὰν μόνον ἡμέρ., which is changed from Bodl. Vat. a. b. Vindob., the Florentine, and most others. Bekker from Par. D S. has given μιὰν ἡμέραν μόνην.


ἄξιός εἰμι τοῦ κακοῦ] The MSS. τοῦ κ. See note.

τῇ δεῖσα; ἢ μῆ π. ] The MSS. τῇ δεῖσα, ἢ μῆ πάθω. See note. ἐλωμαί δὲν εὗ οἴδ' ὅτι] Commonly ἐλωμαὶ τῇ δὲν κ. τ. Λ. But τῇ is omitted in Bodl. Ven. a. b., six Vindob., Flor. a. b. c. d. e. g. i. Par. B C D H S. Ang. Zitt., and, indeed, appears to have been inserted by grammarians.

ὡςπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον] Commonly δὴ νῦν, against the MSS. Further on, Bodl. φ. τιμήσωμαι.
μου οὖχ οἶοι τε ἐγένεσθε ἑνεγκείν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλὰ ύμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασι καὶ ἐπιφθονότεραι, ὥστε ξητείτε αὐτῶν νυν ἀπαλλαγήναι· ἀλλοι δὲ ἀράκτιαι οἴσουσι βαδίσε, πολλοῦ γε δεί, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἄν μου ὦ βίος εὖ ἐξελθόντι τηλικῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλιν πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ἡν. ἐν γὰρ οἴδ᾿ ὅτι, ὅποι ἄν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσσονται οἱ νέοι ωφέρ πέρι ἐνάθε. κἂν μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω,μοι οὖν ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι, πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· ἐάν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέσε τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δὲ αὐτοῦς τούτους.

XXVIII. Ἰσιώς οὖν ἄν τις εὐποί, Σιγάων δὲ καὶ ἰσυχίαν ἄγων, οὐκ Ὀσκρατεῖ, οὐχ οἶος τ’ ἐσεὶ ἧμῖν ἐξελθὼν ἡν; Τούτη δὴ ἐστι πάντων χαλεπώτατον πεῖσαι τινας ὑμῶν. εάν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ’ ἀδύνατον ἰσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθε μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένως εάν τ’ οὖ λέγω, ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὑνα ἀνθρώπῳ τούτῳ, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἁρετῆς τοὺς λόγους τοι- είσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ἄν ὑμεῖς ἐμοὶ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὀ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βλοῦ νῦ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταύτα δ’

ὁποὶ ἂν ἐλθὼν] Commonly ὅπη, against the best MSS.

XXVIII. Σιγάων δὲ] Commonly τε, which is corrected from Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S.

ἐὰν τ’ ἀλ λέγω] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S. T. The common reading was ἐὰν τ’ ἄδισ. Many MSS. with Bas. 2. have ἐὰν ταύτα λ.

μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὑν] ῶν has been lately added from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S. T.

ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε.] Commonly ἰκουετε, which is changed from Bodl., and most others.

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XXIX. On πολλοῦ γ' ένεκα χρόνου, which is changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1.4.6. Flor. g. h. Par. D S T.


ei οὖν περιεμ.] Commonly γοῦν, which is corrected from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1.4.6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. Bekker retained the common reading.

ὑμῖν τούτῳ ἐγένετο] Commonly, the words ἐμὲ τεῦναναι δή, are added, which gloss is correctly omitted in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1.4.6. Par. D S T., and the Florentine MSS.
"Γένετο· ὁ δὲ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὅτι πόρρω ἦδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. Λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῖ καταψηφισμένους θάνατον. Λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. 'Ἰσως μὲ οἷσθε, ὡς ἄνδρες, ἀπορία λόγων εἰλακκέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἐπείσα, ἐι φημὴν δὲν ἀπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὡστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορία μὲν ἑάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμησι καὶ ἀναίχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἑθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οὐ' ἂν ὑμῖν μὲν ἤδιστ' ἤν ἀκούειν, θρηνοῦτός τε μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἀλλὰ ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλά καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ φήμερ' ὅποια δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν, ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε φήθην δεῖν ἐνεκά τοῦ κινδύνου πράξαι ὑμᾶν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλεις οὔτως ἀπολογησάμενος, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι δὲ ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνος ζήν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκη οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλων οὐδένα δεὶ τοῦτο μηχανάσθαι, ὅποις ἀποφεύγεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται, ὅτι τὸ γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἕκφυγοι καὶ ὅπλα τὴν ἡλικίαν] Commonly, but most erroneously, δρατε γὰρ δὴ εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, which is corrected from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. h. Par. D S T.

καὶ τὸν ἑθέλειν λ.] Commonly καὶ τοῦ μῆ θ. λ. which Bekker retained. Μῆ is omitted in Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

ἡμηνούντος τε μου] Commonly ἡμηνούντος μου, which is changed from the best MSS. Bekker wrote τ' ἐμοῦ.

ἀποθανεῖν ἢ τις ἕκφυγοι] Commonly ἢ τέ. ὑδὸν ἢν τις ἕκφ. ὑδὸν is omitted in Ven. b. Vind. 3. 6. Flor. a. b. e. c. g. h. i. Coisl. Ang. Par. B C D E H S T. Yet it is preserved in Bodl. which has ὑδὸν. Further on, for the common reading τραπεῖς, we
have substituted τραπόμενος from Bodl. Coisl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 3. 4. 6. Flor. d. c. h. Par. D S T., and others.

μηχαναί πολλαί] So the best MSS. for the common reading πολλαί μηχαναί.

οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατηγοροί] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. Commonly οἱ δὲ μου ἔσον τὸν χρησμὸν. Further on the common reading was ἐφ' ὑμῷ, which is changed from Basil. 2. and Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. a. c. d. g. h. Par. C D. and from (an alteration) in B. Ven. b. (from a correction.)

καὶ ἐγώ γε τῷ τιμῆσαι] Bekker gives as a correction καὶ ἐγὼ τε ἢ τε, τὰ, against all the MSS. So Ficinus’s translation: atque ego quidem poena aequisque, et isti.

θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπώτεραν νη Δή ὡδιαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνισα ἀπαλλάξθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἐλεγχον τοῦ βλου. τὸ δὲ υἱὸν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβῆσεται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι. πλείους ἐσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὐς νῦν ἐγὼ κατείχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἦσθανεσθε καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἐσονται ὅσω νεότεροι εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτῆσετε. εἰ γὰρ οὔσθε ἀποκτείοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχίσειν τοῦ ὑνεὶδης τινα υἱὸν, ὅτι οὐκ ὅρθως ἦτε, οὐκ ὅρθως διανοείσθε οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνω δυνατῇ οὔτε καλῇ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῃ καὶ καλλίστῃ καὶ ραστῇ, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούνει, ἀλλ' ἐντὸν παρασκευάζειν, ὅπως ἢσται ὑδ βέλτιστος. Ταῦτα μὲν ὑμῖν τοὺς καταψηφισαμένους μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

XXXI. Τοὺς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένους ἤδεως ἀν διαλεξθελὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τούτου πράγματος, ἐν ὧνὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολιαν ἁγοῦσι καὶ ὃπως ἐρχόμαι οἶνος καὶ οὐδὲν ἄρχεται εἰς.

The common reading is bad, εἰ μὲ ἀποκτείοντες. The sense is: ye who have condemned me to death.

ἡ ὑδιαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνισα] Commonly ἀπεκτόνισα. The perfect tense, which is necessary for the sense, is supplied by Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6, and many others.

οὔσθε ἀποκτείοντες] Steph. ἀποκτείοντες, without the authority of MSS.

οὐκ ὅρθως διανοείσθε] Commonly οὐ καλῶς δ', which I have not hesitated to change from Bodl. Coisl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. a. c. d. g. h. Par. BCDHST. Ang. The repetition of ὅρθως makes the sentence more emphatic. Bekker retained the common reading.

οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' αὕτη] Commonly ἐστε, which is corrected from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. a. g. h. Par. D S T. and an alteration in B.

ἐνεντὸν παρασκ.] Commonly ἐνεντὸν which is corrected from the best MSS.
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ελθόντα με δει τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, παραμένατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον. οὐδὲν γὰρ καλύει διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἄλληλους, ἡς ἐξεστιν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὕσιν ἐπιδείξαι ἐθέλομεν τὸ νῦν μοι ἐξυμβεβηκός τι ποτε νοεῖ. Ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς δικασταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστάς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἃν καλολήν—θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰσινία μοι μαντική ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνῇ ἂεὶ ἤν καὶ πάνω ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιομένη, εἰ τι μέλλομι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν νῦν δὲ ἐξυμβεβηκεί μοι, ἀπέρ ὀράτε καὶ αὐτοί, τατι, ἃ γε δὴ οἰσθείς ἃν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἃ σχάτα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε εξίσωτε ἐσθενν ὀικοδεπ ἴηαντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἴηικα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντι τι ἐρεῖν καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπεσχέ λέγοντα μεταξὺ. νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν πράξειν οὔτ' ἐν ἐργῷ οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἴηαντιώτατι μοι. τὶ οὖν αὐτίον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ύμῖν ἐρώτ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ μοι τὸ ἐξυμβεβηκός τούτο ἁγαθόν γεγογέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐσθ. ὑπὸς ἴηεις ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἴμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτοις γέγονεν.

XXXI. τὶ ποτε νοεῖ] Commonly τὶ ποτ' ἐννοεῖ, against the usage of the language, and the authority of all the best MSS.

οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντι τὶ ἐρεῖν] Commonly οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδὲν, μέλλοντι τὶ ἐρεῖν, which we have corrected from Bas. 2. Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6., and most others.

περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν πρ.] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. D S T., which appears also to be the true reading from the preceding έμοι δὲ οὔτε εἰ. κ. τ. λ. Old editions, περὶ ταύτην τ. πρ., which Bekker has retained. Further on, instead of the common reading ἴηαντιώθη we have restored ἴηαντιώτατι, from the same MSS.

tεκμήριον τούτου] Commonly τούτο, which is changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 4. Flor. d. g. Par. D S T.
où γὰρ ἐσθ’ ὁπως οὐκ ἦναντιώθη ἂν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημείων, εἰ μὴ τι ἐμελλόν ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

XXXII. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆς, α΄ ὡς πολλῇ ἐλπὶς ἠστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. Δυνῖν γὰρ βατέρον ἠστι τὸ τεθνάναι· ᾧ γὰρ οἶον ημὲν εἶναι μὴν ἀισθη- σιν μηδεμιὰν μηδενὸς ἐχειν τὸν τεθνεώτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολῇ τις τυγχάνει οὔσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ τόπου ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εὔτε δὴ μηδεμίαν ἀισθησίς ἠστιν, ἀλλ’ οἶον ὑπνός, ἐπειδὰν τις καθεύδων μὴν ὄναρ μηδὲν ὅρα, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἰ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἰ τινὰ ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτῃ τὴν νῦκτα, ἐν ἡ οὕτω κατέ- δαρθεν, ὡστε μὴν ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεφάμενον εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἁμεινον καὶ ἰδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίω- κεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴν ιδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαρισθήτουσιν ἂν εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατος ἠστι, κέρδος ἐγαγε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλειών ὅ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύκτες. εἰ δ’ αὐτὸν ἀποδημήσαι ἠστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἠστι τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ᾧ ἐκεὶ εἰδο χαπαντες οἱ τεθνεώτες, τὰ μείζων

XXXII. μετοίκησις τῆς ψυχῆς] So Bod, Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par S. Commonly τῆς ψυχῆς, which Bekker also has retained. We have preferred the dative, because this construction was less known to the grammarians, and, therefore, might easily have been changed into the other. Further on, δὴ is omitted in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. h. Par. D S T.

πόσα ἁμεινον] Commonly ὑπόδεα, against the best MSS.

ἀπαντες οἱ τεθν.] Commonly πάντες, which is changed from all the best MSS.
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ἀγαθόν τούτον εὐη ἄν, ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἀϊδον, ἀπαλλαγεὶς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἄληθῶς δικαστάς, οὔτε καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικαζεῖν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ὑράκανθος καὶ Ἀἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος, καὶ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ εαυτῶν βίῳ, ἀρα φαύλη ἄν εἰη ἡ ἀποδημία; ἡ αὐτὸ Ὁρφεῖ ἐγνηενόθαί καὶ Μουσαῖο καὶ Ὡσιόδω καὶ Ὀμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἄν τις δέξατ' ἄν υμῶν; εἰ γὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθῆλο τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, ἐπεὶ ἐμονε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστῇ ἄν εἰη ἡ διατριβή αὐτόθι, ὁ ποτε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Αἰαντί το Τελαμόνος καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἀδικον τεθνηκεν ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς ἐγὼ οἴμαι, οὐκ ἄν ἀποδεῖ εἰη. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνώντα ὡς περ τοὺς ἐνταuding διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστι καὶ τίς οἴεται μέν, ἔστι δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἄν τις, ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξατο ἐξετάσαι τὸν τούτων τῶν φασκ.] So the best MSS. instead of the common τούτων τῶν φασκ.]

Παλαμήδει[ Commonly Παλαμήδη, which is not more in use than Σωκράτης. The true reading is given by almost all the MSS. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον] Commonly καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ μ., which is preserved by Bekker. καὶ is correctly omitted in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστι] Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. τίς ἄν αὐτῶν; which construction, if it could be sufficiently confirmed from other sources, Hermann thinks, De Part. ἐν, p. 43, would add much to the elegance of the sense, indicating that it would be by some singular chance that any one should be found truly wise. For τίς ἄν is interpreted by Hermann, qui forte, “who by chance.”
ἐπὶ Τρολαν ἀγαγόντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιάν, ἡ Ὄδυσσεα, ἡ Σίσυφον, ἡ ἄλλους μυρίους ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἷς ἐκεί διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἔννειναι καὶ ἔξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαίμονίας πάντως. οὐ δήτου τούτου γε ἔνεκα οἱ ἐκεί ἀποκτείνουσι τὰ τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροι εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἦδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοι εἰσιν, ἐπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἔστιν.

XXXIII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ υμᾶς χρῆ, ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ, εὐθλπίδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τῷ τούτῳ διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθῆς, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνδρι ἀγαθῇ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὕτε ζωντι ὄντε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἑμᾶ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλον ἔστι τούτῳ, ὅτι ἦδητεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ τῶν καταψηφισμένων μου καὶ τῶν κατηγόρων οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαῖνος, καὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ διανοία καταψηφίζοντο μου καὶ κατηγόρουν, ἀλλ' οἴομενοι βλάπτειν τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι.

Τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι τῶν νῦες μου, ἐπειδὲν ἡβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὁ ἄνδρες, ταυτά ταυτα λυποῦντες, ἀπερ εἴη ὑμᾶς, ἐλύπουν, εἶν ὑμᾶν δοκώσιν


οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι] Commonly ἀποκτείνουσι, which is changed from Bodl. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. g. h. Par. B D S T.

XXXIII. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ] Commonly διὰ ταυτί, against all the best MSS.


ταύτα ταὐτα λυποῦντες] The common reading, λυποῦντας, is
APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

ἡ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἁρετής, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσι τί εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς, ὀστρέ ἐγὼ ύμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὅν δεῖ, καὶ οἴονται τί εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα πούητε, δίκαια πεπονθῶς ἐγὼ ἐσομαι ύψι ύμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ νῦεῖς.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὅρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανομένῳ, ύμῖν δὲ βιωσομένους. ὀπότεροι δὲ ἦμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἀμείνον πράγμα, ἀδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἤ τῷ θεῷ.

bad, and was changed by Muretus, Var., Lect. VIII. 4. into ἀποδοῦντες, which also appears in Bodl. Flor. h. Par. D H S. and (from a correction) T. Ang.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.
SCHLEIEERMACHER'S
INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITO.

It has been already remarked in the introduction to the Apology, that this dialogue appears to be of the same nature with that piece. It seems probable that the Crito is not properly speaking, a work conceived and framed by Plato himself, but a conversation, which actually took place; and which was communicated to Plato as faithfully as possible by Crito, between whom and Socrates it had occurred. In this conversation Plato appears to have made scarcely any alteration, except that he restored and embellished the Socratic mode of speaking, which was so well known to him, adorned the commencement and the end, and perhaps here and there supplied little deficiencies. This view rests upon exactly the same grounds, which have been explained in the introduction to the Apology. For neither in the one case nor in the other, does there appear any special philosophical object; and although the occasion itself naturally led to the most important inquiries concerning justice, law and compact, in which Plato was certainly at all times interested, yet these subjects are here treated of so exclusively with a view to the
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INTRODUCTION TO THE

individual case before us, that we clearly see that the persons engaged in the dialogue, if the conversation actually took place, were wholly wrapt up in it; and should it be considered as a work of Plato's, which was written without reference to anything that actually occurred, we must admit, that it bears the complete character of a work written for a special occasion. Besides, it is expressly mentioned in it that philosophical inquiry is put aside, since particular principles are only stated and taken for granted, without any further examination, and with reference to previous conversations, though by no means as if these principles were to be sought for in other writings of Plato,—a mode of proceeding never employed in those works of Plato which are of philosophical importance. But supposing it to have been Plato's own work, what could have been the occasion of his writing it? For there is no sentiment given here, which is not contained in the Apology. If, however, we should suppose that it was Plato's intention only to make known the fact, that the friends of Socrates offered to assist him in escaping from his prison, and that he refused their offer, and that the remainder, with the exception of this historical basis, is Plato's own invention: a more minute consideration would perhaps prove, that the former part of this supposition can stand the test of examination, but not the latter. For, on the one hand, there is nothing remarkable in this fact except the manner in which it took place; for the result—might have been foreseen from the
Apology, and the friends of Socrates would therefore have been perfectly justified, even if they had not undertaken anything of this kind; on the other hand, the conversation itself bears the character of one that actually took place, which must always to a certain degree be subject to chance circumstances; but these characteristics would not be suited to a conversation that was deliberately and artificially composed. For dialogues of the former class may easily abandon an idea after barely alluding to it, or they may confirm and establish by repetition what might at once have been said decidedly and expressly; the latter, on the contrary, can neither return to the same point without having some particular object in view, for their progress would be interrupted, nor raise expectations which they do not satisfy. The characteristics of the former kind of conversations are manifest in the Crito, and although the idea is on the whole beautifully and clearly defined, yet the connection of its parts is often loose, unnecessarily interrupted and carelessly resumed. Of these defects of a real conversation, which is reported to a third person, scarcely one will be found entirely wanting in the Crito.

I still think it possible for this dialogue to have been written by Plato in this manner; and I conceive that writing it so near the death of Socrates, he may have treated such a conversation as conscientiously as he did the Apology. It was only at a more distant period, to which according to my view the Phædo belongs, that he could, even
on circumstances connected with the death of So-
crates, depart from a strict adherence to facts, and
proceed to use them freely, and to interweave
them in a work of his own, destined to illustrate
certain philosophical problems. For the present,
at any rate, I shall endeavour by means of this
view to vindicate the claims of Plato to this dia-
logue, until some criticism more solid than any
that has been hitherto produced, shall prove that
it is not his work. Two things, chiefly, induce
me to maintain this opinion; in the first place,
the language, against which Ast makes no parti-
cular objection, which unites all the peculiarities
of the first period of the Platonic writings just
as clearly as the language of the Apology; and
secondly, the great strictness with which the author
keeps to the individual case which is the subject of
the conversation—abstaining from introducing any
kind of enquiry concerning first principles—an
act of moderation, which such inferior men as
the other Socratic philosophers, were certainly in-
capable of; and by which Plato at the same time
clearly distinguishes this work from his other
writings. Hence the strong emphasis, which is
laid on the assertion, that all deliberation in com-
mon is impossible for those who start from dif-
ferent moral principles—an emphasis, which must
rather be ascribed to Plato, who thereby intended
to explain the nature and the tenor of the conver-
sation, than to Socrates, who would hardly have
made use of it towards his friend Crito, since he
could only differ from him in his inferences.
Little importance, perhaps, is to be attached to the statement of Diogenes, that the conversation actually occurred between Socrates andÆschines, and that Plato, from dislike towards the latter, substituted Crito in his place. However, it is possible that Plato in this respect may have made some alteration, and chosen Crito, who was most secure by his station and age from unpleasant consequences, and who probably died soon after the death of Socrates. The desire, at least, of not compromising any of the Athenian friends of Socrates is evident from the fact, that Plato only mentions strangers as having partaken in the plan of saving Socrates by his escape from prison. So that the fact itself is not improbable, but the motive seems to be fictitious, but whose invention it is we do not know.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

Chap. I. Τι τηνυκάδε ἀφίξαι, ὥ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρφ ἐτι ἐστίν; ΚΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Σ. Ω. Πηνίκα μάλιστα; ΚΡ. Ὄρθρος βαθὺς. Σ. Ω. Θαυμάζω, ὡτε ήθελησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι. ΚΡ. Ἐνυώθης ἡδή μοι ἐστίν, ὧ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δέυρο φοιτᾶν, καὶ τι καὶ εὐφργεῖταιὶ ὑπ' ἐμοὶ. Σ. Ω. Ἀρτι δὲ ἥκεις ἢ πάλαι; ΚΡ. 'Επιεικῶς πάλαι.

Chap. I. ἢ οὐ πρφ ἐτι] All MSS. read πρωί. But Fisich, on the authority of the old grammarians, rightly judged that πρφ ought to be restored. See Tim. Gloss, under this word. Hermann De em. rat. Gr. Gr. I. 8. p. 36 sqq. The metre in Aristophanes everywhere requires πρφ to be a monosyllable, as Brunck observes ad Lysistr. v. 613., although the MSS. have πρωί in that passage also. The ancient copyists, instead of subscripting the ι to the long vowels, used to put it after them, which we know to have been constantly done in the Bodleian MS. But Buttman was deceived in recommending the rejection of ι by an appeal to the authority of the Etym. M. which speaks only of pronouns of the dual number, Compare Matthiae Gr. Grammar, vol. i. p. 118.

ὀτες ἡθήλησε σοι] Ven. α. Coisl. Vind. 2. 3. 5. and pr. Ang. ἡθελε, which Buttman ought not to have omitted.

καὶ τι καὶ εὐφργεῖται] Ald. with Par. E. Flor. b. g. i. καὶ τοι καὶ. Ald. Bas. 2. Steph. εὐφργεῖται, which we have changed from Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 2. 4. 5. 6. 7. Flor. α. c. d. c. h. i. Tub. Zitt. Huet. Ang. Par. H. S. In several other MSS., εὐφργεῖται, which is interlined in Bodl. See note.
Σ.Ο. Είτα πώς ούκ εύθυς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ σιγή παρακάθησαι; ΚΡ. Οὔ μὰ τὸν Δι', ὃς Σώκρατες, οὔδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἡθελον' ἐν τοσαύτη τε ἀγρυπνίας καὶ λυπή εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος, ὡς ἤδεως καθεύδεις· καὶ ἐπίτηδες σε οὔκ ἥγειρον, ἢν ὡς ἥδιστα διάγησ. ἐν καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βιω εὐδαιμόνια στὸ τρόπον, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλιστα ἐν τῇ νυνί παρεστώσῃ ξυμφορᾷ, ὡς ῥαδίως αὑτὴν καὶ πράως φέρεις. Σ.Ο. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν, ὃς Κρίτων, πλημμελές εἰς ἄγανακτεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα, εἴ δει ἢδη τελευτῶν. ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὃς Σώκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοσαύταις ξυμφοραῖς ἄλλοσκονται, ἀλλ' οὔδεν αὑτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἢ ἡλικία τὸ μῆ' οὔχι ἄγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ. Σ.Ο. Ἐστὶ ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τὰ δὴ οὕτω πρὸ ἀφίξαι; ΚΡ. Ἀργελιάν, ὃς Σώκρατες, φέρον χαλεπήν, οὔ σοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείως πᾶσι καὶ χαλεπῆν καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἢν ἐγώ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύταιροις ἐν ἐνέγκαιμι. Σ.Ο. Τίνα ταῦτην; οἳ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκεται ἐκ Αἴγου, οὐ δεί ἁφικομένου τεθνάναι με; ΚΡ. Οὔ τοι δὴ ἀφίκεται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἡξειν' τήμερον εἰς ἄν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν

ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρ.] So Bodl. Vind. 2. 4. 5. 6. Tub. Ven. a. b. Flor. a. b. c. f. h. i. Ang. Huet. Zitt. Par. B C D E H S. Ang. with Bas. 2. In the common editions τε was wanting; it is put after ἀγρυπνίας in Vat. Vind. 1. 3. 6. Flor. d. g.


φέρων χαλεπήν] Bodl. with some others: χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρεῖαν, οὔ κ. τ. λ., which arose from what follows. The error may be detected from some MSS. having καὶ βαρεῖαν marked with points.

κοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλυπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τοῦτων τῶν ἱγγέλων, ὅτι ἦςει τῆμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὐριον ἑσται, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτάν.

II. Σ.Ω. Ἀλλ' ὁ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ. εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτη ἑστω. οὐ μέντοι οἴμαι ἦςειν αὐτὸ τῆμερον. ΚΡ. Πόθεν τούτο τεκμαίρει; Σ.Ω. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρώ. τῇ γὰρ ποὺ ὑστεραία δεὶ με ὑποθνη- σκεῖν ἦ ἂν ἔλθην τὸ πλοῖον. ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δή οἱ τούτων κύριοι. Σ.Ω. Οὐ τοῖνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἴμαι αὐτὸ ἦςειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑτέρας. τεκμαί- ρομαι δὲ ἐκ τίνος ἐνυπνίαν, ὃ ἐώρακα ὑλόγον πρότερον ταῦτης τῆς νυκτὸς· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ των οὐκ ἐγείρατι με. ΚΡ. Ἡν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνυπνίων; Σ.Ω. Ἐνδοκεί τις μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ εὐειδὴς, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἑχοῦσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν, Σ.Ω Σώκρατες, ἡματί κεν τριτῶτῳ Φθίην ἑρίβωλον ἱκοι. ΚΡ. Ὡς ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνυπνίων, ὁ Σώκρατες. Σ.Ω. Ἐναργεῖς μὲν οὖν, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὁ Κρίτων.

III. ΚΡ. Διὰν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν. Ἀλλ', ὃ δαμόνιες Σώκρατες, ἐτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πείθοι καὶ σώθητι. ὡς ἐμοὶ, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνης, οὐ μία ἕμφωρά ἑστιν, ἀλλά

II. ἢ ἵ νῦ ἐλθῇ] Commonly ἐλθοι, contrary to usage, and to the authority of the best and most numerous MSS.

Φασί γέ τοι δὴ] Commonly δὲ γέ τοι δή, against the MSS.


χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερήσατι των υπὸν ἐπιτηδείου, ὅν ἐγὼ οὐδένα μὴ ποτε εὑρῆσω, ἐτί δὲ καὶ πολλοὶς δόξω, οἱ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἱσασιν, ὥς ὅδιος τ' ἄν σε σῷ-ζευ, εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελήσαι. καὶ τοῦ τίς ἄν αἰσχύνω εἰς ταύτης δόξας ἡ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονοι ποιεῖσθαι ἡ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοὶ, ὡς ὅτι αὐτός οὐκ ἤθελησας ἀπίειν ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμομένων. Σ. ο. ἄλλα τί ἢμιν, ὁ μακάρει Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπεικέστατοι, δὴν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπράξθαι, ὡσπερ ἄν πραξῆ. Κ. Ρ. ἄλλα ὁρᾶς δὴ, ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σ. ὁκρατεῖς, καὶ τής τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειι. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνί, ὅτι οἰοί τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξερ-γαζεῖσθαι, ἄλλα τὰ μέγιστα σχεδὸν, εάν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος γ'. Σ. ο. Εἰ γὰρ ὁφελον, ὁ Κρίτων, οἴοι τε εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐξεργαζεῖσθαι, ἢν οἰοὶ τε ἤσαν αὐταὶ ἄλλοι τὰ μέγιστα· καὶ καλῶς ἄν εἴξε. νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἴοι τε· οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα δυνατοί ποιήσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τούτο, ὁ τι ἄν τύχωσιν.

ἄλλα, ἄλλα χρ. In other MSS. ἄλλα is omitted, and ἄλλα preserved.

χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερ. ] Wolf's correction. The MSS. have σοῦ.

ἀμελήσαι. ] So Bodl. CoisL. Par. D E H S. Angel. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 2. 3. 6. 7. Flor. f. g. h. i. Tub., and others. Commonly ἀμελήσαμι.

αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα ] Steph. without necessity conjectures δηλοί.

ἔνα οἴοι τε ἤσαν αὕτων ] αὕτω is found in Ven. b. Huet. Par. D S. We have followed Bekker in adding it.

καὶ καλῶς ἄν εἴξε. ] ἄν is omitted by Steph. and Ven. Ξ. Vind. 7. It is found in all the others.
IV. KP. Taúta μὲν δὴ οὗτως ἑξέτω· τάδε δέ, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ μοι. ἀρα γε μη ἐμοῦ προμηθεύει2 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μὴ, εὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθης, οἱ συκοφάνται ἥμιν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ός σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασι, καὶ ἀναγκασθόμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὔσιαν ἀποβαλεῖν, ἥ συχνὰ χρήματα,6 ἤ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις παθεῖν; εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἔσον αὐτὸ χαίρειν6· ἡμεῖς γάρ ποὺ δίκαιοι ἐσμὲν σώσαντες σε κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον καὶ, εὰν δέ, ζη τοῦτον μεῖζω. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μη ἄλλως πολει.4 Σ.Ω. Καὶ ταύτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὁ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. KP. Μήτε τοίνυν ταύτα φοβοῦ6 καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τάργυρίον ἐστίν, ὁ θέλοις ιαβόντες τινὲς σώσαλ σε καὶ ἐξαγαγείν ἐνθένδε. ἐπείτα οὐχ ὅρας τούτος τούς συκοφάντας6 ὦς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδέν ἄν δεοὶ ἐπ' αὐτοὺς6 πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου; σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἑμὰ χρήματα,6 ὥς ἐγὼμαι, ἰκανά· ἐπείτα καὶ εἰ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἷον δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τὰμά, ξένοι οὗτοι ἐνθάδε· ἐτοιμοὶ ἀναλίσκειν. εἰς δὲ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀργυρίον ἰκανόν, Συμμίας ὁ Ἡθβαίος· έτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. ὅστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε ταύτα φοβούμενοι ἀποκάμης64 σαυτὸν σῶσαι, μήτε ὅ ἐλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ,1 δυσχέρες σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθῶν ὁ τι χρῶ σαυτῷ, μ. πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἀν ἀφίκη6


είς δὲ κεκόμ.] Commonly είς δὲ καὶ κεκόμ., but καὶ is omitted in Ven. b. Vind. 1 3. 4. 6. 7. Flor. a. c. g. h. Huet. Par. D., yet Bekker has preserved it.

ὁ τι χρῆ] So Bodl. Ven. b. and most others, for the common reading χρῆ.
Τοιαύτα σπεύδεις] Stephens has rashly corrected σπεύδεις. For these words do not depend on what goes before, but make a sentence by themselves.

συ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς] Bekker from some MSS. has given δ' ἐμοὶ δ. ὡς εἰςήλθες] Bodl. Ven. b. Flor. d. f. εἰςῆλθεν: in Bodl. however, εἰςήλθες is interlined. The third person can scarcely be admitted consistently with what follows, ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσέλθειν.
τουτί, ὡσπερ κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως, κακίας τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρίας τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαπεφευγέναι ἧμᾶς δοκεῖν, οὕτως σε οὐχὶ ἐσώσαμεν, οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν, οἶνον τε ὁν καὶ δυνατόν, εἰ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἡμῶν ὀφέλος ἦν. ταῦτα οὖν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ὃρα, μὴ ἅμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρᾷ ἵ σοὶ τε καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλεύου, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαι ἑτὶ ὀρὰ, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύσθαι. μία δὲ βουλή τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσις νυκτὸς ταῦτα πάντα δεὶ πεπράχθαι; εἰ δὲ τι περιμενούμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οὖν τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὁ Σῶκρατες, πειθὸν μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλοις τολεῖ.

VI. ΣΩ. Ὁ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἄξια, εἰ μετὰ τινὸς ὄρθότητος εἰηνε εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὡς μείζων, τοσοῦτο χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρη ἡμᾶς, εἰτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἰτε μή; ὦς ἐγώ σομον νῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰεὶ τοιοῦτος, οἶνος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, δς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους, οὓς ἐν τῷ ἐμπρόσθεν ἐλεγον, οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἢδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν τἰ ὁμοιοί φαίνονται μοι, καὶ τινῶν αὐτῶν προσβευῶ καὶ τιμῶν, οὕτως καὶ πρότερον δὲν ἐδώ μὴ βελτίω ἐχωμεν λέγουν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὗ ἑσθι, ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοι ἄνθρωπος, ὃς ἄν πλεῖσ τῶν νῦν παρόντων εἰ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὡσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύτητα, δεσμοὺς καὶ μανάτους ἐπιπέμπομεν.


eἰ δὲ τι περιμέν.] τι is added from Ven. b. Vat. Τυβ. Vind. 2. 3. 4. 6. 7. Flor. d. f. h. Huet. In Bodl. is εἰ δὲ τί περιμένι.

καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις.§ Πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοπολομεθα β αὐτά; Εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβουμεν, ὅν σὺ λέγειςκ περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλὸς ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὐ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεὶ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὐ. ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεὶν ἀποθνῄσκειν καλὸς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο,1 ὅτι ἄλλως ἔνεκα λόγουkraine ἐλέγετο, ἥν δὲ παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς; ἐπιθυμῶ δ' ἐγογεί ἐπισκέψασθαι, διὸ Κρίτων, κοινὴ μετὰ σοῦ, εἰ τί μοι ἀλλοιώτερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ὅδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάν ομοιόμενον χαίρειν, ἡ πεισμόμεθα αὐτῷ, ἐλέγετο δὲ πῶς, ὡς ἐγόμαι, ἐκάστοτε οὕτω τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὥστερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐλέγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν, ὡς ὁ ἀνθρώποι δοξάζονσι, δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μη. τούτο πρὸς θεῶν, διὸ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γὰρ, ὡσα γε τάνθρωπεια,11 ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν αὐριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακρούσῃ η παροῦσα ξυμφορά. σκόπει δὴ οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖο σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρή τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ' οὐ; οὔδε πάντως, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ' οὐ; τί φῆς; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται; ΚΡ. Καλῶς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μη; ΚΡ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων; ΚΡ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

VII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαύτα ἐλέγετο;

λέγειν περὶ τῶν δοξῶν] Euseb. τὸν περὶ τῶν δοξῶν.
ἐπειδή ὅδε ἔχω] Commonly ἐπειδή γε ὅδε ἔχω, against the MSS.
τὰς δόξας τὰς τῶν ἀνθρ. unnecessarily. A little further ὅδε πάντως—τῶν δ' οὐ, are wanting in Bodl. Ven. b. Flor. h. Huet. Par. D S., yet they are found in the margin of Bodl.
CRITO.

γυμναζόμενος ἀνήρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων ἐπαίνω καὶ φόγω καὶ δόξῃ τῶν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνός μόνου ἐκεῖνον, ὅ ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὄν· ᾿ΚΡ. Ἐνός μόνου. Σ.Ο. Οὐκούν φοβεῖσθαι χρῆ τοὺς φόγους καὶ ἀστάξεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνός ἐκεῖνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν. ᾿ΚΡ. Δῆλα δὴ. Σ.Ο. Ταύτη ἄρα αὐτῶ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἢ ἀν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίνοντι μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ ἐξύμπαυν τοῖς ἀλλοις. ᾿ΚΡ. Ἑστι ταῦτα. Σ.Ο. Ἐιεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαίνοντων ἄρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται; ᾿ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Σ.Ο. Τί δ’ ἐστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ ποιεῖν εἰς τὸν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος; ᾿ΚΡ. Δῆλον, ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο γὰρ διόλλυσιν. Σ.Ο. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκούν καὶ τᾶλλα,


καὶ ἐδεστέον γε] γε is omitted in Huet.


ο Κρίτων, ούτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διώμεν. καὶ δὴ καὶ
περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδικών καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν
καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὄν νῦν ἡ Βουλὴ ἡμῖν
ἔστιν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπεσθαί
cαὶ φοβεῖσθαι ταύτην, ἡ τῇ τοῦ ἔνας, εἰ τίς ἐστὶν
ἐπαίων, ὃν καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον
ἡ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους; ἡ γὰρ ἡ ἀκολουθήσωμεν,
διαφθειροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ
βέλτιον ἐγγυνεῖτο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἡ οὔδεν
ἐστὶν τούτο; ΚΡ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὁ Σῶκρατες.

VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἤμεινον μὲν
βέλτιον γυνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσῶν δὲ διαφθειροῦμεν
dιολέσαμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαινότων
dόξῃ, ἡ ἄρα βιωτόν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν, διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ;
ἐστὶ δὲ που τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα. ἡ οὐχὶ; ΚΡ. Ναὶ.
ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ
dιεφθαρμένου σώματος; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ
μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρα ἡμῖν βιωτόν διεφθαρμένου, ὃ τὸ
ἀδικὸν μὲν λωβάται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐνίνῃσιν; ἡ
φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὅ τι πότ' ἐστὶν τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ δ' ἦτε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη
ἐστὶν; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τιμίωτερον;
ΚΡ. Πολὺ γε. ΣΩ. Ὅψιν ἄρα, ὁ βέλτιστο, πάνυ
Par. B.C. Huet. for the common reading αὐτῆν.

Flor. d. h. and others. Commonly τὸ was wanting, with the
approval of Buttmann.

ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρα] Old editions: after ἄρα insert ἐστίν,
which is rejected by the best MSS.

ὁ τὸ ἀδίκον μὲν λ.] Steph. conjectures ὃ which is read in
Euseb. and in Vind. 3. 4. Flor. d.; but see note.
ημίν οὕτω φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν εἰς τοὺς καὶ ἁδικούς, ὡς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὡστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὅρθος εἰσηγεῖται, εἰς ἔμφυτον μᾶς τὸν καὶ τούτων δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δῆ, φαίη γ' ἢ ἂν τίς, οἷοι τ' εἰσὶν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτινύναι; ΚΡ. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταύτα: φαίη γὰρ ἂν, δὲ Σωκράτης. Σ. Ἀληθὴς λέγεις. ἀλλ', ὅ θαυμάσει, οὕτως τε ὁ λόγος, ὃν διελ-λύθαμεν, ἐμονυγε δοκεῖ ἐτί ὁμοίως εἴναι τῷ καὶ πρό-τερον καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει, εἰ ἐτί μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὗ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζήν περὶ πλείστου ποιήσεων, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ἄν. ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ μένει. Σ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλὸς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταύτὸν ἐστὶ, μένει, ἢ οὐ μένει; ΚΡ. Μένει.


Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταύτα: φαίη γὰρ ἂν—] Στέφ. δῆλαδή καὶ ταύτα φαίη γ' ἂν τίς, see note.

οὔτις τε ὁ λόγος] So Coisl. Βατ. Βεν. b. Παρισ. D E S. Ηυέτ. Αγιλ. Τιμπινγκ. Φλορ. a. b. c. h. i. and from a correction in Βοδλ. The common reading was γ'ε.

δοκεῖ ἐτί ὁμοίως] ἐτί is added from Βεν. b. Ηυέτ. Παρ. D. Φλορ. h. Further on the common reading was τῷ πρῶτοι, which is changed from Βοδλ. Βεν. b. Ηυέτ. Παρ. D S. Βινδ. 4. Φλορ. h. into τῷ καὶ πρῶτον.

καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει] Commonly τόνδε δὲ αὖ σκ. But in Βοδλ. Βατ. Βεν. b. Τυβ. Φλορ. d. Βινδ. b. Ηυέτ. δὲ is correctly omitted.
δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τὲ ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων¹ καὶ δόξας² καὶ παίδων τροφῆς,³ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταύτα, ὁ Κρίτων, σκέμματα⁴ ἢ τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινωνυντῶν⁵ καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων ἢ ἂν, εἰ οἷοὶ τε ἦσαν, οὔδεν ἤξιν νῦν, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ', ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἱρεί,⁶ μὴ οὔδεν ἄλλο σκεπτέοι ἢ ὃπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ χρηματα τελεύντες τούτοις τοὺς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε εξάξουσι καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντες τα καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν ταύτα πάντα ποιοῦντες· κἂν φανῶμεθα ἀδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δή υπολογίζεσθαι οὔτ' εἰ ἀποθνήσκειν δεὶ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας, οὔτε ἄλλο ὅτιον πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικείν.⁷ ΚΡ. Καλὸς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὃρα δὲ τί δρῶμεν. ΣΩ. Σκοτῶμεν, ὃ ἦγαθε, κοινῇ, καὶ εἰ τῇ ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμὸν λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε, καὶ σοι πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, παῦσαι ἡδῆ, ὃ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγον τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὃς χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι· ὃς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσας σε ταύτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκόντος.⁸ ὁρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τῆν ἄρχην, εάν σοι ἰκανὸς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, ἢ ἂν μάλιστα οἴη. ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

Χ. ΣΩ. Οὔδεν τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον

¹ ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Tub. 1. 4. 6. 7. Flor. d. h. Huet. Par. D S. The common reading was περὶ τε χρημάτων ἀναλώσεως, which Bekker also retained.
² ἄλλα μὴ ἀκόντος] ἀκόντα, Vind. 6.
³ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι] Old editions ἀποκρίνασθαι, against almost all the MSS. The present is best suited to the sense.
einaiv, η τινι μεν ἀδικητέον τρόπω, τινι δὲ οὐ; ἢ ουδαμῶς τὸ γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλὸν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὁμολογήθη; ὅπερ καὶ ἁρτὶ ἐλέγετο. ἡ πᾶσα ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσ-
θεν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς ταῖς ὁλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυ-
μέναι εἰσί, b καὶ πάλαι, ὡς Κρίτων, ἃρα τηλικοὶ δέ 
γερντες ἀνδρὸς πρὸς ἀλλήλους στούδη διαλεγόμενοι 
ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παῖδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; ἡ 
παντὸς μᾶλλονc οὕτως ἔχει, ὡσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν; 
εἰτε φασίν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή, καὶ εἰτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐτι 
τῶν 
δε χαλεπτώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ πράτερα, ὡμος τὸ 
γε ἀδικεῖνd τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀισχρὸν τυγχά-
νει δι' παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμέν, ἢ οὐ; ΚΡ. Φαμέν. ΣΩ. 
Οὐδαμῶς ἃρα δεῖ ἀδίκειν. ΚΡ. Οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ 
ἀδικούμενον ἃρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, e 
ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδίκειν. ΚΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. 
Τῇ δὲ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὡς Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ; ΚΡ. Οὐ 
δεῖ δή ποι, ὡς Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ; ἀντικακουργεῖν 
κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασι, δίκαιον, ἢ οὐ

Χ. ἡ τινι μεν ἀδικ.] Steph. has given τοὺς μεν. But the pas-

sage relates to various modes of doing injustice.

Αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει] Commonly τυγχάνειν, which is corrected 

Τῇ δὲ δή;] Commonly τῇ δὲ δή; which is changed from Ven. 
δίκαιον; ΚΡ. οὐδαμός. ΣΩ. Τὸ γάρ του κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους, τοῦ ἄδικεὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρει. ΚΡ. Ἀληθή λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἄνταδικεὶν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν πᾶσχῃ ὑπ' αὐτῶν. ρα, ὁ Κρίτων, ταύτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρά δόξαν ὁμολογῆσαι. οἶδα γάρ, ὅτι ἒλγοις τοις ταύτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὗτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μῆ, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βούλη, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. σκόπει δ' οὖν καὶ σὺ εὗ μάλα, πότερον κοινονεῖ καὶ ξυνδοκεὶ σοι καὶ ἄρχωμεθα ἑνεδθεν βουλεύομενοι, ὃς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἄδικεὶν οὔτε τοῦ ἄνταδικεὶν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς; ἤ ἀφιλτασαι καὶ οὐ κοινονεῖς τῆς ἄρχης; ἔμοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὖτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ, σοι δ' εἰ πη ἀλλη δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δὲ ἐμένεις τοὺς πρόσθεν, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκοῦσαι. ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεὶ μοι ἀλλὰ λέγε. ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ.


 XI. Σ.Ω. 'Εκ τούτων δὴ ἂθρεί.α ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς μη πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν ἂτερον κακῶς τινας ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὖς ἥκιστα δεῖ, η οὐ; καὶ ἐμμενομεν οῖς όμολογήσαμεν δικαίοις οὕσιν, η οὐ; ΚΡ. Ὡνκ ἔχω, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ἄ ἐρωτᾶς οὐ γὰρ ἐννοοῦ. Σ.Ω. 'Ἀλλ' ὅδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε διετε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἰθ' ὅπως δεί ὅνομ- μάσαι τούτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πό- λεως εἰπιστάντες ἐροῦντο. Εἰπέ μοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, τι ἐν να ἐχεῖς ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἦ τοῦτο τοῦ ἐργο, ἃ ἐπιχειρεῖς, διανοεῖ τοὺς τὸ νόμον ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ἡμῖν πασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ δοκεῖ ουὶ οἰόν τε ἐτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ἢ ἃν αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαιοι μηδὲν ἰδιός, ἀλλ' ὧτὸ ἴδιωτῶν ἀκυροῖ τε γλύγνωσσαι καὶ διαφθείρωνται; Τι ἐροῦμεν, ὁ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; τολλὰ γὰρ ἃν τις ἔχω, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, δε τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθελσας προστάττει κυρίας εἶναι. ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὅτι Ἰδίκει τὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἐκρίνε; Ταῦτα ἢ τι ἐροῦμεν; 1 ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νη ΔΓ', ὁ Σώκρατες.

 XII. Σ.Ω. Τι οὖν, ἃν εἶπωσιν οἱ νόμοι, ʕΩ

 XI. εν ἢ ἃν αἱ γενόμεναι δ.] γεγονόμεναι, Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 6. Flor. d. and others, but the common reading is preferable. Some omitting ἃν, have γλύγνωσιν καὶ διαφθείρωνται, which is also found in Bodl. and Ven. b.

 XII. Τι οὖν, ἃν εἶπωσιν] The comma was commonly omitted. Immediately afterwards, Steph. ἢ καὶ τ. and δικάζου, against all the MSS. and the meaning of the passage.
Σώκρατες, ἕ καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοι, ἕ ἐμένεν ταῖς δίκαιαι ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ;α εἰ ὁν αὐτῶν θαυμᾶζομεν λεγόντων, ῥήσω ἄν εἴποιεν, ὅτι Ω Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἰσώθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν τε καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρὸτον μὲν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ᾦςεις, καὶ δι᾽ ἡμῶν ἠλαβε γίνην μητέρα σου δ' ἐπικαλούμενον, καὶ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, τοὺς ἡμῶν τοὺς περὶ τούς γάμους, μέμφεις τί ὦς οὔ καλῶς ἔχουσιν; Οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίην ἄν. Ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροπῆν τε καὶ παιδελαν,ε ἐν ἕ καὶ οὐ ἐπαιδεύθης; ὦ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτων τεταγμένωι νόμουι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύεις,κ καλῶς, φαίην ἄν. Εἰεν ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ ἐξετάρφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης,ἐ ἔχουσι ἀν εἰπεῖν πρῶτων μὲν, ὡς οὔχι ἡμέτερος ἡσθα καὶ ἐκγονος καὶ δοῦλος, αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ σοι πρόγονοι; οἱ καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' όυτος ἔχει, ἀρ' ἐξ ἴσου οἱει εἰναι σοι τό δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἀττ' ἄν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ συ ταῦτα ἀντιποιείν οἴει δίκαιον εἶναι; ἦ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα
peri τὴν τοῦ γενομένου] Ven. E. and the margin of Par. BC Flor. a. h. γενομένου, which might be defended from Lysis. p. 237. E. Alcibiad. I. p. 121. D. But see Herodot. V. 4. VII. 3. A little further, old editions, ἐ σοι καλῶς, which is connected from Vind. 2. 5. Ven. b.

οἱ ἐπὶ τούτωι τεταγμένωι] I have not hesitated to adopt this reading from Bodl. Vat. Tubing. Vind. 1. 4. 6. 7. Flor. d. h. Huet. Par. D S. for the common reading τοῦτῳ.
kai so ταῦτα ἀντιπ. So Par. B. Vind. 2. 3. 5. Vat. Ven. a.


Commonly ἐπιμελώμενος, which is changed on the authority of Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 4. 7. Par. D S. Flor. d. h.

The old editions corruptly give κελεύω, which is changed on the authority of almost all the MSS.
τε εἰς πόλεμον ἀγῇ τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὐτὸς ἐχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπενεκτέον, οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον, οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἢ ἀν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἡ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε· βιάζεσθαι δ’ οὐχ ὄσιον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἐτὶ ἤττον τὴν πατρίδα. Τι φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους, ἢ οὖ; ΚΡ. Ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ.

Χ. Σ. Ω. Σκόπει τοῖς ν, ὥ Σώκρατες, φαίην ἃν ἵσως οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δράν ἢ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς γάρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκβρέφαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἀπάντων ὅν οἴοι τ’ ἡμεν καλῶν σοι καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις πᾶσι πολίταις, ὅμως προσωγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαιν πεποιηκέναι. Ἀθηναίοιν τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῆ καὶ ἵδη τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ὃ ἄν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξείναι λα- βόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅπιοι ἃν βούληται. καὶ οὐδὲις

ποιητέον ταῦτα] Commonly ποιητέα, against Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Tub. Vind. 1. 4. 5. 6. Flor. a. b. c. d. f. h. i. Huet. Par. B. C D E S. A little further οἶχι for οἷχ is supplied by nearly the same MSS.

κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις] Commonly κελεύοι, against all the MSS. except Paris. E. The old editions also have ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡ πατρ., but τε is omitted by the best MSS.

Χ. Σ. Ω. Ψ. [ὑν] ἐπιχειρεῖς] ὅυν formerly omitted, is found in most MSS. Also in Bas. 2.

σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλα.] Editions have σοι τε κ. τ. ἄλλα. I have rejected τε on the authority of Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Tub. Vind. 1.3. 4. 6. 7. Flor. d. h. Huet. Par. D S.

ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ] Commonly δοκιμᾶσθη, which Ven. Ζ. alone appears to have.
CRITO.

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ήμων τῶν νόμων ἐμποδόων ἐστὶν οὔδ᾿ ἀπαγορεύει, εάν τε τις βούληται ἤμων εἰς ἀποικίαν ἴναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκουμεν ἤμεις τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, εάν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσέ ποιεῖν ἔλθωσο, ἴναι ἐκείσε, ὅτι οὐ βούληται, ἔχοντα τὰ αὐτοῦ. ὃς ἐὰν ἤμων παραμείνῃ, ὃρων ἄν τρόπον ἤμεις τάς τε δίκας δικάζουμεν καὶ τάλλα τήν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἢδη φαμὲν τοῦτον ὁμολογηκέναι ἔργον ἤμων ἃ ἄν ἤμεις κελεύσωμεν ποιῆσειν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τριχῇ φαμέν ἄδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννήταις οὐσίν ἤμων οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεῦσθαι, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἢ μὴν πείθεσθαι ὅτι οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι προφεῦστι, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἢ μὴν πείθεσθαι, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιῶμεν, προτιθέντων ἤμων, καὶ οὐκ ἀγριώς ἐπιταττόντων ποιῶν ἢ ἄν κελεύσουμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφιέντων δυνεὶς θάτερα, ἡ πείθειν ἤμας, ἡ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖν.

XIV. Ταύταις δὴ φαμὲν καὶ σέ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἴπερ ποιῆσεις ἢ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐκ ἥκιστα Αθηναίων σέ, ἀλλὰ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. Εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἴπομι, διὰ τί δή; ἵσως ἂν μου δικαίως καθάπτοιντο.
lēgontes, ὃτι ἐν τοῖς μᾶλστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὀμολογηκὼς τυχάνῳ ταύτην τήν ὀμολογίαν. φαίνει γὰρ ἂν ὃτι Ω Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἦμῖν τούτων τεκμῆρια ἐστιν, ὃτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἡρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις ὑγάρ ἂν ποτὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μὴ σοι διαφερόντως ἡρεσκε, καὶ οὔτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίᾳ πτώποτε ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, ὃτι μὴ ἀπαξ εἰς Ἰσθμόν, οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μὴ τού στρατευσόμενος, ἔπειτα ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πτώποτε, ὡσπερ ὀἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμίᾳ σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδ' ἄλλων νόμων ἐλαβεν εἴδέναι, ἂλλα ἡμεῖς σοι ἰκανοὶ ἢμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις οὔτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἠροῦ, καὶ ὀμολογεῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι τὰ τέ αλλα καὶ παίδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποίησω, ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως ἐτι τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δική ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι εἰ ἐβούλοι, καὶ ὀπερ νῦν ἄκοινος τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκούσης ποιήσαι. συ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἄγανακτῶν, εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἄλλ' ἠροῦ, ὡς ἐφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον νῦν δὲ οὔτ', ἐκεῖνος τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει,

XIV. ὃτι μὴ ἀπαξ εἰς Ἰσθμόν] These words are wanting in Tub. Ven. b. Vind. 6. 7. Flor. h. Huet. Par. D S. But they were read by Athenæus, as Fischer rightly observed. In Bodl. they are written in the margin.


καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι] Stephens, against all the MSS. has given the conjectural reading πολιτεύεσθαι, which is approved of by Buttmann. See note.

épichëirwv diafthéirai, práteis te āper án dòulos fàulótatos prâxiein, ápodidrâskein épichëirwv parà tás xynðhïas te kai tás òmológyas, kath' ás òmûn xyn
véthou politeúseibai. pròtovn mév ouv òmûn toût' autò
âpókrinai, ei allêthi légomev, fàs Îkontês se òmológy-
kéna politeúseibai kath' òmûs ërgw, all' ou légraf, ò
ouk allêthi. Tî fôwmen pròs tâuta, ò Krítwv; ìllo
ô tì ò òmológywmev; KP. 'Anâgik, ò Sôkratès. Ï.Î.
'Allo tì ouv òn òn fàièv' ò xynðhïas tás pròs òmûs
au'tous kai òmológyas parâbaînes, ouç ut' ònâgikhs
òmológyas, ou'de òpatakthiês, ou'de en ou lígou xrhôn
ànâgikasthiês bouleúswsasbai, all' en ètesin èbdomi-
konta, en ouç ëjwv suou apîeitai, ei ìh ò'reskomev òmêis
mûdë dikaià ëfainontò suoi ai òmológyai eînai. suv
dê ouûtè Laksèdalìmona prôprou ou'è Krîtîn, òs òn

dòulos fàulótatos] ò the article commonly put after dòulos, is
Par. D E S.

xynbhou politêusethai] Here also Stephens, with Buttmann's
approbation, against almost all the MSS. corrected politêusethai.
mèv after pròtovn, omitted in old editions, is inserted from Venet. b.
Vat. Tub. Vind. 1. 4. 6. 7. Flor. d. h. Par. D S.

òmológykéna politêusethai] Old editions have politêusethai
which, following Bekker, we have changed from Coisl. Ven. b.

'Allo tì ouv òn fàièv] Stephens omitted tì and òn. Bas. 2.
left out òn only. The true reading is supplied by almost all the
MSS.

Flor. a. c. d. f. h. Huet. Par. B C D E S. for the common reading
suv te. A little before the old editions except Bas. 2. en ou òs òn,
which is corrected from Bodl. Vat. Ven. a. b. Tub., 7 Vindobb.
and most others.

καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι

Bekker corrected ἐμμενεῖς, which is added by another hand in Bodl.; whereas the other MSS. have ἐμμενεῖς. But the future tense is required by the next words: εἶναι ἡμῖν γε πείθη, ὡς Σ., with which it is plain that ἐμμενεῖς is to be understood. Stephens inserted it before εἶναι, writing ἐμμενεῖς δὲ, εἰάν κ. τ. λ.

Commonly Μέγαράδε. The former is found in
γὰρ ἀμφότεραι—πολέμιοι ἥξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, αἱ θεοὺς κηδόνται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψαντι σε διαφθορέα ἤγονόμενοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ Βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν, ὡστε δοκεῖν ὅρθως τὴν δίκην δικάσαι. ὡστε γὰρ νόμων διαφθορείς ἐστι, σφόδρα τού δόξειν ἄν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοίητων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεῖς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν ἔμετεῖ ταῖς τε εὐνομομέναις πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιοτάτους; καὶ τούτῳ ποιοῦντι ἄρα ἄξιόν<br>ΙΒ Σοι ξίν ἔσται; ἢ πλησιώσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντισεις διαλεγόμενοι—τίνας λόγους, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ οὐσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἢ ἀρετή καὶ ἡ δικαίωσιν πλείστον ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἶει ἀσχημον ἄν φανείσθαι εἰ τοῦ Σώκράτους πράγμα; οἶεσθαί γε χρή. Ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἥξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κριτωνος ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἰσως ἄν ἤδεως σου ἀκούσεις ὡς γέλαιος ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἄπειδος ὀμπρεσκες, σκευὴν τὲ τίνα


τίνας λόγους] So Ven. b. Huet. Par. D S. The common reading was τινάς.


τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κριτωνος] So Ven. b. Vind. 4. Tub. for the common reading τοῦ Κρπ.

σκευὴν τὲ τίνα] τε is added from Bodl. Vat. Ven. Σ. a. b.
περιθέμενος, ἡ δυθέραν λαβὼν, ἡ ἄλλα οἱ δὴ εἰωθαίν ἐνοσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆ-μα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας. οτι δὲ γέρων ἀνήρ σμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὑντος, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἐτόλμησας οὖν γλῶσχρωσ ἐπιθυμεῖν τῇ, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβάς, οὐδεὶς δὲ ἐρεῖ; ἵσως, ἄν μὴ τινα λυπῆς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀκούσει, ὁ Σώκρατες, τολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων1 τί ποιῶν ἡ εὐωχούμενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δείπνων ἀποδεδημήκος εἰς Θετταλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; ἄλλα δὴ τῶν παίδων ἕνεκα βούλειµ ἐξήν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκβρέψης καὶ παιδεύσης; τί δαί; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρήψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ἔξονς ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τούτῳ σου ἀπολαύσωσιν;2 ἢ τούτῳ μὲν οὗ, αὐτοῦ3 δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ξύντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται, μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ ἀυτοῦ; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον ἐὰν εἰς Θετταλίαν5

Tub. Vind. 1.2.3.4.6.7. Flor. a. b. c. d. f. h. i. Par. and others. Bodl. Huet. Par. D S. Tub. Flor. h. καταλλάξας, but the margin of Bodl. μεταλλάξας.

οὔτω γλῶσχρωσ] Bodl. Ven. b. Tub. Vind. 1.4. 6. 7. Flor. h. Huet. Par. D S. οὔτως αἰσχρῶς. The better reading has been preserved by Bodl. in the margin.

ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει—[ Commonly πάντας ἀνθρώπους βιώσῃ, which is changed from Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Huet. Par. D S. Vind. 1. 4. 6. 7. Tub. Further on Vat. Flor. d. δουλεύων καὶ τί ποιῶν. Vind. 6. for ἐν Θετταλίαν has εἰς Θετταλίαν, the same words being omitted after ἀποδεδημήκος. See note.


πότερον ἐὰν εἰς Θετ.] Editt. have πότερον ἐὰν μὲν εἰς Θ.
κρίτο. 89

αποδημῆσις, ἐπιμελήσονται· εὰν δὲ εἰς Ἀἴδου ἀπο-

dημῆσις, οὔχι ἐπιμελήσονται; εἴπερ γε τι ὅφελος

αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἰναι;

οὐσθαί γε χρή.

XVI. ἈΛΧ' ὁ σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἦμιν τοῖς σοῖς

tροφεύσι μὴτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μὴτε τὸ

ξῆν μὴτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου,α ἵνα εἰς Ἀἴδου

ἐλθὼν ἔχῃς ταῦτα πάντα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ

ἀρχοντειν' οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε διοικεῖται ταῦτα πράτ-

tοντιε ἄμεινον εἰναιδ οὔδε δικαιώτερον οὔδὲ ὀσιώτερον,

οὔδε ἄλλω τῶν σών οὖν οὔνεί, οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἄφικομένῳ

ἄμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ήδικημένος ἀπει, εὰν

ἀπίης, οὐχ υφ ήμῶν τῶν νόμων ἄλλ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων·

εὰν δὲ ἦξελθης οὕτως αἰσχρός ἀνταδίκησας τε καὶ

ἀντικαιουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ

κυνήθηκας τὸς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβᾶς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασά-

μενος τούτοις, οὐχ ἦκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε καὶ φίλους

cαὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τὲ σοι χαλεπανομεν

ξόντι, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν Ἀἴδου νόμοι

οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέχονται, εἰδότες, ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς

ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μὴ σε

πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἄ λέγει μᾶλλον ἡ ἡμεῖς.

XVII. Ταῦτα, ὁ φίλε ἐταίρει Κρίτων, εὐ ἵσθι, ὅτι

ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἄκοινείν, α ντι νοὶ κορυβαντίωντες τῶν

αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἄκοινειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἡχὴ


4.6. Flor. d. h. Huet. Par. D S.

eis Aīdov ἀποδημῆσις] Vind. 3. omits ἀποδημῆσις. But in this

opposition of clauses the repetition of the same word is not in-
enlegant. A comma was commonly put after ἐπιμελήσονται, and

a note of interrogation after ἐπιτηδείων εἰναι, which, following

Buttmann, we have changed.

XVI. ταύτα πάντα ἀπολογ.] Bodl. Tub. πάντα ταύτα.

13
τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν ἄλλα ἵσθι, ὡσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἓν τι λέγης παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς. ὃμως μέντοι εἰ τι οἷει πλέον ποιήσειν, λέγε. ΚΡ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. Σ. Ἐὰ τοῖνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτη, ἐπειδὴ ταύτη ὁ θεὸς υφηγεῖται.

ΧVII. τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν] Tub. omits τῶν.
NOTES
ON THE
APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

CHAP. I.  
Some MSS. omit 'Athnvaioi. He might also have said δ' andres dikastai. But Socrates seems to have had a good reason for addressing his judges δ' andres 'Athnvaioi. For 'Athnvaioi not only signifies an Athenian citizen, but also one who is worthy of the citizenship of Athens. In Chap. XVII., about the middle, he says: "Οτι, δ' εριστε ἄνδρων, 'Αθηναῖοι ένω, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἴσχυν, κ. τ. λ. Compare Cicero de Offic. I. 1. Epist. ad Divv. XV. 19., where he opposes one born at Athens to rustics. The words "Ο τι μίν υμεῖς πεπόνθατε κ. τ. λ. are to be thus understood: "How your minds are affected by my accusers;" or, "How the oration of my accusers has affected your minds." Of the preposition άνω joined with a verb neuter, see Matth. Gr. §. 496. 3., and on the similar use of the preposition ab in Latin, Heusinger ad Cie. de Offic. I. 2. 12. Goereuz. ad Academ. I. 11.

"έγώ δ' έδώ καλ αύτώς—επελαθόμην] I have nearly forgotten myself—that is, he is brought to think that I am not the man that I really am; which is said ironically. The same expression is used in Phædr. p. 228. Α. ει έγώ Φαίδρων ἄγνω, καλ έμαυτον επικλήσωμαι. Menexen. p. 235. C. μόγις ἀναμίμησκομαι ἐμαυτοῦ. ον' αύτῶν is "in consequence of their oration," as the Greeks say ἐπ' φόβου, ἐπὶ φιλίας, ύπὸ μίσους, ύπὸ ἔχρας, etc.

"δ' εξος εἰπεῖν] that is, "I should almost say." It refers to οὐδέν εἰρήκασιν. Compare cc. VII. and VIII.

"αὔτων ἐν ἕθαιμασα] On the genitive αὔτών, see Matth. Gr. §. 317. The meaning is, "one thing in those persons;" for αὔτών is masculine. τῶν πολλῶν also depends on ἐν.

"δ' εριστε ἄνδρων εὐλ. μη —ἐξαπατηθήτε] He indicates that this attack of his accusers is unfounded, and, therefore, he uses the imperfect indicative. Compare Matthiæ Gr. §. 510.

"επειδὰν μηδ' ὁπωστιων] This is added to illustrate the word
The word διψωτιοῦν is said by Phavorinus and Thom. Mag. to have been used by the Attics for δψωσιν. δψωσιν is, however, sometimes used by Attic writers. See Ducker ad Thueyd. VII. 49. The signification of μηδ' διψωτιοῦν is not even a very little, in no sense, in no degree. So νῦν' διπσωτιοῦν, Chap. XIV. Xenoph. Οεcon. XIII. 12. Cyrop. VIII. 4, 9. Memorab. I. 6, 11, and elsewhere. A little further on, the student will observe the formula εὶ μη ήπα, which signifies unless perhaps.

οὗ κατὰ τοῦτον εἰναι βήτωρ] Socrates in these words declares that he is of the same opinion with his accusers concerning the duty of an orator, namely, that he should speak the truth; but that he does not act like them by speaking falsely. Therefore the meaning of οὗ κατὰ τοῦτον εἰναι βήτωρ is: that I am an orator unlike them, since I speak truth, not falsehood.

η τί η οὖδεν ἄληθες εἰρήκασιν] That is, have said scarcely anything true; have said little or nothing true. See Valckenaer ad Herodot. III. 149. who compares Xenoph. Cyrop. VII. 5. 45. τούτων τῶν περιεστηκότων η τινα η οὖδένα οἶδα. Ἀλιαν de Nat. Anim. VI. 50. Ἰσαϊν Αλγυπτίων η τίς η οὐδείς. VII. 8. θαυμάζει τις η οὐδείς. See Matth. Gr. §. 487. 8. πᾶσαι τὴν ἁλήθειαν has been correctly rendered by Fischer in Latin omnem rem.

κεκαλλιεπημένους τε λόγουσ—] Καλλιεπεῖν, on which word see Valckenaer Diatrib. p. 291. is to speak gracefully and elegantly. Therefore λόγοι κεκαλλιεπημένοι βήμασι τε καὶ ὄνομασι are speeches composed both of graceful sentences and elegant words. For βήματα and ὄνοματα differ in this, that the latter are words, but the former, sentiments expressed by words. See Theaetet, 190. E. and there, Heindorf. p. 449. Moreover, Socrates mentions λόγους κεκοσμημένοι, that is, speeches ornamented with tropes, figures, &c.—ἐλιξ, extemporaneously.—τοὺς ἐπιτυχόσων ὄνομασι, that is, without any set selection of words. For τὰ ἐπιτυχόντα ὄνοματα are not common and trite words, as Fischer interprets, but words which, as it were, offer themselves of their own accord.

δίκαια εἰναι & λέγω] That is, that I can do this rightly, namely, speak without ornament or premeditation.—τῆς τῆς ἥλικια, that is, it would not become an old man, such as I am. The abstract for the concrete, which also appears from the addition of ὁστερ, μειρακίω. Socrates was 70 years of age when he was publicly accused. See further on this in this Chap.—πλάττειν λόγους is to speak in a rhetorical manner; see Ernesti Lexicon Techn. Græc. Rhetor. p. 267 sq., where the words πλάσις and πλάσμα are explained.
APOLOGE OF SOCRATES.

Demosth. de Coron. p. 268. ed. R. τι λόγους πλάτεις; — For εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι might have been put εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἰσιέναι.

1 καὶ παρίεμαι] Timæus Glos. Platon. p. 207. παρίεμαι παρατούμαι: at which place Ruhnkenius says: “The reason of this construction depends on the nature of the middle voice. Ασ ήμι and ἐφίμι is I send, ἰμαι and ἐφίμαι is I wish to be sent to me, that is, I desire, I seek; so παρίμι I permit, παρίεμαι I wish to be permitted to me, that is I pray, I entreat.”

καὶ ἐν ἄγορα ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν] The words καὶ ἐν ἄγορα ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν correspond to those following καὶ ἀλλοβι. The reading καὶ ἐν ἄγορα καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν was not correct, because αἱ τραπεζαὶ were in the market place. See Salmatius de Usur. p. 510. The words ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν are added for the purpose of explanation. So in Hippias min. p. 368. B. ἐν ἄγορα ἐπὶ ταις τραπεζαῖς. We are here to understand the tables of the bankers, which elsewhere, as in Demosthen. Vol. II. p. 470, p. 472. p. 946. Isocrat. p. 449. p. 450. p. 704. ed. Reisk. are called simply αἱ τραπεζαί and thence the bankers are called οἱ τραπεζιταί.


μήτε θυρεβεῖν] The verb θυρεβεῖν is said of bustle and confusion of every kind, as when the judges murmur to one another, and speak loud enough to be heard. Μὴ θυρεβεῖτε is an established formula of the orators, when they are about to say any thing which may be displeasing to their auditors. See Chap. V. in two places.

Π ἡ γεγονὼς πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα. There is no necessity that η should be added after πλείω. See Matth. Gr. §. 455. 4. Serranus translates “ more than sixty years old;” so that he appears to have read πλείω ἐξήκοντα.

ξένους ἡχω] On this use of the genitive see Matth. §. 337.—ἡ ἐνθάδε λέξεις, style of speaking customary in courts of justice.

οςπερ οὖν ἄν, εἰ—] So Gorg. p. 447. E. p. 451. A. Protag. p. 311. B. In these passages άν must not be referred to the opening, but to the conclusion of the proposition. It is, however, rightly repeated at the conclusion. In such passages the reader is prepared in the beginning of a sentence pronounced with some emphasis, for what the construction is to be, so that, a complete clause being interposed, άν is repeated anew. This passage is, therefore, to be understood, as if it were written: οςπερ οὖν άν ξυνεγίγνωσκετε δήποτε μοι, εἰ τῷ ὑμῖν ξένος εἰ. άν.
NOTES ON THE

8 ἐν ἱκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ—ἐπεθράμμην] That is, the vernacular language, which differed from the style of speaking customary in courts of justice. τὸῦτο δίκαιον is the same as τὸῦτο ὡς δίκαιον τι. See Matthiae Gr. § 470. There are many proofs that strangers were allowed to plead their own causes in the courts of justice. In the same manner in C. 5. ταυτὶ μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὃ δέλγων.

1 ἀβτὴ ἀρετῆ] If the article is preserved, the words are to be thus connected: ἀβτὴ ἡ ἀρετῆ (that is, that he see whether the truth be spoken or not) δικαστοῦ ἔστιν. If the article is omitted: for this is the virtue of a judge. For when the pronoun is the subject, and the substantive the predicate, the article is omitted.

II. οἱ δίκαιοι εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι] On this construction see Matth. § 296. A little further the construction is πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα κατηγορημένα μαν ψευδῆ.

b καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἡδη ἔτη] The words πολλὰ ἔτη are added for the purpose of determining more precisely the meaning of πάλαι; since πάλαι is not always used of time long since past, but often also of a short space of time, of years, months, days, &c. The Latin dudum and jamdudum are used in the same manner. The words are to be thus connected: καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἡδη ἔτη λέγοντες καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, the sense being: For there have been many accusers of me before you, who, though they have accused me for some time,—for many years now,—have not brought forward anything true.

c ἡ τοῦς ἀμφὶ Ἀνυτοῦ] That is, Anytus and his associates, Meletus and Lycon. See Matth. § 272. Anytus, in particular, is mentioned, because he was the most formidable enemy of Socrates; for he had acquired great popularity by his conduct during the time of the Thirty Tyrants. See Xenoph. Hellen. II. 3, 42.

d ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι—] Socrates appears to refer to the accusations which Aristophanes and the other comic poets, as Eu- polis, &c., had brought against him.

e τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντισθῆς κ. τ. λ.] φροντισθῆς having the same signification as φροντίζων, takes the accusative. On this accusation, see Aristoph. Nubb. v. 100. v. 189 foll. v. 359. Xenoph. Sympos. VI. 7. Compare Ruhnken. ad Mem. I. 2, 31. Socrates appears, in his youth, to have devoted considerable attention to physical studies; as he informs us himself in the Pheido p. 97 foll. Compare Xenoph. Memorab. IV. 7.


Heinendorf thought that it ought to be written: οἱ ταῦτην τ. φ. κ. But there is no need of the article, since the participle expresses the reason why that class of accusers was most dangerous to Socrates. "Those persons," he says, "because they have spread abroad that report, are formidable and dangerous accusers.

1 εἰς τὴν κυρίαν οὖν διοθέναι or μὴ ἀπαντήσαν. Therefore ἐρήμην κατηγορεῖν is to accuse an absent defendant, when he has forfeited his recognisance. See Petitus ad Legg. Attic. p. 317.

The most impracticable, that is, such as cannot be convinced.

In the following words, σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογοῦμεν are in immediate connection, so that τέ is correctly subjoined to them; and the corresponding clause is εἰλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκριμένου. In exactly the same manner, Rep. V. p. 470. C. polemēn μαχομένους τε φήσομεν καὶ πολεμίως φάσει εἶναι.

That is, do you also then consider. The word ἄξιον has been ably illustrated by Buttmann, Demosth. Or Midian, p. 165.

The Attics use the word ἐλένει to signify that they do not wish to say more on what has preceded, but to pass to other things. Sometimes also, it simply indicates a transition, as in Chap. III.

That is, to remove from your minds the bad opinion concerning me, as C. X. For διαβολὴ means bad
opinion, suspicion, produced by false accusations. Hesychius: Δικαίωσις ἔσται ὑπέρτερος ἡ ὑπάλληλος. But since Socrates, by removing this ill opinion of the judges concerning him, consulted his own advantage, and did himself a service, it is easy to see why Plato wrote εξελίσσαται, not εξελίσσατο. In the words ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγοις χρόνοις is to be observed the emphasis of the sentence, which is partly in the pronoun ταύτην, partly in the opposition of the words ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ and ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγοις χρόνοις. Compare C. X.

τοῦτο οὕτω γενέσθαι] The words οὕτω γενέσθαι are more accurately defined by the following words: καὶ πλέον τι με ποιήσαι ἀπολογούμενον, that I might do something more, that is, to cause you to throw aside your bad opinion of me and conceive a good one. On the formula ἀμειψθή ξανθί, see observations on Crito, C. XVI., note (c).

III. a Μέλητὸς μὲ ἐγράφατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην] See Euthyphro, p. 5. where is found γραφὴν σὲ τις, ἂς ἔσειτε, γέγραπται. For it is correct to say, γράφεσθαι γραφὴν: also to say γράφεσθαι τινα: and hence, by the union of both constructions, has arisen γράφεσθαι γραφὴν τινα.

b ἢσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων—οὕτων] The sense is: their accusation, as the information of accusers properly so called, ought to be recited. Ἀντιμοσοια is properly the oath, either of the plaintiff, when he swears that he brings the accusation for just causes and without calumny; or of the accused, when he swears that he is innocent. Further, this term is applied to the written declaration of the accusation, which is given in to the judge by the plaintiff: in which signification it is also found in C. XI.

c περιεργάζεσθαι] περιεργάζεσθαι is properly to treat any subject minutely, and hence to bestow too much attention on any thing. Hence it signifies, as in this passage, to attend to those things which do not in any way belong to you; to attend to frivolous, vain, and useless things.

d ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνου κωμῳδίᾳ] “The Clouds” of Aristophanes was acted B.C. 423; but was unsuccessful notwithstanding its great merit as a work of art. The poet not only failed in obtaining the first prize, but was placed below Amelipsias as well as Cratinus. He appears to have brought it forward again in the following year, with some alterations; but this fact has been disputed by many critics.

e οὐδέν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρόν] This is a proverbial saying, See Herm. ad Viger. p. 720. 78. Compare C. VI. and XIII.
Remark the preposition περὶ removed a good distance from its noun. The word ἐπατεῖν is constructed either with a simple genitive or with the preposition περὶ and a genitive. Compare Heindorf ad Hippiam maj. p. 289. Ε.

[1 καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων—] The words are to be taken ironically in this sense: I do not despise and reject that knowledge of celestial things and of the art, by aid of which the worst cause may be made the better: and may I never be accused by Meletus of such great injustice. The form δίκην φεύγειν is to be accused, to be prosecuted, and is opposed to the word δίκαιον which signifies to accuse. But since φεύγειν is the same as διώκεσθαι it is easy to see why it should be translated as a passive. The words ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμὸι τ.—μετέστι are to be interpreted: ἀλλὰ ἐκείνο οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοῦτων οὐδέν. μετέστι. Compare Herm. ad Viger. p. 611.

[2 καὶ ἄξιῶ ὑμᾶς—] that is, I wish or request that you yourselves would explain to one another.


IV. [4 Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὗτε τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν οἶδε γ', —] He proceeds to another accusation made against him by his adversaries, that he gave instruction and exacted money from his pupils. See Aristoph. Nub. v. 98. οἴδε γ' is properly inserted after οὗτε, since the following clause is emphatic. There is, therefore, no necessity to read, with Fischer, ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἶδε τούτων, nor with Bekker, ο𐌽 γ', εἰ τινὸς κ. τ. λ.

[5 καὶ χρῆματα πράττομαι] Is the same as μισθῶν τῆς συννοιας πράττεσθαι in Xenoph. Mem. I. 2, 60., in which passage Xenophon bears witness that Socrates never received any remuneration from his pupils.

[6 ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο γέ μοι—] In would not have been necessary to remark that this is said in order to stigmatise and ridicule the avarice of the Sophists; if there had not been some persons who have supposed that it was said seriously.

[7 ἐπεὶ τις οἶδος τ' εἶν] On this construction, Matth. § 524. Obs. 3. Gorgias, (n. c. 459.) a disciple of Empedocles and preceptor of Isocrates, was a native of Leontini, a town in Sicily. He did much to raise the study of rhetoric by his discoveries; according to Suidas, he first reduced it into the form of a science. He was so much distinguished by his eloquence in extemporaneous speaking, that he received great honours from all Greece, but particularly from Athens, where he resided for many years. He is said, after
the example of Protagoras, to have exacted a hundred minae from each of his pupils. See Diog. Laert. 9. 52. Cic. de Orat. i. 22. III. 32. Brut. 8. de Fin. II. 1. Paus. VI. 17. Philostr. I. 1. Vit. Sophist. p. 487. ed Morell. Dorvilli Sic. c. 9. p. 169. and especially the dialogue of Plato, inscribed Gorgias. Prodicus [b. c. 435.] was a native of Ceos, one of the Cyclades. He bestowed much labour on distinguishing and explaining the signification of words. Hippias was a native of Elis, a city in the Peloponnesus; Cicero has given some particulars concerning him in the De Orat. III. c. 32. and Brut. c. 8. Compare also Plato's dialogue inscribed with the name of Hippias.

e τούτος πείθομαι] These words afford a remarkable instance of ἀνακολούθα. For as ὁδὸς τ' ἐστίν goes before, an infinitive ought now to follow. But πείθομαι is placed as if ὁδὸς τ' ἐστίν did not go before. ξυνεῖαι and ξυνουσία refer to learning and instruction, as is frequently the case: whence disciples are constantly called οἱ ξυνῶντες.

ἀνὴρ ἐστιν Πάριος] Namely, Evenus, of the Isle of Paros. The subsequent words, ὅθεν ἀγάθοις ἐπιδημοῦντα, are to be understood thus: whom I once understood to be staying in our city. Socrates means that he had not seen Evenus himself, but had heard from Callias what he is about to say of him.

δὲ τετελέθη πλ.] That is, who has paid more money to the Sophists than all among us who study philosophy. The common reading τετελέκει was bad, being altogether opposed to the construction of the sentence.

καλλίς, τῷ ἱππονίκου] The riches of Callias were so great, that he was called, according to Plutarch, Vol. I. p. 165., simply ὁ πλοῦτος. It is evident from many passages that the Sophists were greatly enriched by him, as Protagoras. p. 479. ed. Heind. p. 314. B. C. Hipp. Maj. p. 218. B. Xenoph. Symsop. I. 5. An account of this wealthy family is given in Bockhx's 'Public Economy of Athens,' Vol. II. p. 242. foll. (Eng. Trans.)

1 μισθώσασθαι μισθὸν to let or hire to another, μισθοῦσθαι to procure services for hire, to purchase.

πέντε μηνῶν] An Attic mina consisted of 100 Attic drachmae, see Pollux, IX. 59. 86. Evenus, therefore, demanded a very small remuneration for his wisdom, since it is recorded that Protagoras, Gorgias, and others, received 100 minae.

$ 

Concerning the construction, see Matth. §. 529. 3. The words καὶ οὕτως ἐμελεῖς seem to have reference to the moderate price τῶν πέντε μηνῶν. For ἐμελεῖς is said of any
thing which does not depart from a proper medium. It is a metaphor taken from musicians who keep the prescribed measure and rhythm of the song. There is great elegance in these words, for if Socrates had said ὁδὼς εὐνελὼς, so cheaply, he would have too openly laughed at Evenus and Callias.

That is, ἀλλ' οὐ δύναμι καλλόνεσθαι καὶ ἀβρύνεσθαι; οὐ γὰρ ἐπισταμαι.

V. a οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε ὀὐδέν] Compare C. XXXII. οὐ δήπου τούτου γε ἐνεκα οἱ ἐκεὶ ἀποκτείνουσι.

b οὐδέν τῶν ἀλλων περιττότερον] That is, doing nothing out of the common way. A little further ἐπειτα is introduced after the participle, a usage of frequent occurrence, on which, see Heindorf. ad Gorg. p. 37. ad Phaedon. p. 115. Herrn. ad Viger. p. 772. Buttm. Gr. Gr. §. 131. not. 6. and §. 136. The following words are to be explained: that report concerning you would not, I think, have arisen, unless you had acted differently from other men; so that it might be said at full length, λόγος γέγονεν, ὃς οὐκ ἂν ἐγενετο, εἰ μὴ τι ἐπραττέ.

c περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν] αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, properly said of those who say or do anything suddenly and on the impulse of the moment, is here applied to judges who form a hasty judgment.

d πεποίηκε τὸ τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν] τὸ ὄνομα refers to the fame of Socrates for wisdom, as is said a little further on, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐσχήκα: and ἡ διαβολή refers to the calumnies and accusations of his adversaries. Muretus Ἀρ. Lectt. VII. 16. has compared the form σοιείν ὄνομα with the Latin 'famam confeceret.'


f μείξω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον] That is, may have a greater wisdom than falls to the lot of man. Compare Matth. Gr. Gr. §. 449. The words ἢ, οὐκ ἔχω, τί λέγω are said ironically: the Sophists have either divine wisdom, or none. There is, therefore, no occasion for Forster's correction ἐν οὐκ ἔχω δ' τι λέγω.

Livius II. 1. has used regium metum for metu regis; and III. 16. terrem servilem for terrae servorum.

h μέγα λέγειν] That is, to say something to be wondered at.

i ἀξιόκριτον] Which is properly said of one who is solvent, and, therefore, worthy to have money intrusted to him. In the same manner locuples in Latin is used of a witness worthy of credit. Hesych.: ἀξιόκριτος, ἀξιόπιστος. Suid.: ἀξιόκριτος ἰκανός, ἐξέγ-γιος, ἀξιόπιστος.

κ τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς—καὶ οἷα] That is, παρέξομαι γὰρ ὑμῖν τὸν θεόν τὸν ἐν Δέλφοις μάρτυρα τῆς ἐμῆς σοφίας, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστίν, καὶ οἷα ἐστίν.


καὶ διμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἔταιρος] Reference is made to the flight of the Athenians in the time of the Thirty Tyrants. The words κατιέναι, κατέρχεσθαι are very often used in speaking of those who return to their native country from exile. See Aristoph. Ran. 1274; Herodo. III. 45. and Porson, on Eurip. Med. 1011. Further on ἐφ’ ὥς τι ὀμήσεις is said more emphatically for εἰ ἐπὶ τι ὀμήσεις.

έτοιμης τούτῳ μαντεύσασθαι] μαντεύεσθαι here is, to require an oracle to be delivered to him, that is, to consult, to inquire, as in Xenoph. Memor. I. 1, 6, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων, ὅπως ἢν ἀποβῇσιν, μαντευομένους ἔπεμπεν, εἰ ποιητέα.


π ἀνείλεν οὖν ἢ Πυθα] The words of the Pythian priestess were, according to Laert. Π. 37. 'Ἀνδράν ἀπάντων Ἐκφάγης σοφάτατος. In Schol. Aristoph. Nubb. v. 144. they appear thus: Ἐκφάγης Σοφοκλῆς, σοφάτερος δ’ Εὐριπίδης. 'Ἀνδράν δὲ πάντων Ἐκφάγης σοφάτατος.

Χαρεκρατεῖς. See Xenoph. Mem. Π. 3.

VI. a ξινοῦδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὄν] In another manner, C. VIII. ἐμαυτῷ ἐξυμήδον οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ. See Matth. §. 548. 2.


c ἥφθον, τί ποτε λέγει] Fischer thought it ought to be written λέγω. But there is no occasion for this; since he passes from the oratio obliqua to a direct address: whence also τί, not δ’ τί, is used. See Matth. §. 529. 3.
This usage of the participle in the nominative case with the verb ἔδοξε, where the strict grammatical construction would require the dative, is not uncommon. De Legg. III. p. 686. D. ἀποβλέψας γὰρ πρὸς τούτον τὸν στόλον, οὗ πέρι διαλεγόμεθα, ἔδοξέ μοι πάγκαλος εἶναι. Xenoph. Hell. VII. 5, 18. ἐνθυμομένος, ὦτ—ἔδοξει αὐτῷ. Cyrop. VI. 1, 18. βουλόμενος πέμψαι—ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ. In the same way in Latin. Hir. De bello Afr. c. 25. Dum hæc ita fìerent, rex Iuba, cognitissimam diffìcultatibum copiarumque paucitatì, non est visum, &c.

That is, I reasoned with myself: as Phædo c. 45. πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκεφτόμενος, and Euthyrho, p. 9. B. πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκοπῶ. On the words ὀσπερ οὗν οὐκ οἶδα. See Matteii Gr. §. 625.

The words belong not only to δειδώς, but also to αἰσθανόμενος and λυπούμενος. Wolf has correctly rendered them: seeing indeed and grieving that I was becoming hated and for that reason fearing. On the words τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, see Matth. §. 284.

Socrates relates to the judges what he said and thought at the time spoken of. I must go then, I said to myself (for this is implied in the preceding ἔδοξει), to find out what is the meaning of the oracle, &c. The reading καὶ ἴένα σκοποῦντι, which appears in the old editions, gives a feebleness to the sentence, and might easily have arisen from a correction. I have, therefore, rejected it with Bekker. In one Vindob., which has preserved the true reading, we find in the margin καὶ ἴένα.

There are various opinions respecting Socrates’ swearing by the dog and other animals, which have been collected by Menagius, Laert. II. 40. p. 92. f. and Pet. Petitus Observatt. Miscell. 4. 7., who thought that by the dog was understood
the *daemonium* of Socrates. Ioach. Camerarius Opuse. de R. R. p. 28, thought that the dog was the symbol of faith, and, therefore, that the oath υή τὸν κύνα nearly answered to the Latin medius fidius. But, on this obscure subject, I am inclined to agree with those who think that Socrates swore by the dog, the goose, and also the oak (see Cyrill. Alexandr. c. Julian. 6. p. 190. Λ.), because he was unwilling to swear by the gods themselves. See Porphyry. de Abstinent. III. 16.


*Soocrates says, that he did all things in order to refute the oracle; but, that after much trouble on his part, he even confirmed its truth so completely, that it was ἀνέλεγκτος, that is, incapable of being convicted of error.*

*That is, which appeared to have been composed by them with most diligence. The imperfect δηρῶτων joined with ἄν, denotes the repetition of the action. See Matth. §. 599. 1.*

*All who were present used to think best of those poems which they themselves had composed. The imperfect ἔλεγον with ἄν denotes in this passage also the repetition of the action.*

*Hence, if they made it a rule to show the public what they composed,* Ion. p. 533. Ε. πάντες γὰρ οἱ τέων ἔτων ποιηταὶ οἱ ἄγαθοι οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης, ἀλλ' ἐνθεοὶ ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι πάντα τὰ καλὰ λέγουσι ποιή-ματα, καὶ οἱ μελοσιοι οἱ ἄγαθοι ἄνασται. —καὶ οὐ πρῶτερον οἶνος τε ποιεῖν (δ' ποιητῆς), πρὶν ἄν ἐνθεοὶ τε γένηται καὶ ἐκφρων.
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cal δ' νοις μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἔνη. ἔως δ' ἀν τούτο ἔχῃ τὸ κτίμα ἄδικοτάς ἐστὶ ποιεῖν—καὶ χρησμοθείν.  

οὖθαλμὴν αὐτῶν—ἐλναὶ ἀνθρώπων] On the construction see Matt. §. 349. 1. Compare §. 549. 4. and §. 536.— & ὦκ ἢσαν, that is, σοφοὶ.


c καὶ τάλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφωτάτοις εἶναι] That is, to take a part in the management of the affairs of the state.

d ἐκέϊσθαι τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν] That is, the error and folly of these men obscured their real knowledge.

e ἀνεφωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ] That is, on behalf of the oracle. Further on, the word δέχεσθαι signifies to prefer, to choose, as often elsewhere.

f ἀμαθῆς τὴν ἀμαθίαν] i.e. αὐτῶν.—ἀμφότερα, understand σοφίαν and ἀμαθίαν.

IX. a καὶ οἱ θεοὶ καλέσαται] That is, by far the most grievous and severe. For before οἱ is to be understood τοιαῦτα. Xenoph. Mem. IV. 8, 11. ἐδόκει τοιούτος εἶναι, οἷς ἐν εἴη ἄριστος γε ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπανομένατας. See Matt. §. 461. Compare Viger. de Idiot. p. 120.

b ὑνομα δὲ τούτῳ λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι] The words σοφὸς εἶναι are added by way of explanation to the preceding. It is usual to put εἶναι after a verb of naming; see Heindorf on Theaet. p. 160. ἄστε εὐτε τίς εἶναι το ὑνομίζει.

The article with óv indicates so opposed to some other thing, that it ought to be accounted true. In this passage after το óv is put το δε, in order that the force of that form, το δε, may be increased and made more apparent.

d ὁλγευν τινδός — καὶ ὀδονδός] Here καὶ before ὀδονδός increases and corrects the meaning of ὁλγευν τινδός, in this sense: human wisdom is of little value— I should rather say, of no value at all. In the same way μικρά καὶ ὀδονδί in Demosth. p. 790. 20. and p. 260. 26. ed. Reisk. There is, therefore, no occasion to write ἣ καὶ ὀδονδός. The Latin writers use atque in exactly the same manner. See Matth. on Cicer. II. Catil. XII. 27. Manil. XVIII. 54.

e καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ’ ὅ ὅλεγεν τόν Ζωκράτη] That is, and he appears not to say this of Socrates. The pronoun τοῦτο refers to what has gone before τὸ σοφὸν ἐλναί. On the construction compare Crito C. VIII. φροντιστέον, τί ἔρωσιν οἴ πολλοί ἡμᾶς. Menon. p. 77. Λ. ὀπερ φασι τοὺς συντριβοντάς τι. Aristoph. Acharn. ν. 593. ταύτι λέγεις σύ τὸν στρατηγὸν; Ibid. ν. 580. τί δ’ εἴπας ἡμᾶς; οὐκ ἔρεις; Sophocl. Electr. ν. 984. τοιαίτα τοι νῦ πᾶς τις ἐξερεί βροτῶν. Eurip. Iphig. Ταυρ. ν. 340. θαυμάστρ’ ἔλεγας τὸν φανέρ’. Andromach. ν. 646. τί δήτ’ ἐν εἴποις τοὺς γέροντας ὡς σοφοί; Heyne on Homer, Vol. V. p. 285. The Attics use the form λέγειν τινά, for λέγειν περὶ τινός. For it is usual to say, λέγειν τινά τι, λέγειν τινά ὅτι, ὅς, εἰ τινάς, as λέγειν τινά ὅτι ἔσθοι ἔστι.

κ ὀπερ εἶν εἴ ποιο] On the construction of the words ὀπερ εἶν εἴ, see C. L note (7). In this passage the complete sentence would be ὀπερ εἶν εἴ ποιοτο, εἴ εἴποι. Therefore I have no doubt that Stephens, Heindorf, and Bekker have correctly inserted εἴ.

καὶ τῶν ἀντων’ καὶ τῶν ξένων] These genitives depend on the following τινά.

το δεῖ βοήθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι] That is, acting in such a manner that the response of Apollo may appear to be true. The word ἀποχολια, Thom. Mag., interprets: ἕ περι τι ἀναστροφή, that is, attention bestowed on any thing.

τόλ’ εν πενία μυρία εἰμι—] Πενία differs in the same manner from πτωχεία, as Lat. paupertas from egestas. Therefore πενία is applied to artisans and other men of that description, who live by the labour of their hands; but πτωχεία to beggars. See Aristoph. Plut. ν. 552 sqq. and the commentators on the passage. μυρία πενία is the greatest poverty; which expression has been illustrated by Valckenacr on Phoeniss. ν. 1480. The extreme poverty of Socrates is spoken of by himself, in Xenoph. Οἰκονομ. Π. 3., where
he says that he would sell his house and all his other property for 5 Attic mina. Whence he was also commonly called πένης, as we learn from Xenoph. Εcon. II. 3.

X. a οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων] This is added by Socrates, that the cause of the odium against himself may more clearly appear. Protagor. p. 328. C. καὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον ποιοῦν οἱ μᾶλλον δύναμεν, (i.e. take care that their sons should be instructed,) μᾶλλον δὲ δύναται οἱ πλουσιώτατοι.

b ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἰστα ἐπιχειροῦσιν] It is well known that εἰστα and ἐπιστά is often put for καὶ εἰστα, and καὶ ἐπιστά after a finite verb. See Thucyd. p. 151. C. Euthyd. p. 295. C. D. Phaedr. 63. C., in which passage it signifies then, afterwards. The construction in this passage is a little different, in which εἰστα is and then, καὶ τότε. It is used in the same manner, Cratyl. p. 411. B., on which Heindorf, besides this passage, has compared Rep. p. 336. B. Fischer, therefore, has badly corrected it μιμοῦμενοι.

c εἰσότων δὲ ὅλγα ἢ οὔδεν] This is more emphatic than the common reading ἡ ὅλγα ἢ οὔδεν. For ἡ used in this manner, signifies or rather; which is not the case in the form ἡ ὅλγα ἢ οὔδεν. Plat. Phaedr. p. 224. B. βραχέα ἡ οὔδεν. Alciphron. III. 4. ὅλγα ἢ οὔδεν διαφέρουσι.

d ἀλλ' οὖν αὐτοῖς] This is said ironically. They are enraged, he says, with me, when they ought rather to be angry with themselves for allowing themselves to be refuted by those lads. The common reading οὖκ αὐτοῖς, has much less of ironical elegance, and would probably have been rather οὐκ ἔκεινοι.

e ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ υπὸ γῆς] These words depend upon διδάσκων, which must be repeated at the end of the sentence.

f ὅτι κατάθηλοι — προσποιούμενοι] On the construction see Matth. § 296. compared with 549.

g καὶ σφαθραὶ καὶ πολλοὶ, καὶ ξυντεταγμένως καὶ πιθανώς. λ.] This is a metaphor taken from soldiers arrayed in line of battle; who are said to attack the enemy ξυντεταγμένως, when they assault them in regular line. Therefore, the calumniators of Socrates are here said ξυντεταγμένως λέγειν, since they assailed him with calumnies as it were in regular array; that is, in such a manner as it appeared that they had come to an agreement among themselves as to the best and most efficacious mode of calumniating. πιθανῶς, that is, in a manner adapted to persuade.


1 Μέλητος μὲν ὑπέρ τῶν ποιητῶν] Meletus, who brought the cause of Socrates, by a regular form of accusation, before the Archon, as appears from Euthyphr. p. 2. B. and other passages, was a tragic poet, who was not very celebrated or successful in his art. See the scholiast on Aristoph. Ran. v. 1337., and Thirlwall’s ‘History of Greece,’ vol. 4. p. 274, note 5. At the time he accused Socrates, he was very young, but puffed up with pride and arrogance, as may be understood from Euthyphr. p. 2. B. C. Meletus is said to have been one of the Four, who by order of the Thirty Tyrants, brought Leon of Salamis to Athens. The affair is related by Andocides De Myster. p. 46. Orat. T. IV. ed. Reisk. Compare c. XX.—

Anytus, son of Anthemion, a βαρισοδήψης, or tanner (as appears from Epist. VII. Socr. p. 30. and Schol. on Plat. Men. p. 90. A. compare Xenoph. Apol. 39), was by far the most powerful and inveterate of the accusers of Socrates, so that Horace, Satyr. II. 4., not without justice, called Socrates Anyti reum. Being a man of great wealth and political influence, and opposed to the aristocratical party, he was exiled by the Thirty Tyrants; he returned to Athens with Thrasybulus, after holding the rank of general at Phyle. See Xenoph. Hellen. II. 3. Plat. Epist. VII. about the middle. In the dialogue of Plato entitled Meno, “Anytus is introduced as violently offended with Socrates on account of the turn which his discourse had taken, and as quitting him with a threat, which, if it was ever uttered, was fulfilled by this indictment.”—Thirlwall’s ‘History of Greece,’ Vol. IV. p. 275; see Meno, 92—94. E. Other causes of his enmity against Socrates have been realised by Xenoph. Apolog. Socr. §. 29. Libanius Apol. Socr. p. 11. ed. Reisk. Plutarch Vit. Alcib. c. 4. Anytus is said to have been a man of bad character; see Aristot. ap. Harpocr. under the word ἐκδικεῖν. Plutarch Vit. Coriol. c. XIV. Diod. Sicul. XIII. 64. Compare Plut. Amator. p. 276. C. D.—Lyco was one of the ten orators, who according to the law of Solon were to plead and conduct the public causes. See Diog. Laert. II. 38., and the commentators on the passage.

k Ταῦτα ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὡς καὶ ὑμᾶς ἄγαθον, τάληθή] That is, these are the things which I before said that I would relate to you with truth. He refers to the words, C. I., ὑμεῖς δὲ ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεις πᾶσαν τὴν ἀληθείαν.

1 οὐδὲ ὑποστελλόμενος] ὑποστέλλεσθαι is properly to withdraw one’s self, to depart privately: hence to dissimulate, as in this
passage. The use of this word has been learnedly explained by Wytenbach on Julian. p. 149 sq. ed. Lips.


XI. ἀδίπτη ἔστω—ἰκανὴ ἀπολογία] The old editions erroneously add the article. For ἀδίπτη is the subject: Let this be sufficient defence. Compare c. I. note (t).

b τὸν ἄγαθον τε καὶ φιλόπολιν] Suidas and other grammarians are wrong in saying that the word φιλόπολις is κοινών, but φιλόποτρις, Ἀρτικόν. Both are used in Attic Greek; see Ducker on Thucyd. VI. 92., φιλόποτρις means a lover of Greece; but φιλό-πολις a lover of the Athenian community.

c ἀδίπτς γὰρ δῆ—λαβώμεν αὖ] He indicates by these words, that after having disposed of the charges of his former accusers, he is now going to refute those of the others; and that he wishes their bill of indictment likewise to be read, as he had read the ἄντωμοσία of the others, C. III. ἀδίπτς αὖ, Again then—let us now on the other hand take the indictment of these.

d ἔχει δὲ πως ἄδε] That is, somewhat thus. Hesych. ἄδε πως, οὕτω, τούτον τὸν τρόπον. But that is the meaning of ἄδε by itself. Socrates, therefore, says that he is not going to give the exact words, but only the substance of the indictment against him. The form of the accusation was still extant at Athens in the time of Phavorinus, in the second century, in µυτρφθ, that is, in the temple of the mother of the gods, in which, says Diog. Laert. II. 40. there was a registry in these words: ἢ δὲ ἄντωμοσία τῆς δίκης τούτου ἐκέν τὸν τρόπον ἀνάκειται γὰρ ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν, φησὶ Φαβωρίνος, ἐν τῷ µυτρφφ. "Τάδε ἐγράφατο καὶ ἄνωθεν ἀναλογηθατο Μέλιτος Μελίτου, Πιτεύς, Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου, Ἀλωπεκί̃θε̃ν Αδικεί Σωκράτης ὦς µὲν ἡ πόλις νοµίζει θεοῦς οὐ νοµίζων, ἐτέρα δὲ καὶ νόµα δαιµόνια εἰσηγούμενος ἄδικει δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διηθεῖ̃ρων, τίμιμα θάνατος." Therefore the accusation which is here put first, is there mentioned in the second place.

e ὧτι σπουδὴ χαριντίζεται] χαριντίζεται, which is derived from χαρίζει, witty, cheerful, is properly to joke or banter in a cheerful and witty manner, in the same sense as ἐφαρσπελεύσεται; hence, absolutely, to joke, to sport, as here and c. XIV. Therefore σπουδὴ χαριντίζεται is, as we say in English, to joke in earnest.
For Meletus, in casting such an unfounded imputation on Socrates, and pretending that he himself cared for the education of youth, appeared χαριντικεσθαι, that is, to sport and joke; but, because he accused Socrates of corrupting youth, and prosecuted that accusation seriously and zealously, he is said σπουδὴ χαριντικεσθαι. Further on, ῥαδίως rashly. See Heindorf on Charmid. §. 44.—eis ἀγώνα καθιστάναι, means to accuse. See Euthyphr. c. 3.


d ἐὰν εἰσάγεις τοντοισι] The verb εἰσάγειν is said either of the magistrate, when it signifies to permit an accuser to indict a person on some law, to grant permission to bring an action; or of the prosecutor, when it means to bring into court, to accuse, as here. In both significations, either εἰς δικαστήριον, as c. 17., με εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, or something of the kind is understood. In this passage the word τοντοισι is added, and supplies the place of that expression. See Meier and Schœmann 'Der Attische Process,' p. 709. nöt. 19.


f νὴ τὴν Ἡραν] This oath is also used by Socrates in Xenoph. Mem. I. 5, 5; III. 10, 9; III. 11, 5.

g τῶν ὀφελοῦντων] That is, τῶν βέλτιον ποιοῦντων.

h Τὰ δαὶ οἱ βουλευταί] Concerning the βουλευταί, see note (b) on C. XX. There were two senates at Athens: the Areopagus, βουλὴ ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου, and the senate of five hundred, βουλὴ ἡ τῶν πεντακοσίων, instituted by Solon. Either may be meant here. On the words 'Ἀλλ' ἢρα,—μὴ οἱ ἐν τ. ἐκκ. see Protag. p. 312. A. ἀλλ' ἢρα, ἢ ἢπίκρατες, μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις;
Tous neosteros] No one was permitted to be present at the assemblies until he had attained the age of at least 18 or 20. See Schœmann ‘De Comitiis Atheniensium,’ p. 76 sq. Hence it is obvious that oi neoi and neosteroi were young men under 18.

k emos katagnwgas dustomian] The construction has been explained by Matthiæ §. 378. Esch. adv. Ctesiph. §. 12. tis én oiv úmous tolmhseie tosaouthn aneleuverian katagnwnai tov dtimou;

oi mén beltious — ð diaftheirom] To pantes ðntrwpcoi we must understand dokousi, from what has preceded; exactly as Hipp. min. p. 379. D. Lysis. p. 212. D. These words contain the explanation of the words oútow dakei sou eixein, and therefore are added without connective particles. Gorg. p. 479. B. kivdweuvou; yap — tioiwtov ti poiiev kai oi tiv dikhn feugontes, ð Pwle' to álgevwn astow kathorán, pors ðe to wphelwv tuflwv eixein kai ángwv.

m éan te — oiv phite] Grammarians commonly say that after ei, elan, ðna, dphra, dpos, and other words of the same kind, ð and not oiv ought to be used. We may, however, correctly say el oiv, when oiv is so closely joined in signification with the verb, as in reality to form with it only a single idea, as Hermann says, on Viger. p. 833. But this is the case in the form oiv phainai, which from its literal signification, to say not, becomes equivalent to to deny. When it retains this meaning, oiv phainai is always used, although preceded by conditional particles.


XIII. a ð tàv, àpokrinai] A contraction of ð étav, see
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c καλ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι] The very words of the law to which Socrates here refers, are found in Demosth. c. Steph. orat. II. p. 1131. Νόμος. τοῖον ἀντιδίκου ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἀλλῆλοις τὸ ἐφωτάμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μὴ.

d τηλικούτου ὄντω[1]

For Meletus was a young man. See c. X. note (!). Compare C. XIV.

e εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθιάς ἤκω] On this construction see Matth. §. 341. Compare 504. 1. 2.

[οἷ]μαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλων—οὔδένα] That is, πείσεσθαι σοι, by a usual ellipsis after οἷμαι δὲ καλ., Enythropho p. 3. Ε. ἀλλὰ σοὶ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνίει τὴν δίκην, οἷμαι δὲ καλ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμὴν.

[παθμοῦ]μαι δὲ γε ἅκων ποιώ] The participle ποιῶν must be understood. For it is not correct to say παθεσθαλ τι. Heindorf. conjectured that ποιῶν ought to be restored to the text.

XIV. a οὕτε μέγα οὕτε σμικρὸν] Compare C. VI. οὕτε μέγα οὕτε σμικρὸν ἕνωθα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὦν.

b ἢ δῆλον δὴ, ὦτι—] Here ἢ is put as it were to correct what he has before said. The sense is this: But, why do I ask? it is evident—or: is it indeed evident?

c ὦτι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν] Understand ἐμὲ φῆς διαφθείρειν τοὺς νεωτέρους.

d οὗ ταῦτα λέγεις] We are to connect ταῦτα with the participle διδάσκων.

e ἐν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν] The genitive ἐν is governed by λόγος, and we are not to understand the preposition περί, which has been done by some. For as we can say not only λέγειν περί τινος, but also sometimes λέγειν τινά, (on which construction some remarks have been made on C. IX. note (9)) we may also correctly say both λόγος περί τινος and λόγος τινός. For he might have said ὅσ νῦν λέγομεν, which would have been more in accordance with the meaning than the other construction περί ὧν νῦν λέγομεν. The same construction is found in Charmid. p. 156. A. οὐ γὰρ τί σου ὁ λόγος λόγος ἐστίν. Demosth. de Cor. p. 281. ed. R. τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν,
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...peri autou. Eurip. Med. v. 541. ouk tvn pfi stheu, i. e. peri sou. Compare Dorvill on Charit. p. 592. Schaefer on Sophocel. Antig. v. 11. where there is filow, i. e. peri filon.


g tvn ti tahta leges] Hermann, on Viger. p. 849., says that tvn ti involves an ellipsis, and that the full construction in the present tense would be tvn ti genetai; in the past tvn ti geneto.

h Mnde, — epei t. xal.] With ma Delta we are to understand from what has gone before ou nomizei theous. For Budeens has truly observed that ma Delta is not a negation by itself, but that we must often supply the negation from the preceding part of the sentence. See Viger. p. 450.

i 'Anaxagorou olei—] Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, according to Laertius II. 8., taught that the sun was movdon diapouron, which some understood to be an ignited mass of iron, others of stone, as Socrates himself, in Xenoph. Mem. IV. 7. 7., where he endeavours to refute this opinion of Anaxagoras. The same philosopher said that the moon had oikeis, lofous and fparagalas, i. e. was gamma. Meletus attributed these opinions to Socrates, because Socrates had received instruction from Archelaus, who had been a disciple of Anaxagoras. Anaxagoras was born B.C. 500, and died B.C. 428.

k kal dhi kal oi neoi tauta—] And the young men forsooth learn these things from me. For Socrates ironically repeats the words which he supposes to proceed from Meletus. Heindorf, by taking away the comma before kal dhi kal, made these words depend on the preceding 6ti, a construction which appears to me to be forced.

l drakhmns ek tis arxistras] Dacier understands by these words, that the books containing these opinions of Anaxagoras might be purchased for a drachma from the orchestra. But Forster rightly remarks that we never read of books being exposed for sale in the orchestra. — Originally no sum was charged for admission to the theatres; but crowds and tumults having arisen from the concourse of many persons, of whom some had not any right to enter, it was evidently to be expected that in a theatre made of wood, which was

L 3
the only one that Athens then possessed, the scaffolding would break; and this accident, in fact, took place; to avoid which evil, it was determined to let the seats: the phrase used to express this was ῥεῖν ἀπομισθοῦν and ῥεῖν ἀνορθεῖν. The seats were let by the farmers or lessees of the theatres, who were called either ἑπταρώναι, or ἑπταρπωλαί, or ἀρχιτέκτονες, as in Demosth. de corona p. 234, 23. Vol. I. Compare Casaubon on Theophrast. Char. 2.; and two oboli was the general price paid by each person, according to Demostenes in the passage referred to; sometimes a drachma, according to Casaubon in the passage referred to. Compare Bœckh 'On the Public Economy of Athens,' Vol. I. p. 293 foll. Engl. Transl. But since, according to Harpocratin and Suidas, under the word θεωρία, and Schol. on Lucian's Timon. Vol. I p. 6., a drama was the greatest sum that could ever be demanded by the lessee, it is evident why Socrates said & εἴςετιν, εἶ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμὴς πρίασθαι.—But how could these doctrines of the philosopher be learned in the theatre? It is certain that the dramatic poets often inserted the opinions of the philosophers in their plays; either to praise them, as Euripides, who frequently alluded in his tragedies to the opinions of Anaxagoras, as is shown by Valcken. Diatribe in Fragm. Eurip. p. 29 foll., or to condemn and ridicule them, which we know to have been done by Aristophanes. That Socrates principally alludes to Euripides in this passage, appears from the circumstance that he was the first who introduced on the stage the doctrine of Anaxagoras concerning the sun and moon. See what has been said on this by Valcken, in the work above cited, p. 31., and Porson on Eurip. Orest. v.971. p. 192. ed. Lips. sec. The sense of the whole passage is this: Meletus declares that I affirm the sun to be a stone, and the moon earth. But surely the judges know that this is the doctrine of Anaxagoras; and if I were to pretend that I introduced this opinion, the young, men could discover, even from the plays of the dramatic poets, my vanity in appropriating it to myself, and would justly ridicule me.

m καὶ νεότητι] He alludes to the youth of Meletus. See C. XIII.

n ἔστερ αἰνεῖμα ξυνίθεντι διαπεραμένῳ.] Ficinus has correctly interpreted this: videtur enim ceu enim quoddam componere, tentans, an Socrates, &c. There is no need of kal, which is commonly inserted before διαπεραμένῳ. Gorg. p. 464. C. and p. 479. D. Ἀρχέλαιον εὐδαμονίξων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἄδικοντα, δίκην οὐδεμιᾶν διδόντα, where kal is commonly inserted after ἄδικοντα,
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ο γνώσεται — ἐκὸν χαριντείς.] The construction has been explained by Matthiae §. 349. 1.—δ σοφόν δή, that wise man forsooth, said ironically.

XV ὃ μοι φαύνεται] That is, in what way, how he appears to me. For Socrates begins to show that Meletus is so inconsistent as both to deny and to affirm that Socrates believes in the existence of gods.


d 'Ὄς ὁνήσαι,—ἀναγκαζόμενος] How much have you obliged me by giving me an answer at length! Casaubon has observed on Pers. Sat. I. v. 112. that ὁνήσαι, like the Latin juvare, often has the meaning of delectare and not ὑπηθεῖν.

e ἀλλ' οὖν δαμόνια τὲ νομίζω] These words are to be referred to what goes before, εἰτ' οὖν κανὰ εἰτε παλαιά.

f διωκόσα ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ] 'Ἀντιγραφή is here the same as ἀντισκοπία in C. III. (note b) that is the bill of accusation. The plaintiff, on delivering the bill of accusation to the judges, was obliged to swear that he did not bring the accusation through malice. Meletus had taken this oath.


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[1] ὁ δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ—οὐδεμία μηχανὴ ἔστιν] The sense is: you will in no wise be able to persuade any one, that one and the same man believes in spiritual and divine things, and at the same time disbelieves in the existence of spirits, gods, and heroes. It is evident from the preceding argument that the adjectives are opposed to the nouns substantive.

XVI. [2] Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὥσπερ] Socrates, having concluded the material part of his defence, now commences the discussion of other points which bear upon the subject. He first complains of the danger of his being sacrificed to the hatred of the multitude; but, at the same time maintains, a good man ought to consider virtue and justice as of more importance than life itself.

[3] τοῦτο already expressed the same idea; but they are added to express the former idea with more emphasis.

[4] oúdeν δὲ δεινὸν, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στρ.] That is, there is no danger of my being the last who will be condemned by the envy and hatred of the multitude. Compare Phædo p. 84. οὔδεν δεινὸν, μὴ φοβηθῇ.

Fischer has observed that these words might have been omitted, since the preceding pronoun τοῦτο already expressed the same idea; but they are added to express the former idea with more emphasis.


[6] εἰ οὖν δεῖν κἀκεῖνον ὕπολογίζεσθαι—] Crito. c. 8. κἂν φαινόμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δὲρ ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὔτ' εἰ ὑπήκουν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἰσοπλήσιαν ἱσοτρίαν ὀμό ἄλλο ὅτι ὅποιον πέπλεκεν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν. Compare the conclusion of this character.


[8] ἀλλὰ τὰς Θέσιν υἱὸς] Allusion is here made to IIiad. σ'. v. 90 foll.—παρὰ τὸ ἀλαχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, in comparison with enduring any thing disgraceful—rather than submit to any thing
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disgraceful, that is, lest it should be said that he did not care for the death of his friend Patroclus. For παρὰ with an accusative sometimes indicates a comparison; see Matthiae Gr. § 588. c.

1 avtika γὰρ τοι, φησι', μεθ' "Εκτορα.] These words are introduced in a parenthesis, which will account for their want of strict connection with the context.

2 δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας] δὲ δὲ is inserted in consequence of the length of the sentence. The regular grammatical construction would be: δὲ τοσοῦτον τὸν κυνῆνον κατεφόρησεν, ὡστὲ—ἀκούσας ταῦτα—ὥλιγάριος. This is, therefore, an anacoluthia. Similar passages are given by Matthiae Gr. § 626.

1 avtika—εὐθαλήν] Iliad. ơ'. v. 98. and 104.

m μη αὐτὸν ο��ει—] Heusdlius Specim. Crit. p. 12. thought the reading ought to be όλον, of which there is no need. For μή has often the force of an interrogation where a denial is expected or wished for. See Hermann on Viger. p. 789. Gregor. Corinth. p. 162 et 824. ed. Schef.

n ἡ γυγοσάμενος] In order that ἡ may not appear to be introduced improperly, it is to be observed that the same construction is not observed in the subsequent part of the sentence, since the words ἡ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθὴ are added, when we should have expected ἡ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος κελευθεῖς. For a similar construction see Demosthen. De Rhodior. libert. p. 197. ed. Reisk. ei γὰρ τι ποιν 

καὶ κεκράτηκε τής πόλεως βασιλεῖς, ἡ τοὺς πονηροτάτους τῶν 'Ελλή- 

νων πείτας η οὐδαμῶς ἄλλως κεκράτηκεν.


καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεβείγειν. Crito c. 16. μήτε παῖδας περὶ 

πλεονοὺς ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ χίν μήτε ἀλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαλοῦ. See 

C. XVII. πρὸ ὀνὸ τῶν κακῶν. On the sentiment compare Crito 

c. 12. at the end, where the question is respecting the obedience to be paid to the laws of our country.

XVII. a δεινὰ ἀν εἶχεν εἰργασμένοι] Heindorf, on Gorg. p. 518. E, says that εἰργάζεσθαι in this passage, is used for ποιεῖν. But 

εἰργάζεσθαι: is stronger in its signification than ποιεῖν. I should 

have perpetrated a great crime.

b ei, ὅτε μὲν με—τόσε μὲν ὦ ἐκ.—τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ—ἐνταῦθα δὲ—] 

See Buttmann on Demosthen. Mid. p. 155., where he has given many similar instances. He remarks that when there is a double μὲν and a double δὲ in the sentence, the whole becomes more emphatic. In a similar manner, Isocrat. Areopag. 19. παρ' οἰς. 

μὲν γὰρ μήτε φυλακὴ μήτε ξημίᾳ τῶν τοιοτῶν καθότητη, μήθ' αἱ
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crîseis ἄκριβεσις εἶσιν, παρὰ τούτοις μὲν διαφθείρεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐπεικεῖς τῶν φύσεων ὅπου δὲ μὴτε λαθείν τοῖς ἄδικοις βαθὺν ἐστίν, μὴτε φανεροῖς γενομένους συγγραμμὸς τυχεῖν, ἑνταῦθα δὲ ἐξήθλους γλύνεσθαι τὰς κακοπληκτὰς. Observe the difference of moods, ἕμενον καὶ ἐκινδύνευν, and λιπομ. The indicative refers to a matter which really happened; the optative to one which may possibly happen.

d ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ] That is, τοῦ θεοῦ.
f Kai τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμ.] καὶ is in this passage to be pronounced with emphasis, as is often the case in sentences indicating opposition. Fischer erroneously thought that τοῦτο was put for διὰ τοῦτο: it is the nominative case. A little further on, the words ἢ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι signify, which consists in one's thinking that he knows what he does not know.
g τοῦτο ἀν] With these words φαίνω εἶναι or εἶναι may be understood. Further on, ὅπτω is used, because οὗκ εἶδώς has the same signification as ὀσπερ οὐκ οἶδα.
h πρὸ ὅου τῶν κακῶν — οἶδε φεύγομαι] This construction is remarkable. For φοβεϊσθαι and φεύγειν πρὸ τῶν κακῶν — οὐκ οἶδα, are used instead of φοβεϊσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ κακὰ ἄ οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ἢ ταῦτα ἄ οἵ ὅδη ἀ οἴεται ὅντα τυχάνει. On this use of the preposition πρὸ see C. XV. note (t).
i ἄστε οὖν εἰ μὲ νῦν ἄφιετε — τὴν ἀρχὴν] Ἀρχὴν is at all. See Hermann on Viger. p. 723. A little further on, ἄποκτείναι, as in C. XVIII., is to condemn to death by their votes: in which sense ἄποκτείνειν is also used by Xenoph. Mem. IV. 8, 5., where it is opposed to ἀπολύειν. The structure of the sentence is remarkable, εἰ — ἄφιετε, εἰ μοι — ἐποιεῖ, εἰ οὖν ἀφιέτε, the particle οὖν indicating that the speaker returns to what he has been saying.
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κ' Αὐτῷ ἀπίστησαντες] 'Απίστευν, ἀπίστος, ἀπίστια, are said not only of those who do not believe, who have no faith in others, but also of those who refuse to comply with the demands of others because they disbelieve them.

' ἐφ' ἔτε—φιλοσοφεῖν] On this construction see Matthiae § 479.

ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ] 'Ασπάζεσθαι is to salute with an embrace, φιλεῖν to salute with a kiss. In this passage these words signify: with grateful and joyful mind I salute and reverence your kindness and clemency. Lysid. p. 217. B. ἀναγκαζεῖται δὲ γε σῶμα διὰ νόσου λατρείαν ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν. Legg. III. 689. Α. τὸ δὲ, ποιητὴν καὶ ἄδικον δοκοῦν εἶναι φιλεῖ τε καὶ ἀσπάζεται.

καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος] This word is used in the same manner in C. IX. at the end, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδεικνυμαι, ὦτι οὐκ ἐστι σοφός.

ο εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἱσχύν] ἱσχύν is used here not in the sense of power, but of greatness and strength of mind. For the subsequent words show that ἱσχύν is opposed to a desire of riches, honours, and praise.

καὶ νεωτέρῳ—ποιήσω] On this rather uncommon construction, see Matth. § 415. obs. 1. Buttm. § 120. 2. 3. Compare Viger. p. 29.


τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν] See C. IX. διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν, which might also have been διὰ τὴν τῷ θεῷ λατρείαν, since verbal nouns are frequently constructed with the same case as the verb from which they are derived. See Matthiae, § 367. 1.

μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα] Μηδὲ is here introduced after μῆτε, because these words form, as it were, a new member of the sentence.
The common reading μήτε ἡλλον τινὸς οὕτω σφόδρα, appears to have been inserted by some grammarian to explain the sense. Compare C. XXVI. at the end, οὐκ ἐσθ' ὑπὶ μάλλον—πρέπει οὕτως ὄν τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀνήρ ἐν πρυτανεῖο χιτείσθαι, and the note on that passage.

* καὶ τάλλα ἀγαθά τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντὰ] The common reading, καὶ τάλλα τάγαθα, is a very bad one, for it signifies: and all the other things, namely, those which are good and useful to men; which is opposed to the whole scope of the passage.

u eί μέν ὄνων—διαφθείρω—, ταύτ' ἄν εἶν ἔλα.] See C. XII. note (a).


y οὐκ ἄν ποθήσοντος]. On άν construed with a future, see note, page 28. Compare Matth. §. 598. D.

* οὖθ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι] That is, not even if I were to be several times dead. It is worthy of remark that the Greeks, when they wish to lay stress on the bitterness of death, use the state and condition of death itself for the pains which precede it. Crito, C. I. ή τὸ πλοῦν ἀφίκται ἐκ Δηλῶν, οὐ δεὶ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με; which is a more emphatic expression than ἀποθήσκειν με. Crito, C. XIV. ὅσ οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν; εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε. Apol. C. XXIX. πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι ὀδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκεῖνος εὖν. C. XXXI. οὕτω ἔρχομαι οἱ ἐλθόντα με δει τεθνάναι. C. XXXII. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἔθελω τεθνάναι, εἰ ταύτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ. Compare Demosth. Philipp. IV. p. 138. De rebus Chersones. p. 102. De Coron. p. 301. πῶς οὐκ ἀπολωλέναι πολλάκις ἐστὶ δικαίος.

XVIII. a μὴ θαριβεῖτε] Socrates now enters upon another subject. He proceeds to show that his condemnation and death will be a great loss and injury to the Athenian state.

b οδ γὰρ οἷομαι θεμιτῶν εἶναι] That is, I do not think it consistent with the laws of divine wisdom. ἀμεινὸν ἀνὴρ is used instead of the common construction ἀμεινὸν ἄνδρα, because these words are closely joined with θεμιτῶν εἶναι—ἀποκτείνων is to cause a person to be condemned and executed: ἔξελαύνειν to cause a person to be punished with exile: ἀτμιαίειν to cause a person to lose either the whole, or at least, the most important, rights and privileges of citizenship. There were three kinds or degrees of ἀτμιὰ, as is shown by Ed. Meier de Bonis Damnat. p. 101 sqq. 137 sqq.

c ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον] Understand οἷομαι μέγα κακὸν.
On this construction of δέω, see Heind. on Theet. p. 364.

That is, lest ye rashly reject this benefit granted to you by Apollo, who ordered me to rebuke your errors and vices, and to exhort you to the pursuit of virtue. The dative διίν depends on the noun δόσις, on which construction, see C. XVII. note (c).

The interpretation of these words depends on the word μύωνος, which signifies both a spur, and a gad-fly, that is, a kind of larger fly, which annoys and infuriates cattle; on which see Blomfield Gloss. on Aeschyl. Prom. v. 583. We are disposed to interpret μύωνος in this passage as a gad-fly, as more consistent with the words εἰ καὶ γελοιοτέρον εἶπεν; and because προσκείδαθαι, προστεθεικείναι, and προσκαβίζειν, are more applicable to a gad-fly than to a spur. For the words προσκείδανον τῷ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ do not merely signify: added or given to the state by the god, which is the opinion of some; but προσκείδαθαι ὑπὸ θεοῦ includes the notion of the pressing and urging, so that the proper version is: given by the god to urge on the state: on which use of the word, see Thomas Mag. under the word, and Sturz. Lexie. Xenoph. T. III. p. 725. This is often said of animals provoking and annoying others, but I have never seen a passage in which it is applied to a horseman. In nearly the same manner the word προσκαβίζειν may be explained, which Socrates uses in reference to the metaphor which he has just employed.—Ἀφεδεστέρω is interpreted by Suidas by βραδυτέρω.

οἶνον δὴ μοι—ποιοῦτόν τινα] ποιοῦτόν τινα is added by apposition to the pronoun οἶνον, in order to unite what follows the more closely with this part of the sentence.

Remark the number of participles in this passage; on which, see C. XIV. note (n). Wolf thus translates the passage: But you, offended, perhaps, as sleepers when they are roused, will strike me, and, complying with Anytus, will rashly slay me: afterwards you will sleep uninterruptedly for the remainder of your lives, unless the god, caring for your welfare, shall send you some one else. The former metaphor is still continued:

On the construction see Matth. §. 535.

That is, it does not appear consistent with human motives. For men rather attend to their own affairs than to those of strangers, and consult their own safety rather than
that of others. On the construction of ἀνέχεσθαι with a genitive, see Matth. §. 358. Compare 550.

1 ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα] Lest any difficulty should arise from the article, it may be remarked that these words are to be taken thus: ὁ μάρτυς, ὃν παρέχομαι, ἢ πενία. ἦκανὸς μάρτυς ἑστίν, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω.

XIX. a ἐπικωμφδέων ἐγράψατο] Socrates alludes to the words of the ἀντωμοσία, Ἔτερα δὲ δαιμόνια. Ἡ ἐπικωμφδεῖν is to laugh, to mark for ridicule, since κωμφδεῖν and διακωμφδεῖν have the same signification as διασάδειν, σκόπτειν, χλευάζειν. See Pollux IX. 148. The reason is, that in the old comedy the vices of men were marked out, and the men as it were, stigmatised.


c καὶ εἰ μὲλλει δι. ἥρ.] Herm. on Viger. p. 832. has shown a distinction between καὶ εἰ and εἰ καὶ. He says that "καὶ εἰ is even if; the καὶ refers to the condition, which is thus indicated to be uncertain: even then, if. Therefore καὶ εἰ is used of what we suppose true, not of what we declare to be true, for in the latter case εἰ καὶ is used. On the other hand, εἰ καὶ is although; and καὶ, being put after the conditional particle, is not referred to it and does not indicate that the condition itself is uncertain. Therefore εἰ καὶ signifies that the thing exists actually, and is not merely supposed. But εἰ καὶ is also taken, not as although, but as if even, in which case καὶ ought not to be joined with εἰ, but with some of the following words. The Latin etiam si is used in a similar manner."

XX. a φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανίκα] Φορτικά properly signifies heavy and troublesome: hence things spoken with arrogance. Hesychius: φορτικά: τὰ γέλοια. — Δικανίκα is interpreted by antient glossaries, a speaker in courts of justice, a pleader. But since advocates usually exaggerate, embellish, and even speak presumptuously, δικανίκα was applied to what was disagreeable, troublesome,
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presumptuous, absurd, as Theaet. p. 128. E. Lucian. Somn. 17. \( \varepsilon \) μακρόν τὸ ἐνύπνιον καὶ δικαυκόν. The common translation, forensic, judicial, is without meaning.

b ἀρχὴν υδέματι — ἕρξα] That is, I never filled any public office. Bouleivons signifies, as in many other passages, to be a member of the senate of five hundred. Fifty members were chosen from these five hundred to preside over the senate for thirty-five days, under the name of προτάνεις. Ten of these fifty were chosen by lot to preside over the senate for a week. These were called προεδροῦ, and their chief either ἐπιστάτης or ἐπιστάτης τῶν προεδρῶν, as in Ἀσχίνες against Ctesiph. p 380. Vol. II. or ἐπιστάτης ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, as Xenoph. Mem. I. 1, 18., or ἐπιστάτης ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, as Memor. IV. 4, 2. The matter has been more fully discussed by Schlemmam de Comitiis Atheniensium, cap. VII. Socrates was ἐπιστάτης of his tribe, Antiochis, when the question was brought forward of punishing the generals. How he acquitted himself in this office is related in Xenophon, Hellen. I. 7, 14. 15. 38. The generals alluded to are the ten (which was the usual number in a war) who gained a naval victory over the Lacedaemonians off the Arginuse Islands, B.C. 406. After the battle, instead of attending in person to the burial of the slain, they left for that office ταξιάρχα. For this they were publicly prosecuted and condemned to death. See Xenoph. Hellen. Lysias c. Eratoth. p. 72, ed. Brem. As to whether they all suffered death, see Valekenar. on Xenoph. Mem. I. 18, p. 316. ed. Schneid. ἀναφεύγας, to take up the bodies of the dead for burial,—τοὺς ἐκ ναυμαχίας is said instead of τοὺς ἐν ναυμαχίᾳ. For in phrases like this, compounded of the article and a noun with a preposition, that preposition is used which is most suitable to the verb connected with the phrase.

c ἧμων Ἦ φυλη Ἠ Ἀντιοχίς] Perhaps one might have expected Ἦ Ἀντιοχίς, the article being repeated, as Schefer wished it to be corrected, in Demosth. Appar. T. II. p. 386. But compare Memnon. p. 70. B. oἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἐταίρου Ἀριστίππου πολίται Λαρισαίοι, Phaedon. p. 57. Α. τῶν πολιτῶν Φλισιοὺν ὀδείς, in which also the proper name is added without the article.

d ἀδίκους κρίνειν] That is, to collect the votes at the same time respecting all the accused, μιᾷ ψήφῳ (see Memor. I. 1, 88.), whereas the law ordered the votes to be given separately for each, κρίνειν διὰ έκαστον, as we are told by Xenophon. Hellen. I. at the end. Therefore he adds παρανόμως, i.e. παρά τοὺς νόμους, as Xenoph. Mem. I. 1, 18. IV. 4, 2.
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8 ἐσομωσ ὑπων—τῶν ῥήτορων] The words ἐνδεικνύοναὶ and ἀπάγειν signify to denounce to the magistrates (ἐνδεικνύοναι), and lead away (ἀπάγειν), a person caught in the act of committing an offence, in order that he may be immediately punished: which acts are called ἐνδείξις and ἀπαγωγή. That the reading ἀπάγειν is to be preferred to the common reading ὑπάγειν, which Fischer endeavoured to defend, appears by those passages in which ἐνδείξις and ἀπαγωγή are joined. Demosthen. against Leptin. p. 504. 24. ed. Reisk. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἐνδείξεις καὶ ἀπαγωγάς. Against Timocrat. p. 745. οὐδ' ὅσον ἐνδείξις ἐστὶ τινὶ ἢ ἀπαγωγή, προσεγγίσατ' ἄν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, τὸν δ' ἐνδείξειν καὶ ἀπαγωγέντα δησάντων οἱ ἐνδεκά ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ. Against Theocrin. p. 1325. 9. ἐδὺ τις ποιητὰ τῶν συκοφαντοῦντων, ἐνδείξειν αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἀπαγωγήν.

h οἱ τριάκοντα—μεταπεμψάμενοι μὲ πέμπτον αὐτῶν] When the Athenians were conquered by Lysander at Ἀγοσποταμι, and the city seized on, in the first year of the 94th Olympiad (B.C. 404), he appointed thirty tyrants, who are sometimes called οἱ τριάκοντα, as here, and in Xenoph. Mem.IV. 4. 3.; sometimes τριάκοντα πάντων ἄρχοντες αὐτοκράτορες, as in Plato ep. VII.; sometimes οἱ περὶ Κριτίαν, as in Laert. II. 24.—πέμπτον αὐτῶν, that is, me with four others. Xen. Hellen. 2. 17. ἡ ρέθη—δικαστὸς αὐτὸς, that is, he himself with nine others. Thucyd. I. 46. πέμπτος αὐτῶς, where the scholiast says: αὐτὶ τοῦ αὐτῶς μετ' άλλων τεσσάρων. Melecius was among the number, according to Andocid. De Myst. p. 46. ed. Reisk. The circumstance is spoken of by Lysias adv. Agorat. p. 106. Brem. ὅστε μὲν γὰρ τοὺς ἐκ Σαλαμίνος τῶν πολιτῶν κομμοθέντας οἱ ίσοι καὶ ὅσοι, καὶ οὗτος ἀλέθερος ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἀπάλοντο. Also c. Eratosthen. p. 77. ὁ δὲ—ἐδὲν μετὰ τῶν συναρχόντων εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ Ἐλευσίνα δὲ τριάκοσιον τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπήγαγεν εἰς τὸ δεσμωτηρίον καὶ μηδὲ ψφήφοι αὐτῶν ἀπάντων θειατόν κατεψηφίσατο.

i εἰς τὴν θόλον] The θόλος was a public building near τὸ βουλευτήριον τῶν πεντακοσίων, according to Pausan. I. 5., in which the Prytanes dined and sacrificed every day. It derived its name from its resemblance to a tortoise. See Harpocratio and Hesych. under the word, and Pollux. On. VIII. 155.—Leon, born at
Salamis, but a citizen of Athens, had gone into voluntary exile to Salamis, to avoid falling a victim to the Tyrants, who coveted his wealth. See Xenoph. Hellen. III. 3, 39.

k ἀναπλήσας αἰτιῶν] That is, to stain with guilt and crimes; in order that as many citizens as possible might appear to have betrayed the cause of liberty by taking part with the Tyrants. On the word ἀναπλησάναι in the sense of polluting and staining, see Ruhnken on Tim. Glossar. p. 30.

l τὸ πᾶν μέλεϊ] That is, is altogether, by all means, a care to me. So Xenoph. Cyrop. I. 6, 13. τὸ πᾶν διαφέρει.—ἐκπλήττειν, to strike and move one so that he becomes, as it were, beside himself.

m ψάχνειν ἀπίων οἰκάδε] That is, I went straightway. See Matth. §. 559. c.

XXI. a ei ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια — ἐποιούμην] The aorist διαγε- νόσας ἄν, having preceded, one might have expected ei ἔπραξα — ἐποιησάμην. But the imperfect is correctly used, since he speaks not only of past time but also of the present; that is, of a past action continuing to the present time. In English, we should say: Do you think that I could have lived through so many years, if I had continued to take a part in public affairs, and as an honest man stood by the side of justice, and, as it was my duty to do, regarded this above all other considerations?—οὐδὲ γάρ ἄν ἄλλος ἄνθρ. οὐδείς. Understand διεγένετο.

b τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι] The pronoun τοιοῦτος is explained by the words which follow it a little further on: οὐδὲν πάποτε ξυγχαρήσας οὐδέν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον.

c ἐμὸς μαθήτας εἶναι] Alcibiades and Critias are probably alluded to; whose vices were said to have arisen from the instruction of Socrates. See Xenoph. Mem. I. 2, 12 sqq.

d ei δὲ τῖς — ἐπιθυμεῖ ἄκοιν] Socrates calls τὰ ἑαυτοῦ what he was enjoined to do by Apollo; namely, that he should detect and rebuke the errors of men, and exhort his fellow citizens to the pursuit of virtue.

e χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων] An allusion to the avarice of the sophists. See notes on C. IV.

f παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν] That is, I give an opportunity of interrogating me. The subsequent words, καὶ ἐὰν τις βούλεται ἀπ. ἄκοιν, are to be explained καὶ παντί, οὕτως ἄν βούληται ἄκ. For ἐὰν τις is put elegantly for οὕτως ἄν.

g οὐκ ἄν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχουμι] That is, this cannot
rightly be attributed to me. Ἀιρίαν ὑπέχειν is properly used in a bad sense, of one who is deservedly blamed. Τοῦτων, masculine, is joined with τὴν αἰρίαν ὑπέχοιμι.

XXII. [a τοῦτο—προστέταται] That is, τὸ ἔξετάζειν.

[b καὶ εὐθελεγκτα] Εὐθελεγκτα is generally applied to what may easily be refuted. But here it means what may easily be examined to find out whether it is true or false. For έλέγχειν not only signifies to refute, but also to examine with the design of convicting another of error. The word may therefore be rendered (after Serranus) easy to be refuted if they are not true.

c [εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ ἠθέλον] Fischer has erroneously written εἰ γε μη. For εἰ δὲ may follow εἰτε, in the same manner as δὲ by itself may come after τέ, and νῦν after νῦτε. In C. XXXI. we have: καὶ εἰτε δὴ μηδεμια αἰσθαναίς εστιν—εἰ δ’ αὐτ’ ἀποδημήσαι.

d [πάρειν—ἐνταῦθα] Hesychius: ἐνταῦθοι ἐνταῦθα. Errorneously. For as παρείναι εἰς τινα τόπων is not merely said for παρείναι ἐν τινι τόπῳ, but is used in such a manner as if two sentences were joined together; that is, it signifies to come to a place and be engaged there; so ἐνταῦθοι by itself is not put for ἐνταῦθα but παρείναι ἐνταῦθοι signifies to come hither and be present here. Examples of this construction are given by Valcken. in Herod. I. 21. Heind. on Phaed. p. 4. Protagor. p. 310. Λ. τι οὖν ὃ ὀνδῆσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνοικίαν, εἰ μὴ σε τι καλὸν, καθιζόμενος ἐνταῦθοι, that is, taking your seat to this place and sitting here with us.

e [Κρίτων ὁτιοδί] Crito is the same person whose name is given to the following dialogue of Plato. He is called ἡλικιωτής, or of the same age of Socrates; and δημώτης, that is, of the same demus, namely, Ἀλωπεκή. See Harpocrat. Hesychius and Stephanus Byzant. under Ἀλωπεκή.

[f Λυσανίας] Lysanias, father of the Socratic Ἀσχίνης, is called ὁ Σφῆττος, from δήμος Σφῆττος, which was δήμος φυλῆς Ἀκαμάντιδος. See Harpocrat. Hesych. Stephan. under that word.—Antipho is called Κηφισιεύς, from δήμος Κηφισος, which was φυλὴ Ἑρεχθείδος. See Harpocrat. under Κηφισιεύς.

[g ἕλλαὶ τοιῶν ὁτιο]—Heindorf remarks that τοιῶν, therefore, makes the sentence unintelligible. He conjectures that the better reading would be ἕλλαὶ τε ἐνταῦθοι. There is no occasion for any change, for τοιῶν, as the Latin jam vero, is often used, not συλλογιστικῶς, but καταβατικῶς.

h [Νικόστρατος] Respecting this person and Theodotus nothing has been recorded, as far as we are aware.—Respecting Demodocus,
father of Theages, see Theages, p. 127. E. Of Paralnus, who is not to be confounded with his namesake, the son of Pericles, nothing is known.—Adimantus is the brother of Plato, often mentioned in the Rep. See II. p. 357—368. VIII. p. 548. D. E. and elsewhere.—Of Antidorus nothing is known.—Apollodorus is known to have been most devoted to Socrates. See Phædo p. 59. A. p. 117. D. Xenoph. Mem. III. 11, 17.—καταδεισθαι is to overcome and persuade anyone by entreaties. For the sense is this: Theodotus cannot beseech his brother Nicostratus, not to accuse me and bear testimony against me.

1 ἐγὼ παρακατω[ To This is, I yield to him the privilege of doing this. For no one was permitted to interrupt the accused while defending himself, and by irrelevant matters to abridge the time granted for his defence; which was measured by the clepsydra. The accuser was bound to go through all that had reference to his side of the question, before the defendant commenced his answer to the charge.

k τῷ διαφθείροντε[ The apposition here marks the ironical tone of the speaker, C. XII. Crito: καλ σῶ—φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, δ τῇ ἁληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελώμενος; Euthyr. p. 3. Δ. Μέλητος ἱς πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βάσινι λοιπὰ διαφθείροντας, ὡς φησί. More examples are given by Valcken on Phceniss. p. 752.

1 λόγον ἐχοντι ποθοῦντες[ That is, would have some object to attain in defending me: namely, that they might not appear to have been intimate with an impious and depraved man, and that they might not be accounted wicked themselves.

m οὶ τοῦτων προσδοκότες[ A participle joined with a genitive like a substantive: on which construction see Lobeck on Ajac. v. 358. Schaefer on Gregor. Corinth. p. 139.

n ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὅρθον τέ καὶ δίκαιον] The form ἀλλ' ἢ is well known to be used in the sense of unless, generally when a negative goes before. See Bergler on Aristophan. Equitt. v. 777. An excellent explanation of this construction is given by Herm. on Viger. p. 812.

XXIII. a τάχα δ' ἄν τις ἀγανακτήσει[ Socrates now proceeds to give his judges an explanation of the grounds of his firmness and fortitude; and he shows why he will not follow the example of others by attempting to move their pity. For, first, he says that such a course would be unworthy of the estimation in which he is held by men; secondly, that it would be against the laws.
That is, engaged in a trial attended with less danger. So Euthyphro p. 3. E. ἄγωνιξεσθαι δίκην. It was the custom at Athens for the defendants to bring into court their children, and even their wives, to excite the pity of the judges; as is also evident from Aristophan. Plut. v. 383. Vesp. v. 566 sq.

ο ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τ. π.] δὲ ἄρα in such passages indicates that to do contrary to what has been already mentioned is absurd, and by no means to be approved of. The expression involves what logicians call the *reductio ad absurdum*, whether the speaker enunciates his own opinion or that of another person. Examples have been collected by Heindorf on Phaed. p. 68. A., to which the following may be added: Crito c. 12. η πρὸς μὲν ἄρα συ τὸν πατέρα ὁμι ἐξ ἱστον ἢν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς δεσπότην, εἰ δε οὐ δέχεσθαι, ὠστε ἀπερ πάσχοι ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιπημείν,—πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τῶν νόμων ἔξεσται σοι; compare Crito C. VI. and C. XII. Rep. X. 600. D. ἄλλα Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα—καὶ Πρόδωκος—ἐπὶ ταιτη τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται,—"Ομηρον δ' ἄρα οἱ ἐπ' ἐκείνου—ἡ Ἡσίοδον μαφοδεῖν ἰν περιίνθας εἶναι; Apol. C. XXVII. πολλή μὲνι' ἀν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστος εἰμι—ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἶονοι ῥᾴδιοι.

d αὐθαδέστερον ἰν πρὸς μὲ σχεὶ] This is said of judges who should refuse to acquit a defendant, although they might be expected to do so from the goodness and justice of his cause, because he would not implore and supplicate their mercy. Further on, after εἰ δ' οὖν understand τις ἵμιν οὕτως ἔχει.

e τὸ τοῦ 'Ομηρον] Odyss. XIX. v. 162., where Penelope asks Ulysses, whom she had not recognised, to relate from what race he is sprung, adding to her request the words οὐ γάρ ἀπ' ἄριστο ἐσσι παλαιφάτου οὕτ' ἀπ' πέτρης.—καὶ υἱεὶς ἥ. In enumerating several things, it is customary to add γε to that noun to which the most weight and emphasis is attached: of which, examples have been collected by Heindorf on Hipp. Mai. §. 47. Buttmann on Crito §. 7. n. 2. It is, therefore, incorrectly omitted by some MSS. in this passage. The three sons of Socrates were Lamprocles, Sophroniscus, Menexenus. The eldest was Lamprocles, who is here called μειράκιον, a youth, but, in Phædo 65., μέγας. See Xcnophon, Mem. II. 2, 1.; but the other two, whom their father here calls παῖδα, are called by Plato also (Phædo 65.), σμικροί. Compare Valcken. on Theocr. Adon. p. 349., who says that τὸν μικρὸν παῖδα was commonly called παιδίον.
APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

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1 καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχοντα] That is, having such a reputation for wisdom. Lest this should appear to be spoken arrogantly, he adds, εἴτε οὖν—ψευδός. In which it must not be supposed that ψευδός ought to be written, for to the adjective ἀληθῆς is often opposed the noun ψευδός. Cratyl. p. 430. Α. ἦ τὸ μὲν τί αὑτῶν ἀληθῆς, τὸ δὲ ψευδός; Euthydem, in the beginning, ἐξελέγχειν τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον ὁμοίως, εἶναι τέ γε ψευδός εἶναι τέ ἀληθῆς \(\gamma\); which sentences have been pointed out by Heindorf. Aristoph. Ran. v. 628.

κόσμος ἔρεις ἐνταῦθα μὴ δὲν ψευδός.

κ ἦ δοκοῦντα μὲν τί εἶναι.] That is, who appeared to be endowed with I know not what wisdom. See Matthiae §. 487. 5.—ὡς δεινῶν τι οἰομένοις πελεσθαι. I do not think that Heindorf was correct in connecting ὡς with δεινῶν, making ὡς signify very; of which signification the examples collected by him, on Cratyl. p. 41, and Phædo p. 152., are inconclusive. In this passage ὡς is rather to be referred to οἰομένοις, in this sense: as if in truth thinking that they will suffer something dreadful. For ὡς often indicates the cause and reason. We cannot therefore see, why Heindorf should say that, if ὡς be connected with the participle, ἐτερ ought to have been written. These words are connected closely with the words immediately preceding, θαυμάσα τε ἐργαζομένους, in this sense: yet acting in a marvellous manner, as if they thought, ἕκ. On the genitives ἀπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομενων, see Matth. Gr. §. 568. 2.

κ ὑμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν] The common reading ὑμᾶς χρ. π. is bad since these words immediately follow: οὔτε, ἄν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπουν. This sense is: neither does it become us to do such things, nor, if we were to do them, would it become you to permit or tolerate them. Similarly C. XXIV. οὔτε ὑμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπουσιν, οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι. καὶ ὡτιόν ἐίναι, that is, who appear to ourselves to possess even a little wisdom. So Æschin. against Ctesiph. §. 5. τῶν καὶ ὡτιών πρὸς τὰ κοινὰ προσεληνύστων, that is, even in any manner. Xenoph. Cyrop. I. 6. 12. οὔτε ὡτιόν ἐπεμνησθῇ, that is, not even a little. Aristoph. Plut. v. 385. καὶ διοικοῦντι—οὔτ' ὡτιῶν τῶν Παμφιλων. Phædo, p. 78. D. μὴ ποτε μεταβαλῇ καὶ ἡμιοίου ἐνδεχεται; Phileb. p. 59. C. p. 60. E. Hipp. Mai. p. 291. D. Legg. I. p. 639. A. In exactly the same manner as in this passage. Rep. IV. p. 422. E. καὶ ὡτιόν \(\gamma\).
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Ibid. VII. p. 538. D. τοὺς καὶ ὅπιοῦν μετρίους. The common reading καὶ ὅπιτιοῦν εἶναι is bad, since τι thus does not belong to the verb εἶναι, but is placed as in ὑποστιοῦν.

1 τὰ ἀλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος] 'Ελεεινὰ δράματα means tragedies in which the pity of the spectators is excited. εἰσάγειν, to bring forward into the court, that is, when the accused introduces his wife, children, and relations, in tears, to dispose the minds of the judges to mercy.


caρίζεσθαι τὸ δίκαιον is to sacrifice justice to favour, to neglect justice in favour to bestow a favour on another.


Sή τῶν δικαστῶν περὶ μὲν δὲ νόμου εἰσὶ, κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ψηφιεύσθαι

a πφὶ 

d ὑ ὁ

μὲν 

e ἀξιώτε] That is, do not then think. A little further on the collocation of the words is worthy of remark: ἢ μὴ 

μὴ 

e μὴ 

καὶ 

e ἀλλωσ 

τε 

pántως 

μάλιστα 

μὲν 

cal —] That is, both at other times by all means, and most particularly now, when I am accused of impiety by Meletus.

f εἰ πείθωμι—βιαζόλην] Understand χαρίζεσθαι μοι τὰ δίκαια. In the following clause the words should be connected thus, διδάσκομαι ἐν διά 

μχ ἡ 

ψήφε 

θεοῦ 

XXV. a Τὸ 

νῦν 

μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν] The preceding part of the 'Apology' is supposed to have been spoken before the judges gave their first votes concerning him; the remaining part after he was found guilty of the crime imputed to him by Meletus. For now the
question of the punishment due to his offence was to be determined. There were two kinds of causes, the one ἀνίμητος, in which the punishment was already appointed by the laws; the other τιμήθη, in which the judges were allowed by the laws a discretionary power as to the punishment. We must always, therefore, when we read of causes in antient writers, be careful to distinguish to which of these two kinds the case belongs. There is no doubt that the cause of Socrates ought to be referred to the kind called τιμήθη. In a cause of this kind, the following mode of proceeding appears to have been adopted in the courts of justice. After the accuser and the defendant had made their speeches, the Judges determined, by their first votes, whether they condemned or acquitted the accused. Then if the crime was not capital, and the punishment was not fixed by law, they proceeded to determine the punishment; that is, the defendant was asked what punishment he considered himself to deserve, whether that which the prosecutor wished, or another more just. This was said, ἀντιτιμάσθαι. See Meier and Schoemann "Der Attische Process" p. 724 foll. This having been done, the judges again gave their votes, and decided the cause. On these two kinds of causes, ἀνίμητος, and τιμήθη, see Meier and Schoemann Att. Proc. p. 171—193.—But since Socrates was accused of impiety, as is indicated by his own words: μὴ οὖν ἄξιοντε μὲ—τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς υμᾶς πράττειν——ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτού, it is naturally asked whether that accusation belonged to the causes called τιμήθης, or not. For one would naturally suppose that a capital punishment would be awarded by law against those who attacked the religion of the country; especially since we know that several had already suffered death who had been accused of impiety. But that this was not the case, is evident, not only from this Apology of Socrates, but also from Demosth. Timoc. p. 702.5: ἀσεβείας γραφὴν κατασκευάτος εἰς ἀγῶνα κατέστησεν. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων οὐ μεταλαβὼν ὕπειρε χίλια.

b kal oüκ ἀνέλπιστον γέγονε] That is, has not happened to me contrary to my expectation. For ἐπίσ, ἐπίσειν, and their derivatives, are used either in the sense of hope or of fear. See commentators on Thom. Mag p. 299. Observe the brevity of the expression. At full length, it would be: καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὖν ἀνέλπιστον μοι γ.——οὔτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔστεθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολλῷ is correctly translated by Fischer: I did not think that the number of votes acquitting me would differ so little from the number condemning me; on the contrary, I thought that the number of votes in my favour
would be far exceeded by the number against me. On which use of the forms παρ' ἄλγον, and παρὰ πολύ, see Budaeus Comment. L. Gr. p. 209. Viger p. 647. and Matthiae §. 588. n. 2.

εἰ τρεῖς μόναι μετέπεσον] Μεταπίπτειν, is to fall otherwise, to fall into another balloting-box, as Fischer correctly translates, quoting Aeschin. c. Ctesiph. 461. Vol. II. ed. Taylor. εἰ δὲ μία μόνον μετέπεσεν. The reading τρεῖς Stephens from Bas. 2, has changed into τριάκοντα, after the best MSS. Süvern, in his essay "on the Clouds of Aristophanes," quotes the following opinion of Böckh; who remarks on the passage in Diog. Laert. II. 41, that there were 281 votes against Socrates; "As the passage in Plato is clear, it does not appear to me very important what notions we form on that in Diogenes Laertius, regarding the trial of Socrates, and the judgment of his contemporaries respecting it. It is clear that this author's expression is of doubtful meaning, for he speaks as if 281 was the difference between the votes for and against Socrates. If this notice of Diogenes be correct, we must conclude from the two passages taken together, 1. Either (in conformity with the Bibliot. der alten Literatur und Kunst, II. p. 10; Matthii, Misc. Philol. I. p. 252; and with Fischer on the Apology of Plato, §. 25.) that 556 judges decided the question; for if from the 281 votes three are reckoned on the other side, there then remains an equality of 278 votes, by which Socrates would have been acquitted: there must consequently have been 275 judges who voted for him. 2. Or the whole number was 557, and Socrates had 276, and then if three had been taken from the 281, he would have had a majority of 279 against 278. Schömann, on the contrary (See Att. Process, s. 139), makes the number 559; but this must be wrong.

"Now as it can scarcely be imagined that a court of 556 or 557 judges could have been seated, there are only two ways, in my opinion, of explaining the circumstance.

"As we find tribunals not only of 500, 1000, 1500, etc., that is, simple, double, triple, and so on, 500 being the simple regular number (i.e. an aliquot section of the judges), but also those of 200, 400, 700, or what I consider as tantamount, 201, 401, 701, by which this aliquot arrangement is broken, there is no reason why we may not suppose also a tribunal of 600. But 556-557 is so much below this last number, that if we assume that the tribunal before which Socrates was tried, properly consisted of 600 judges, the number of absentees could not have been merely accidental. We may therefore conceive the following solution of this difficulty. By the
usages of Rome a judge could neutralize his vote by the N. L.; but we know of nothing of this kind in the Athenian jurisprudence. The Athenian judge had only a black and a white pebble (pierced or entire). But it is not probable that the judge was absolutely obliged to vote for one side or the other; if he was allowed to withhold his suffrage, it must have been by not casting his vote into the ἄμφορεσ κόριος, urna valida, but he cast both the black and the white pebbles into the ἄμφορεσ ἄκυρος, as Petit conjectures, and Schömann, §. 723, thinks not improbable; and we must consequently suppose, that in the affair of Socrates about 40 judges withheld their votes in this manner.

"An ordinary Helicea consisted of 500 judges. This would be admissible, if we could venture, in Diogenes Laertius, to write πεντήκοντα instead of ὀγδοίκοντα. Socrates would then have had 251 votes against him and 246 or 245 for him; if then we take three from 251 he would have had a majority of 249 against 248, or 248 against 248, that is, an equality of votes. The whole number of judges would thus have been 496 or 497, and so few would be wanting to the legal number, that this may have been accidental, either because they came too late, and were not admitted after the hour, or were detained by illness, etc. In no case could such a judgment have been invalidated in consequence of the absence of a few, as 251 was the absolute majority of 501. But yet the reading of ογδοίκοντα in Diogenes must be of considerable antiquity, as it is highly probable that upon this is founded the reading τρίακοντα for πρεῖς, which is found in many MSS. of Plato's Apology, and in that of Clarke: but it does not therefore necessarily follow that Diogenes, or the authority he followed, wrote ογδοίκοντα, though it is clear that the author of the reading τρίακοντα must have been thinking of a tribunal of 500 or 501 Heliasts, although even this leads to no satisfactory result; for after subtracting 30 votes from 281, 251 for conviction would still be the majority; and thus Socrates would not have been acquitted by this removal of 30 votes: and the reading τρίακοντα seems the less to deserve consideration, although it were more suited to the context than it really is. For if Socrates had been condemned by 500 or 501 judges, with a majority of 281 against 219, or 220, there would have been 60 more against him than for him, and Plato could not have expressed himself as he has done; and however valuable may be Clarke's MS. it can only be considered in the light of a copy, which is not infallible." (Translated by Hamilton.)
How it is to be obtained that Meletus, who had instituted the prosecution, it was permitted to them, as well as to Meletus, to speak against Socrates on the trial. See Meier and Schömann "Attische Process," p. 707 foll.

Unless the accuser obtained a fifth part of the votes he was fined one thousand drachmae, was branded with infamy (άτωμιδ), and was forbidden to become an accuser again. See Demosth. in Mid. p. 529. 23., in Timocrat. p. 702. 5., in Theocer. p. 1323. 19., Harpocrat. in δώρων γραφή, Meursius Lectt. Attic. V. 13., Themid. Att. II. 21., and Meier and Schömann "Attische Process," p. 734 foll. Socrates here says that Meletus without the aid of Anytus and Lyco, would not have obtained the fifth part of the suffrages, since his own influence was not great enough to obtain a verdict against Socrates. The passage, which has been misunderstood by Fischer, has been correctly interpreted by Schleiermacher.

The accuser always inserted in his declaration the punishment which he thought the accused deserved, if the punishment were not already fixed by the laws.

That is, but why do I ask? or, is it indeed evident? etc. The reading ἢ is therefore erroneous.

This was a regular phrase in trials, παθεῖν referring to the punishment of the body, ἀποτίσασθαι to the fine. See Meier and Schömann "Attische Process," p. 739 foll.—On the expression διὰ μαθῶν, of which examples have been collected by Heindorf on Euthydem. p. 339 foll., see Hermann on Viger. p. 759. foll., Praefat. ad Aristoph. Nub. p. xlvii. ed. sec. The sentence may be thus translated: How then? What ought I to suffer or to pay for having on no occasion in my life kept quiet, but—etc.

Understand ἐπιμελεύονται.

For when a negative verb precedes in sentences opposed to one another, the affirmative verb is frequently omitted. See Heindorf on Gorg. §. 29. Matth. §. 634. 2. Ruhnken, on Rutil. Lup. p. 47 and 131. and the authors quoted by Heindorf on Horat. Satir. I. 1. Compare Ruddimann's Instit. L. L. T. II. p. 361. —καὶ δημηγορίαις καὶ τῶν ἥλλων ἄφορων. Δημηγορία in this passage means the occupation of him who makes speeches in the assemblies of the people. Although this was not one of the magistracies, yet it is not
incorrect to add τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν. For ἄλλος is used here as in Gorg. §. 64. ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων, that is, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ξένων ὑπνων. Where see Heimort. Therefore the sense of the words is this: because I have cared nothing for gain, domestic affairs, military commands, influence with the people, and moreover also public offices, and conspiracies, and seditions. Fischer therefore is wrong in defending the other reading δημουργίων, especially since he has by no means proved, that δημάρχοι were also called at Athens by the name δημουργοι. —The factions and seditions which arose after the Peloponnesian war throughout all Greece, and particularly at Athens, are well known.—Επειδὴ is frequently opposed to φαῦλος, and signifies good, liberal, just.

e ἑνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἤτα] Remark this use of ἑνταῦθα, which occurs again a few lines below in ἑνταῦθα ἤτα. Phileb. p. 57. Ἄρκει τοῖς ἔμοιγε οὖτος ὁ λόγος — ἑνταῦθα προβεβηκέναι. Rep. p. 445. Ἐπείπερ ἑνταῦθα ἐληλύθαμεν. Ibid. C. ἑπείδη ἑνταῦθα ἀναβεβήκαμεν τοῦ λόγου. Menexen. p. 248. C. ἑνταῦθα τῶν νομίν τρέποντες. Xenoph. Anab. I. 10, 13. ἔτει δὲ καὶ ἑνταῦθο ἐχώρουν οἱ Ἑλληνες. Sophoc. Philoctet. v. 377. ὁ δὲ ἑνταῦθε ἡμῶν, καὶ περ ὅν ὑποργος ὑν, δηχθεὶς πρὸς ἐξήκουσεν δὖ ἥμειψατο. Gorg. p. 494. Ἐ. Ammonius p. 51. ἑνταὐθοὶ καὶ ἑνταῦθα καὶ ἑνταῦθε διάφερει. ἑνταὐθοὶ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἐν τόπῳ (ἐπι. εἰς τόπον) σημασίαν ὑπολογίσας ἑνταῦθα ἤτα καὶ τὴν ἐν τὸπω ἐν τόπῳ καὶ τὴν εἰς τόπον. ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ ἑνταῦθε. This mode of expression is exactly the reverse of that which has been spoken of in C. XXII. note (i). For in the same manner as it was shown there that verbs signifying rest are joined with adverbs of motion to a place, the two ideas of rest and motion being united in a single proposition: so, conversely, verbs indicating motion are added to adverbs which properly signify rest, and not motion. This must be explained by the mental activity of the Greeks, who were accustomed to unite many different notions in the same member of a sentence.

f ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδία ἐκακοῦν ἐὰν — ἤτα] This redundancy is remarkable. It is evident that the participle ἐὰν might have been omitted.

g οὖτο τατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπου] These words also are put ἐκ παραλλήλων. Similar examples have been collected by Astius ad Legg. p. 24.

h ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτη] A person who had deserved well of the state was honoured with the name εὐεργέτης. Dorvill on Chariton.
But, \( \frac{\text{Phrynich.}}{\text{p. 273 sq.}} \) who informs us

\[ \text{p. 317. ed. Lips. says: "Great men, nay, even kings, sought as a distinguished honour } \]
\[\text{εὐεργέτας τοῦ δήμου γραφήματι of Athens." }\]
\[\text{Xenoph. de r edit. 923. Lysias 20. p. 365. Suidas in στῆλη. }\]
\[\text{Antient inscriptions supply many examples.} \]
\[\text{ι μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς—] \text{The common expression would} \]
\[\text{have been either, ὃ τι μᾶλλον πρέπει ἢ τὸν τ. ἀ. κ. τ. ι. ορ ὃ τι} \]
\[\text{πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τ. κ. τ. ι. But, unifying both constructions,} \]
\[\text{he said μᾶλλον οὕτως ὡς, in conformity with that free mode of} \]
\[\text{speaking which the Greeks very often used. So, C. X.VII., μὴτε} \]
\[\text{σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μὴτε χρημάτων πρότερον οὕτω σφόδρα, ὡς} \]
\[\text{τῆς ψυχῆς. See also, Rep. VII. p. 526. C. καὶ μὴν, ὡς ἐγγὺς,} \]
\[\text{ἄ γε μείζων πόνων παρέχει μαθάντων καὶ μελετῶντι, οὐκ ἂν βαδίως} \]
\[\text{οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὐροῖς, ὡς τούτο. }\]
\[\text{Min. p. 318. Ε. οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' ὃ τ} \]
\[\text{τούτου ἀσβεστέρον ἔστιν, ὡς' οὕτω χρὴ μᾶλλον εὐλαβεῖσθαι, πλὴν} \]
\[\text{εἰς θεοὺς καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐργῷ ἑξαμαρτάνειν. }\]
\[\text{Eryx. p. 392. C. ὡς} \]
\[\text{ἄτων σμικρῶν τούτων ἂν μᾶλλον ἀργίζουσιν ὡς οὕτως, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα} \]
\[\text{χαλεπώτατοι ἐλήσαν.} \]
\[\text{k ἐν πρωτανεῖ σιτεῖσθαι] \text{The Prytanenum was a place in the} \]
\[\text{citadel where the laws of Solon were kept, see Pausan. I. 18.: and} \]
\[\text{a daily allowance of provisions was given to the citizens who had} \]
\[\text{desired well of the republic, called σιτεῖσθαι: which was} \]
\[\text{accounted among the Greeks a very great honour. See Cic. Orat. I.} \]
\[\text{54. Demosthen. de falsa leg. p. 231. Aeschin. de f. leg. p. 267.} \]
\[\text{Aristoph. Equitt. p. 199. Bas.—"Ιππος is the same as κέλης, a} \]
\[\text{single horse, guided by one driver, see Scheffer. de re vehic. I. 8.} \]
\[\text{p. 85. }\]
\[\text{Εὐνοπίς is a chariot with two horses, and ξεύγος one with} \]
\[\text{three or four horses. See Suidas, Hesychius, Phavorinus under} \]
\[\text{these words. νε\-νική\-κεν Ολύμπια is generally used for νε\-νική\-κεν} \]
\[\text{"Ολυμπιάδι: But the same construction is also used by Isocrat. de} \]
\[\text{Big. p. 351. C. and p. 357. 'Ολυμπιάδισιν έν\-κή\-σεν.} \]
\[\text{XXVII. a ἀσπιρ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως] \text{He} \]
\[\text{refers to his saying, in C. XXIII., that he would not follow the} \]
\[\text{example of other accused persons, who tried to move the pity} \]
\[\text{of} \]
\[\text{the judges, and that he would not implore the judges} \]
\[\text{as a suppliant. This is the ἀντιβολή\-ςις or ἀντιβολά} \]
\[\text{λα which he} \]
\[\text{speaks of. For as ἀντιβολεῖν is the same as ἰκετεῖν, so} \]
\[\text{ἀντιβολή} \]
\[\text{ςις is the same as ἰκετεῖα. See Thom. Mag. p. 75.} \]
\[\text{b έκών εἶναι] \text{That is, as far as depends on my own intention.} \]
\[\text{For it is not the same as έκών by itself. See Herm. on Viger.} \]
\[\text{p. 888. Compare Lobeck on Phrynich. p. 273 sq., who informs us} \]
that the Attic writers use this form chiefly in negative propositions.

ε ἀλλήλοις διειλέγουσα] That is, in the earlier part of the speech.

δ ἄξιος εἰμὶ τοῦ κακοῦ] So after Koehler, Heindorf and Bekker we have corrected the common reading ἄξιος εἰμὶ τοῦ κακοῦ. Which correction is proved to be necessary by the words in C. XXVIII. οὐκ ἐκθεσμαί εμαυτῶν ἄξιον κακοῦ οὐδενός. The indefinite pronoun τις is often put before the word which it agrees with. Theocrit. Idyll. I. 32. ἐντοσθὲν δὲ γυνᾶ, τι θεῶν δαιμόνια, τέτυκται, where see Meinekis.

e τί δελτα; ἣ μὴ πάθω—] The meaning required that we should mark the sentence with a note of interrogation; and for ἣ read ἣ.—What fearing? that is, shall I fix a punishment for myself. Is it lest I should suffer, ὥστε—ὁ δὲ Μέλητος μοι τιμᾶται. Remark the construction of the verb τιμᾶσθαι with a dative, as in C. XXVI, and C. XXVIII, where he says of the judges: τοσοῦτον βούλεσθε μοι τιμῆσαι. The active is always said of the judges, the middle of the accuser and accused: of which an example occurs a few lines further on in this chapter.

f ἐλαμαὶ δὲν εὖ ὡδ' ὧτι κακῶν υντῶν] The regular construction would be, either ἐλαμαὶ τι τούτων & εὖ ὡδ' ὧτι κακὰ ἐστίν, or ἐλαμαὶ τι τῶν, εὖ ὡδα, κακῶν υντῶν. Both constructions are here combined. In a similar manner Gorg. p. 481. D. αἰσθάνομαι, oun σου ἐκάποτε καλὰ ὑπὸς δεινοῦ, ὤτι, ὡσ' ὡν φη' σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὑπὸς ὡν φη' ἔξειν, οὖ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλόμενον, where see Heindorf.

g τοῖς ἔνδεκα;] The Eleven were magistrates, to whom persons condemned by public trial were delivered for punishment. Some regarded these words as a gloss, and recommended their omission; an opinion embraced by Heindorf, Schleiermacher, and Bekker. I think they may very well be retained, as exhibiting more emphatically the disagreeable and odious condition on which he would then hold his life.

h καὶ διδέσθαι ἐως τῷ ἐκτίσεω;] Διδέσθαι, to be in the public prison. This passage alone is sufficient to show that persons who were fined, were imprisoned until the fine was paid. Demosth. c. Timocr. p. 721. 1. εἰν ἄργυρου τιμήθη διδέσθαι ἐως τῷ ἐκτίσει. Adv. Mid. p. 529. 26. See the commentators on Nep. Miltiad. 7.; and also Cimon. 1. Meier and Schömann "Attische Process" p. 517.
On this use of the indicative see C. XII. note (c).—A little further on \( \xi \nu \tau e i \nu \) is to wish, to desire.

On this expression see C. XXIII. note (c). These words do not depend on the preceding \( \delta \tau i \), but the sentence begins anew.

This is said ironically.—The verb \( \varepsilon \xi \varepsilon \tau e \theta a i \), not \( \phi e \gamma e \nu \), is said of going into exile, as has been well observed by Fischer.—\( \varepsilon \lambda \lambda \eta \nu \varepsilon \xi \varepsilon \lambda \lambda \eta \pi \omicron \lambda i \nu \pi \omicron \lambda e \omega \varepsilon a i \) is to change, or go, from one state to another to take up his residence.—The infinitive \( \xi \nu \nu \) is added to the preceding words \( \kappa a l \delta s \) and \( \delta \) \( \beta i o s \) \( \epsilon \nu \nu \) to give additional force to the expression; which is frequent after demonstrative pronouns. Compare Matth. § 535. γ. and § 468.

That is, do not admit them to hear my discourses.—On the Attic future \( \varepsilon \xi \varepsilon \lambda \lambda \omega i \), see Buttm. § 86. XXVIII. a τυ\( \nu \)\( \chi \alpha \nu \)\( \alpha i \)\( e i \) \( \mu e \gamma i o \tau o n \) \( \alpha \gamma a d \nu n \) \( \delta \nu \) The participle \( \delta \nu \) is restored from the best MSS. But Heindorf, after Erfurdt, has shown that the verb τυ\( \nu \)\( \chi \alpha \nu \)\( \alpha i \)\( e i \nu \)\( \nu \) may also be used absolutely, Gorg. § 124. See also Lobeck on Phrynich. p. 277.

These words also depend on the preceding \( \delta \tau i \), and are not introduced as a parenthesis, as was thought by Fr. A. Wolf.—On the particle \( \delta \) in the words τα\( \iota \)\( \alpha \)\( t \)\( \tau o n \) \( \pi e i \sigma e \theta e \), which contain the apodosis expressed with emphasis, see Hermann on Viger. p. 784 and 845.—On the expression \( \beta i o s \) \( \beta i o t s \), a life having the properties of life, see Crito, C. VIII. note (c). After ν\( \nu \nu \) \( \delta \) understand \( \omicron \) \( \delta \nu \nu \)\( \nu \)\( \mu a \)\( i \)\( \tau e \)\( j \)\( \sigma a t h a i \) \( \chi \rho \)\( \mu a t o n \). Some supposed that the words ought to be read without a pause: ν\( \nu \nu \) \( \delta \) \( \omicron \) \( \delta \nu \nu \)\( \nu \)\( \gamma \nu e \)\( r \)\( e t \)\( \iota \), since the Greeks, from the rapidity with which their thoughts followed one another seemed also in this expression to have united two members of a sentence.

Understand \( \phi a s i \), which is contained in the preceding word \( \kappa e l e \omega \nu \)\( \iota \). For illustrations of this expression, Fischer refers to Hemstèrh. on Lucian, T. I. p. 492. Valcken. on Herodot. VII. 104. IX. 9.—Etymol. M. 'Εγγυνηθής' \( \delta \) \( \alpha \nu a i \chi \rho \mu e \)\( \mu e \)\( n o s \) \( \delta \xi \varepsilon \tau e \). On the word \( \varepsilon \xi \iota \o\)\( \chi \rho \varepsilon \)\( \omega \)\( s \) see C. V. note (c).

The remainder of the "Apology" is spoken by Socrates after the judges had condemned him on the second vote. In this part of the oration, also, we observe
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an admirable liberty of speech, courage, and evenness of soul, so that Cicero most truly observed that Socrates spoke, not like a suppliant, or accused person, but like the master or superior of his judges.—The words οὗ πολλοῦ γ˚ ἐνεκα χρόνου have been rendered by Stephens, on account of no long space of time, that is, as Fischer correctly explains, the remainder of my life. For Socrates had now arrived at old age; and therefore could live but a short time longer.

—Ὄνομα ἑξευ properly, in a good sense, to be praised, to be celebrated, but, in this passage, to be censured or blamed. Αἰτίαν ἑξευ, is properly to be accused, to be an accused person: hence, as in this passage, to be reprehended or blamed. Yet it is very often also used, in a good sense, to be praised to be celebrated. See Casaubon on Athen. IX. 2.—Since the expression Ὄνομα καὶ αἰτίαν ἑξευ has a passive signification, it is construed with ὅν."
329. κιχάνει τοι βραδὺς ὁκύν.—δεινὸλ καὶ δέξεις, that is, strong and quick. We might perhaps have expected καίπερ δεινὸλ καὶ δέξεις. But Socrates plays on the ambiguity of the verb ἀλῶναι, which is applied both to one who is overtaken in running, and to one who has lost his cause and been condemned.

1 θανάτου δίκην ὕφλον] That is, condemned to the punishment of death. This expression, which is not uncommon, has been illustrated by Ruhnken, Tim. Gloss. p. 262. and Pierson, Moer. p. 426. Playing on the word, he adds ὑπὸ την ἀλήθεια ἀφληκτότες μοχυπριλαν καὶ ἀδικίαν, that is, you are convicted and condemned by Truth to the reproach of wretchedness and injustice.—τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω, that is, I am prepared to undergo the punishment which has been ordained by you.—μετρίως ἐχεω the same as εὖ, ὑρθεὶς. For μέτρων is applied to whatever is suitable or becoming to any one. See Graevius and Heinsius on Hesiod's "Works and Days," v. 306.

XXX. a ἐν ἓ μάλιστ' ἀνθρωποι χρησιμοθύσων] That the antients were of opinion that the mind became more divine on the approach of death, and that dying persons foresaw and predicted future events, is shown by Cicero, Divin. I. 30. where see commentators. The subject has also been treated by Eustath. on Iliad. π'. p. 1089. ed. Rom. See also Phaedo c. 53.

b ἡ οὖν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε] That is, than the punishment which ye have inflicted on me in condemning me to death.—τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ διού, that is, from your life being examined, and therefore censured. For these words follow: πλείους γὰρ ἔσονται ἡμᾶς ὦν ἔλεγχοντες.

c καὶ καλεστέρει] On the omission of τοσοῦτο, see C. XVII., note (9). A little further on, ἀποκτένοντες ἀνθρώπους is, because ye put men to death. Fischer was wrong in supposing that the norist was required.

d μὴ τοὺς ἀλλοὺς κολοβεῖν] Kolothein is properly to amputate; to mutilate: hence, to prevent any thing from being accomplished; to stop a person's undertaking; to restrain a person, so that he may not be able to do what he attempts, as in this passage.

XXXI. ἐν ἓ οὶ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολεῖν ἀγόνοι] That is, while the Eleven are occupied. The judges were accustomed to deliver to the Eleven those who were condemned to be punished. It was the duty of the Eleven to order their assistants to lead away the culprit to prison, and to inflict on him the prescribed punishment.—On ἐν ἓ, in the mean time, while, see on Rep. VI. p. 498. B. Theaet.
p. 196. E. p. 190. E.—οἱ ἐλθόντα—τεθνάναι i.e. εἰς τὸ δεισμωτήριον. A little further on, διαμυθολογῆσαι is confabulari, that is, to discuss or converse together, as Phædo c. XIV. p. 70. B. ἄλλα τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκός ὅταν ἔχειν, εἴτε μὴ; Legg. I. p. 632. E.

... η γὰρ εἰσθανόμεν αὐτὶ μαντικῆ ἡ τοῦ δαμονίου] I cannot agree with Schleiermacher, who considers the words ἡ τοῦ δαμονίου a gloss, because Plato elsewhere is accustomed to call the thing itself τὸ δαμονίον, and because when he expresses the same thing by a substantive, as μαντικὴ, φωνή, σημείον, he either adds nothing, or else τοῦ θεοῦ, rather than τοῦ δαμονίου. For even if a passage cannot be found in every respect resembling this, yet I think we are safe in following all the MSS. I even think that the want of those words would be felt. For ἡ εἰσθανόμεν μοι μαντικῆ, would be obscure, since it might be doubted what description of μαντικῆ he meant. Therefore he adds ἡ τοῦ δαμονίου, namely, that which I owe to that spirit which I have before mentioned. For ἡ μαντικῆ does not denote the thing itself, which Socrates meant, when he spoke of his δαμονίον, but rather the effect of the daimonion.—A little further on, observe the collocation πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικρῶς for ἐπὶ πάνυ σμικρῶς. The reason is, that πάνυ is the emphatic word. So Euthyd. p. 305. C. πάνυ παρὰ πολλοῖς. Phædo, p. 110. C. καὶ πολὺ ἐπὶ ἐκ λαμπροτέρων. Rep. IX. p. 509. B. πολὺ ἐπὶ δεινοτέρῳ διάλειπρον. Euthyphr. p. 14. E. πολὺ διὰ βραχυτέρων. Cratyl. p. 413. C. πολὺ ἐν πλείον ἀπορίᾳ. More examples are given by Bornemann on Xenoph. Sympos. p. 46.—ἐλ τι μέλλομι, that is, as often as I was about, &c.

... ζ ὡς δὴ οἰδίπει ἐκ τις καὶ νομίσει] That is, and are really regarded as the worst of evils; for we ought to interpret the word νομίσεια in this manner.


... τὸ ὀὖν—ὑπολαμβάνω] There is no good reason for following Stephens and others in substituting a comma for the note of interrogation; indeed this weakens much the vigour and liveliness of the passage. Plato often makes his speakers interrogate themselves,
and answer their own questions. A little further on, ὅσκ ἔσθ᾽ ὀπως, is, by no means. Compare Matth. §. 482. 2. On the words immediately following, compare Euthydem. p. 272. E. ἀντισταμένου δὲ μου ἑγένετο τὸ εἰώθος σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον.

XXXII. a Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε—] The greater part of this chapter has been transcribed by Eusebius Praepar. Evang. p. 661. ed. Viger, and Stobaeus Sermon. 119. p. 606. Cicero also translates it, Tuscul. Disput. I. 41. The beginning of it is quoted with approval by Theodoret. Therapeut. Serm. XI. p. 651.; and it is also referred to by Plutarch, in Consolat. ad Apollon. p. 107.

b ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι] That is, τοιοῦτον τι ἤστε μηδὲν εἶναι,
as a little lower down: εἰ δὲ οἷον ἀποδημῆσαι ἐστὶν ὁ δανατος. Eusebius and Theodoretus have μηδὲν τι εἰναι, whence Heindorf conjectured that the reading ought to be μηδὲν ἐτι εἶναι.

c καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ—] On the dative instead of the genitive, see Matth. §. 389. 1.—For μετοίκησις τοῦ τόπου might have been said μετοίκησις ἐκ τοῦ τόπου. Yet the former is no less usual. For since the verb μετοικεῖν is not only construed with prepositions, but also governs an accusative of the place, from which one person goes to another, as in Pausan. IV. 40. Ἀκαρνανίαν μετοικήσατι therefore μετοίκησις τοῦτος is no less correct than μετοίκησις ἐκ τοῦτου.—A little further on, τὸν ἑνθένδε is put for τοῦ ἑνταῦθα, because the verbal substantive signifies motion to a place. We have before spoken of a similar use of prepositions: the construction of the adverbs has been illustrated by Heindorf on Gorgias, p. 472. B. where we find: ἢ Περικλέους ὥλη οἰκία ἢ ἄλλα συγγένεια. ἤμεν' ἀν βούλῃ τῶν ἑνθένδε ἐκλέξασθαί. Compare also Buttmann's Gr. §. 138. 8.

d καὶ εἶτε δὴ μὴ δεμεία—] To the particle εἶτε correspond, after a long interval, the words further on: εἰ δὲ αὖ. On εἰ δὲ after εἶτε see C. IV., note (a).

e ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν ὀλμαί] Ἀν belongs to the infinitive εὑρεῖν. It is repeated on account of the long parenthesis; on which usage, see Hermann on Viger. p. 780. For the same reason, the words δὲοι and ὀλμαί are subsequently repeated. Heindorf wished also the word εἰ to be repeated before the words δὲοι σκεφάλαμεν, for the sake of perspicuity. It is written so in Eusebius. But as the construction of the sentence is not altered from the beginning, this repetition does not appear to be necessary.

f μὴ δὴ οἰδατην] That is, not to say any private man. See Hermann on Viger. p. 804.
APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

The pronoun ἄντων is to be connected with τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα, and increase the force: the great king himself.—Εὐαριθμητοί ἥμεραι, that is, days which may be easily counted, here means very few, and πρὸς indicates comparison: if they be compared with other days and nights. So, a little further on: τὰ ἐμαντοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἔκεινων.

Fischer, from Eusebius, has written πλείων. But the more correct reading is πλεῖον, meaning longer, ὀδὲν being used for ὦ, as is frequently the case. Cicero has thus translated these words: perpetuitas consequentis temporis similis futura est uni nocti.—Compare Eurip. Med. v. 25. τὸν πάντα συντίθουσα δακρύοις χρόνων. Ibid. 1096. τρυχομένους τὸν πάντα χρόνων. Rep. X. p. 618. B. ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος. Gorg. p. 470. E.

These words are placed in apposition in the same case as the relative pronoun; whereas the first part of the sentence requires them to be in the accusative. So Phaedo, p. 66. E. καλ τότε—ἡμῖν ἐσταὶ ὦ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν,—φρονήσεως, where Fischer ought not to have preferred φρόνησις.

Hipp. Mai. p. 281. C. τί πατε τὸ ἀτίον, δτί οἱ πολιαοὶ ἐκεῖνοι, ὃν ὅνοματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφία. Πιετικοῦ τε καὶ Βιλντος,—φαίνονται ἀπεχόμενοι τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων. More examples of this kind have been collected by Wolf, on Demosthen. Lept. §. 15. Heindorf, on Hipp. Mai. §. 2. on Phaedo, §. 30. Similarly Sulpicius in Cicer. Epp. IV. 5. genus hoc consolationis miserum est, quia, per quos ea confieri debet, propinquos ac familiare, ipsi pari molestia afficiuntur.—Respecting the judges of the infernal regions, and their duties, there is a remarkable passage in Gorg. p. 523. E. sqq. It appears to have been the opinion of the common people in Attica, probably derived, by rumour, from the Eleusinian mysteries, that Triptolemus, and other heroes who had lived a just and pious life, became judges in the infernal regions. For Triptolemus was said not only to have taught the Athenians agriculture, but also to have given them very wise laws, whence he was called θεσμοφόρος.


On this use of the verb τεθανάω see C. XVII. note (2). Eusebius has: ἐγὼ μὲν
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kal polllakis: whence Heindorf suspected that Plato wrote: "η διατριβή αυτόθι.] Wolf has well rendered this: delightful conversation, if I may converse with P., etc.—Respecting Pala-

medes, who was stoned by the Greek army, having been suspected of treason through the arts of Ulysses, see Heyn, Excurs. ad Virgil Æneid. II. 81. Valckenar. Diatrib. de fragm. Eurip. p. 190 sq.—

Ajax Telamonius, the bravest of all the Greeks after Achilles, became mad. and killed himself, from having been deprived of the arms of Achilles by the unjust judgment which conferred them on Ulysses. See Homer Odys. Χ'. v. 545 sqq.

2 τον επι Τρολαν δηγαγόντα] That is, Agamemnon.


b kal εν τι τοιτο διανοεισθαι δαληθες] The circumstance that
τι is used here before τοῦτο arises from the usage of the Greeks, first to express what they mean generally by the pronoun τι, and then to limit or define the meaning more accurately. So we should say, one thing, namely this, is to be regarded as true.—ἀπὸ τοῦ αδρομάτου: that is, by chance, fortuitously, not by the design and will of the gods.—ἀπηλλ. πραγμάτων, that is, human affairs, the idea of labour and toils being added.—οὗ πάνω χαλ., not much; not greatly. Others have incorrectly translated it by no means, a signification which the words nowhere have.—A little further on, Heindorf conjectured that the reading ought to be: τοῦθ᾽ ὑ αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέρευσθαι. Injudiciously, as it weakens the force of the sentiment.

c ταύτα ταύτα λυποῦντες] That is, exhorting them to virtue, making trial of their wisdom, convincing them of folly.—ἐλνάλ τι, that is, to be endowed with great wisdom.

NOTES ON THE CRITO.

1. a Περίκα μάλιστα;] What hour is it at most? For μάλιστα is here to be taken as if put after numbers; on which usage see Bastius Epist. Crit. p. 37 sq.

b ορθός βαθός] Crito defines the time more accurately in these words, for πρόφ and ορθός differ from one another, as in Latin mane and diurnum, of which the former is the part of the day extending from twilight to about the third hour, according to the antient division of the day; but the latter is the twilight itself, when nox abit, nec tamen orta dies, according to Ovid. Amat. I. 5, 6. Phrynichus: ορθός το θρόνον ἄρχομένης ἡμέρας, ἐν δὲ έπτι λόχυφ δύναται τις χρήσθαι. The adjective βαθός is used by the Greeks in reference to time as the word "depth" is used in the phrase "the depth of winter." Protagor. p. 310. A. τῆς παρελθόντος νυκτώς ταυτησί, ἔτι ορθον βαθός. Lucian. Asin. 34. νῦς βαθεία, where see Reitz. Polyæn. Strateg. I. 28, 2. βαθείας ἐσπέρας.

c θαυμάξω, ὑπός ἤθελ.— I wonder how it came to pass that. Compare Xenoph. Mem. I. 1, 20. θαυμάξω ὅδε, ὑπός πολε ἐπεισθαν αἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. Eurip. Med. v. 51. πῶς λειπεσθαί θέλει; On this construction, which is frequent, see Coraius on Isocrat. Π. p. 23. So a little further on: πῶς οὐκ ἐπείγειρας με εὐθός; Socrates wonders that Crito was admitted so soon by the jailor, because of πάντα προς ἀνεψγετο. Phaedo c. ΠΙ. - ὁ παλοκειν, which is properly said of a porter who hears persons knocking (τοῖς κρούοναι), is also used in the signification of opening the door and letting a person in.

d καὶ τι καὶ ἐδεργετηται] The reading καὶ τοι καὶ, and indeed also, which some have preferred, appears inconsistent with the modesty of Crito, who does not wish to boast of benefits conferred on the man, but merely to state the cause of his being admitted. Therefore καὶ τι καὶ, is preferable, not only from the authority of MSS., but also from the whole scope of the passage. For Crito
speaks with modesty, and with a careful regard to the feelings of his high-minded friend, when he says that he was accustomed to give a trifle to the jailer. Ti is connected with ἐφεργέτησαι; on which construction, see Matth. §. 415. Buttmann, §. 118. 4. 5. The accusative separated from its verb is usual, the common construction being: καὶ τίς καὶ, καὶ τίνες καὶ, καὶ τι καὶ. See Ducker. on Thucyd. p. 309. Poppo Observ. Critt. in Thucyd. p. 196. Buttmann and others preferred ἐφεργετείται, the present tense, as indicating that Crito, frequently coming to the prison, usually gives a gratuity to the keeper. But Crito is reciting the causes which procured his admission at a former time; and therefore rightly uses the perfect, by which he indicates both that the man formerly received benefits from him, and was still mindful of them. On the form ἐφεργέτησαι see Matth. §. 169. note; compare §. 167. n. 6. The omission of the augment gave rise to the reading ἐφεργετείται and ἁπεργέτη- ται.

ε Ἐπιεικῶς πᾶλαι] That is, pretty long since, or, a good while ago. Thaet. near the beginning, "Ἀρτι, ἄ Τερψίων, ή πάλαι εξ ἄγροι;" Terps. Ἐπιεικῶς πᾶλαι. Phaedo, p. 80. C. Ἐπιεικῶς συν- νόν εἵμενει χρόνον. Grammarians interpret Ἐπιεικῶς, when so placed, by πάνω, λίαν. See Eustath. on II. δ., p. 547. Hesych. under the word.—Immediately afterwards, the interrogative είτα indicates wonder and annoyance. See Apolog. Socr. C. XVI.

[οῦδ' ἂν αὖτὸς ἥσελον—] I should not myself have liked to be in such a state of watchfulness and grief, if I were in your place; for since so grievous a calamity threatens you, it would have been wrong to disturb your rest. The particle ἂν used with the imperfect indicates the supposition of a case contrary to that which in reality exists. See Hermann on Viger. p. 820.—For ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἄγρυπνῳ καὶ λύπῃ the ordinary construction would be ἐν τοσαύτῃ ἄγρυπνῳ τε καὶ λύπῃ, which is found in some MSS. But the other reading is explained by understanding τοσαύτη again after καὶ. For τε is put immediately after τοσαύτη to show that that word belongs to λύπῃ as well as to ἄγρυπνῳ. Phaed. p. 94. D. τά τε κατὰ γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἱατρικὴν, i. e. τά τε κ. γ. καὶ τά κατὰ τ. i. Legg. VII. p. 796. D. ἐἰς τε πολύτελαν καὶ ἱδίους οἴκους, i. e. καὶ εἰς ἱδ. οἶκ. Herodot. VII. 106. οἱ τε ἐκ Θράκης καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, i. e. καὶ οἱ εἰς τοῦ Ἑλλα. More examples are given by Schaefer. Indic. ad Brunkii. Poetas Gnomic. p. 367. The subject has also been fully explained by Hartung Lehre von den Partikeln der griech. Sprache P. I. p. 116 sqq.
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h ἵνα ὡς ἢδοστα διάγγξ] The Greeks use the subjunctive mood after conjunctions indicating the final cause, when a preterite has gone before, if the object sought is not yet completely finished, but is contemplated as still continuing, as in this passage: on this point see Hermann, De emendanda ratione Gr. Gr. p. 212 sq. on Viger, p. 850. Compare Matth. §. 518. 1. Buttm. §. 126. i. — With the verb διάγγξ is to be understood τὴν βλέυ, on which ellipsis see Lambert. Bos. p. 59 sqq. ed. Schæfer.

1 εἴδαμωνα τοῦ τρόπου] On the construction see Matth. §. 367. a.—τρόπος here means the mode of thinking and acting exhibited by a man’s life, — his disposition. Phædo, p. 58. E. εἴδαμων ἐφαίλετο τοῦ τρόπου. The meaning is plain from the words of Xenophon Memor. IV. 8, 3. ἐθαυμάζετο ἐπὶ τῷ εὐθύμως καὶ εὐκόλως ζῆν. — Before τηλικοῦτον ὤντα, ἐμι is not understood, but an indefinite subject (as it is called). χρῆ δὲ — ταῦτα αἱρεῖται φάσκοντα γε δὴ, κ. τ. λ. To make the sentiment more emphatic, he expresses it in general terms: “it were absurd that a man being of such an age, should be unwilling to end his life.” — Τηλικοῦτος, of so great an age: for Socrates was now seventy. See c. XIV.

k ἐν τοιοῦτοις ἐξουφοράι ἀλίσκονται] There is the same construction, Phileb. p. 45. C. ἐν τοιοῦτοις νοσίμασιν ἐχόμενοι. Rep. III. p. 395. D. ἐν ἐξουφοράις τε καὶ πένθεςι καὶ θρῆνοις ἔχομεν. Phædo, p. 108. B. ἐν πάθῃ ἐχομένη ἀπορία. Ibid. δεδεμένος ἐν ἀνάγκαις. Sophocl. Ajax. v. 270. ἄνηρ ἐκεῖνος, ἥνικ’ ἥν ἐν τῇ νόσῃ, αὐτός μὲν ἤδεθ’ οἴσιν εἶχετ’ ἐν κακοῖς. See on Phileb. p. 137. The common reading αὐτός is consistent with the construction of the verb ἐπιλύσθαι, which properly signifies to render any thing free for any one, and hence to grant. Yet it was desirable to follow the better MSS., especially since ἐπιλύσθαι τινα appears to be used correctly in the sense of rendering any one free from something. The sense of the words is this: But old age, however, does not set them free from the fear of death. The article τό is to be referred to ἀγανακτεῖν, forming an accusative absolute, ὥς, ou retains its proper force ne non, when it is used after a negative ὥς.
particle. Therefore the words may be thus translated: But old age, however, does not render them free as regards this, namely that they should not be troubled at death. It may be also understood from this, how ἄν μὴ οὐ may generally be rendered by the Latin quominus. On the accusative see Eurip. Hippolyt. v. 48. τὸ γὰρ τῆς δ' οὗ πρωτομᾶσιν κακὸν, τὸ μὴ οὔ παρασχεῖν τοὺς ἐμοὶ ἑχθροὺς ἐμοὶ διὰν τοσαῦτην, where some MSS. have τοῦ μὴ οὐ. Ἀeschyl. Prometh. v. 243. ἐξερυθάμην βροτόν τοῦ μὴ διορθαίσθεντας εἰς 'Αἰδον μολὼν, where some MSS. have τὸ μὴ. Plato, Rep. III. p. 354. B. οὐκ ἀπεσχήμην τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἐλθεὶν ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου.

1 ἀλλὰ τῇ δῇ — That is, but, to return to the former subject, why then, etc.

m οὗ σοι, ὧς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται] There is much beauty in the addition of these words. Not to thee, he says, will that news be terrible, or produce any anxiety, whom I know to be superior to human troubles, and even death itself, but to us, etc. For ὧς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται is: as appears to me, that is, as I am fully persuaded.

n ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα] That is, ἐν τοῖς φέρουσιν ἐγὼ βαρύτατα ἀν ἐνέγκ. See Matth. §. 289.

ο Τίνα ταίτην;] Understand φέρεις, i.e. τίς ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ ἀγγελία, ἥν φέρεις. See Matth. §. 264. So Euthyphro, p. 14. D. τίς ἡ ὄφελε αὐτὸς τῆς θεοῦ τυγχάνει οὕτα ἀνδ τῶν δώρων; In such sentences the article indicates that mention has before been made of the thing spoken of.

p ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκται] This has been erroneously translated by Schleiermacher: "is the ship perhaps arrived from Delos," etc. For the particle ἢ, which used generally to be put in the first member of an interrogative sentence of two parts, afterwards began to be so taken that the first member was suppressed, and the ἢ had a restricting and correcting force. Therefore this passage is to be thus understood: but why do I ask? the ship has certainly arrived, on the return of which, etc.—On the use of the infinitive τεθνάναι, where ἀποθνῄσκειν might be expected, see Apolog. Socrat. C. XVII, note (*).—The Athenians, in gratitude for Apollo's sending Theseus and his companions back in safety from Crete, sent annually a public embassy to Delos, to offer sacrifice to Apollo, and celebrate his praises in hymns. These ambassadors were called θεωροί, or θεωρία, from the verb ἀφεῖν, i.e. φροντίζειν, θεραπεύειν, and the noun θεῖος, i.e. Apollo. From the time when the sacred ship was ornamented with a laurel crown until its return, it was unlawful to
inflict punishment on condemned persons. See Xenoph. Mem. IV. 8, 2. Since it happened, that the ship was ornamented with the laurel crown the day before the condemnation of Socrates, and returned thirty days after, Socrates was thirty days in prison after his condemnation. See Phædo, at the beginning. Xenoph. ut supra.

a ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἥξειν] After the verbs οἴμαι, δοκεῖ, and others, μὲν is often placed without being answered by δέ. See Hermann on Viger, p. 800. and Heindorf on Phædo, p. 5. But the sentence, which should be opposed to the other, is always easily understood. The usual mode in which the deficiency is supplied is by understanding: σαφῶς δ' οὖν οἶδα. But since Crito says afterwards: δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων, οτι ὢνι ἥξει τήμερον, it must be evident that something very different is required by the sense, and even that the words δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἥξειν τήμερον are used with the delicacy of Attic speech to signify ἥξει τήμερον, which use of the verb δοκεῖν, very common among the Socratic speakers, has been illustrated with examples by Bergler, on Aristoph. Plut. v. 422. Ruhnken, on Tim. p. 281. In the same manner Phædo, p. 61. C. ἀπεμι δέ, ὡς οἰκε, τήμερον. This being the case, I think that the sentence to which μὲν is referred is contained in the preceding words οὐ τοι δῆ ἄφικται, so that it might have been written thus: τὸ πλοῖον ἥξει μὲν τήμερον, οὐ τοι δὲ ἄφικται.—Immediately afterwards εἰ δὲν ἀπαγγέλλωσιν is the same as ἐκ τούτων δὲ ἀπαγγέλλομεν: according to those things which they report Cicer. Epist. XVI. 22. ex suis epistolis.—Σοινον, a promontory of Attica, situate in that part which faces the Cyclades and the Ægæan Sea.

II. a τῷχ ἀγαθῷ] A well known form used by the Greeks as a good omen, when they themselves or others were undertaking any thing. It answers to the Latin quod bene vertat, quod felix faustumque sit. See Sympos. p. 177. E. Thucyd. IV. 118. Therefore Socrates, hearing that he must die, is so far from fearing death, that he even considers it to be an object to be sought for as a blessing.

b ἥ ἧν ἔλεος] After ὄστεραλα the particle ἥ is put, because that word has all the force of a comparative. Sympos. p. 173. A. τῆ ὄστεραλα ἥ τᾶ ἐπινίκια ἐθνεν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ χρευταλ. See Wytenbach on Phædo, p. 314 sq. and Bast. Append. Epist. Crit. pref. p. VII. Instead of the optative ἔλεος we have adopted the subjunctive: for the meaning is: on whatever day it may have returned. Compare Matth. §. 527.
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c Φασί γέ τοι δή οἱ τοῦτων κύριοι] That is, the Eleven, οἱ ἐνδεκα, who had the office of imprisoning and punishing those who were condemned by the public tribunals. These punishments are referred to by ταῦτα. See note on Apolog. Socr. C. XXVII.—On the particles γέ τοι δή, which have the force of an affirmation with some restriction, see Hermann on Viger, p. 790.—τεκμαλρομαί δὲ ἐκ τινος—This is a common mode of using the verb τεκμαλρεσθαί, where τοῦτο or αὕτω must be understood. See Rep. III. p. 406. D. Gorg. p. 484. B. Phaedo, p. 108. A. Lysid. p. 204. E. Hippias mai. p. 288. C. and elsewhere. The words διάγον πρότερον are added, because dreams seen after midnight were thought true. See Homer’s Odys. IV. v. 842 sqq. XX. v. 82—91. Hor. Satir. I. 10, 33. Quirinus post medium noctem visus, quum somnia vera.

d ἐν καίρῳ τωι] Very opportunely. On the word κινδυνεύειν, which among the Attic writers signifies to seem, Timæus Gloss. p. 159. κινδυνεύει ἐγγίζει, where see Ruhnken. Compare also Valkenar on Herodot. IV. 105. Hindenburg on Xenophon, Mem. IV. 2, 34.

e Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γνών πρ.] Δοκεῖν is a verb used respecting dreams and visions. Euripid. Iphig. Taur. v. 44. ἐδοξὲ ἐν ὑπν. Orest. v. 402. ἐδοξὲ ἵδειν τρεῖς νυκτὶ προσφερεῖς κόρας. Aristoph. Vesp. p. 31. ἐδοξὲ μοι περὶ πρῶτον ὕπνον ἐν τῇ πυκνῇ ἐκκλησιάζειν, κ. τ. λ.—As persons appearing in dreams were believed to be divine, they are generally represented as more beautiful, large and august than human beings. Hence the woman, who appeared to Socrates, is called καλὴ καὶ εἰειδής, beautiful and well formed, and she is also spoken of as λευκὴ ἵματια ἔχονσα, having white garments, since the ancients thought that spectres were arrayed in white apparel, on which see Commentators on Pliny’s Epist. VIII. 27.—λευκὴ is the same as λαμπρὰ, i. e. white or shining. See Thom. Mag. p. 566 sq.—The verse, which the woman is said to have recited, is taken from Iliad. IX. 363. They are the words of Achilles, in which he says that, being enraged by the insults of Agamemnon, he will return home, which he hopes to reach on the third day. In Homer the word is therefore ἰκολύμνη Cicer. de Divinat. I. 25, where he mentions this passage, thus translates the verse: Tertia te Phthiae tempestas læta locabit.—Fischer has correctly remarked that we are to understand Socrates to refer to that other life which he hoped for.

"Ως ἀποσμον—] That is, how wonderful, ὡς θαναμαστὸν καὶ παράδοξον, as the word is correctly interpreted by Thomas M.,
Phavorinus, and others. Phædo, p. 60. B. ὥς ἀτοπὸν τι—ἐξοικε ἐλναι τούτο, ὥς καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἥδ. —He calls this dream ἐναργῆς, i. e. so clear and evident, that there is no need of conjecturing or interpreting.—The particles μὲν οὖν have the force of increasing and correcting: nay, nay indeed, as Gorg. p. 466. A. E. Legg. II. p. 655. Euthydem. p. 304. E. Hipp. mai. p. 283. B. Xenoph. Mem. III. 8, 4. Aristoph. Equitt. v. 13. 910. and elsewhere.

III. a ἄλλ', ὧ δαιμόνιε—] By the words ἕτι καλ νῦν, even now, now at least, he indicates that Crito had before made vain attempts to persuade Socrates to consult his safety by flight.

b οὐ μία ἔμφορά —ἀμελήσαι] The sense is this: not one calamity only, but several, will happen to me if you die: for besides my being deprived of you, such a frind as I shall never find anywhere, I shall also incur the imputation of perfidy and worthlessness with those who do not sufficiently know you and me. The full expression would be: οὐ μία ἔμφορά ἔστιν ἐμοι, ἄλλα πλείους χωρίς μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἔστερηθαί, etc., but this is shortened by subjoining to ἄλλα the words containing the explanation of the suppressed part of the sentence opposed to οὐ μία ἔμφορά ἔστιν.—To confirm the received reading χωρίς τοῦ ἔστερηθαί, which does not rest on the authority of MSS., I add some examples of the same construction. Sympos. p. 173. C. χωρίς τοῦ οἶνος ταῦτα ἀθέλεισθαι ὑπερφυῶς ὡς χαῖρω. Ibid. p. 184. B. οὐδὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ τούτων οὔτε βεβαιον οὔτε μύσην εἶναι χωρίς τοῦ μηδὲ περικεῖαι ἀπ' αὐτῶν γενναίαν φιλάν. Charmid. p. 44. B. Demosth. adv. Mid. p. 43. ed. Buttm. and elsewhere.—Remark μὲν and δέ united in the same clause of the same sentence. Some examples of this have been collected by Boeckhins Commentar. ad Pindar. T. II. P. II. p. 105.—The particle ὥς is not, with Buttmann and others, to be referred to the infinitive ἀμελήσαι, as it never follows δοκεῖν in that manner; it is to be connected with oἷς τ’ ὄν. See Matth. §. 568. The sense of the words is this: moreover I shall also appear to many, who do not sufficiently know me and you, to have neglected you, as if I were able, by expending money, to secure your safety.—It is not necessary here to have the particle οὖν so as to write ὥς oἷς τ’ ἄν ὄν. See, on this point, Herm. on Eur. Hecub. v. 1087. Wunderlich on Ἀσchinis Orat. in Ctesiph. p. 222. Bremi on Lys. p. 438 sqq. and the numerous examples collected by Schaefer. Mellett. critt. p. 55.

c ταῦτα δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν] On this mode of speaking see Matth.
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§. 468. c. C. XV. of Crito, βεβαιώσεις — τὴν δόξαν, ἢστε δοκεῖν, κ. τ. λ. A similar redundance is found, Herodot. VIII. 4. παρὰ δόξαν—ἡ ὡς αὐτὸι κατεδόκουν.

a ἀυτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παράντα] The reading δηλοῖ, adopted by Stephens from the conjecture of Cornarius, although at first sight it may appear the true one, is unnecessary. We ought also to reject Fischer's notion, derived from some misunderstood or corrupted passages of Theophrastus and Antoninus, that δήλον has an active force and signification, and is equivalent to δηλωτικόν. For the writer passes, by a kind of anacoluthia, from a passive to an active construction. When Crito was about to add: ὅτι ὅπω τῶν πολλῶν ἱεραργάσμενα ἐστὶν, he suddenly changed the construction, and expresses his idea much more emphatically, saying: ὅτι οὕτω τέ εἰσιν οἱ πολλοί, κ. τ. λ.

c ὅνα ὡσὶ τε ἱσαν] On this kind of construction, see note on Sympos. p. 181. B. Hermann on Viger. p. 850. The sense of the words is this: in order that they might also effect the greatest good, which is not in their power.


IV. α ἀρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμ.] These particles ask a question, with a kind of suspicion of what we are unwilling should be the case: surely you are not concerned, etc. See Hermann on Viger. p. 842. Compare Schæfer. Melet. Critt. p. 66. — πράγματα παρέχειν, to give trouble, or create annoyance to any one. This is often said of persons who annoy by accusations. For the word πράγματα is sometimes used simply in the sense of law-suits and quarrels. See Commentators on Aristoph. Plut. v. 20.

b ἥ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν, ἥ συχνὰ χρ.] That is, to lose either even all our property, or at least a great part of our wealth. It is easy to see why καὶ is put in the first member of the sentence, and omitted in the second. In the third it is again added, because a new kind of danger is mentioned: for ἴλλο τι παθεῖν is: lest we should ourselves be thrown into chains, punished by exile, or put to death.

c ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ χαλέπιν] That is, dismiss this fear. This construction has been illustrated by Valckenar on Herodot. IX. 41. on
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Eurip. Hippolyt. v. 113. and Heindorf on Theætæt. p. 441.—Respecting the construction of the words ἡμεῖς γὰρ που δικαίω ἐσμεν—κινδυνεῖσαι, see Matth. §. 296. Buttmann, §. 138. 5.

d καὶ μὴ ἄλλωσ ποιεῖ] So C. V. at the end, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδα-μῶς ἄλλωσ ποιεῖ.

c Ἔμετε τοῖς ταῦτα φθόβου] The thread of discourse, which is here broken, is resumed a little further on with the words: ὡστε—μὴτε ταῦτα φθοβοῦ. It may be understood from this, why the copyists changed μὴτε into μὴ.


e ἐπὶ αὐτού] That is, to bribe them.

h ύπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐναχρήματα] My wealth is ready for you, is at your disposal: for ἵκανα is added by apposition. See Sturtz’s Lexic. Xenophon. T. IV. p. 363.

1 ξένοι αὐτοί εὔθεδε] On this use of the pronoun αὐτοί, see Matth. §. 471. Buttm. §. 114. 1., and Schæfer. Melett. Critt. p. 77. foll.—Simmias and Cebes, Thebans and intimate friends of Socrates, are introduced disputing with him in the Phædo. Some few particulars concerning them are given in their lives by Laert. II. 124 and 125, and Suidas. A slight mention of them is also made, Epistol. Platonic. XIII. Both are said to have written something, but the Tabula, which goes under the name of Cebes, appears to be undeservedly ascribed to him.

k μὴτε—ἀποκάρμης] That is, be not despondent as to consulting your safety. For Crito, in his exceeding love towards his friend, forgot the principles of virtue, and imagined that Socrates himself was willing to consult his safety by flight.

1 οὐ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικ.] See Apolog. C. XXVII.


n καὶ ἄλλος ὧστοι αὐτόν ἀφικη] The ordinary construction would require ἄλλαξον. But since ὧστοι follows, that which has been
called attraction, by the later grammarians, produces ἀλλοσέ. On
which subject see Buttm. §. 138. 1. 4. I have therefore removed
the comma from between ἀλλοσέ and ἔποι.

V. 8 ἔγνω σωθήραι] When you have it in your power to escape.
See Matth. §. 264.

b οἶχθειν καταλιπών] The word οἶχθεθαι indicates, I think,
the quickness of the action, and the eagerness of the agent. It
might be rendered in Latin by confessim deseret. Other examples
have been collected by Matthiae, §. 559. c.

c τὸ σὸν μέρος] As far as in you lies, as far as you are con-
cerned, as C. XI. and XVI.

d τι ἐν—πράξον] That is, they will undergo that lot which
the will of fortune may assign to them; whatever may happen to them.
For the word πράτειν is taken in the sense of having good or ill
fortune, as in the phrases εὖ πράτειν and κακῶς πράτειν. Remark
the use of the pronoun τὸντο, for which, according to the usual
construction, some adverb would be substituted. But in the same
manner Eurip. Troad. v. 700. πράζειν τι κεβὼν, where Seidler
says, that phrase is employed for εὖ πράζειν. Eurip. Iphig. Aul.
v. 345. πράσσειν μεγάλα the same as μᾶλ' εὑρικεῖν.

e τὰ ῥαθυμάτα αἵρεσθαι] Ράθωμα means, those things which
are worthy of a trifling, slothful, and inconstant person. Serranus
has well rendered the sentence thus: Tu autem mihi videris
ca, quae cum maxima pigritia atque supinitate conjuncta sunt,
elegisse.


g καὶ ἡ εἰσοδός τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. Forster and others,
observing that the words τῆς δίκης, were not translated by Fici-
nus, suspected that they were a gloss. But since ἡ δίκη is very
frequently said εἰσίναιο or εἰσέρχεσθαι, on which point see Casaubon
on Theophrast. p. 157. also Buttm. index ad Demosthen. orat.
Midian, under this word,—why should it not be correct to say ἡ
εἰσοδός τῆς δίκης? Fischer, Schleiermacher, and Buttmann defend
the common reading in the same manner. The words εἰς τὸ δικα-
στήριον, which Schleiermacher thought ought to be rejected, are
sometimes added when the cause itself is said, εἰσίναι or εἰσέρχεσ-
θαι. Demosthen. adv. Phormion. T. Π. p. 912. 27. μελλοῦσις
τῆς δίκης εἰσίναι εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. The phrase ἡ εἰσοδὸς τῆς
dίκης, is used when the prosecutor and the accused are admitted to
plead the cause before the judge. See Schömann and Meier's
“Attische Process” p. 703 foll. Therefore the words ὡς εἰςήλθες, ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν are added for the purpose of interpretation. It may, however, be doubted whether it ought not to be written ὡς εἰσήλθεν, which was preferred by Wolf, especially since that learned commentator found it in some good MSS. The word ἐξὸν seems to favour the reading εἰςήλθες.—ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν. The commentators differ in their explanation of these words. Some suspect that reference is made to that law which Lysias, p. 354. ed. Reisk. mentions, and according to which it was permitted: δειδώτι δίκης ἑνεκα δρασκάζειν, that is, to one distrusting the issue of his cause, to go into voluntary exile: others prefer referring these words to Anytus, who, according to Libanius, T. I. p. 644., after commencing the prosecution, wished to be reconciled to Socrates on certain conditions. This opinion is certainly erroneous, since in public causes, when the prosecutor had once appealed to the magistrates, he had no longer the power of compromising the matter with the accused. See Meier and Schömann’s “Attische Process, p. 702, and a learned exposition of the subject by Hudtwaleker de Diætēsis Atheniens. p. 159 foll.

h αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης] These words are to be referred to the contest before the judges, that is, to the oorations pronounced, but principally to the defence of Socrates.

i ὅσπερ κατάγειν τῆς πράξεως] “The whole transaction resembles a comic or tragic drama, which has three parts, πρότασις, ἐπίτασις, καταστροφή.” Thus the coming before the judges might be called the πρότασις; the pleading of the cause, the ἐπίτασις; and finally the fact that Socrates was not saved, the catastrophe, which Plato here calls κατάγειν.” Cornar. In Crito’s opinion this issue of the business is ridiculous. He therefore calls it κατάγειν, a ridiculous or preposterous turn which the drama has taken.

k διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν] The words τὸ τελευταῖον ὑπὸ τοῦτο are connected with the words ἀπαν τὸ πράγμα πεπράχθαι in opposition with what goes before καὶ ἡ εἰσόδος τῆς δίκης and καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης. For three things are mentioned by Crito, as probable sources of reproach to the friends of Socrates: the beginning of the cause, the defence made, and finally the issue of the trial, and τὸ κακία τ. κ. ἀ. τ. ἡμ. διαπεφευγέναι δοκεῖν. For the infinitive διαπεφευγέναι δοκεῖν is added by epexegeesis, as the grammarians call it, to the words τὸ τελευταῖον ὑπὸ τοῦτο, according to a common construction. Gorg. p. 469. C. ἀλλ’ ἔγωγε τούτο λέγω.
διερέσκονται επί τῆς πόλεως, ὅ ἀν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τότε, where Heindorf incorrectly suggests the reading τὸ εξείναι. Phædo, p.78. C. ἐρείπου ὁ Ἠρωδότος συνθετέντι τε καὶ συνθετέρον ὡς ἐνέπεσε προσήκει τότο πάσχει, διαφθοράν ταύτην, ὑπερ συνετέθη.— The infinitive διαπερευγέναι is put absolutely, τὸν κλήσων being understood. This usage is frequent, as may be seen from the Lexicons to Thucydides and Xenophon.—The infinitive δοκεῖν, after μὴ δόξῃ ἄπαν τὸ πράγμα—πεπραχθαί, might appear on a first view to be added by a kind of negligence or redundance, such as we perceive, in C. III., in the words: καὶ τοι τίς ἀν αἰσχῶν είπε ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλεόνους ποιεῖάθαι ἢ φίλους; but, considering the matter more closely, it appears that the word δοκεῖν could not well be omitted in this passage. For if Crito said: διαπερευγέναι ἡμᾶς, he might appear to admit the truth of the reproach which, he says, will be urged against himself and the other friends of Socrates; especially since he has been enumerating circumstances which were really true. For it was true that Socrates had appeared before the tribunal, and also that he had made his defence, which is called ὁ ἄγων τῆς δίκης. Hence it appears that the passage needs no emendation, and that there is no anacoluthia in it, as some have supposed.

1 οὔδε οὗ σαυτόν] These words at first seem to destroy the sense. For Crito is now speaking, not of the carefulness of Socrates himself respecting his safety, but of the apparent carelessness and apathy of his friends, who would seem to have deserted their master, and consulted nothing but their own safety. But these words contain an excuse or defence against the view which will be taken of the conduct of the friends of Socrates; and this defence consists of a gentle reproach of Socrates, of whom Crito complains, with generous indignation, for not availing himself of the means of escape provided by his friends. The passage may be thus rendered: who have not saved you (nor would you save yourself), when it might have been done.

m εἷς τί καί—ἡμῶν ὑφελος ἡν] See Apolog. Socrat. C. XVI. note (e). Compare Hemsterhus. on Lucian’s Tim. c. 55. A little further on ἄμα τῷ κακῷ is used in the same manner as πρὸς τῷ κακῷ.

n μᾶλλον δὲ οὔδε βουλ] Μᾶλλον δὲ ἐσ, or rather, nay indeed. It is no longer the season to deliberate, but to have already deliberated, i.e. to have come to a resolution.

VI. a ἦ πραθυμία σου—ὁρθότητος εἰη] That is, Your zeal
for my preservation is very much to be approved of, and praised, if it were joined with rectitude of principle. With ἄγια is to be understood ἐστί, which is often omitted, on which point see Schaefer on Lambert. Bos. p. 605. Matth. §. 304.—On the optative ἐσθι after the indicative, see Matth. § 524. 8.

οὸς τῶν ἕμῶν — That is, ἐστε — πελεθοῦσαι. See Matth. § 479. 2, 3.—Τὰ ἐμά, the things which belong to me, as well passions and inclinations of the mind, as things extrinsic.

οὐ δύναμαι ἐκβάλειν] That is, to reject, to repudiate. For the words are opposed to τιμῶν and πρεσβεύειν. Ἐκβάλλειν is properly to cast out, to throw away, and is said of things that are useless, which we do not care about: hence it often means to spurn, to despise.


ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοι ἔγχωρήσω] That I certainly will not yield to you.

ὁ ὑμ᾽ ἐν πλείω τῶν νῦν παράντων —] According to Buttmann, the order of the words is: οὔδ᾽ ἂν ἢ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις μορμολύττηται ἡμᾶς ὡσπερ παιδας, ἐπιπέμπουσα πλείω, δεσμωᾶς, κ. τ. λ. This I do not agree with. For πλείω is to be connected with μορμολύττηται, and is an accusative absolute put for an adverb: the collocation of the words confirms this view. So further on, C. XIV. near the end, ἔλαττον ἀπεδήμησας. Rep. III. p. 396. C. Μορμολύττωσαι is to frighten children by gestures and by pronouncing the word Μορμό, as is correctly remarked by Gesner, on Claudian. Carm. XXXI. v. 111. Hence it means to terrify or frighten a person by objects calculated to inspire fear; or generally, to terrify, to intimidate, but the terror meant is generally groundless. The active μορμολύττειν is only found in the works of grammarians: the Attic writers always say μορμολύττεσθαι. — The word ἐπιτίμπειν, like the Latin immittere, is said of what is suddenly and forcibly presented before a person, as is remarked by Hemsterhuis. on Lucian. T. I. p. 208.

καὶ θανάτοις — καὶ ἀφαιρέσεις] The plural number is used for the sake of greater emphasis. Nouns of this kind, when violence and cruelty are indicated, are often put in the plural. Compare Seidler on Eurip. Electr. v. 479. Achilles Tat. VIII. 8. καὶ
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thagatos kal deoioi para

Πῶς οὖν ἄν μετριώτατα σκοποῦμεν] Metriws skopoeiwsais is to inquire as is proper, as agrees with the matter under consideration, as the matter demands, i. c. well, correctly. So metriws lègeiv is used, and other phrases of the kind, as Theaet. p. 180. C. Rep. IV. p. 421. C. VI. p. 484. B. and elsewhere. These words are commonly assigned to Crito, but the question does not come appropriately from him. Moreover, the speakers in Plato are wont to put questions to themselves, and immediately afterwards to give the required answers; by which the style is enlivened. See Gorg. p. 457. E. Protagor. p. 343. B.

τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβομεν —] The word ἀναλαμβάνειν is to treat anew, to resume the investigation. Fischer is wrong in translating it simply to inquire, to examine, to investigate. For reference is made to what had been previously said by Socrates on the same subject; which investigation he now proposes to renew. For the words πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ἦν οὖν, are to be understood thus: Whether on the several occasions when we formerly argued this point, was it correctly said, or not, that “some opinions of men are to be regarded, others not.”

κ ἄν εὖ λέγεις] That is, which you mention, namely in C. III. and V.

νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο] On this construction see Matth. §. 296. Buttmann, §. 135. 5. On the use of the particles δὲ ἄρα, see Apology, C. XXIII. note (e).

.nio χικά λόγον] These words are used ἐκ παραλλήλων. For ἄλλως, i. e. rashly, without reason, is explained by the phrase ἐνεκα λόγου, for form's sake. On which see Heindorf, on Theaetet. p. 452. — ἐπειδῆ δὲ εἰς, Since the danger of death threatens me, after I have come to be in danger of my life. — The form τὶ λέγειν is opposed to φαυρεῖν and λαρεῖν, whence it is easy to determine its signification. See Viger, p. 731.

Ὡσα γε τάνθρωπεια] That is, as indeed human affairs are, i. e. as far as least as may be conjectured from what usually happens to men. The word παρακροβεῖν Hesychius interprets ἑπαταρῶν, πλανῶν. Which signification has arisen from the artifice in wrestling τοῦ παρακροβεῖν ἢ ποῖλ ἢ χειρ. See Etym. Magn. under the word, and Buttmann on Phaedr. p. 383. 2nd. ed. Heind. The sense
therefore is this: For the present calamity cannot so influence you, as to lead you away from the correct mode of judging.

ο ὁδὸν ἰκανῶς δοκεῖ] Here ἰκανῶς is the same as καλῶς which goes before. The use of the word τιμῶν in this passage is worthy of remark. It often signifies to cultivate, to regard, to esteem highly, so as to be opposed to the word ἀτιμάζειν. Eurip. Iphig. in Taur. v. 54. κάνω τέχνην τήν ᾧν ἑχω ξενοκτόνων, τιμῶν', ὅδαινον ἄτον ὅς δανούμενον κλάσσομαι. Plat. Gorg. p. 462, D. Βουλεύει καὶ, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾶς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρὸν τί μοι χαρίζεσθαι; So further on, C. VII.

VII. a καὶ τούτο πρᾶττων] And doing this attentively or zealously. In the same manner Xenoph. Hellen. IV. 8. 22. ἀεί, πρός δὲ εἰπὰ έγροφ, τοῦτο ἐπράττειν.—The preceding words, πῶς αὖ τὰ τουαῦτα ἐλέγετο; are to be thus understood: Whether were they said rightly or wrongly? The imperfect tense indicates that reference is made to the discourses of a former period on the same subject.

b ὅσ τὸν πυγχάνη ιατρὸς ἐπανερήμην ἦν;] The sense is this: Or will he only regard the opinion of the person who presides over the exercises, and prescribes the regimen, whoever he may be? It appears therefore that the word ought to be written πυγχάνη. Fischer attempts to defend the common reading, ὅσ τὸν πυγχανεί, which is entirely contrary to grammatical usage. It is also erroneous to use the optative πυγχάνοι, which would give this sense: Or will he regard the opinion of him only who would be master of the exercises and physician, that is, if some other circumstances took place. For the optative with ὅσ signifies that the sense is to be taken hypothetically.—ιατρός, in this passage, is the same person who is also called γυμναστής: his office was to prescribe the diet and regimen to future athletes, and to all persons who put themselves under his care to be trained in corporeal exercises (τοῖς γυμναζομένοισ), as may be seen from Xenoph. Mem. II. 1, 26. and other passages. To this person reference is made in the words εἴδωσέν γε καὶ ποτέν.—πανερήμην is the master of the exercises who used to teach wrestling to the young men in the palaestra. The words τί πράκτον καὶ γυμναστήν refer to the office of this person. The subject has been illustrated more extensively by Perizon. on Ἀειλιαν. V. H. II. 6. Fabricius on Sext. Empir. p. 535. Commentators on Aristoph. Nubb. v. 969.—In enumerating several particulars, the particle γέ is added to the word which commences, as it were, a new class of notions. See Heindorf on Ηιπ. Maj. p. 174.
I am surprised at Buttman’s finding so much difficulty in accounting for the imperfects in this passage. He quotes Theodoret, who has copied this passage, Curr. Affect. Græc. II. p. 27., as an authority for reading ἐγένετο—ἀπάλετο, so that the aorist may indicate customary acts. But this mode of using the aorist does not apply to this passage, and moreover Theodoret does not write ἀπάλετο, but ἀπόλλυται, which has been violently changed by Buttman. I think that the imperfect may be easily accounted for; since Socrates before used the imperfect when he opened the present disquisition, saying πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαύτα ἐλέγετο; why should he not here also use the same tense, to indicate that he was referring to the remarks which he had formerly made on the same topic with his friends? The common reading may therefore be thus paraphrased: ὁ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον γίγνεσθαι, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ὧν ἦμῶν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένων. The imperfect is here correctly employed to indicate the repetition of an action, but in a very different sense from that in which the aorist could be used for that purpose. See Matth. §. 503.

VIII. a πειθόμενοι μὴ τῆς τῶν ἑπαίωντον δόξῃ] Fischer has a long dissertation on this passage concerning the inversion of the order of words in the best writers by some such figure as synchysis or hyperbaton: but he appears to have overlooked the reason of the arrangement of the words in this passage. But it has been correctly remarked by Langius that μὴ is put before the words τῆς τῶν ἑπαίωντον δόξῃ, because another sentence in opposition, to be connected by ἄλλα with what goes before, must be understood. We may account in like manner for a passage in Xenoph. Memor. III. 9, 6. τὸ δὲ ἀγνοοῦν ἐαυτὸν καὶ μὴ ὡδε δοξάσειν τε καὶ οὐδεὶς γιγνώσκειν, ἐγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἰναί, although the later editors have written, contrary to the MSS., & μὴ ὡδε. The following passages are also similar to the present. Xenoph. Symp. IV. 16. μαίνονται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ τοὺς καλοὺς στρατηγοὺς αἰρούμενοι. Understand ἄλλα τοὺς αἰσχροὺς. Legg. XII. p. 943. A. ἐὰν δὲ τις ἐκλείπῃ τινὶ κάκῃ, μὴ στρατηγῶν ἀφέωντων, γραφᾶς ἀστρατειας εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς ἐρχοματι, ὥστε ἐλθομαν ἀπὸ στρατοτέδου. Phædo, p. 77. E. μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἠμῶν δεδομένων.—ἄρα βιωτὸν. That is, whether life is worth living for, i. e. agreeable and pleasant.

b ἄλλα μετ’ ἐκείνου ἄρα] Here ἄλλα—ἄρα is used in the same manner as δὲ—ἄρα in C. VI.
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c φ το ἀδικον μὲν λαβάται] In conformity with all the best MSS. I have retained φ, which all the more recent editors, except Bekker, have changed into δ, as it is written in Eusebius. For the verb λαβάσθαι may also be joined to a dative, as appears from Phrynich. in Bekker's Anecedot. T. I. p. 50. who writes: Λαβάσθαι τόνδε καὶ τῷ δε, αἰτιατικῷ καὶ δοτικῷ. Aristoph. Equitt. v. 1413. ἐν ἵδωσιν αὐτῶν, ὅς ἠλαβάσθη, οἱ ξένοι, where the common reading was οὐ, which Dindorf corrected from the Ravenna MS. Other examples are quoted by Creuzer on Plotinus de Pulcritud. p. 244., among others Dionys. Halic. Antiq. Rom. VII. 77. fin. p. 1501. ed. Reisk. (ἡ Βουλή) ἀναζητήσασα τὴν τῷ θεράπωντι λαβώσαμεν. The reason why the dative is changed by Eusebius into the accusative is easily accounted for. The word δινήσων immediately follows, and this is never used with any case but the accusative. But it is not unusual to put the relative pronoun before verbs of different constructions. Menexen. p. 239. C. ἐν δὲ οἴτε ποιήσῃ πω δόξαι δείλαι— λαβῶν ἔχει, ἔτε τέ ἐστιν ἐν μνήμεια. Sympos. p. 201. B. ἑκατολγήται, οὗ ἐνδής ἐστι καὶ μὴ ἔχει, τούτων ἴραν. Compare Matth. §. 428. 2.

d ἡ φαύλοστερον] Timaeus rightly interprets φαύλον by εὐτελεῖς. For it is here opposed to τιμώστερον. See Ruhnken on Tim. p. 268.


f οὐκ ὅρθως εἰσηγεῖ] Eἰσηγεῖσθαι is said of those who propose and urge any law or condition; hence, those who are advisers of any thing. See Sturtz's Lexicon. Xenophont. under this word.

g Δήλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα: φαίη γὰρ ἐν, δ σ. The MSS. vary much in this passage. The principal doubt is whether the words
δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα belong to the speech of Socrates, or to Crito's answer. The former opinion, on the authority of Ald. Bas. 1. 2., is held by Buttmann; the latter by Cornarius and Stephanus, who think that the words ought to be written: Δηλαδὴ καὶ ταῦτα φαίνεται εν τις, ὥς Socrates first were to affirm that the thing was manifest; then Crito to confirm this assertion; and Socrates finally again to express his approbation of the same opinion. But the reading suggested by Cornarius and Stephanus is inadmissible, since all the MSS. have γὰρ, and δηλαδὴ does not suit well with the remainder of the sentence. Wherefore we prefer the reading already restored by Im. Bekker, by which all difficulty is removed. For after Socrates has said that some may urge that the opinion of the vulgar is to be regarded on account of their power being so great as to enable them even to deprive of life whomsoever they please; Crito eagerly answers that this is manifest, for that certainly it might occur that some person would offer this objection. To this Socrates answers: Ἀληθὴ λέγεις, that is, you are very right in saying that this is evident, but ——; and he proceeds to show the groundlessness of the objection.

h ἀλλ' — ὅμως εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρῶτερον] That is, what we before said, that all opinions of men are not to be regarded and followed, but only the opinions of persons deservedly reputed wise, still remains certain, and has not been shaken by any argument. For what Socrates had affirmed (C. VI. near the beginning), before entering on the discussion, respecting the opinions of men, namely, that even under his present circumstances he ought to be guided by the same principles which had actuated him during the former part of his life, he now repeats and confirms in a few words at the close of the discussion. Therefore οὕτος ο λόγος, ὅν διεληλύθαμεν means the discourse on the opinions of the vulgar, which discourse, he says, ἦτι ὅμως εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρῶτερον, i. e. differs not from the sentiments to which he had formerly given utterance in conversation with his friends on the same subject, before he was prosecuted and condemned. For there can be no doubt that ὅ καὶ πρῶτερον λέγεις λόγος refers to a discussion he had formerly had with his friends on the same topic. Since this is the case, it is easy to see how the words, καὶ τὸν δὲ αὐτὸν συνάψει, εἰ ἦτι μὲν εἷμι ἣμῖν, ought to be understood. For since Socrates intended to speak respecting the love of life, and the desire of preserving it, he desires Crito to consider
whether their former opinions on this subject are still to be regarded as right and true. But as these words are connected with what goes immediately before, it is evident that the received reading: οὕτως τε ὁ λόγος—καὶ πρότερον—καὶ τὸν δὲ ἀδ ἁκόπει, is far preferable to that of the old editions: οὕτως γε ὁ λόγος—πρότερον. Καὶ τὸν δὲ ἀδ ἁκόπει. So καὶ ἂδ placed after τε. Charmid. p. 157. E. ή τε γὰρ πατρίδα ἡμῖν οἰκία—ἐγκεκριμενε,—καὶ καὶ ἡ πρὸς μητρὸς ἁσαντώς.


b μὴ ἀφιέντων 'Αθηναίων] That is, the Athenians not permitting me to be freed from punishment. Therefore there is no necessity for writing ἐφιέντων, which appears in the Tubing. MS., and one of Paris. The word is used in the same manner in Eurip. Med. v. 374. τὴν ἀφηκέν ἡμέραν μείνα με, i.e. permitted me to remain, mitigating the former severity.

c περὶ ἀναλάσεως χρημάτων] That is, that you and others ought to give money, to rescue me from prison. See C. IV.

d καὶ δόξας] That is, lest you should appear to have failed in your duty towards your friend. See C. III.

e καὶ παιδῶν τροφῆς] That is, that I ought to bring up and educate my sons. See C. V. Before μὴ, here and a little further on, understand ἡρα, which word is expressed in C. X. Compare Matth. §. 632. 2.

f σκέψεις] Reasons, considerations, principles, before called σκέψεις.

g τῶν πρὸς ἀποκτηνών] That is, by their votes.—The verb ἀναβιώσκεσθαι is to recall to life, to restore life, for your own benefit, if you profit by it, as Fischer rightly interprets. So Phædo. p. 89. B. Wytenbach, Epistol. crit. p. 232. ed. Lips., thought it ought to be read ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἂδ. But this is erroneous. For ἂν joined to participles has the same force as when added to the tenses of the optative, or to the imperfect and aorist indicative. Therefore the words are to be explained thus: καὶ τοῦτων, οἱ ἀνεβιώσκοντο γ' ἂν, εἰ νῦν τε ἦσαν. See Matth. §. 598. b. Buttm. §. 126. 14. The words τοῦτων τῶν πολλῶν are added by
apposition, with a kind of contempt, on which use of the pronoun ὁδὸς see C. IV. note (!), on the words ἐπείτα οὖν ὁδὸς τούτων τοὺς ἀνυκοφάντας.


µὴ οὖ δὲν ὑπολογίζοντες—πρὸ τοῦ ἄδικειν] Apolog. C. XVI. μηδὲν ὑπολογίζομενον µὴ τὸνατὸν µὴτε ἀλλο µηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ. The sense is this: See whether it is not improper to consider whether death or other calamities may result from our remaining here, previously to considering whether we shall do right or not. Παραμένειν is to remain in custody, and not to escape: it is used principally of faithful slaves, παραμένοι, to whom are opposed oi ἀποδιδόσκοντες, fugitives. See Xenoph. Occ. III. 4.

& ὅς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῖ—ἀλλὰ µὴ ἄκοντοι Various attempts have been made to explain this passage; but none of them appear perfectly satisfactory. The principal point in dispute is whether Socrates or Crito is the subject of the infinitive πεῖσοι. If we take Socrates as the subject, ταῦτα πράττειν must signify παύεσθαι λέγοντα πολλάκις τῶν αὐτῶν λόγον, and to ἄκοντοι we must supply σοῦ. The sense would then be: I am very desirous to persuade you (Crito) not to repeat again and again the same thing, provided this be not done against your will. But although this interpretation is approved of by Buttmann and Wernsdorf, it appears to me very objectionable. For, besides the fact that no example of such a use of the verb πράττειν has been produced, it appears inconsistent with the character of Socrates to wish to press his opinion on Crito in so urgent a manner.—If Crito be considered the subject, we must understand µοῦ with ἄκοντοι. The meaning will then be: I esteem it a great favour that you again and again attempt to persuade me to do this (i. e. to escape), only do not do so against my will. This, if carefully considered, means: I indeed prize highly your generous friendship, which prompts you to urge this counsel on me repeatedly (for the aorist indicates this repetition); but do not leave out of consideration my own will and opinion, since I am accustomed to be influenced not by motives, derived from external things, but solely by considerations of truth and virtue. This interpretation is
confirmed by what goes before, εἶ ἦν ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοὶ λέγοντος, κ. τ. λ.; for what is said there, εἶ δὲ μὴ, παύσαι ἥδη — πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν ἀυτὸν λόγον, is here more briefly expressed by the words, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔκοντος. The verb πράττειν is therefore used in its proper signification. Socrates says emphatically that Crito is attempting to persuade him to do this, i.e. to contrive the means of escaping.—Before μὴ repeat πείσης, from the preceding sentence; which expression cannot be regarded as harsh, when we recollect the frequent occurrence of the phrases μὴ μοι, μὴ μοι οὕτως, μὴ μοι ταῦτα, which have been explained by Heindorf, on Protagor. p. 494. —Instead of μὴ ἔκοντος the proper construction would have been μὴ ἔκοντα, which is extant in some MSS., but perhaps this passage is to be numbered amongst those in which the genitive is used without regard to the preceding verb. A passage very like this is in Thucyd. VII. 45.: χρημάτων μὲν ἄποριν αὐτούς ἐκτριχώσειν, ἀλλως τε καὶ ἐπὶ πλίον ἤδη ταῦτα διαρχοῦσας ναι ἔον θαλασσοκρατοῦν-τον. Compare Matth. §. 563. 

Χ. a ἐκοντα ἄδικητέον εἶναι] The grammarians commonly state that verbalis require a dative of the person; but an accusative also is used with them. The reason is, that they contain the notion of the verb δεῖν or χρῆμα, so that ἄδικητέον εἶναι is the same as ἄδικεὶν δεὶν. See Matth. Gr. §. 447. a. 
b ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσὶ[ Have been poured out, i. e. thrown away. Jacobs appropriately compares the expression with ἐκχεῖν πλοῖον, ἐκχεῖν χρῆματα. The words γέροντες ἄνδρες, which might have been omitted, are inserted in consequence of the strong opposition to παῖσιν. 
c ἔν παντὸς μᾶλλον] Παντὸς μᾶλλον, instead of which πάντων μᾶλλον, is also used.—It means; most of all, beyond all dispute. See Hemster. on Lucian. I. p. 173. 
d ὡμοὶ τὸ γε ἄδικεῖν — ] Compare Gorgias, p. 469., where being asked, σὺ ἢ ἄρα βούλοις ἢν ἄδικείσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄδικεῖ, he gave this most excellent answer: Βουλόμην μὲν ἂν ἐγώ γε οὐδέτερα. εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἰς ἄδικεῖν ἢ ἄδικείσθαι, ἔλοιμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἄδικείσθαι ἢ ἄδικεῖ. 
NOTES ON THE

drân ἄνθρωπος ἡγοῦμαι μέρος. That this was the general opinion is shown by the works of most ancient writers. For to revenge an injury was regarded as the characteristic of a brave spirit.

ε ὅσον ὅπως ἐρώτησα, τὸν ἀνθρώπον ὁποίον αὐτόν τους ἔχων  They is, even if he be subjected to the most grievous injuries. After πάσχα Ἐυσέβιος and Theodoret insert τις, without any necessity, since in the preceding.

dεὶ ἀνταδικεῖν there is a latent signification of an indefinite person.

κατά τί ὅσον ποτε ὁμ ζησι. Theodoret shown.

To Euthyphro, little and hand, 5) j person.

TOJ. 264

To right.

To J. 106

other is wrong ovSivi.

To ἄφιεν ἐκ των ἡγομαι καὶ ὁμαλα. That is, taking it never to be right. Rep. IV. p. 437. A. ὑποθέμενοι ὅσον τούτων ὄντως ἔχοντες. Protagor. p. 323. E. ἐνθεὶ δὲ πᾶς παντὶ θυμισται καὶ νοθετεὶ δῆλον διὸ ὅσος ἐξ ἐμπείρεις καὶ μαθησεῖς κτητής ὄφης. A little further on ἀρχή is the principle of the discussion, on which everything else is based. This is a very common use of the word. Τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, i.e. the conclusions drawn from that principle, as Euthyphro, p. 12. D. Cratyl. p. 402. D. — ἐμμενεῖν here means to abide by and retain your former opinion. Phædo, 92. A. ἐγὼ μὲν—καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶ σώ ἐπείσθην ὅπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὅσον ὁδηγεῖ ὁδοῖς.

XI. "Εκ τούτων ὅσον ἠθρεῖ] That is, if this is true, that it is wrong to injure any one in any manner, see what follows from it.

μὴ πείσουτε τὴν πόλιν.] That is, ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων or μή ἀφείεντων Ἀθηναίων, as in C. IX.

οἵ άμολογήσαμεν δ.] On the construction, see Matth. §. 473. 2.

ei μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένθε — Since the verb ἀποδιοράσκειν is generally used of run-away slaves, he adds, in order to soften the expression, εἶτ' ἄρωσ δεὶ ἀνομάζαι τοῦτο, i.e. or by whatever other name we are to call it. Legg. I. p. 633. A. εἴτε μερῶν εἶτ' ἀττα αὐτὰ καλεῖν χρεῖον ἐστιν.

ed. Brem.—Observe the accumulation of participles ἐλθόντες—ἐπιστάντες ἐρωτοῦντο. This passage seems to have been imitated by Cicero in Catil. I. 7.


εὸν μέρος] The same as, C. X. καθ' ὅσον δόνασαι.

καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι] That is, and not lie prostrate, being overthrown: for this is the force of the perfect tense.

ἀλ γενόμεναι δίκαι] Or αἱ δίκαι αἱ δικασθέοισαι, means: the judgments given or pronounced according to the laws.

[ὁτι Ἡδίκηε γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις] Respecting ὃτι prefixed to a speech quoted in the first person, see Matth. §. 624. c. Since the words are quoted in the first person, the introduction of γὰρ becomes intelligible. For Ἡδίκηε Heindorf preferred ἅδικηε. But Socrates does not now speak of injustice in general committed by the government upon the citizens, but of the particular injustice in his own condemnation: as is clear from the words, which immediately follow. The passage may be thus translated: For the state acted unjustly by us, in condemning us, and keeping us in prison. The correct view of the passage was taken by Buttmann, who also rightly observed that the verb ἐκρίνει is in the aorist.


[Ὡς καὶ ταῦτα ὠμολόγησο—δικαίρυ] Conjectural emendations have been made on this passage, but without any necessity.—Fischer justly remarks: “The passage is undoubtedly genuine, if we read ὃς καὶ ταῦτα, according to the MSS. and the Aldine edition. For as ἐμένειν ταῖς δικαίας is to abide by the judgments: so there cannot be a doubt but that the pronoun ταῦτα refers to the words going before: Ἡδίκηε γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὄρθως τὴν δίκην ἐκρίνει in this sense: Whether has this also been agreed on between us, namely, that you should accuse the state and its judgments of injustice; or rather has not the agreement been, that you should abide by the decisions which the state may make.”—On the expression ἐμένειν ταῖς δικαίαις, see Lucian. T. I. p. 606. ed. Reitz., where we find νόμωις ἐμένοντες. Liban. T. IV. p. 271. ed. Reisk. μένειν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις. Thucyd. p. 330. ed Ducker. Plat. Rep. X. p. 619, C. οὐ ἐμένοντα τοῖς προββήθεισιν.

[ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγεννησάμεν] It is worthy of observation,
in this passage, that πρῶτον is not followed by ἔπειτα. But the force of that word is in the following words: 'Ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφῆν τε καὶ παιδείαν, κ. τ. ῥ. For this might also have been written in the form: ἔπειτα ὥσ καλῶς προσέπαττον οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ τροφῆ τε καὶ παιδεία τεταγμένοι νῦνοι παραγγ. = παι- δεῖειν; ἢ καὶ τοῦτοι μέμφεις; A little further on Buttman substitutes ἐλάμβανε for the common reading ἐλαβε. Buttman maintains that the imperfect indicates not only the act of marriage, but also that it was performed according to law; but this assertion cannot, I think be proved. For since the words: καὶ δὲ ἡμῶν ἐλαβε—καὶ ἐφότισσε σε, contain the explanation of the preceding words: οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν, it appears impossible to doubt the correctness of ἐλαβε, which rests on the authority, if not of the best, at least of the most numerous MSS.—On the laws of the Athenians respecting marriages, see Meursius's Them. Attic. I. 14. II. 6.

c τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους] These words are added to explain more fully the preceding clause, and do not appear to me to be of doubtful authority, although I was formerly of opinion that τοῖς νόμοις arose from a gloss.


e ἢ οὐ καλῶς, κ. τ. ῥ.σ] The laws repeat with great emphasis the same question which they had previously put, in the words: 'Ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τ. τ. γ. — ἐπαιδεύσεις; The passage may be thus translated: But do you find fault with the laws respecting the rearing and education which you have received. Have not those of us (i.e. laws) which have been enacted for these purposes enjoined well, etc. The common reading ἢ οὐ κ. is incorrect.


Compare These irpos fj'Ler' iravra dUaidv Kal Kai a?5'.

"HAios doíe blon toioüton. See Apolog. Socr. C. XXXIII. note (d).

kai σ'ν ταύτα ἀντ. Most MSS., and amongst them Bodl., have kai σοι τ. ἀντ., which is received into the text by Beikk.; but I do not think that examples of such an expression as: δικαιών μοί ἐστι ταύτα ποιεῖν, will be found. This σ'ν is referred to the verb oíe, when common usage would require σε, which would refer to the infinitive εἶναι. It is not difficult to account for this construction. For by the use of σ'ν, the opposition is more emphatic; and, besides, the perspicuity of the passage would be injured, if we were to write: καὶ σε ταύτα ἀντια. Protagor. p. 316. C. ταῦτ' ὤν ἦδη σοι σκόπει, πότερον περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον, οὐδ' δειν διάλειγεσθαι πρὸς μόνον ἦ μετ' ἄλλων: where see Heindorf. Demosthen. de Male Gest. Legat. p. 414. 15. ed. Reisk. ἤγουμην ἐν τούτοις πρῶτος αὐτὸς περιείναι δειν αὐτῶν καὶ μεγαλοψυχότερον φαίνεσθαι. Fritsch. Lectt. Lucian. p. 102 foll. Schaefer Demosth. Appar. T. V. p. 626. A few words further on, σοί belongs to ἐξ ἦσον ἦν.

οὕτως δὲ ἀνακοῦντα ἀντιλεγεῖν—] These words are added for the purpose of explaining ταύτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν: I mention this lest it might be supposed that a clause is wanting. It has been already remarked that connectives are not used with sentences which are added for the purpose of explanation.

πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα—] Compare Apolog. Socrat. C. XXIII. note (c).—A little further on, instead of καὶ σοι ἡμᾶς simply, we have καὶ σοί δὲ ἡμᾶς, in order to add to the force of the opposition. The words: δὲ τῇ ἀλ. τ. ἄρ. ἐπιμελῆμεν, added by apposition, are ironical.

τιμωτερὸν ἐστὶ πατρὶς] There is no need of the article before πατρὶς, which is found in some MSS. For the nouns πατήρ, μήτηρ, παῖς, ἀδελφός, γῆ, πόλις, ἄγρος, and others, when not used in reference to a certain and definite individual, but to a whole class, are usually put without the article. See Schaefer. Melett. crit. p. 45. p. 62 foll. p. 116. on Sophocl. Ed. Tyr. v. 630. Buttmann, on Meno. §. 7. So, further on: καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μάλλων—πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἡ πατέρα. There is also an example in the preceding words: μητρὸς τε καλ. πατρῶς.

καὶ εἰν μείζονι μοίρα] 'Εν μείζονι μοίρα εἶναι is said of that
which is estimated more highly, which is in greater estimation and honour. Compare Valcken, on Herodot. III. 172. αὐτὴν ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ μεγάλῃ μορφῇ ἠγον.

ο ὁ καὶ ἠ πείθειν, ἡ ποιεῖν] Wolf translates it, aut persuadendo contendere oportere. For πείθειν is to conciliate by speaking, representing how the matter stands; to show a better way of proceeding. See Apolog. C. XXIV., where διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν are joined. A little further on: πείθειν ἦ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε.

η ὁ πείθειν αὐτήν ἦ τὸ δ. πέφ.] The infinitive πείθειν is used as if it had been preceded by ποιεῖν δει, which construction is very frequent. Gorg. p. 492. D. τὰς μὲν ἐπίθυμας φῆς οὗ κολαστέων, εἰ μέλει τις οὖν δει εἶναι, εἴναι δὲ αὐτὰς ὁς μεγίστας πληρωσιν ἠλλοθεν γε ποθὲν ἐναμάξειν. On which Heindorf remarks: “We are to supply δεῖν, the force of which is contained in κολαστέων.” Rep. IV. p. 424. B. Xenoph. Mem. I. 5. 5. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ— ἐλευθερίὰν ἀνδρὶ εὐκτένον εἶναι μὴ τυχεῖν δούλου τιοῦτον, δουλεύοντα δὲ— ἰκτεύειν τοὺς θεοὺς, κ. τ. λ. Lucian. Hermotim. c. 23. T. I. p. 761. πάντων καλοτα ἐπὶ τούτῳ σπουδαστέον, τὸν δ' ἄλλων ἀμελητέον, καὶ μηδὲ πατρίδος— πολὺν ποιεῖται λόγον, μήτε παλίν δ' γονέων— ἐπικλάθαι, ἀλλὰ καλοτα μὲν κακείνους παράκαλεῖν, κ. τ. λ.

XIII. a τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι] Stephan. erroneously conjectures τὸ. For, as Fischer remarks, the verb προσαγορεύομεν is connected with the infinitive ἐξεῖναι, and the words τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι signify by what means the laws proclaim that they allow any citizen, who chooses, to emigrate,—namely, by means of having made an enactment to that effect. Hence it is plain why the perfect tense is employed, and why προσαγορεύομεν is used, which some have translated: we proclaim, we order.

b ἐπείδαν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἴδῃ] This is the reading of all the MSS., with one exception; and there is no reason why it should be changed into δοκιμάσῃ, which is approved of by all the editors. For the sense is this: After he has become his own master, has arrived at years of discretion, and has become acquainted with public affairs; that is, when he has arrived at that age, in which he is most capable of judging about matters relating to the commonwealth. This passage is illustrated by Ἀσchin. adv. Timarch. p. 26. ed. Bremi. ἐπείδαν δὲ ἐγγραφῇ τις εἰς τὸ λῃχιαρχικόν γραμματεῖον, καὶ τοὺς νόμους εἶδον τοὺς τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ἥδη διϊσταῖ διαλογιζεσθαι τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ μῆ, οὐκ ἐτερφί διαλέγεται (ὁ νομοθέτης). We are now to consider what was the δοκιμασία εἰς ἀνδρας. The names of
those persons who wished to have the full and perfect rights of Athenian citizens, and to attain to public honours, were enrolled in the ἀνθιηρχίκον. Before this could be done, the young men underwent an examination as to their parentage, whether they were legally adopted, and other particulars of a similar kind. See Demosthen. in Midiam, c. 43., and the Commentary of Ulpian.— Further on, observe the accusative ἀλβώντα, although it is preceded by τῷ βουλομένῳ. Sophocl. Electra, v. 470. Ἠπεστὶ μωι θράσος, ἀδυνάτων κλέωναν ἄρτιως ἀντιφάτων: on which see Brunck. Lysias, Epitaph. p. 28. ήτων γὰρ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις—ἡμοῦντας.

c εἰς ἀποικίαν ἵναι—μετοικεῖν ἄλλοις ποιῇ] Εἴς ἀποικίαν ἵναι, is to go to an Athenian colony: but metoikéin is to go to a place belonging to a foreign power, Greek or Barbarian, as has been correctly remarked by Fischer.

d καὶ ἦν ὁμολογήσας ἢ μὴν πείθεσαι, κ. τ. λ.] The common reading for ἢ μὴν was ἢμῶν, which has been corrected from the best MSS.—See Buttmann, §. 149.

e οὕτε πείθει ἡμᾶς] Understand, that we act unjustly: as appears from the words εἰ μὴν καλῶς τι ποιοῖμεν. But after saying: οὕτε πείθεται οὕτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, there was no need to add: τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ. However, since by the words: προτιθέμενων ἠμῶν—διεῖν δάτερα, the principal idea intended to be conveyed is in some measure thrown out of view, there is no impropriety in the repetition, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ; especially, since another member of the sentence may appear to commence with ἀλλὰ ἐφιέντων.—A similar negligence of construction has been noticed by Heindorf, on Theaet. §. 73.—The laws are in this passage said προτιθέμαι, those things which they order to be done; because all edicts are publicly set forth, in order that they may be read and judged of by all; which is necessary to enable any one to suggest any improvement. Therefore the passage may be thus translated: Whereas we give every one the opportunity of learning and judging of what is enacted by us, and do not compel any one by arbitrary severity to do what we wish to be done; and moreover give a choice of two things, either to convince us of error, or, if he is unable to do so, to obey us; nevertheless, this man does neither of these things.

XIV. Ταῦτας δ' ὑφ. — ἐνέχεσθαι] Hesychius: ἐνέχεσθαι· ἐγκαλεῖσθαι, κρατεῖσθαι, συνέχεσθαι. The proper signification of ἐνέχεσθαι is to hold a person bound: hence the middle verb means: to give one's-self up to be bound, to permit one's-self to be bound, that is, to be held bound, and, in the legal sense, to be liable to a charge;
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from which is derived ἐνοχὸς, obnoxious, liable to a charge. Therefore the sense is: We say that you also will be liable to these accusations, or, will be guilty of these crimes.

b ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα] Understand ἐνεχομένοις.


d τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων διαφερόντως] That is, more than the other Athenians. See Phædo, p. 64. E. On the subject here spoken of, see Phædr. p. 230. D.

e ἐπὶ θεωτάν] That is, to witness the solemn games, namely, the Olympian, Nemæan, Isthmian and Pythian, which were attended by persons from every part of Greece.

f εἰ μὴ τοι στρ.] When he fought at Potidea and Amphipolis, towns of Thrace, and at Delium, a town of Boeotia. See Apolog. C. XVII. and Laert. II. 22.

g οὔδ’ ἄλλων—εἰδέναι] That is, οὔτε εἰδέναι αὐτοῖς. We are informed by Seneca, Laertius, Libanius, and others, that Socrates resisted the inducements of Archelans, king of Macedonia, and other princes, who invited him to settle in their dominions.

h ὁμολογεῖς καθ’ ἡμᾶς πολιτεύοσθαι] The infinitive which is here put in the present tense, was changed by Stephens, against the MSS., into πολιτεύοσθαι. In the same manner, C. XIII. near the end: καὶ δὴ ὁμολογήσας ἡ μὴ πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει. And, further on in this chapter: φῶσκοντες σε ὁμολογηκέναι πολιτεύοσθαι, καὶ δὴ ἡ ἡμῶν ἕξωθον πολιτεύοσθαι, where Stephens likewise corrected to πείθεσθαι and πολιτεύοσθαι. Legg. p. 937. B. ἐν ἐγγυηθῆν ἐξιχνεον ἡ μὴ μένειν καταστήσας: where Ast, with Stephens, wrote μενείν. Herodot. IX. 106. πιστὲ τε καταλαβόντες καὶ ὄρκοις ἐμέμενεν τε καὶ μὴ ἀποστήσεσθαι: where Westling, against the MSS., substituted ἐμέμενεν. Xenophon. Cyrop. VI. 2, 39. ἐμοὶ προσαγαγὼν ἐγγυηθάς ἡ μὴ πορέσεσθαι: where Stephens preferred πορεύσεσθαι. Anabas. II. 3, 27. ὄμοσαί ἡ μὴ πορέσεσθαι: where Schneider, after Stephens, gave πορεύσεσθαι. Eurip. Med. v. 750. ὄμνιμι—ἐμέμενεν, ἢ σου κλώ: where see Schaefer. It certainly is not indifferent whether the future or present tense is used. If the future is employed, the speaker indicates an action not yet present, but which will take place at some future time, and promises that he will perform it at a future time. As in Xenophon. Hellen. II. 4, 30. ὄμωσαντες ὄρκοις ἡ μὴ μὴ μνησικακήσειν, could not be expressed in any other manner, since not a present, but a future vengeance
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is thought of. But if the present is used, the speaker refers to a state of things, not simply in futurity, but now present, although it may continue longer. When a person says: ἢ μὴν, ἐμμένω; he declares by these words that, from the very moment of his giving the oath, he will abide by what he promises, since the circumstances are now present which call for its fulfilment. If this is a correct view, it must be easy to determine whether the present is to be retained in this passage, or the future form substituted. Let us imagine a citizen swearing that he will direct and govern his life, manners, and pursuits, according to the laws and ordinances of the state, in which he is about to live. Which will be the most correct: ἢ μὴν ὀμολογῶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους πολιτεύεσθαι; or ἢ μὴν ὀμολογῶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους πολιτεύεσθαι? It appears to me, that the second form of the oath is preferable; since it indicates that from the moment of taking it he will obey the laws. It cannot then be wrong to use the same law of construction in obliqua oratione (i. e. in reciting a speech in the third person), as is used in directa oratione (i. e. in the speech as it comes from the speaker). Therefore, in all the passages before quoted, to which many others might be added, I think the reading of the MSS. ought to be preserved, as being singularly adapted to the meaning. For as to the addition of καὶ μὴ ἀποστήσεσθαι, the passage may be easily understood, without changing ἐμμένων into ἐμμενεῖν. For the sense of the word is: Affirming that they both now are willing to abide by their promises, and will never violate them at a future time.—The next words: τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποίησον, are added as if they were preceded by καὶ ἐπολιτεύου, i. e. and you conducted yourself as a citizen as well in other things, as also in this, that, &c. This construction arises from the free formation of sentences often employed by the Greeks, who paid in such cases more regard to the sense, than to the grammatical construction.

1 ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμῆσασθαι] When the judges gave their first votes on his case. For, as we have mentioned in a note on Apolog. Socr. C. XXV. the accuser always fixed the punishment in the indictment, if no punishment was already fixed by the laws. This was called τιμᾶν, which governs a dative of the person, and a genitive of the punishment. After the pleadings had been gone through, and the judges had by the first vote found the accused person guilty, he was asked what punishment he thought that he had deserved: τί δέχοις εἰς παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσωι. This was τιμῆσασθαι or ἀντιτιμῆ- σασθαι, Apolog. Socr. C. XXVI. and XXVII., or ὑποτιμῆσασθαι,
as in Xenophon, Apolog. Soc. C. XXIII. Therefore Socrates, on this question being put, might have answered that he had deserved exile.—καλλωπιζεσθαι, according to Hesychius, is properly κοσμείσθαι, to adorn, or deck one’s-self: whence καλλωπιστρια, a female who adorns others, a lady’s-maid. But in a metaphorical sense it signifies: to be haughty like persons who are proud of their dress, to be elated, to swagger, as here. Protagor. p. 333. D. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκαλλωπιζετο ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας—ἐπειτα μέντοι ξυνεχάρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Respecting the infinitive τεθνάναι, for which θυησκεύω might have been expected, see Apolog. Socrat. C. XVII. note (2).  

κ άλα τι οὖν ἦν φαίεν] The particle ἦν was commonly omitted; but it is by no means improperly inserted in this sentence, Aristoph. Pac. v. 137. ἄλλ’ ὁ μέλε ὡς μοι στίνων διπλῶν ἠθει. Demosth. p. 1445. 14. ed. Reisk. τι οὖν ἦν εἴσοι τις στὶ παραινεῖς; Olynth. p. 14. 5. ed. R. τι οὖν ἦν τις εἴσοι στὶ γράφεις; Plato, Phaed. p. 87. B. τι οὖν ἦν φαίη δ λόγος ὑπὶ ἀπιστεῖς;  

1 άς δη ἐκάστοτε φης εὐνομ.] The laws and institutes of these states are spoken favourably of by Socrates, Republ. VIII. p. 544. C. Legg. I. p. 634 foll. Protagor. p. 342. C. D. Alcibiad. I. p. 121. In this place δη is equivalent to the Latin scilicet, on which use of the word see Valcken. on Herodot. V. 20. —ἐκάστοτε, as often as you speak of them.  

μ οὔθε τῶν βαρβαρικῶν] This is the correct reading, being opposed to πόλεων Ἐλληνίδων. If βαρβάρων were read, τῶν Ἐλλήνων πόλεων would have been used.—Πηρὶ and ἀνάπτροι are applied to those who are deficient in any part or member of the body, or at least deprived of its use, as is correctly observed by Fischer on this passage.  

ν οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὑπὶ.] These words appeared to Stephens to have arisen from a gloss. But Fischer has correctly observed that, if they were removed, what follows would lose almost all its force: τινὶ γὰρ ἦν πόλις ἄρεσκοι ἱκεῖν νόμον; Besides δῆλον ὑπὶ or, as it was commonly written, δηλοῦται, refers not only to οἱ νόμοι, but to the whole of the foregoing sentence, as if the passage stood thus: δῆλον ὑπὶ ὑπὸν διαφερόντως σοὶ ἱδεσκεύν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ οἱ νόμοι.  

ο ἦν ἡμῖν γε πεῖθρ] In these words the laws answer themselves. At the close of the sentence we are to understand: ἄλλα ἐμμενεῖν, being a repetition of the expression, which was employed in asking the question.
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XV. \(\tau\eta\ \tauουτων\ \piολιτεία\] Understand, of the citizens of those states.— ὤποβλέψοντας σε. Hesychius: ὤποβλεπόμενος ὄπονος, ἐχθραῖνων. The meaning of ὤποβλέπεσθαι is to regard with suspicion, to suspect, and sometimes to hate, to be an enemy of.

\[\beta\varepsilon\varepsilonιμ α\varepsilonις\ τ. δ.\] That is, You will confirm the judges in their opinion that they were right in condemning you: or, you will confirm others in the opinion that the judges were right in their decision; as if the reading were ὅστε αὐτοὺς δοκεῖν, κ. τ. ἀ. Euthydem. p. 305.

D. ἓν τούτων εἰς δόξαν καταστήσωσι, μηδενὸς δοκεῖν ἄξιον εἶναι.

c καλ τῶν ἄνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους] Κόσμιοι is said of those who observe τὸν κόσμον, i. e. order and moderation, or, as Fischer interprets it, those who diligently direct and regulate their life, morals, and pursuits according to the standard of the laws; moderate, upright. See Perizon. on Ἀδιαν. V. H. XIV. 7.

d καλ τούτο ποιοῦτι ἄρα ἄξιον. \[P\h(e)\d\(\phi\)\(a\)\(d\)\] Phædo, p. 65. A. καλ δοκεῖ γέ ποι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἄνθρωπος, ὃ μηδὲν ἥδω τῶν τοιοῦτων, ἂν ἄξιον εἶναι ζήν. — A little further on we have written: καλ ἀνακριθήσεις διαλεγόμενος — τίνας λόγους; since the structure of the sentence is changed by an interrogation suddenly introduced. The former reading was: καλ ἀνακριθήσεις διαλεγόμενος τίνας λόγους, ὃ Σ., ἢ οὔσπερ ἐνθάδε. The interrogative pronoun, τίνας, is found in the best MSS.

e ἄκομημον ἀν φανείσθαι] The particle ἀν with a future infinitive is not unusual. See Apol. C. XVII. note (?). Τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πράγμα, the business, or affair of Socrates, is to be understood as meaning Socrates himself. So τὸ πράγμα is said of the people, Gorg. p. 520. B.—The expression οἰσθαὶ γε χρῆ is often used in this manner. See C. XVI. ἓν δὲ εἰς "Ἄδιον ἀποδημήσῃ, οὐχὶ ἐπιμελησθοῦνται; — οἰσθαὶ γε χρῆ. Phæd. p. 68. A. οὐκ ἀμένους εἰσιν αὐτόσε; οἰσθαὶ γε χρῆ. Protag. p. 325. C. ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται οὐδ' ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν; οἰσθαὶ γε χρῆ. Gorg. p. 412. B.

f ἐκεῖ ἤπειρον ἓν πλείστη — ἀκολοούσα] The Thessalians were then infamous, on account of the licentiousness of their mode of living; their fraudulence, indecency, wantonness, luxury, and other vices. See Athenæus, IV. 6. p. 137. X. 4. p. 418. XII. 6. p. 527. XIV. 23. p. 663. — Fischer.

g σκεῦν τε τίνα περιθ.] Hesychius and Suidas: σκευή· στολή. Phavorinus: σκευή· δέχτωνας, τὸ ἐνδύμα· ὅθεν καὶ σκευάζομαι τὸ
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εὐδόκωμαι. A garment which covers the whole body appears to be understood, as appears from the verb περιτιθέομαι.

That is, habit or clothing. Hesychius: σχῆμα—ιματισμὸς. This use of the word has been noticed by Kuster, on Suidas, T. I. p. 192. The words are thus connected: σκεύην τε περιθέμενος καὶ τὸ σχῆμα μεταλάβας. But the words: ἥ διφθ. λ. ἥ ἄλλα, κ. τ. λ. indicate the different kinds of τῆς σκευής.

εὐθυμίας οὕτω γλασχρως] Here τολμᾶν is to endure, not to blush at, οὐκ ἀπεχώνεσθαι. See Jacobs Addit. ad Athenæum. p. 309.

εἰ δὲ μή] But if otherwise; but if you should be troublesome to the Thessalians. See Matthiae Gr. §. 617. Buttmann, §. 135. 10. Compare Eurip. Alcest. v. 707. εἰ δὲ ήμᾶς κακῶς ἐρείς, ἀκούσει πολλὰ κοῦ ψευδή κακὰ.

ὑπερχώμενος δὴ—πάντας — καὶ δουλεύω] Schleiermacher considers τὶ ποιῶν introduced in so awkward a manner, and δουλεύων so superfluous, that he regards the latter as a gloss on ὑπερχώμενος, and would read the sentence: ὑπερχώμενος δὴ π. ἀνθρ. βιώσει καὶ τὶ ποιῶν. Buttmann, disliking the introduction of ἐν Θεταλίᾳ, towards the end of so long a sentence, and having seen in one of the Vindob. MSS., εἰς Θεταλίαν, omits these words after ἰποδεθήμου, and thus remodels the whole passage. ὑπερχώμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καὶ τὶ ποιῶν ἧ εὐχαριστοῦμεν, εἰς Θεταλίαν ἐστερ ἐπὶ δείπνου ἰποδεθήμοκας; But, to say nothing of the objections which might be offered to this correction, it does not appear necessary to alter the common reading. For καὶ δουλεύων is by no means without a distinct signification; it expresses the meaning more forcibly than the preceding ὑπερχώμενος.

For the meaning is: You will live indeed studying how to insinuate yourself into the favour and companionship of others, and even being a slave to them. The second reproach, therefore, is much stronger than the first, especially when directed against a man, who had so utter an aversion to every thing servile. It does not appear necessary to insert καὶ before τὶ ποιῶν, as Schleiermacher has done. For these words are not closely connected with what goes before, although the interrogation only begins here. I have therefore considered it sufficient to put a shorter stop after δουλεύων than the common full point. The sense of the whole passage is: You will therefore live the flatterer, and even the slave of other men: how else employed, pray, than banquetting in Thessaly, as if you had gone to
Thessaly from your own country to some feast? The repetition of Thessaly is not without force. On what follows, compare Axioc. p. 124. Αξιόεξες, τι ταῦτα; ποῦ τὰ πρῶτευν αὐχέματα; Soph. Οἰ. T. v. 940. ο θεῶν μαντεύματα, ἧν εστέ; Ibid. 946. τὰ σέμαν ἧν ἦκε τοῦ θεοῦ μαντεύματα; Eurip. Suppl. v. 127. τὸ δ' Ἀργος ὡμῖν ποῦ 'στιν; ἢ 'κόμπει μάτην;

m ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων ἐνεκά β.] Here ἀλλὰ δὴ, like the Latin at enim, may be translated: But perhaps you will say that. It is used for the purpose of refuting an objection by anticipation. Republ. X. p. 600. A. ἀλλὰ δὴ εἰ μὴ δημοσίᾳ, ἵδια τισὶν ἡγεμόνι παιδείας αὐτὸς ξόν λέγεται Ὀμήρος γενέσθαι. Protag. p. 338. C. ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίων ἢμῶν αἰρήσοσθε. Where see Heindorf. Compare C. VIII. of Crito, near the end.

n ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο σου ἀπολαύσωσιν:] The verb ἀπολαύων, which is properly said of things good and pleasant, is often employed with Attic εἰρωνεία in a bad sense. Legg. p. 910. B. καὶ πᾶσα ὀστῶς ἡ πόλις ἀπολαύη τῶν ἀσεβῶν τρόπων τινὰ δικαλῶ. Lucian. Dialog. Deor. X. Sol. τοιαύτα ἀπολαύσονται τῶν Δίων ἐρώτων. Mercur. Σιάπα, δ Ἡλία, μὴ τι κακῶν ἀπολαύσῃ τῶν λόγων.

o αὐτοῦ] That is, At Athens.—Immediately afterwards θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύονται are to be taken παθητικῶς. Compare Matth. §. 496. note 4. Buttm. §. 123. 3.

p πότερον εὰν εἰς Θ.] Lest the reader might find a difficulty in the want of a conjunction to connect this sentence with the preceding, it may be remarked that sentences placed in strong opposition are often without any particle. Therefore there is no reason for reading with Eusebius, πότερον δὲ εἴπ. — On the words εἰ τι θρέλος, see C. V. note (m).

XVI. a πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου] See C. IX. note (l).

b οὕτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε] That is, in this life.

c ταῦτα πράττοντι] Which Crito has proposed to you.

d ἡμεῖνον εἴναι] ἡμεῖνον εἴναι is constantly used instead of ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. Compare Apolog. Socr. C. II., near the end. Phaedo, p. 115. A. Gorg. p. 468. B. D. Republ. III. p. 410. D. But since the comparative ἡμεῖνον is frequently used in this manner, ὡδὲ δικαίωτερον ὡδὲ δισῴτερον are also added by a kind of attraction. In the same manner Phaedo, p. 98. E. The sense is: Neither you, nor any of your friends will be, or be considered, happier, juster, or holier, if you make your escape.
That is, But if you do not comply with the suggestions of Crito, you will depart, &c.

XVII. \( \ddot{\alpha} \tau_{i} \dot{e} \gamma \omega \ \delta o k \omega \ \dot{a} k. \) The Corybantes were priests of the Mother of the Gods in Phrygia, and they leaped or danced under the influence of the divinity. See Strabo. X. p. 725. Almelov. Whence \( k o r u b a t i a t \dot{a} n \) is, to be affected with the disease called \( k o r u b a n t i a s m \dot{o} s, \) in which the person imagines he hears the sound of flutes in his ears: which disease was supposed to come from the Corybantes. See Scaliger on Catull. XLII. 8. and Langbaen. on Longin. p. 209. Toll. Compare also Ruhnken on Tim. p. 163.—\( \dot{h} \chi \hat{h}, \) for \( \dot{h} \chi \nu s, \) is an Attic word. See Mæris and Thomas M. under the word.—\( b o m b e i n, \) to buzz, is here said of the voice of the laws resounding in his ears. Synesius Epist. 123. \( \dot{e} m b o m b e i \ \mu o n \ \tau a i s \ \dot{a} k o a i s \ \dot{h} \ \theta a u m a s t \tau \eta \ \sigma o u \ \tau \acute{a} \nu \ \sigma o r f \acute{a} \nu \ \lambda \gamma \nu \nu \ \dot{h} \chi \hat{h}. \) —A little further on \( \tau o \theta i — \mu \acute{a} t \eta n \ \dot{e} \rho e i s \) is used as in Apolog. Socr. C. V. \( e \ddot{b} \ \mu e n t o i \ \dot{i} s t e, \ \pi \acute{a} s a n \ \dot{u} \dot{m} \nu \ \tau \eta n \ \dot{a} l \hat{h} \theta e i a n \ \dot{e} \rho \acute{a}. \) Ibid. C. XVII. \( t a u n \tau a \ \gamma \acute{a} r \ \k e l \dot{e} \dot{b} e i —, \ \ddot{e} \ddot{b} \ \dot{i} s t e. \)

\( \dddot{e} d n \ \tau i \ \lambda \acute{e} g \eta s \ \pi a r \dot{a} \ \tau a \dot{u} t a. \) Phædr. p. 107. A. \( o \dddot{b} k o u n \ \dot{e} \gamma \omega \gamma e \ \dot{e} \gamma \omega \ \pi a r \dot{a} \ \tau a \dot{u} t a \ \dddot{a} l l \dot{o} \ \tau i \ \lambda \acute{e} g e i n. \) Phædo, p. 80. B. \( \dot{e} \chi o m e i n \ \tau i \ \pi a r \dot{a} \ \tau a \dot{u} t a \ \dddot{a} l l \dot{o} \ \lambda \acute{e} g e i n. \)
APPENDIX.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

Chap. I. ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Αὐτὸς, ὁ Φαίδων, παρεγένους Σωκράτει ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἣ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιαν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου τοῦ ἱκουσας; ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Αὐτὸς, ὁ Ἐξέκρατες. EX. Τι οὖν δὴ ἐστιν ἄττα εἰπεν b ὁ ἀνήρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐπελεύσατα; ἤδεως γὰρ ἂν ἁκούσαμι. καὶ γὰρ οὐτε τῶν πολιτῶν Φιλασιων c οὐδεὶς πάνυ τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθηναίες, οὐτε τις ξένος ἀφίκται χρόνου συχνῶν ἐκεῖθεν, ὡστε ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές τι ἀργγεῖλαι οἶδο τ' ἦν a περὶ τούτων, πλὴν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πῶν ἀποθάνου; τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἰχε φράζειν. ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἀρα ἐπύθεσθε οὖν τρόπον ἐγένετο; EX. Ναὶ, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἠγγειλέ τις, καὶ ἑθαυμάζομεν γε, ὅτι, πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς, πολλῷ ὑστερον e φαίνεται ἀποθανόν. τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο, b ὁ Φαίδων; ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχῃ τις αὐτῷ, ὁ Ἐξέκρατες, συνέβη; ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραιᾷ τῆς δίκης ἡ πρύμνα i ἐστεμμένη k τοῦ πλοίου, δὲ εἰς Δήλον Ἀθηναίοι πέμποντες. EX. Τούτο δὲ δή τι ἐστιν; ΦΑΙΔ. Τούτο ἐστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὅσ φασιν Ἀθηναίοι, ἐν δ Ὁσηεύς m ποτὲ εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς διὸ ἐπτά ἐκείνους ὥστε ἄγων καὶ ἐσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὐξαντο, ὅσ λέγεται,
τότε, εἰ σωθεὶς, ἐκάστου ἐτος ὑπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον ἢν δὴ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἐτερεῖ ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπτουσιν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀρχονταὶ τῆς θεο- ρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθα- ρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσία μηδένα ἀποκτινώναι, πρὶν ἄν εἰς Δῆλον τε ἀφίκῃται τὸ πλοίον καὶ πάλιν δεύρο τοῦτο δ' ἐνίοτε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχοις ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες αὐτούς. ἁ ἀρχῇ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας, ἐπειδὰν ὁ ίερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψῃ τὴν πρύμναιν τοῦ πλοίον· τοῦτο δ' ἐτυχεῖν, ὡς περ λέγω, τῇ προτεραιᾷ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταύτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμω- τηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

Π. EX. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τῶν θάνατων, ὁ θατιδων; τί ἢν τὰ λεγόντα καὶ πραξάντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδεῖων τῷ ἀνδρί; ἢ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ ἀρχοντες α' παρεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα ἄλος; ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδ' ἐγγυτάτων, ἀλλὰ παρῆσαν τίνες, καὶ πολλοὶ γε. EX. Ταύτα δὴ πάντα προθυμιήθητι ὃς σαφέστατα ἦμιν ἀπαγγέλλειν, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυργχάνει οὖνα. ΦΑΙΔ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε, καὶ πει- ράσομαι ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι· καὶ ἄρα τὸ μεμνήσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούσθην ἔμοιγη αἰεὶ πάντων ἥδιστον. EX. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὁ θα- τιδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσμένους γε τοιότοις ἑτέρους ἐχεῖς. ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνη ἀκριβέστατα διελθεῖν πάντα. ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγες θαυμάσια ἐπαθον παραγενόμενος. οὔτε γάρ ὃς θανάτῳ παρόντα μὲ ἀν- δρός ἐπιτηδείου ἐλεος εἰσήγε. εὐδαίμων γὰρ μοι ἄνδρ ἐφαίνετο, ὁ Ἐξέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λό- γων, ὡς ἀδεως καὶ γενναιος ἐτελεύτα, ὡστ' ἐμοι' ἐκεῖνον παριστάσθαι μηδ' εἰς Ἀιδοῦ ιόντα ἄνεν θείας
μοῖρας ἢ ἑναὶ, ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖσε ἀφικόμενον εὐ πράξειν, εἴπερ τις πῶποτε καὶ ἄλλος. διὰ δὴ ταύτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἐλεευνὸν εἰς ἑι, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειν εἴναι παρόντι πένθει ณ οὗτοι αὐ ὧδον ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων, ἢ ὡς ἐν τῷ παρῴης τοὺς δοξάζοντας. 

EX. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ΦΑΙΔ. Ἑκεῖνος τε τοιὸν παντάπασιν οὕτως ἔπχη, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐτε- 

tαράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. EX. Ἐνυχον δὲ, ὁ Φαίδων, 

tίνες παραγενόμενοι; ΦΑΙΔ. Οὔτος τε ὃ τι ἀπολ- 

ἴδορος τῶν ἑπτιχορίων παρῆν καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἔτε Ἐρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Ἀἰσχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης. ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήςιππος ὁ Παιανεὺς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι 

tίνες τῶν ἑπτιχορίων; Πλάτων δὲ, οἶμαι, ἡσθένει. 

EX. Ξενοὶ δὲ τίνες παρῆσαν; ΦΑΙΔ. Ναι, Σύμμαθα 

tέ γε ὁ ὘θείας καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαίδωνδῆς, καὶ Με- 

γαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων. EX. Τί δαί; 

Ἀρσιτιππος καὶ Κλεομῆρος παρεγένοντο; ΦΑΙΔ. Ὄφ 

ἑτα: ἐν Δίγινη γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι. EX. Ἀλλος 

tές παρῆν; ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδὸν τί οἴμαι τούτους παρα- 


gένομαι. EX. Τί οὖν δῆ; τίνες, φῆς, ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; 

ΠΙΙ. ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ σοι εὔ άρχής πάντα πειράσσομαι διηγήσασθαι. ἀεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας 

eἰώθειμεν φοιτᾶν καὶ ἔγω καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σω- 

κράτη, συνηλεγόμενοι ἐσθὲν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐν φ
καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο: πλησίον γὰρ ἦν ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. περιμενομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε, ἐώς ἀνοιχθεὶν τὸ δεσμωτηρίου, διαπρῆβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων ἀνεφγετο γὰρ οὐ τρώς ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθεὶ, εἰσῆμεν παρά τὸν Ὁσκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερέομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ προϊαίτερον ἠνελέγημεν. τῇ γὰρ προτεραίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἐσπέρας, ἐπυθόμεθα, ὅτι τὸ πλοῦν ἐκ Δήλου ἀφιγμένον εἶναι παρηγγειλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλους ἤκειν ὡς προϊαίτατα εἰς τὸ εἰώθὸς. καὶ ἦκομεν, καὶ ἦμιν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰσῆθει ὑπακούειν, εἰπεν περιμένειν καὶ μὴ προτερον παριέναι, ἐως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ. Λύουσι γὰρ, ἐφι, οἱ ἐνδέκα Ὁσκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλοσιν, ὅπως ἄν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτησθῇ. οὐ πολὺν δὲ οὖν χρόνον ἐπισεχὼν ἤκει καὶ ἐκέλευσεν ἡμᾶς εἰσίναι. εἰσίοντες οὖν κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Ὁσκράτη ἄρτι λευμένον, τῇ δὲ ᾿Εανβίππην, γιγανόσκεις γάρ, ἐχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ᾿Εανβίππη, ἀνευφήμησε τε καὶ τοιαύτ' ἀττα εἰπεν, οἷα δὲ εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι δὲ Ὁσκράτης, ὅστατον δὴ σε προσεροῦσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτίθεοι καὶ σὺ τούτους. Καὶ ὁ Ὁσκράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα, ᾿Οι Κριτῶν, ἔφη, ἀπαγαγέτω τις ταύτην οἰκαδε. Καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἄτηγον τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσαν τε καὶ κοππομένην ὁ δὲ Ὁσκράτης ἀνακαθίζομεν ἐπὶ τήν κλίνην συνέκαμψε τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἄμα Ἡώς ᾿Ατοπον', ἔφη, ὡς ἄνδρες, ἐοικε τί εἶναι τούτο, ὁ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἥδυ ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τῷ ἀμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἔθελεν παραγγειλεθαι τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ, ἐνάν δὲ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἔτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκαζέοθαι αἰεὶ λαμβάνειν
καὶ τὸ ἑτερον, ὡσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένω δῦ ὄντε. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφι, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Δίσωπος, μῦθον ἀν συνθείναι, ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλαξαὶ πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἢδύνατο, ξυνηψεν εἰς ταῦτὰν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφὰς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὦ ἄν τὸ ἑτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὡστερον καὶ τὸ ἑτερον. ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ αὑτῷ μοι ἐοικεν, ἐπειδὴ υπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει πρότερον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἥκειν ὑπὸ φαινεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδὺ.

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LXIV. Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ, ὁ Κρίτων, Ἐιεν, ἐφὶ, ὁ Σῶκρατες τι δὲ τοῦτοι ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐπιστέλλεις ἢ περὶ τῶν παῖδων ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του, ὦ τι ἀν σοι ποιοῦντες ἥμεις ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοίμεν; ὃ ἀπερ ἀεὶ λέγω, ἐφὶ, ὁ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν καινότερον ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελοῦμεν ὡς ἥμεις καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τὸς ἐμοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἄττ' ἂν ποίητε, κἂν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσητε' ἐὰν δὲ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἀμελήτε, καὶ μὴ θέλητε ὡσπερ κατ' ἱλίνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ξῆν, οὐδ' ἐὰν πολλὰ ὀμολογήσητε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε. Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖνυν προθυμηθησόμεθα, ἐφὶ, οὐτω ποιεῖν θάπτωμεν δὲ σε τίνα πρόπον; Ὢτιος ἂν, ἐφὶ, βουλήσθε, ἕκαστος ἐν φασίγετε με καὶ μὴ ἐκ-φύγοι υμᾶς. Γελάσας δὲ ἀμα ἤσυχὴ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἰπεν, Οὐ πεῖθω, ἐφὶ, ὁ ἀνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὥς ἐγὼ εἰμι οὕτος ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ νυνι διαλεγόμενος καὶ διατάττων ἐκαστὸν τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ' οὐτεῖ δι' ἐκείνον εἰναι, ὃν ὡς βιοῦλον ὡστον νεκρὸν, καὶ ἑρωτᾶ δὴ, πῶς με βάπτῃ, ὅτε δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὡς, ἐπειδὰν πίω τὸ φάρμακον,
οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ, ἀλλ' οἰχήσομαι ἀπιῶν εἰς μακάρων δὴ τινας εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἀλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἀμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἀμα δ' ἐμαυτόν. ἐγνυήσασθε οὖν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἔφη, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγγύην ἢ ἢν οὕτως πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἡγυάτω. οὕτος μὲν γὰρ ἢ μὴν παραμενεῖν μή ὢμεῖς δὲ ἢ μὴν μὴ παραμενεῖν ἐγνυήσασθε, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ οἰχήσεσθαι ἀπίόντα, ἵνα Κρίτων ῥᾴνον φέρῃ, καὶ μὴ ὄρων μου τὸ σῶμα ἢ καόμενον ἢ κατοπττόμενον ἀγανακτῇ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, ὡς δεινὰ πάσας χοντώς, μηδὲ λέγη ἐν τῇ ταφῇ, ὡς ἡ προτίθεται Σωκράτη ἢ ἐκφέρει ἢ κατορὔττει. εὐ γὰρ ἐσθι, ἢ δ' ὡς, ὃ ἄριστον Κρίτων, τὸ μή καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτον πλημμελέσ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακῶν τι ἐμποτεί ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ θαρρεῖν τε χρῆ καὶ φάναι τούμον σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν οὕτως, ὅπως ἂν σοι φίλον ἢ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγῆ νόμιμον εἴναι.

LXV. Ταύτ' εἴτ'ον ἔκεινας μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἰκημα τι θαλαυσάμονοι, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εὕπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιμενομένοι οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτὲ δ' αὐτὶ περὶ τῆς ξυμφοράς διεξώντες, ὡς ἡμῖν γεγονόν τι ἀπευξόδως ἡγούμενοι, ὡςπερ πατρὸς στερηθέντες, διάξειν ὅρφανοι τὸν ἔπει- τα βίον. ἐπειδῆ δὲ ἐλούσατο, καὶ ἤνεχθη παρ' αὐτόν τὰ παῖδια— δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ νέες, καὶ μέγας— καὶ αἱ αἰσχρὰ ὑγίαν διείκνυσι, ὡς ἡμῖν ἀνατίνας τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλέξθεις τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἀττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παιδία ἀπιέναι ἐκελευσαν, αὐτός δὲ ἢκε παρ' ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἢν ἡ ἔγγυς ἡλίου δυσμῶν. χρόνον γὰρ τούλιν διέτριψεν ἐνδον. ἐλθὼν δ' ἐκαθέζετο λευκουμένος, καὶ οὐ πόλι
α̱ττα μετά ταῦτα διελέξθη. καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν ἐνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς παρ' αὐτὸν, ὩΣ Ὁσκρατες, ἐφ', οὐ καταγγέλλομαι γε σοῦ ὁπερ τῶν ἄλλων καταγγέλσκο, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουσί καὶ καταρωνταί, ἐπειδ' ἄυτοις παραγγέλλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχώντων. εἰ δ' ἐγώ καὶ άλλως ἐγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ πράττατον καὶ ἀριστον ἄνδρα ὑντα τῶν πώτοτε δεύρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ' ὧτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλε- πανεῖς, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αὐτίους, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους. νῦν οὖν, οἴσθα γὰρ ᾧ ἥλθον ἀγγέλλων, χαίρες τε καὶ πειρῶ ὦς ράστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαία. Καὶ ἁμα δα- κρύσας μεταστρέφουμεν ἀπῆλ. Καὶ ο Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτὸν, Καὶ σύ, ἐφ', χαίρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. Καὶ ἁμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ὡς ἀστείως, ἐφ', ὁ ἀνθρωπος καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνου προσεῖ καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἄνδρῶν λόγος, καὶ νῦν ὃς γενναίως με ἀποδακρύει. ἀλλ' ἂγε δή, ὅ Κρίτων, πειθώμεθα αὐτῶ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμα- κον, εἰ τέτρπωτα' εἰ δὲ μή, τριψάτω ὁ ἀνθρωπος. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, Ἀλλ' οἶμαι, ἐφ', ἔγγο, ὅ Σωκρατες, ἐτι ἡμιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὑπερκ νυτω δεδεκεναι. καὶ ἁμα ἐγώ οἴδα καὶ άλλους πάνυ ὕψε πίνοντας, ἐπειδ' ἐπαραγγελθή αὐτοίς, δευτηρεῖσας τε καὶ πίνοντας εὖ μάλα, καὶ ξυγγενομένους ἡ ἐνίους ὅν αν-τῦχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντε. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπείγον' ἐτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεί. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰκότως ὅ', ἐφ', ὁ Κρίτων, ἐκεί- νοὺ τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὕς συ λέγεις, οἴνοντα γὰρ κερδανέιν ταῦτα ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἔγγο ταῦτα εἰ- κότως οὐ ποιῆσοι οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδαίνεις ὁλόγον ύστερον πιὼν ἄλλο γε ὢ γέλωτα ὅφλησεν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, χλικόμενοι τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος
οὐδενὸς ἐτὶ ἐνότος. ἀλλ' ἵθι, ἐφη, πιθοῦ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

ΛXVI. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδὶ πλησίον ἐστώτι. καὶ ὁ παῖς ἔξελθὼν καὶ συχνῶν χρόνον διατρῆφασ ἦκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμμένον. ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Ἐωκράτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Εἰεν, ἐφη, ὃ βέλτιστον, ὁ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμην, τὶ χρὴ ποιεῖν; Οὕδεν ἄλλο, ἐφη, ἦ πιώντα περιέναι, ἢ ἐναν σβάρος ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένεται, ἐπειτα κατακείσθαι καὶ οὗτως αὐτὸ ποιήσεις. Καὶ ἀμα ὀρέξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Ἐωκράτει. καὶ ὃς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἑλεος, ὃ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οยว διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρῶματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ εἰώθει, ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψεις πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Τί λέγεις, ἐφη, περὶ τούτου τοῦ πώματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποστεῖσι τινι; ἔξεστιν, ἢ οὖ; ὁ Τοσοῦτον, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν, ὅσον οἴομεθα μέτριον εἶναι πιείν. Μανθάνω, ἢ ὃς ἀλλ’ εὑχεσθαί γέ ποιος θεοὶς ἐξέσται τε καὶ χρὴ τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε εκείστε εὑτυχῇ γενέσθαι ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαι τε καὶ ἑνόοιτο ταύτῃ. Καὶ ἀμα εἰπὼν ταῦτα ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπτε. καὶ ἕμων οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἰοὶ τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν, ὅς δὲ εἰδομεν πινόντα τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ’ ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ ἅπακτι ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυπτόμενοι ἀπέκλανον ἐμαυτόν τε ἐκεῖνον γε, ἂν ἄλλα τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τύχην, οἶνον ἀνδρός ἐταιροῦ ἐστηρημένοι εἰγν. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδη οὐχ οἶος τ’ ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξανέστη. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνω οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος, κλάων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν
οὐδένα οὖν τινα ὁτι κατέκλασεν τὸν παρόντων, πλὴν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐκείνος δὲ, Ὅλα, ἐφῆ, ποιεῖτε, ὁ δὲ θαυμαστὸς. ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ οὐχ ἦκιστα τοῦτον ἔνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ὅνα μὴ τοιαύτα πλημμελῶνε· καὶ γὰρ ἄκηκοα, ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρή τελευτᾶν. ἄλλῃ ἴσηνόξαν τε ἀγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε. Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἴσχυνθημένε τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύειν. ὁ δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδῆ οἵ βαρύνεσθαι ἐφῆ τὰ σκέλη, κατεκλίθη ὑππτιος· οὔτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ ἀμα ἐφασπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὔτος ὁ δώς τὸ φάρμακον, διαλπτὼν χρόνον ἔπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κάπετα σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτού τὸν πόδα ἤρετο, εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο· ὁ δὲ οὖν ἐφῇ. καὶ μετὰ τούτο αὖθις τὰς κνήμας καὶ ἐπανιδον οὔτως ἤμιν ἐπεδείκνυτο, ὅτι ψυχοίτο τε καὶ πήγνυτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἦπτετο καὶ εἶπεν, ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχήσεται. ἤδη οὖν σχεδὸν τι αὐτοῦ ἢν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἡτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυφάμενος, ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γὰρ, εἶπεν, ὁ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγξατο. 'Ο Κρίτων, ἐφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφελομεν τῇ ἀλκτρυόνα. ἀλλ᾽ ἀπόδοται καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσῃτε. Ἀλλὰ ταύτα, ἐφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα, εἰ τί ἄλλο λέγεις." Ταύτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὖν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλιγον χρόνον διαλπτών ἐκινηθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὁ τά ὃμματα ἐστησεν ἱδαν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων ξυνέλαβε τὸ στόμα τε καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς.

LXVII. "Ἡδὲ ἡ τελευτή, ὁ Ἑχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταύτου ἦμιν ἐγένετο, ἄνδρός, ὅς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὅν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστῳ καὶ ἄλλος φρονίμωτότου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.
NOTES ON THE PhÆDO.

Chap. I. "Avtös à Φαῖδων, π.] This was Phædo the Elean, so called from his birth-place Elis, a city of Elis, in Peloponnesus. He was the intimate friend of Socrates and Plato, whence he is called by Cicer. de N. D. I. 33. and by Socrat. Synes. p. 23. δ Φαῖδων ὑ τῶν Πλάτωνος. He afterwards became the founder of the Elean sect, and wrote many dialogues, none of which are extant. See Diog. Laert. II. 105. Gellius II. 18. Hesychius Milesius περὶ σοφῶν, p. 39 foll. Meurs. Suidas, in Φαῖδων. Plato affixed his name to this dialogue, because he introduces him relating to Echecrates the discourse of Socrates on the immortality of the soul, which he delivered before drinking the hemlock.—Echecrates, as appears from what follows, was a Phliasian, so called from Phlius, a town of Sicyonia. Echecrates the Phliasian is mentioned among the Pythagoreans by Diog. Laert. VIII. 46. and Iamblich. in the Life of Pythagor. I. 35. This appears to be the same person as is here represented conversing with Phædo. The connection between the Pythagoreans and the town of Phlius, appears from Pausanias, II. 14., where we read that Hippasus the Phliasian, great-grandfather of Pythagoras, removed from his native place to Samos. Compare Diog. Laert. VIII. 1., and the commentators on the passage.

b Τι οὖν δὴ ἐστιν ἄττα ε.] So C. II. τί ἐν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα. Gorg. p. 508. C. σκέπτεσθαι, τί τὰ συμβαλλοντα; Euthyphro, p. 15. A. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ τὸν ἄν εἰσίν ταύτα; In a similar manner Terence, Hecyr. I. 2, 22. Sed quid hoc negotii est modo quae narravit mihi Bacchis?

c οὗτε τῶν πολιτῶν Φλισίων] This is a remarkable collocation. The usual construction would be τῶν Φλισίων πολιτῶν or
NOTES ON THE

τῶν πολιτῶν τῶν Φλιασίων. Therefore some commentators thought that the word Φλιασίων ought to be removed as superfluous; and others, that the article τῶν ought to be inserted after πολιτῶν, which reading is found in one of I. Bekker's MSS. But since this reading greatly weakens the sentence, and Φλιασίων is not omitted in a single MS., it seems proper to resort to another explanation. It appears to me that proper names, being in themselves sufficiently definite, and forming only a single notion with their substantives, do not require the article. Apolog. Socrat. C. XX. καὶ ἔτυχεν ἤμαν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχῆς προτανεῖον, where no MS. has the article. In Meno, init. καὶ οὖς ἡκιστα οἱ τοῦ σου ἔταφον Ἀριστίττου πολίται Δαρισσαίοι.—The verb ἐπιχωρίαζειν, to sojourn, is joined with Ἀθηναίες, to Athens; since the Greeks frequently joint verbs of rest to words signifying motion to a place; so as to unite two sentences in a single clause. Therefore the sense is this: for none of the Phliasian citizens now goes to Athens and sojourns there. Xenoph. Anab. I. 2, 2. παρῆσαν εἰς Σάρδης, i. e. went to Sardis, and were there. Stephens therefore is wrong in interpreting ἐπιχωρίαζειν by the word “ventitare” go frequently.

d ὅστις ἐν ἡμῖν—οἱος τε ἤν] The sense being that no one was able to give us any certain information on that subject, Heindorf appears to have been correct in reading οἱος τε ἤν. Reisigius commentat. de ἐν particula, p. 113., considered ὅστις ἐν—ἤν less elegant on account of the preceding perfect, ἔφικται. This, however, may be thus explained: οὕτε τις ἔστι τῶν ἔξων τῶν ἕκειθεν ἀφικομένων, ὅστις—οἱος τε ἤν. In the same manner, Euripid. Medea, v. 1306. οὐκ ἔστιν ἦτις τοῦτ' ἐν Ἐλαπηνίς γυνῇ ἑταλη ποθ'. The words immediately following seem to confirm this construction: πλὴν γε δὴ οἵ ἀφρακον πιῶν ἀποθανοι.

e Οὔδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄκρα ἐπ.] Instead of τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης, because, as Fischer has rightly observed, περὶ with a genitive case is used, on account of the verb ἐποθεσθη. See note (b) on Apolog. Socrat. C. XX. Compare Matthiae, §. 595. 5. a. b.

f ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἣγειλέ τίς] μὲν is used without δὲ following, because the idea, which would be contained in the corresponding clause of the sentence, is already expressed by the preceding words. See Crito, C. I. note (b), on the words: ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἥξειν.
30 days afterwards. This also appears from Xenoph. Mem. IV. 8, 2.

1 h τι ὧν ἦν τοῦτο] That is, *why was this so?*

i η πρώμανα ἐστ. τ. πλολου—πέμπουσι] See Crito, C. I.

k ἐστεμένη] That is, ornamented with laurel, which was sacred to Apollo.

l πέμπουσι] *Send with solemnity.* The word is peculiarly applied to this ceremony. See Spanh. on Callimach. Hymn to Del. v. 279.

m εν ϕ Ἐσεὺς—] Minos, King of Crete, in order to avenge the death of his son Androgeus (see Plutarch’s Life of Theseus, p. 6. Pausan. I. 27. at the end), is said to have besieged Athens, and to have at length consented to depart, on condition that every ninth year the Athenians should send to Crete, instead of tribute, seven virgins, and as many youths (ἡθένους ἐπτὰ καὶ παρθένους τοσαντας, Plutarch. παρθένους ἐπτὰ καὶ παῖδας ίνον, Pausan.), to be devoured by the Minotaur, in the Labyrinth. These are, οἱ δὲ ἐπτὰ ἐκεῖνοι. Theseus, being among the number of victims at the third period of tribute, killed the Minotaur, and returned safe with his companions, that is, καὶ ἔσωσε τε καὶ ἀντὸς ἐσώθη. See Plutarch’s Life of Theseus, p. 6 foll. Pausan. I. 27. p. 67. Meursius Thes. 16. Compare Catullus Epithal. Pceil et Thetid. v. 76. Virgil Aen. VI. 20. Ovid. Metamorph. VIII. 170.

n θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν] Thom. Mag. p. 446. says that θεωρία is ἡ θυσία, which agrees with the scholiast on this passage. The word indicates both the embassy itself, and its solemn accompaniments, as may be collected from Plutarch Nic. p. 525. Α., where Nicias is said, δεινῷ τὴν θεωρίαν, when he is preparing the Chorus, providing victims, and attending to the other preparations of festivals. Compare Valcken. on Ammon. p. 92.—These Δήλαι, which were celebrated annually, are not to be confounded with those festivals which are mentioned by Thucyd. III. 104., and which took place every fifth year, to commemorate the purification of the Island of Delos by Pisistratus.

ο ἀεὶ καλ. νῦν ὑτι] This custom was continued to the times of Demetrius Phalerius, according to Plutarch, Theseus, p. 10. C.

p Ἑπειδὴν οὖν ἄρξωνται—] That is after the stern of the vessel had been ornamented with the laurel crown, as Phædo himself informs us. A little further on, the common reading, καθαρίσεων, is erroneous; since that verb, if used at all, which is very doubtful, is derived from καθάρωσ, *cleanly*; and can therefore signify nothing
else than to be cleanly; which sense is quite inappropriate in this passage. Therefore the better MSS. are correct in giving καθαρσιν, i.e. to be pure, and not to be polluted by punishments, which is approved of by all the more recent commentators. The addition of τὴν πόλιν, is to indicate that this law refers to the state in general, and not merely to the citizens individually.

a αὐτῶν] That is, τοὺς πλέοντας, which is implied in the preceding word, πλοῖον. Homer Odys. a. 930. καὶ κεν τοῦτ’ ἐθέλαμι, Δίὸς γε διδόντος, ἀρέσθαι, where τοῦτο means βασιλεύειν which is applied in the noun βασιλεὺς. Aristoph. Plut. 502. πολλά πλουτοῦσι—ἀδίκως αὐτὰ συλλέγουσι; where with αὐτὰ we must supply χρήματα from the preceding πλουτοῦσι.

r ἔστερ ἑαυτῷ] This expression is frequently used respecting any thing already mentioned. We say: As I said before. See Apology, C. V. ὑπὲρ λέγω.

II. a oi ἄρχοντές—That is, oi ἐνδέκα. See Apolog. Socr. C. XXVII. note (ε'). At the beginning of C. XXXI. of the Apology, they are also called oi ἄρχοντες.

b τινὲς καὶ πολλοὶ γε Χενοφ. Ηellen. I. 5, 22. καὶ τινὰς ἀπέκτειναν οὐ πολλοὺς. Plat. Gorg. p. 455. C. ἐς ἑγὼ τινὰς σχέδην καὶ συνχρόνος αἰσθάνομαι. In such sentences, καὶ adds force to the following clause. See Apolog. Socrat. C. IX. note (d'). The sense therefore is: some, nay many, were present.

c τοιοῦτον ἔτερον ἔχεις] That is, But those who are going to hear you have also the same feeling.

d παρόντα με—εἰσέχει] The verbs εἰσέχειν and εἰσέρχεσθαι, like the Latin subire, are used of hope, joy, sorrow, pity, etc., taking possession of the mind. Eurip. Med. 931. εἰσήλθε μ’ οἴκτος. Iphig. Anul. 491. μ’ ἔλεος εἰσῆλθε. A little further on, a different construction is used: οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἔλεεινον εἰσέχει, on which see Matth. §. 401. C.

e εὐθαλων γὰρ μοι.] Compare with this passage, Crito, C. I. note (ε') on the words, ὡς ἴδεις καθευδεῖς.

passages in which neither δόξα, nor πράγμα, nor any other word of the kind, is added.

Without the design and will of the gods in his favour. For the words are followed by ἀλλὰ κάκεισε ἀφ. εἰ πράξειν. Plutarch. An. Pravitas Sufficit ad Infulcitatem, p. 499. B. ἀποθνῄσκοντα δὲ αὐτῶν (Σωκράτη) ἐμακάριζον οἱ ξιώντες ὡς οὔδ' ἐν "Ajax θεῖα ἀκόη μολπας ἐσόμενον.

Heindorf was wrong in referring παράντι to μοι. For the participle involves an indefinite person, which makes the sentence general. For the same reason, τῶν πένθει is not used, which Heindorf conjectured to be the true reading. The meaning is: as would appear natural to any one present on a sad and mournful occasion. The dative παράντι depends on έκός, as in Eurip. Hippolyt. 1433. ἀνθρώποις δὲ—έκός έξαμαρτάνειν.

That is: as when we were discussing philosophical subjects, according to our custom. Men. p. 91. E. τετ-ταφάκοντα έτη ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ οὐτα. Sophoc. Ed. T. 570. τότ' οὖν δ μάντις ἦν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ; was the soothsayer then exercising his art? Xenoph. Cyrop. IV. 3, 23. οἱ μὲν δὲ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις ἠσαν. Maxim. Tyr. p. 396. T. I. ed. Lips. τοὺς δὲ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ πάνω ἐν τίς μέμψιτο.

That is: belonged to some topics of philosophy. In the same manner, Phaedo, p. 80. C. ἐν τοιαύτῃ ἀφρ. οὖτω διεκλεµέθα, ὅτε μὲν γελάντως, κ. τ. λ. έτη περὶ τυπή καθέστατε; δειλαντες ἡ στέρξαντες; Xenoph. Anab. IV. 4, 1. τὴν δὲ—ἐμβολὴ ὃδε ποιόντες, ἄμα μὲν λαθεῖν περιμενο, ἄμα δὲ φθάσαι, Gorg. p. 478. Λ. p. 513. E. Phileb. p. 20. A. Rep. VIII. p. 556. A. IX. p. 583. C. Sophocel. Philoctet. 164. ταύτην γάρ ἑχειν βιοτήν αὐτών λόγον εστὶ φόρον, θυραμβολοῦντα πτηνοῦς ίοὺς στυγερῷ στυγερῶς, οὐδὲ των' αὐτῶ παιῶν κακῶν ἐπινώμαι.—On the words ὅτε μὲν—ἐνίοτε δέ, see Hermann on Viger. p. 792.—Apollodorus was an attached friend and eager disciple of Socrates, ἐπισωμηνὴς λαξυφῶς αὐτῶ, as is said by the author of the Apolog. Xenoph. § 28. Memorab. III. 11. 17. He was of a fervid temperament, prone to sadness, and having his mind always fixed on serious concerns. At length he became still more gloomy, and even lost the power of preserving a
manly steadiness and fortitude. Therefore he received the surname τοῦ μανικοῦ. See Sympos. p. 173. D. On the occasion of the death of Socrates, he not only wept much, but loudly wailed and cried out. See C. LXVI. It is related by Ἕλιαν, V. H. 1. 16., that he brought to the prison a tunic and cloak, to array Socrates for death.

καὶ Κριτόβουλος—] Crito, of whom an account is given in the notes on that dialogue, is said to have had four sons, Critobulus, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Ctesippus. See Laert. II. 121. But the Hermogenes here mentioned appears to have been the son of Hippocrates, and brother of Callias. Respecting him, see Heindorf on Cratyl. § 3., and the remarks of Schneider on Xenoph. Memor. IV. 8, 4. on Sympos. I. 3. Compare also Proclus, Schol. on Cratyl. p. 10. ed. Lips. Neither is Epigenes here to be understood as Crito's son, as there is no doubt of his being the same person as is mentioned in Apolog. Socrat. C. XXII. and Xenoph. Mem. III. 12, 2., and whose father was Antiphon the Cephasian.—Respecting Ἀσχίνης, the disciple of Socrates, see Diogen. Laert. II. 60—64. — Antithenes is well known as a distinguished imitator of Socrates' fortitude and contempt of pleasure, and as the Founder of the sect of Cynics. Respecting him, see Laert. VI. 1—19. Ἕλιαν, V. H. IX. 35. and elsewhere.—Ctesippus the Preanian, i.e. belonging Παναγιω τῆς Πανδοβίδος φυλῆς, is known from Euthydem. p. 273. A. and Lysid. p. 206. B. foll.—Menexenus is distinguished by the book bearing his name, written, as it appears, by Plato. He was of noble extraction (see Lysid. p. 207. C.), and in his mature age applied himself to the study of philosophy, and was a follower of Ctesippus, and other sophists. See Lysid. p. 206. This accounts for Ctesippus and Menexenus being here mentioned together.

Πάτων δὲ, ὅμα, ἡσάνει] The conjecture of Forster is not improbable, that by these words Plato meant to signify the sorrow which overwhelmed him at the approaching death of his illustrious master. — The circumstance of Xenophon's name not being mentioned here, is enumerated by Atheneus, XI. 15., among the arguments to prove that Plato and Xenophon were not on good terms. There is a learned discussion on this point by A. Bœckh, in commentatar, academ. De simulatæ, quæ Platonii cum Xenophonte intercessisse fertur. Berol. a. 1821. It has been rightly observed by Fischer that Xenophon could not with propriety have been mentioned here, since he had gone to Asia the year before the death
PHÆDO.

of Socrates, and was still there.—For ἤν δὲ καὶ Κτῆσιππος, Heindorf preferred παρῆν δὲ καὶ Κτ., but without necessity. For it is usual with the Greeks, when verbs compounded with prepositions are to be repeated, to omit either verb or preposition in the repetition. The omission of the verb is of very frequent occurrence in the Poets and Herodotus. There is an example of the omission of the preposition in Eurip. Bacch. 1062. λαβὼν γὰρ ἑλάτης οὐράνιον ἀκρον κλάσαν κατῆγεν, ἠγεν, ἠγεν εἰς μέλαν πέδων; and many similar passages have been collected by Elmsley on Eurip. Medea, v. 1219. Nearly similar is Eurip. Orest. 1100. Πυλ. πισταὶ νῦν, ἀνάμενον δὲ φασγάνου τομᾶς. Orest. μενῶ, τὸν ἄξιον εἶ τι τιμωρῆσομαι. Plat. Phædr. p. 248. A.

ο Σιμμιᾶς τε γε—[ Simmias and Cebes, the Thebans, are said to have been disciples of Philolaus, a celebrated Pythagorean, who is mentioned by Plato further on in this dialogue, as well as in many other places. They were familiar associates of Socrates (see Crito, C. IV.). It is therefore evident why Plato introduces them in a discussion with Socrates on the immortality of the soul. Compare Diogen. Laert. II. 124. 125.—Phædo appears to have been a Theban, not a Cyrenian. See Ruhnken. on Xenoph. Mem. I. 2, 48.—Euclides was the founder of the School of the Megareans, also called Eristici and Dialectici. See Laert. II. 106—110. He relates to Terpsion, of whom no particulars have been handed down, the conversation of Socrates with Theætetus, in the dialogue of Plato, which is known by the name of the latter.—Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic sect, is too well known to require any mention here. The name of Cleombrotus the Ambraciot, is also well known. It is said that, on reading this dialogue, he threw himself into the sea; on which subject there is extant an elegant epigram of Callimachus, n. 24., which is also mentioned by Cicero, Tuscul. I. 34. For, even from what follows, it may correctly be doubted whether another Cleombrotus is referred to in this passage. For the suspicion of some antient writers seems not groundless, that a reflection is here intended to be cast on Aristippus and Cleombrotus, for being so forgetful of Socrates through self-indulgence and luxury, as not to be present on this occasion; although the island of Ægina was only about 200 stadia from Athens, to which city they might easily have crossed over. See Diogen. Laert. II. 65. III. 36. Athenæus, XII. p. 544. D. Demetrius Rhetor. de Elocut. §. 306. Compare Mueller’s Æginetica. p. 186.
III. a Πλησίου γὰρ ἥν—] The prison was near the marketplace, where the Court of the Heliaste was held. Compare Plat. Legg. X. p. 908. A.
b ἕως ἀνοιχθείη] On this optative, which indicates a thing frequently repeated, see Matth. §. 521. Buttm. §. 126. 14. In the same manner, a little further on: εἰπείδη δὲ ἀνοιχθείη: every time, as soon as it was opened: which words Fischer misunderstood.
c διατριβοντες μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων] That is, διαλεγόμενοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς, as he says in C. LXV.—On the word ἀνεφγετο, see Scho- liast on Lucian ad Soloe, T. II. p. 54. τὸ ἀνέφγει βούλονται μὴ λαμβάνεσθαι εἰς παθητικὴς διαθέσεως ἀλλ᾽ οὕκ ἀκριβῶς τοῦτο. χρίται γὰρ μετὰ καὶ ἂλλων πολλῶν ὁ Πλάτων παθητικῶς ἐν θαλάτων, ἀνεφγετο, λέγων, ἡ θύρα οὐ πάντων προῖ, whence Fischer wrote, οὐ πάνεν προῖ, against all the MSS., and without the sense requiring it. For the words οὐ προῖ are to be pronounced emphatically.—On the form of this imperfect, see Matth. §. 168.—On the form πρωιάτερον, Thom. Mag. πρωιάτερον καὶ πρωιάτατον ἀμφότερα γὰρ Θουκυδίδης——κρεῖτῳ γὰρ ταύτα τοῦ πρωιάτερον καὶ πρωιάτατον. But this opinion is successfully controverted by Ruhnken on Timaeus. Glossar. p. 227. Compare Buttmann. Ausführ. Griech. Grammatik. T. I. p. 264.
d ὅπερ εἰδοθεύναι οὐκακοεῖν] On the signification and use of the verb ὁπακοεῖν, see Crit. C. I. note (c).—Immediately afterwards, instead of the common reading, ἐπιμένειν, we have restored περιμένειν from the best MSS. The meaning of both words has been examined by Bekker, Lectio. Philostratt. p. 89., and is thus explained, by Fr. A. Wolf, on this passage: ἡ ἐπιμένειν is to wait, to await patiently the result of any thing; περιμένειν is generally to stay waiting for a person, to await the arrival of a person. Hence the latter is commonly used absolutely, whereas the former is much more frequently joined with ἕως ἄν. I am therefore surprised that this commentator approved of ἐπιμένειν, and rejected περιμένειν, which seems to be used here with singular propriety. Further on, C. LXV. ἡμᾶς δ᾽ ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιμένομεν οὖν. A little before: περιμένομεν οὖν—ἑως ἀνοιχθείν τὸ δεσιμωτήριον. Sympos. in. οὐ περιμενεῖς; κἀγὼ ἐπιστὰς περιέμενα. Rep. I. at the beginning, ἐκέλευε—τὸν παίδα περιμεναί ε κεκελείε. Xenoph. Cyropæd. IV. 2, 9. καὶ τοῦ ἱππακινὸς περιέμενεν ἐκέλευε, ἰνα ἃμα τινιν. Ibid. VII. 5, 39. ἄνδρες φίλοι, περι- μένετε, ἕως τὸν ὅχλον διωστόμεθα, in which passage remark the omission of ἄν.

1 ειςελθόντες ουν κατελ.—άρτι λευμένον] That is, at the very moment when we were entering. The common reading, ειςελθόντες, when we had entered, is less adapted to the sense of the passage.

έ ἀνεφήμησε] Cried out with weeping and wailing, according to Valer. Maxim. VII. 2. This is one of those words wherein we trace the Attic delicacy, which applies to sad and disastrous things words properly applicable only to what is agreeable; which the grammarians call κατ' ἀντίφρασιν. For εὐφήμειν and ἀνεφήμειν are properly said of words and expressions well-omened and fortu- nate. But (κατ' ἀντίφρασιν) they also signify to lament, to cry out, to wail. Hesychius: ἀνεφήμησεν | ἀναμώξει, κατα ἀντίφρασιν | Σο- φοκλῆς Ῥαχυρίοις, where see the commentators. He also says: εὐφήμωσι: στενούσι, κλαίοντι. See Sophoc. Trachin. 783. Αelian. V. H. XIV. 1. and the observations on the word εὐφήμωμοι used for δύσφημοι, made by Stanley on Αέschyl. Agamemn. 1227. Yet Hermann, on Sophoc. Trachin., in the place before quoted, does not acknowledge any ἀντίφρασιν in the word ἀνεφήμειν; which he explains to mean, to cry out εὐφήμει; that is, to cry out, "let ill- omened words be refrained from."

θ των τοῦ Κρίτωνος] Of the slaves of Crito. For noble and rich Athenians seldom went abroad alone, but were generally accompanied by several attendants. See Meno, p. 82. B. ἄλλα μοι προσκάλεσον των πολλών ἀκολόθων τουτων: των σαυτοῦ ἕνα, δύνα αυτεί.
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1 ἀνακαθ. ἐπὶ τὴν κλ.]] That is, raising himself on the bed. For Socrates, who had been freed from his chains at the first dawn, was not yet risen from his bed; he now sits up in the bed. A little afterwards, καθήκε τὰ σκέλη ἀπὸ τῆς κλίνης καὶ καθεδρίσατον οὖτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο. The common reading, ἐς τὴν κλίνην, is bad, since ἤσυσθαι καὶ καθεδίσατον εἰς τι mean to go and sit down somewhere, as is clearly shown by Valckenar, on Herodot. VIII. 71.


m ὡς βαμπασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τ. ὅ.]] How wonderful is the relation between pleasure and pain in this, that they will not be present with a man at once, etc. For τῷ, with an infinitive, is in this that, or because that, as in Rep. V. p. 471. D. II. p. 361. C. IV. p. 429. C.


LXIV. ἡ ἐμὸν ἐπιστέλλεις] The verb ἐπιστέλλειν is properly used concerning the last will of the dying. See Valcken. on Hippolyt. p. 255. The common reading, ἐπιστέλλη, does not appear to be in accordance with the usage of prose writers. Homer uses it in a similar sense, Πιαδ. XXIII. 95. and 107.

This comparative is not used simply for the positive. See Euthyphro, in. τι νεώτερον γέγονεν; Nitzsch. in Append. to Plat. Ion. p. 56 foll.

So as to improve in virtue and wisdom.

That is, even if you promise much, you will avail nothing. For oδηδεν πλέον ποιήσετε is the same as oδηδεν ὑφελος ὑμῖν ἔσται. See Viger, p. 138.

The words are to be construed thus: ὡς οὗτος ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ νυνὶ διαλ. καὶ δ. ἐκ. τ. λ. ἐγώ εἰμι.

“I cannot persuade Crito,” he says, “that the Socrates who is now conversing with him and you, and who arranges and determines what is said, i. e. who is endued with spirit and intellect, is myself.” This passage is spoken of by Cicero, Tuscul. I. 43.

If the common reading, πῶς δεῖ με θάπτειν, was found in any MSS. by Stephanus, there can be no doubt that it arose from an interpretation of what is called the deliberative subjunctive, of which the use in the third person is rather uncommon. Crito had before asked Socrates: θάπτομεν δὲ σε τίνα τρόπον; and Socrates now, as it were, putting himself in the place of Crito, repeats his expression, saying: πῶς με θάπτηρ, i. e. how he is to bury me. Plat. de Legg. p. 719. E. ποτέρον οὖν ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τοῖς νόμοις μηδὲν τοιοῦτον προσαγορεύῃ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῶν νόμων — καὶ μὴ φράξῃ τε καὶ ἐπαπειλήσας τὴν ζημιὰν ἐπὶ ἄλλον τράπηται νόμον, παραμιθαὶς δὲ καὶ πειθοῦς — μηδὲ ἐν πρὸσδιδό; Sophist. p. 225. A. τῷ δὲ λόγῳ πρὸς λόγους τί τις, ὃ Θεαλήττη εἶλο εἶπ; Meno, p. 92. E. ἀλλὰ σὺ εἶπε, παρὰ τίνας ἔλθη Ἀθηναίων. Protag. p. 348. D. περιών λέγει, ὃτι ἐπιδείκνυται καὶ μείζων ἄλλου βεβαιώθηται. Rep. I. p. 348. E. οὐκέτι βάθος ἔχειν ὃ τί τις εἴπη. Aristoph. Nubb. 438. τοῦ τίς φύγη; Sophocl. Ed. Col. 170. θύγατερ, ποῖ τίς φροντίδος ἔλθῃ; Compare Matthiae Gr. §. 516. 3.


k ἀλλωσ λεγ.] i. e. μάτην.

1 ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν me τo. Kp.] 'Εγγυήσασθαι τίνα is to undertake to deliver up a person to another, to become bail for a person, to pledge one's self for another. Demosthen. p. 609. ed. Reisk. ταύχ' ὕπο τῆς ξενίας ὑπάρχον τοιαῦτα, ἤν ὧν ἐλευθερούς ἐγγυήσατο. Ibid. 899. μάρτυρας μέν παρασχόμενοι, ὡς οὖν ἐγγυήσαμεν ἐγώ τῶν Παρμένοντα. Ibid. p. 1349. ἐγγύνατο τὰς ἐτέρων θυγατέρας
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As the Greeks use the phrases μάχην μάχεσθαι, ἑξήθος ἑξαίρειν, and others of the kind, so we here find ἔγγυασθαι ἔγγυν. And since ἔγγυασθαι takes an accusative of the person, it is also correct to say ἔγγυν ἔγγυασθαι τινα, in a similar manner as ἑξῆθος ἑξαίρειν τινά, μοίος μοισεῖν τινα, and other expressions of the same nature are used.

άνακτη, be indignant, troubled, or grieved. Further on, C. LXVI. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύνων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε κλάων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν ὑπέδει δυτίνα οὐ κατέκλασε.

The verbs ἐκφέρειν, κατοφυτεῖν and προτίθεσθαι are here used in their proper sense as applied to funerals. See Kirchmann, de Funerib. Roman, lib. II. c. 1. and I. 12. The middle verb is accounted for by referring it to Crito himself as conducting the arrangements of the funeral, which he had undertaken to do. See Eurip. Alcest, 378, where Admetus, being about to die, reproaches in these words his father, who refuses to die in his stead: τοιγαρ φυτεύων παίδας οὐκ ἐν φθάνοις, οἱ γηρομοβακχούσαι καὶ θανῶτα σε περιστελοῦσι καὶ προθήσουσαι νεκρῶν. The Athenian law, in Demosthen. in Macart. p. 1071. R. τὸν ἀφοθαλόντα προτίθεσθαι εὑρόν, ὅπως ἂν βούληται. Lucian. de Luctu. §. 27. μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ λουσαντές αὐτὸν καὶ μύρο τῷ καλλίστῳ χρίσαντες τὸ σῶμα καὶ στεφανώσαντες τοῖς ἀραίοις ἦκεθει προτίθενται.

οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τούτο] Not only in that respect, that is, in respect τοῦ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν.—With πλημμελεῖς understand ἕστιν.

LXV. ἀνίστατο εἰς οἰκήμα τι] That is, he rose and went into a certain chamber. Aristoph. Plut. 683. εἰλ τὴν χώτραν τὴν τῆς ἀδάρης ἀνίσταται. Eurip. Heraclid. 59. ἀνίστασαί τι σε χρή εἰς Ἀγρός. These words are to be explained in the same manner as we explained ἐπίχωρῳ ταῖς Ἀθήναξ, C. I. On the word οἰκήμα, which is used for separate parts of a building according to circumstances, see Valckenar on Ammon. III. 4. and Dorvill. on Charit. p. 587.—Further on, the fuller construction would have been: περιεμένομεν ὅπως τοτὲ μὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς δ.—τοτὲ δὲ—. But τοτὲ μὲν is often omitted before τοτὲ δὲ, in the same manner as τὸ μὲν is sometimes omitted before δ δὲ. See Hermann Viger. p. 768.

δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ οἰεῖς] Compare note on Apol. Socr. C. XXIII.
Nothing can be more fabulous than the assertion that Socrates had two wives at one time. This passage has, however, been so far abused as to be urged in proof of that position, among others by Tiber. Hemster: who, in his note on Lucian. Haleyon. T. I. p. 184., and in the Preface, p. xxxiii., affirms that it is clear from these words of Plato, that both the wives of Socrates, Xanthippe and Myrto, survived their husband.

To prove this, he argues that γυναῖκες ought to be translated wives. This is fully refuted by Io. Luzae in Lect. Att. p. 38 foll., where he has investigated the subject thoroughly, and proved the futility of such a supposition.

Luzae translates οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες women of the house and family, female relations or domestics; for if Plato intended to speak of wives, he would have merely said, αἱ γυναῖκες, not αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες. Almost the same arguments have been employed against the opinion of Hemsterh. by Heindorf, on this passage.


εις καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τῶν χρόνων] The preposition παρά is often thus used to signify duration of time. Xenoph. Mem. II. 1, 2. παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀρχήν, under his government, while he governed. The sense is: throughout the whole thirty days which I have passed in prison, he visited me, and sometimes talked with me.

h τριψάτω ὁ ἀνθρωπος] Ἀνθρωπος is—generally thus used in speaking of a common and mean person: as here of the attendant and minister of the Eleven, and further on of the executioner.—The seed of the hemlock was bruised, in order to extract the juice. See Plin. H. N. XXV. 13.

>i καὶ ἔννεμ.] Stephanus has correctly rendered this: et quidem nonnullos suis amoribus potitos.

k οὐδὲν γὰρ οἴμαι κερδαίνειν] On this use of the Present Infinitive, see note on Crito, C. XIV.; and on the circumstance itself, see Antonin. IV. 47., and the note of Gataker. A little further on, the words παρ' ἐμαυτῷ are not superfluous, but are added to define T
more accurately the meaning of ὑφελεῖν γέλωτα, which signifies
to incur ridicule either with others, or with one's self. Therefore it
was almost necessary to add παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, i.e. in my own mind.
The meaning then is: I think that by drinking the hemlock a little
later I gain nothing else than this, that I shall appear ridiculous in
my own eyes. In the words φειδόμενος οδύνις ἐτὶ ἐνότος, allusion
is made to the verse of Hesiod, Works and Days, 367. μεσοσάφε
φείδωθαι, δείλῃ δ' ἐνλ πυθμένι φείδα. Seneca Epist. I. Nam ut
visum est majoribus nostris: Sera parsimonia in fundo est.

LXVI. a elew, ἐθη, & β.] Heindorf's assertion that elew has
always the meaning of trying or proving, cannot be satisfactorily
proved. This meaning does not come from the word itself, but
rather from the next sentence or turn of the discourse, as in this
passage.—The words σὺ γὰρ τοίνυν ἐπιστήμων, are put first, be
cause the Greeks usually put that part of the sentence first, which
contains the reason of what is about to be said. The particle γὰρ
is prefixed in such cases. Ἀσχυλ. Agam. 1077. ἐγὼ δ', ἐπων
tείρω γάρ, σὺ θεμώσομαι. Sympos. p. 175. C. τὸν ἄν 'Ἄγαθωνα,
tυνχάνει τὸν ἐχθρὸν κατακείμενον, μόνον, δεῦρ' ἐφι φάνει, Σάκρα-
tες, παρ' ἐμε κατάκεισο. Ibid. p. 204 C. καλ εἶων εἰπον, εἰν δή,
ὁ ἕπνη, καλῶς γάρ λέγεις· τοιοῦτος ἄν δ' Ἐρως τίνα χρείαν ἔχει τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις;
b ἐως ἂν σου βάρος.] Σου is not to be changed here into σοι.
p. 215. E.
c καὶ δύτως αὐτῷ ποιῆσει] “And thus, while you are walking,
it will operate of itself, so as to require nothing else.” Ποιεῖν, like
the Latin facere, is used respecting the operation of medicines.
See Dioscorides, C. I. 95. ποιεῖ πρὸς φάρμακα, is efficacious against
poisons.
d καὶ μᾶλα ἱλεως] Very cheerfully. This use of καὶ μᾶλα is
frequent, καὶ having an intensive force. A little further on, καὶ
μᾶλα εὔχερως καὶ εὐκόλως εὔχετε.
e ταυρηδῶν ὑποθέλειας] That is, looking at him with firm coun-
tenance, fixing his eyes steadily on him. See Wytenbe. Epist. Crit.
p. 46. The sense of the subsequent words is: Is it lawful to pour
forth to any God a libation from this potion?
T μέτρων εἶναι π.] That is, to be sufficient.
f ἐπιστήμων] Having put the cup to his lips, which is the
force of the middle voice. For ἐπέχειν τιλ πιεῖν is to offer, or
present a potion to any one, as Arist. Nubb. 1385. Apoll. Rhod. I.
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472. ἡ καὶ ἐπισχόμενος πλέον δέσαν ἀμφατέρησι πῦνε. Stesichor. in Athen. XI. p. 499. B. σκύφιον δὲ λαβὼν πιέν ἐπισχόμενος.


1 ἐγκαλυφήμενος] Covering my face with my cloak. See Dorrill on Charit. p. 274.

κ' οἶνον ἄνδρός] That is, ὦ τινι ὀστοῦ.

1 oὔδενα ὅτνα ὀυ κατέκλασε] This reading κατέκλασε, which is found in the best MSS., was restored by a conjecture of Stephanus, instead of the common reading, κατέκλασε. It is supported by the usage of the language, for Wytenb. was wrong in asserting that κατακλάν could not be taken thus simply. It is used in exactly a similar manner by Plutarch, Life of Pericl. c. 37. ἡ παρόδωσα δυντοχαί τῷ Περικλεί περὶ τῶν οἴκων, ὡς δίκην τινὰ δεδωκότι τῆς ὑπεραφίας καὶ τῆς μεγαλαυχίας ἐξείλης, ἐπέκλασε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. Life of Demosthen. c. 17. ὁρώντες ἐπικλάντα πολλοὺς καὶ ἀποθηλύνοντα τῶν Ἀισχίνην τῷ λογῷ τοῦτῳ πρὸς ὀίκων. Αὐτὸ κατακάλαν. Achill. Tat. III. 10. ἤρστην μὲν καὶ Ἐλληνα καὶ φωνῇ κατέκλασε καὶ δήσεις ἐμάλαζεν, where see Jacobs, and in Addit. ad Athen. p. 277.

m οἶα ποιεῖτε] This is an expression of wonder and displeasure. Euthyphr. p. 15. E. οἶα ποιεῖσ, ὃ ἐταίρε, ἃπ' ἐλπίδος με καταβαλῶν. Charmid. p. 166. C. Alcibiad. I. p. 113. E.

n οὗτος ὁ δὸς τὸ φ.] These words are thought by some critics to be a gloss, but without sufficient reason. For in familiar discourse, such a repetition, when consistent with perspicuity, is not inadmissible. Besides, if these words were omitted, the collocation would be: καὶ άμα οὗτος ἐφαντόμενος αὐτοῦ.

ο διαλιπών] Leaving some interval, he now and then looked at. Further on, ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκιώμην. The word διαλιπών is also used simply, see Bast. Epist. Crit. p. 178.

p ἐπανών οὗτος] Advancing his hand higher and higher towards the vital parts.

q οὗτος ἡπτετο] Socrates himself also touched his limbs as they were becoming cold, and said that he should die when, etc. For so these words are to be understood with Fischer. Others refer them to the attendant, but incorrectly; at least Forster's conjecture, αὖθις, must be adopted in that case. On the euphemism τὸ τε νικήσετα, see Bergler on Alciph. I. 232.

r περὶ τὸ ἠτρον] Maius: ἠτρον. τὸν ὅπο τὸν ὄμφαλον τόπον
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"Αττικῶς ὀπογάστρων Ἐλληνικῶς. Τίμαεος: ἦτρον ο μεταξὸ ὁμ-φαλὸν τε καὶ αἰδηίου τόπος.


t τῷ Ἀφκλ. ὰφ.] This is beautifully said. For the sick were wont, on the recovery of their health, to sacrifice a cock to Αἴσχυλος. Socrates thus indicates that being now at length released from the chains of the body, he shall attain true health.

u εὐ τι ἄλλο λέγεις] If you have any other commission to give me.

v τὰ ὄμματα ἐστησεν] Had fixed his eyes, his eyes had become fixed. See Dorvill on Charit. p. 404.


LXVII. b τῶν τότε δὲν ἐπιειράθ.] This passage is considered corrupt by Wytenbach and Heindorf. The former suggested the reading τῶν πόροτε. The latter thought that the whole passage ought to be remodelled thus: ἀνδρὸς, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἐν, πάντων, τότε ὡς ἐπιειράθημεν, ἀριστοῦ καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτά- του. The MSS. give no assistance. One of them, however, omits τῶν τότε, in which words there must be some corruption. Perhaps we ought to write. ἀνδρός, ὡς φαίμεν ἐν, τότε θ' δὲν ἐπιειράθημεν ἀριστοῦ, καὶ ἄλλως φρ. a man both then, when he was dying, the best of all, and through his whole life the wisest and most just. Thus the praise of courage and endurance, which were most conspicuous towards the end of his life is given to Socrates: for ἄριστοι is well known to be peculiarly applicable to a man of courage and fortitude. Wisdom and justice are also attributed to him as virtues which he cultivated through his whole life-time. In which words an animated picture is placed before the eyes of the reader, of all the virtues for which this illustrious sage was distinguished. Therefore καὶ ἄλλως is referred to the foregoing τότε θ', as in C. LXV. σὲ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ χρόνῳ γενναίοτατον—καὶ δὴ καὶ τίνι εὖ οἶδ' ἤτι αὐτ ἐμὸς χαλεπανεῖς. Others have referred τῶν τότε to the contemporaries of Socrates; and applied ἄλλως to all posterity.

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Socrates was the son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor of considerable merit, and of Phaenarete, a midwife, who is called by Socrates, in the Theaetetes of Plato, a very noble-minded woman. He was born at Athens, on the 5th of the month of Thargelion, about the middle of April or May, in the year 469. B.C. (Ol. 77. 4.);\(^1\) and belonged to the tribe of Antiochis and the deme of Alopece. His features, and indeed his appearance altogether, were anything but handsome, and seemed well adapted for the ironical character which he maintained. Alcibiades, in Plato's Symposium,\(^2\) compares him to the Sileni and to Marsyas, the Satyr: "And I may also compare Socrates to the Satyr Marsyas. As for thy appearance, thou canst not deny it thyself, Socrates; to what other things thou art like, thou shalt quickly hear. Thou art a scoffer, art thou not? If thou dost not

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\(^1\) [More probably in B. C. 468. See Clinton's "Fasti Hellenici," Vol. II. Introduction, p. xx.—Editor.]

willingly own it, I will bring forward witnesses." One of the principal passages of the ancients, which bear on this point, is in Xenophon's Symposium, in which Socrates engages in a playful dispute with Critobulus as to which of them is the handsomer. Socrates there tries to prove that his prominent eyes, his depressed nose, and his large mouth must, on account of their greater usefulness, be the handsomer. Several other particulars, which however may be exaggerated, for the purpose of indicating the ugliness of Socrates, are mentioned in the same Symposium.

Notwithstanding the limited means of his father, Socrates was educated according to the manner of the times. Music in the Greek sense of the word, i.e. music and poetry, and gymnastic exercises formed the principal part of the education of an Athenian youth; and in these Socrates was instructed. In addition to which he received instruction in the art of his father; and if we may credit the report of Pausanias, who says that the three Graces made by Socrates had found a place on the walls of the Acropolis of Athens, close behind the Minerva of Phidias, he must have made considerable progress in the art.

1 V. § 5.
2 "Η τόδε γελάτε, says Socrates, chap. II. § 19, εἰ μείζω τοῦ καυροῦ τὴν γαστέρα ἐχων, μετριωτέραν βούλομαι ποιῆσαι αὐτήν; That his father was by no means a wealthy man is evident, from the fact that Socrates, though very economical, was always poor.
3 That his father was by no means a wealthy man is evident, from the fact that Socrates, though very economical, was always poor.
4 Plat. Crito, c. XII.
5 Paus. I. 22, and IX. 35. Compare Diog. II. § 19. and the
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Crito, a wealthy Athenian, who subsequently became an intimate friend and disciple of our philosopher, having discovered the eminent talents of Socrates, induced him to give up the profession of his father. Various anecdotes preserved in Plutarch and Porphyry rest on too feeble historical evidence to throw any light on the history of Socrates. To this class belongs probably the following story in Porphyry, who being attached to the new Platonic system which formed such a contrast to the sobriety of the Attic sage, was an adversary of the latter. Socrates, we are told by him, was in his youth compelled by his father to follow the art of a sculptor against his inclination, was very disobedient, and often withdrew himself from the paternal scholiast to the Clouds of Aristoph. p. 170. Timon, therefore, in Diogenes calls him with a sneer of contempt λαζοξονος.

1 Diog. II. 20. "Demetrius of Byzantium says that Crito, attracted by the charms of his mind, withdrew him from the workshop and instructed him." Suidas, Tom. II. under Crito, p. 377. I do not think that there is any reason for disbelieving this account. Meiners, indeed, (Geschichte der Wissenschaften, &c. Vol. II. p. 354.) considers this to be a mere calumny of Aristoxenus; but it is Demetrius and not Aristoxenus, who is mentioned by Diogenes as his authority.

2 His charges against Socrates he derived from Aristoxenus, a disciple of Aristotle. Aristoxenus himself could not deny that Socrates had been obedient to the laws, and had always been just, yet he accuses our philosopher of being guilty of violent anger and shameful dissoluteness. The most unobjectionable evidence of the most credible contemporaries sufficiently refutes such calumnies. A detailed examination and refutation of the charges of Aristoxenus will be found in Luzac's Lectt. Att. edited by Sluiter, Leyden 1809. p. 27. foll. But why Aristoxenus brought these charges against Socrates, will be seen from our subsequent description of the character of the latter.
roof. In the same manner Plutarch, among other things, relates, that the father of Socrates had been warned not to compel his son to follow any particular pursuit, as he had a guardian spirit who would lead him in the right way.

Thus Crito was the first who raised Socrates into a higher sphere. Whether he had before this time enjoyed the instructions of Archelaus, a disciple of Anaxagoras, cannot be decided by historical evidence, although it is asserted by Porphyry that he was a disciple of Archelaus as early as his seventeenth year. The first study that engaged the attention of Socrates, and to which he applied with great zeal, was that of physics. "When I was young," says he in Plato's Phaedo, "I had an astonishing longing for that kind of knowledge which they call physics." He sought after wisdom where his fellow-citizens sought it; — in the schools of the vaunting sophists, and of the most celebrated philosophers of his age, as well as in the writings and songs of former sages. Parmenides, Zeno, Anaxagoras and Archelaus among the philosophers, Euenus of Paros, Prodicus and others among the sophists, are recorded as his teachers.\(^1\)

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2 Page 96. A.
3 Zeno of Elea, about the year 460 B.C., at the age of about 40, undertook with his teacher Parmenides, a journey to Athens, for the purpose of meeting Socrates. Whether Socrates ever heard Anaxagoras himself, or only studied his writings, cannot be asserted with historical certainty. That he heard Archelaus is attested by Cicero, *Tuscul. V.* 10. Euenus of Paros instructed Socrates in poesy. Compare Fischer's remark on the 5th chap-
Assisted by these masters he made considerable progress in mathematics, physics, and astronomy; the value of which he afterwards confined to very narrow limits. Some of his opinions in natural philosophy, which Aristophanes distorts to suit his purpose, must perhaps be referred to this early period of his life. In the instance in which the comic poet makes him say, that the sky is a furnace, and men the coals in it, the real assertion probably was, that the sky was a vault covering the earth—quite in accordance with the spirit of the cosmological systems of the time; and that he had studied the cosmological system of Anaxagoras with particular attention, is evident; for he himself tells us, that he hoped to find in it information concerning the origin of things. As Socrates himself gives us...
in this passage an explanation of the reasons, which afterwards induced him to think so little of this system, he shall speak for himself. "I once heard a person reading in a book which he said was written by Anaxagoras, and saying that reason arranged all things, and was the cause of them. With this cause I was much delighted, and in some manner it appeared to me quite correct, that reason should be the cause of all things. If it be true, I thought, that reason arranges all things, it arranges and places every thing in the place where it is best. Now if any body wanted to find the cause by which every thing arises, perishes, or exists, he must find the manner in which a thing exists, suffers or acts best. For this reason I thought only that investigation the object of which is the most excellent and the best, to be adapted for man both for himself as well as other things; and he who succeeded in this, must at the same time know that which is bad, for both are objects of the same science. Reflecting upon this subject I was delighted, as I thought I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher after my own heart, who could open my eyes to the causes of things. Now he will first tell thee, I thought, whether the earth is flat or round; and after he has done this, he will also show thee the cause and the necessity of it, and whichever is the better, he will prove that this quality is the better one for the earth. If he tell thee the earth is in the centre, he will at the same time show thee that it is better for it to be in the centre. I was willing, if he would show me this, not to suppose any other kind of causes, and hoped
soon to receive information about the sun, the moon, and other stars, pointing out the mutual relation of their rapidity,—their rotation and other changes; and how it was better that each should act as it acts, and suffer as it suffers. For as he said that they were arranged by reason, I did not think that he would assign any other cause to things than that their actual qualities were the best. As he assigned to all things their causes, and ascertained them in all things in the same manner, I thought he would represent that which is the best for each, as the good common to all. I would not have given up my hopes for any thing; with great avidity I took up his books, and read them as soon as I found it possible, in order that I might quickly learn the good and the bad. But, my friend, I was soon disappointed in this hope; for in the progress of my reading, I discovered that the man no longer applied his principle of reason, and mentioned no causes by which to classify things; but declared air, ether, water, and many other strange things to be causes. This appeared to me just as absurd, as if somebody should say, Socrates does every thing which he does, with reason; and afterwards endeavouring to point out the motive of every single action, he should say in the first place that I am now sitting here because my body is composed of bones and of sinews, &c. I should have liked very much to have

1 He is speaking to Cebes.
2 Νευρα with Plato does not mean nerves, which signification it only received through Galenus.
obtained some instruction, from whomsoever it might have proceeded, concerning the nature of this cause. But as I did not succeed, and as I was unable to find it out by myself, or to learn it from any one else, I set out on a second voyage in search of the cause." The rest are Plato's own thoughts.

Besides this, Socrates was greatly attracted by the intercourse of women of talent, and courted their society for the higher cultivation of his own mind and heart. He, like that powerful demagogue on whom his contemporaries bestowed the highest admiration for the power of his eloquence, was instructed in the art of speaking by Aspasia;¹ and Diotima of Mantinea taught

¹ Plat. Menex. p. 235. E. She is also said to have written a poem to Socrates. Athen. V. p. 219.

[It is doubtful whether any historical weight can be attached to the passage in the Menexemus. The whole may probably be looked upon as a fiction; although it can hardly be supposed according to Ast, that Plato meant to deride Pericles and Aspasia. Plato's real object appears to be to ridicule those demagogues, who think themselves equal to Pericles, although they cannot compose a speech for themselves, and are obliged to learn by heart such as have been composed for them by others. All the other passages of the antients, in which Socrates is said to have learnt the art of speaking from Aspasia, are probably taken from this passage of the Menexemus, and therefore prove nothing. Reiske, on Xenophon's Memorabilia, II. 6. § 36, likewise considers the statement in the Menexemus to be made ironically; in which opinion he is supported by Stallbaum and Loers, the late editor of the Menexemus. As for the influence Diotima is said to have had over Socrates, it seems just as uncertain. It is only mentioned by Plato, and those who copied from him, and is probably of the same nature as the story about Aspasia.—Ed.]
him love;¹ by which as Fr. Schlegel justly observes,² we must not understand transient pleasures, but the pure kindness of an accomplished mind; a circumstance which is of importance in forming a proper estimate of many peculiarities in the doctrine and method of Socrates.

¹ Plat. Sympos. p. 201. D. That Diotima is not to be ranked among the ἐραίφαι, has been shown by Fr. Schlegel Griechen und Römer.
² Griechen und Römer, p. 254.
CHAPTER II.

Socrates, however, was unable to obtain any satisfactory knowledge from the philosophers and teachers of his time. Dissatisfied with the pretended wisdom of the cosmologists and sophists, he entirely abandoned all speculative subjects,¹ and devoted his attention to human affairs, according to his own expression,² i.e. to researches in practical philosophy. He, therefore, in

¹ Diog. II. 21. "When he saw that the science of physics (φυσικὴ θεωρία) was not adapted for us, he began to philosophize on moral subjects in the workshops and in the markets, and said he was seeking

"Οττι τοι ἐν μεγάροις κακὸν τ’ ἀγαθὸν τε τέτυκται."

The latter is a verse of Homer (Od. IV. 392), which, as we are told by Sextus Empiricus contra Mathemat. VII. 21., Socrates was constantly in the habit of quoting.

² Ἀνθρώπεια, res humanae, are here opposed to δαμονίους, rebus divinis (Xenoph. Mem. I. 1. 12 and 16), which he also calls οὐράνια (Mem. IV. 7. 6.) Ἀνθρώπεια are things which directly relate to man as such, as questions on the destination of man, his duties, hopes, and in short all moral subjects; δαμώνια, res divinae, are of a speculative nature, and comprehend either physical or metaphysical questions, and have no direct relation to man as such. This distinction must be well borne in mind, as otherwise many assertions of Socrates might appear very paradoxical. Cicero Acad. I. 15.—"ut—cœlestia vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret, vel si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene (morally) vivendum conferre."
Plato, calls his wisdom a human wisdom.\textsuperscript{1} Socrates, according to Cicero's expression,\textsuperscript{2} called philosophy down from heaven to the earth, \textit{i. e.} he gave it a practical tendency, whereas before, it had taken a direction completely speculative. Previous to Socrates, philosophers were for the most part occupied in cosmological researches: morals were entirely uncultivated; and although the Pythagorean institution, a moral and politico-religious order, had devoted very great care to morals, yet its doctrines had already fallen very much into oblivion; and besides as an order it had a direct influence only on its own members. But the greatest shock that morality had received, came from the sophists, a class of men who flourished shortly before and at the time of Socrates, and who boasted of being in the possession of every kind of knowledge; but were, however, not concerned about truth, but merely about the appearance of it, who by their eloquence knew how to give to a bad cause the appearance of a good one,\textsuperscript{3} and from a love of money gave instruction to every one in this art.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1}Ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία comprehends either the wisdom of which men are in the possession; or the wisdom relating to human affairs, such as the destination, duties, relations, &c., of man. In the former sense it is used in Plat. \textit{Apol.} c. v., where Socrates says: "It appears that the god means to say by the oracle, that human wisdom is of little or no value at all." In the latter sense Socrates ascribes human wisdom to himself.

\textsuperscript{2}Tuscul. v. 10. Socrates primus philosophiam devocavit e caelo et in uribus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit, et coegit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis querere.

\textsuperscript{3}τὸν ἠττῷ λόγον κρεῖττῳ ποιεῖν.

\textsuperscript{4}It is well known that the word σοφιστής at first had an honourable meaning, and was synonymous with σοφός, a sage, a
These men, descendants of the Eleatic school, exerted their utmost power to shake the foundations of knowledge, to unsettle the ideas of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, to confound the moral power of judgment by scholar in its widest sense—for even artists were comprehended in it. Protagoras was the first who adopted the name of σοφιστής to distinguish more decidedly one who makes others wise, especially one who taught eloquence, the art of governing, politics, or in short any kind of practical knowledge. From that time the word sophist acquired that odious meaning which it retains in the present day. Afterwards in the times of the Roman emperors, the name of sophist again became an honourable appellation, and was applied to those rhetoricians who had established schools of rhetoric, in which they treated on any chosen subject for the sake of exercise. Libanius, for instance, belonged to this class of sophists. Though the latter class in a certain point of view differed from the former, yet covetousness was common to both. Themistius, because he received no money, protested against his being called a sophist (Orat. 23.). The description of a Greek sophist of the time of Socrates is taken from the Protagoras of Plato. In reading, however, the writings of the philosophers of the Socratic school, it must not be forgotten that they had imbibed from their master a profound hatred of the sophists, and may consequently have now and then been rather too severe in their remarks upon them. With the description given above, all Greek writers agree, and the sophists themselves by their own actions sufficiently characterize themselves as such. Speusippus Defin. ad calcem Opp. Plat: Σοφιστής νέων πλουσίων ἐνδόξων ἐμμισθος θηρευτής. Arist. de Sophist. Elench. I. 11. Xenoph. Mem. I. 6. 13.: Καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡραύτως τοὺς μὲν ἄργυρίον τῷ βουλομένω πωλοῦντας, σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν. Isocrat. in Hellen. Encom. II. 116 and 117. Later writers, as Philostratus do not draw any precise distinction between sophists, philosophers, and orators. Philostratus thus mentions Carneades among the sophists. Moreover, not only Socrates but Anaxagoras are called sophists by Libanius (Apolog. Socr. p. 54 and 55, edit. Reiske), perhaps in order to raise thereby his own dignity. Compare Carus's graphic description of the sophists in his Ideen zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 493. foll.
dialectical illusions, and to declare a thing to be right at one time, and wrong at another, as their interest dictated. Instead of being teachers of wisdom, they were mere dialectic quibblers, who made no man wiser or better, and who by the spirit of quibbling, which they diffused among their disciples by such questions, as whether virtue could be taught, &c., paralyzed the power of the moral feelings. Socrates discovered the irretrievable injuries inflicted by these people on intellectual advancement and morality, and witnessed the distressing results of it among his contemporaries. Filled with vain pride, the disciples of the sophists returned from their schools, persuading themselves they had discovered the most recondite truths; they thought themselves unequalled in the art of disputing, and were constantly seeking opportunities of displaying their subtleties. Thus they wandered far from the only path of true wisdom, the knowledge of themselves. But the instructions of the sophists were still more injurious, since by their defending what was wrong, those moral principles, which are the supports of public peace and happiness, were artificially undermined. Socrates, therefore, firmly resolved to devote his life to the moral improvement of his fellow-citizens, and at the age of about thirty,¹ he made it his sacred duty to counteract the sophists, who perplexed good sense, corrupted public

¹ I say about thirty. It is indeed generally believed that the public teaching of Socrates commenced precisely at his thirtieth year. But I do not believe that any passage of the antients can be pointed out in support of this belief. However, that Socrates, even when a young man, had chosen the office of a general teacher,
morality, and brought down upon philosophy the reputation of being the art of disputing, nay of being dangerous and injurious. He endeavoured to exhibit them in their naked deformity, and thus directly as well as indirectly, by the doctrines and example of solid virtue, to contribute as much as lay in his power to the moral improvement of mankind.

This noble resolution he faithfully maintained throughout his life, until in his seventieth year he met his has been proved with great sagacity from several historical facts by Meiners in his Geschichte der Wissenschaften &c. II. p. 353.

[Ritter, however, remarks in his History of Antient Philosophy (Vol. II. p. 20. Engl. Trans.), that "from the constitution of the mind of Socrates, which proceeding through many attempts in the discovery of truth, could only at a late period have attained to certainty, it is not improbable that he had arrived at a ripe age before he began to incite others to the study of philosophy. In the more detailed accounts, he is almost without exception depicted as an old man. There are other reasons also, which scarcely admit of a supposition that he devoted himself suddenly and all at once to this vocation; for though it be true that his observation of man, with a view to the science of humanity, has been referred to an oracle for its occasion, even the oracle itself implies his having previously pursued philosophical studies in common with Chærephon; and it is quite consistent with the nature of the case to suppose, that a sense of his peculiar fitness for the education of youth gradually opened upon his mind, as he observed the improvement and instruction which others derived from his society." In a note on this passage, Ritter observes, "The assumption of Wiggers that Socrates commenced teaching in his thirtieth year is wholly unfounded. That of Delbrück (Socrates § 34), that he had openly philosophized five or six years before he was brought upon the stage by Aristophanes (b. c. 423), which would make him about forty at his first appearance as a teacher, is not improbable; although the anecdote of Eucleides, (Gell., Noct. Att, VI. 10.) is apparently inconsistent with it."—Ed.]
higher destination in the manner so generally known. Moreover, Socrates during his pursuit of the high objects of his existence, followed a course in which he sought within himself what other philosophers had been accustomed to seek without, and thus directed attention to the operations of the mind. The cause of his pursuing this mode of thought not only arose from his practical mode of thinking, and from the high cultivation of the reasoning powers attained by the exertions of previous thinkers; but also from external circumstances. The inscription on the temple of Delphi, "Know thyself," and the celebrated declaration of the Delphic god: "Sophocles is wise, Euripides is wiser, but the wisest of all men is Socrates,"¹ may have greatly contributed to direct the attention of Socrates to the internal operations of his mind.

The above inscription on the temple of Delphi must have made a very peculiar impression upon him, for he certainly was the first to whom it became a truth of great moral importance. The inscription itself is well known, and needs no further explanation. But as regards the declaration of the Delphic oracle, it is not so easily to be accounted for.

Socrates relates the whole event in the Apology of Plato;² where he says that an intimate friend of his of the name of Chaerephon, ventured to ask the Delphic oracle, if there was any one wiser than him (Socrates),

¹ Σωφός Σοφοκλῆς, σοφώτερος δὲ Εὐριπίδης, ἄνδρῶν δὲ πάντων Σωκράτης σοφότατος. Suidas, see σωφός.
² c. v.
and that the Pythia replied, that there was none wiser.

It is, indeed, surprising that Chærephon, a friend and disciple of our philosopher, who besides is described both by him and by Plato in the Charmides¹ as a violent and passionate man, should have received this answer to his question. Plessing,² therefore, ventures the bold conjecture, that Socrates himself had contributed to this imposition, in order thereby to gain authority, and to prepare his plan for changing the form of government in Athens: for this was, according to him, the end for which Socrates was constantly and deliberately striving. This hypothesis, however, is too derogatory to the character of Socrates to be admitted without further reasons. The passionate nature of Chærephon renders it more probable that he was guilty of an untimely and extravagant zeal to raise the fame of his master. But on the other hand, it is also possible, that Socrates, even at that time had acquired so great a reputation, that his favour was no longer a matter of indifference to the crafty Pythia.

This declaration of the god of Delphi, together with the application which Socrates made of it, is unquestionably the most important fact in the history of his life, as it gives us a clew to his whole subsequent conduct and mode of thinking. From this time Socrates considered himself as a messenger peculiarly favoured by the Deity, standing under its immediate guidance, and

¹ p. 153. B.
² In his Osiris und Sokrates, p. 186, foll.
sent to the Athenians, as he expresses himself in the Apology of Plato, to instruct and improve them. 1 "But that I was sent," says he, 2 "as a divine messenger to the state, you may see from what I will tell you. Assuredly it is not a human feature in me that I have neglected all my own interests, and for a great number of years, have not concerned myself about my domestic

1 [Delbrück, in his Sokrates laments that there should be many even among the admirers of Socrates in the present day, who, like some of his contemporaries and his judges, take the oracle for a fiction, and his appeal to it for irony. With as much reason, Mr. D. thinks, might Thomas à Kempis, or Pascal, or Fenelon, be suspected of an affectation of humility, when they confirm their convictions on sacred subjects by quotations from the Bible. Like them, Socrates was in the best sense of the word a mystic; and the answers of the Delphic oracle exercised an influence on the weal and woe of Greece, similar to that which the Bible exerts on the destinies and proceedings of Christendom. But Mr. Thirlwall remarks in the sixth number of the "Philological Museum" (p. 587), from which the preceding quotations from Delbrück's work have been taken, "that it may be readily conceived, and seems to be confirmed by several authentic accounts, that Socrates really considered himself as fulfilling a divine mission by his life and labours. But that this idea was first suggested to him by the Delphic oracle is, to say the least, extremely improbable, though such an accidental occurrence (for who but a sincere Pagan can believe it to have been more) may have contributed to confirm the impression, and may have given it a definite form in his mind. But surely his character and pursuits had been already fixed, before Chærephon could have ventured to inquire whether any man better deserved the title of wise. No additional dignity is imparted to his self-devotion, by considering it as the effect of such a casual inspiration. It was the spontaneous, necessary, result of his moral and intellectual constitution, and needed not to be connected with the eternal order of Providence by a tie so frail as a perishable superstition."—Ed.]

2 Plato, Apolog. c. xviii.
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affairs, and am only anxious for your welfare, going to every one of you and admonishing you, like a father or elder brother, to follow the path of virtue."¹ The same oracle had, perhaps, some influence on his belief in a daemon, which restrained him in doubtful cases; of the existence of which, he himself, as well as his friends, were firmly convinced, and whose nature we shall now proceed to examine more closely.

¹ Compare Plat. Alcib. II. and de Re publ. VI.
CHAPTER III.

The daemon of Socrates has at all times caused great trouble to the commentators; at which we cannot be astonished, since even the friends and disciples of Socrates were ignorant of its real nature. Timarchus, having consulted the oracle of Trophonius about it, received no satisfactory answer. Simmias asked Socrates about the nature of his daemon, but received no answer at all; perhaps because Socrates himself thought it something quite incomprehensible. From that time he did not propose any other question on this subject. The explanations of the more antient commentators are almost all of a supernatural kind. The greater number of the ecclesiastical fathers declared it to be the devil; Andrew Dacier, to be a guardian angel. It has also been attempted to explain this mental phenomenon in a

1 Plutarch de Daemonio Socratis, p. 583. Carus observes very much to the point (Geschichte der Psychologie, p. 236): "There are many things of which Socrates would not form any clear idea, such as dreams; others of which he could not, such as his daemon."

2 Tertullian de anima, I. Aiunt Daemonium illi a puero adhæsisse, pessimum ve vera pædagogum.

3 In the preface to his French translation of some dialogues of Plato.
natural way; and can it be wondered at, if the results were mere absurdities? Such an hypothesis is preserved by Plutarch in his essay on the daemon of Socrates, in which it is said to have been a mere divination from sneezing; an hypothesis which even in modern times has found an advocate in M. Morin. Socrates himself certainly did not understand by it a mere prudence acquired by experience, as has been asserted by others, for the very name of daemon, which, according to the definition of Aristotle, means either the Deity itself, or a work of the Deity, suggests to us something beyond the sphere of common experience. To suppose with Plessing, that the daemon of Socrates was a fiction, which would enable him, by the high opinion he would thereby acquire, to realise his plan of changing the form of government in Athens, is an hypothesis which rests on too arbitrary grounds, and is too contrary to the veracious character of Socrates, ever to be adopted by any intelligent scholar.

But notwithstanding these opposite modes of explanation, it may not be so very difficult to arrive at a just view of the genius of Socrates by an historico-psychological mode of enquiry. It was perhaps nothing more than a strong presentiment, which being directed by an accurate knowledge of things, led him to form his

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1 In the Mémoires de littérature tirés des Registres de l'Académie Royale des inscriptions et des belles lettres, Tome IV. p. 333. à Paris 1723.
2 Rhetor. II. 23. ῥ θεώς η θεοῦ ἐργόν.
3 Osiris und Sokrates, p. 185. foll.
conclusions from cause to effect by analogy, without his being perfectly conscious of the process. Such an exalted feeling of presentiment is often found in persons of a lively imagination and refined organization; and that Socrates belonged to this class will be seen hereafter. But Socrates himself actually considered it as an inward divine voice that restrained him from engaging in unpitiful undertakings. This hypothesis seems to be fully confirmed, not only by the universal belief of antient Greece and Rome in guardian-spirits, who attended men from their birth, but also by the manner in which Socrates himself speaks of this daemon, and by the examples which are recorded of its influence. The principal passages which refer to this daemon are in the Theages\(^1\) and Apology\(^2\) of Plato, and in the Memorabilia of Xenophon.\(^3\) Plato and Xenophon seem to

\(^1\) In the Theages he says: "Εστι γάρ τι θεία μοίρα παρεπόμενον ἔμοι ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρχάμενον δαίμονιον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, αἱ μοι σμαίνει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, τοῦτον ἀποτροπὴν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε. p. 128. D. Compare Cicero de Divinat. I. 54. Ast indeed (in the Journ. Philol. by Hauff, Stuttgart, 1803. p. 260.) asserts that the Theages is spurious, but,—even if we could admit this,—we must yet confess that, considering the agreement with the other passages of Plato, Platonic thoughts, at least, constitute its basis.

\(^2\) In the Apology he speaks almost in the same manner: "Εμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρχάμενον, φωνή τις γεγυμομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, αἱ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτον, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε. c. xix. Compare Plat. Phaedr. p. 242. B.

\(^3\) Σωκράτης, says Xenophon, ὡςπερ ἴγινοσκεν, ὀκτὼς ἔλεγε. τὸ δαίμονιον γάρ, ἐφ᾽ σμαίνειν. καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν εὐνύνων προηγώρευε, τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μή ποιεῖν, ως τοῦ δαίμονιον
contradict each other on this point; for Plato states that the daemon only used to restrain him, but Xenophon represents the genius as disclosing to him the future in general, what should not be done as well as what should be done. But both statements, though apparently contradictory, can, as Charpentier¹ and Tennemann² observe, be very well reconciled. For Plato only expresses himself more decidedly in saying that the voice had only restrained, and never impelled him. Actions from which he was not restrained, were lawful to him, and unattended with danger. In the Apology of Plato³ he concludes from the silence of the voice during the latter period of his life, that whatever then happened to him, was for his good. But Xenophon does not draw a precise distinction between that which the voice directly commanded, and that which Socrates concluded from its silence.³

Our view of the nature of the daemon of Socrates is thus confirmed by the manner in which he himself is represented as expressing himself upon it, both by Xenophon and Plato. But the probability is still


¹ La vie de Socrate, p. 104.
² Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. II. p. 33.
³ c. xxxi.

⁴ [Mr. Thirlwall, in the "Philological Museum," No.VI. p. 583, also remarks, "that there is really no inconsistency between the passage in Xenophon, and the assertion in the Apology and in the Phaedrus. For it is evident, that a sign which only forbade might, by its absence, show what was permitted, and thus a positive kind of guidance might not improperly be ascribed to it." — Ed.]
more increased by the examples which Socrates gives as the fruits of the suggestions of the daemon. The genius advised him not to take any part in public affairs, and at first did not allow him to enter into any intimate connections with Alcibiades. Socrates, on his flight after the defeat of Delium, was warned by his genius, and in consequence of it, would not take the same way as the others. He also dissuaded his friends from undertaking apparently indifferent actions—Charmides, from visiting the Nemeian games; Timarchus, from retiring from the repast—and he also opposed the expedition to Sicily. All this he could have known, without revelation, in some measure by an accurate knowledge of circumstances, to which, in most cases,

1 Τούτο ἐστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. Apolog. C. XIX. He himself adds the reason immediately afterwards: "Because an honest man who zealously resists the multitude and prevents unlawful actions, must by necessity become a victim to his honesty."

2 Alcib. I. p. 103. E. Here too he adds the reason, because, he said, Alcibiades in his youth would not have listened to his instructions with proper attention, and he therefore should have spoken in vain.

3 Cicero de divinat. I. 54. Idem Socrates, cum apud Delium male pugnatum esset, Lachete prætore, fugeretque cum ipso Lachete: ut ventum est in trivium, eadem, qua ceteri, fugere nolebat. Quibus quaerentibus, cur non eadem via pergeret, deterreri se a deo dixit, tum quidem ii, qui alia via fugerant, in hostium equitatum inciderunt. This event is more minutely related by the author of the Socratic letters, p. 6 & 7.

4 This and several other instances are related in the Theages of Plato, p. 129 foll. Cicero, de divinat. I. 54. observes that a great number of such instances were recorded by Antipater in his books de divinatione. Some are also mentioned by Cicero himself.
every-day experience would lead him; and many things, on the other hand, must be attributed to chance. It is not likely that the voice of which Socrates speaks, should have been a mere figurative expression: he was indeed convinced of its reality, which is sufficiently accounted for by his mental organization. This conviction of Socrates was moreover facilitated by the belief of the antients in the direct influence of the Deity on man, and in guardian spirits who accompanied man from his birth; and more especially by his own belief in the close connection between the human race and the Deity, as well as by his ignorance of mental philosophy.  

1 [Schleiermacher, however, argues from a passage in the Memorabilia (I. 1. § 2.3.) of Xenophon, that Socrates himself could never have considered his ἀντίφωνος, in the light of a specific supernatural being. For Xenophon there speaks of it as something resembling in kind the ordinary instruments of divination, as birds, voices, omens, sacrifices. See "Philological Museum," No. 6. p. 582. Ritter, in his "History of Antient Philosophy," (Vol. II. p. 37—39.) observes, "We shall not perhaps be far wrong, if we explain the daemonium of Socrates as nothing more than excitability of feeling, expressing itself as a faculty of presentiment. It must not, however, be supposed that we seek thereby to screen Socrates from the imputation of superstition; for his opinion of demoniacal intimations was in unison with his veneration, not merely of the Deity, but of the gods. This is apparent from his recommendation of divination as a remedy for the deficiency of our knowledge of the future and of contingent events, his advice to Xenophon that he should consult the Delphic god as to his Asiatic expedition, his disposition to pay attention to dreams, and lastly, his constant sacrifices, and his command to make all due offerings to the Gods of House and State. Now in this superstition there are two points to be distinguished; that which he derived from the common opinion of his nation, and that which was founded on his own experience. In both phases it is equally
It thus appears that the daemon of Socrates merely related to things the consequence of which was uncertain; but whenever the morality of an action was discussed, Socrates never referred to his daemon. He was perfectly convinced that in order to know what is superstitious, but venial, if not commendable. For, in respect to the former, he who, brought up in the olden creeds and traditions of his country, adheres to them so long as nothing better is offered for his adoption, and so far as they are not opposed to his own reason and enlightenment, is, to our minds, a better and a wiser man than he who lightly or hastily turns into ridicule the objects of public veneration. As to the demoniacal intimations of Socrates, they were, in common with his other superstitions, the good foundation of his belief, that the gods afford assistance to the good, but imperfect endeavours of virtuous men, and prove the scrupulous attention he paid to the emotions and suggestions of his conscience. Among the various thoughts and feelings which successively filled and occupied his mind, he must have noticed much that presented itself involuntarily, and which, habituated, as he was, to reflect upon every subject, and yet unable to derive it from any agency of his own, he referred to a divine source. This is particularly confirmed by the exhortation he gives, in Xenophon, to Euthydemus, to renounce all idle desire to become acquainted with the forms of the gods, and to rest satisfied with knowing and adoring their works, for then he would acknowledge that it was not idly and without a cause that he himself spoke of demoniacal intimations. By this Socrates evidently gave him to understand that this demoniacal sign would be manifest to every pious soul, who would renounce all idle longing for a visible appearance of the Deity. Still, in spite of all this, he cautiously guarded against the danger of that weak and credulous reliance upon the assistance of the Deity which necessarily proves subversive or obstructive of a rational direction of life; for he taught that those who consult the oracles in matters within the compass of human powers, are no less insane than those who maintain the all-sufficiency of human reason."—Ed.]
right and wrong, reason is the only unerring principle.\(^1\)
Among all the instances mentioned in the Theages of Plato, there is not one in which the rectitude of an action was decided by the daemon. Hence many authors, such as Buhle, go too far, when they extend the influence of the daemon to moral feeling. Respecting things imposed upon us as duties, according to the opinion of Socrates, oracles ought not to be consulted.\(^2\)

But it is interesting to see how this conviction of a genius acted on Socrates, and how, together with the external causes above mentioned, it led him to a careful observation of his own mind. On every occasion he listened to the voice of his genius. Whenever a person desirous of improvement wished to have his instructions, Socrates ascertained whether his genius would not dissuade him; and whenever he was requested to do something which was not at variance with morality, his genius was consulted. It will be needless to explain how

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\(^1\) Plutarch *de genio Socratis*, Tom. III. p. 482. says, the daemon of Socrates only enlightened him on obscure subjects into which human prudence could not penetrate. But it is surprising that Socrates did not make use of this genius in all doubtful cases. When Xenophon had received letters from his friend Proxenus, persuading him to go into Asia, and to enter into the service of Cyrus the younger, he communicated them to Socrates, and asked for his advice. Socrates referred him to the oracle of Delphi. See Xenoph. *Anab.* III. 1. 5. Cicero, *de divinat.* I. 54. says: Xenophonti consulenti, sequeretur Cyrum, posteaquam exposuit, quae sibi videbantur, Et nostrum quidem, inquit, humanum est consilium: sed de rebus et obscuris et incertis ad Apollinem censeo referendum, ad quem etiam Athenienses publice de majoribus rebus semper retulerunt.

greatly such a disposition must have contributed to turn the inquiries of Socrates from the speculative questions which had engaged previous philosophers, such as the origin and formation of the world, the unity of the first cause and the variety of its operations, in short,—from divine to human affairs, in the sense of Socrates.  

1 Carus, in his *Ideen zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie*, p. 524 foll. says: "How much must the belief of being under the immediate influence of a protecting genius, have increased his attention to himself, and to what great resolutions and noble self-confidence must it have led him, at that age in which simplicity of heart is still the prevailing characteristic! It is just as remarkable, that he was most strongly attracted to those who had observed in themselves a similar guide."
CHAPTER IV.

Socrates never established any particular school; he taught wherever chance led him, and wherever he found men to whom he thought he might be useful by his instructions, or,—to speak the language of Socrates,—wherever his genius did not prevent him: in public walks, in the gymnasia, porticos, markets, &c.¹

In the same sense in which Socrates established no school, he had no disciples; hence he asserts in the Apology,² he had taught none; yet a circle of inquisitive men and youths were soon assembled around him, and, charmed with his conversation and instruction, were attached to him with incredible affection. Such were Plato, Xenophon, Aristippus, Cebes, Simmias, Euclides and others; and it was, properly speaking, from his school, i. e. from the instructions which he had occasionally given, that all the distinguished Greek philo-

sophists subsequently proceeded. He gave his instructions gratis, a disinterestedness which formed the most striking contrast to the covetousness of the sophists.¹

Socrates never delivered any complete discourse, but conversed with his hearers in a friendly manner on topics just as they were suggested by the occasion.²

His method of teaching, however, had something peculiar to himself, which will be more fully developed in the following remarks.

The peculiarity of his method consisted in questions, the nature of which, however, was different according to the persons with whom he conversed.

Whenever Socrates had to deal with sophists, who were puffed up with their pretended wisdom, he used that admirable kind of irony which Cicero translates by "dissimulatio," ³—a translation which Quinctilian

² Οὐ γάρ ἦστι, he says to Alcibiades, τοιοῦτον τὸ ἐμὸν. viz. εἰπεῖν λόγον μακρὸν. (Plat. Alcib. I. p. 106. B.)—To Antiphon, the sophist, he says: 'Εὰν τι σχῶ ἄγαθὸν, διδάσκω, καὶ ἄλλως συνιστήμη, παρ' ὧν ἂν ἡγώμαι ὕφελήσεσθαι τι αὐτοῖς εἰς ἀρετήν. Καὶ τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἄνδρῶν, οὐς ἱκεῖνοι κατέλειπον ἐν βεβλίοις γράφαντες, ἁνελίττων, κοινῇ σώ ν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι καὶ ἂν τι ὄρμεν ἄγαθον, ἐκλεγόμεθα, καὶ μέγα νομίζομεν κέρδος, τὰν ἀλλήλους ὑφέλιμοι γιγνώμεθα.

did not approve of—and which is nothing more than the contrast of the half-ridiculing and half-sincere confession of his ignorance with the boastings of those who thought themselves to be wise. In this manner conceited pride was exposed by questions; and the distinguishing characteristic of the ridicule consisted in Socrates pretending that he could not form an opinion in any other manner; and this I conceive to be the principal difference between the Socratic and Platonic irony. That of Socrates, which is described by Xenophon in its purity, has nothing of Plato's bitterness; its playfulness only instructs, but never enrages. A more minute comparison of the conversation of Socrates videatur; qualis est vita Socratis. Nam ideo dictus est ἐπων, i. e. agens imperitum et admirator aliorum tamquam sapientum. —The later academicians understood this irony of Socrates in a wrong way, and therefore represented him as the founder of their scepticism. Acad. IV. 23. They also endeavoured to imitate the form of the Socratic method of disputing. Tuscul. I. 10. I need hardly remind the reader that we are here only speaking of that kind of irony which is peculiar to Socrates. For on other occasions he often employed that kind of ridicule which we usually call irony, and which was peculiar to the Athenians in general, viz. that contrast between the literal meaning of the expression with the thought conveyed by it, by which a meaning is conveyed to the minds of the hearers totally different from the literal sense of the words. Instances of this irony are to be found in the celebrated dialogue with Theodota, and in the conversation with Pericles the younger, on whom Socrates bestows much praise for his talents as a general. "I know very well," replies Pericles to Socrates (Memorab. III. 5. 24), "that thou dost not say this thinking that I am actually striving after this kind of knowledge, but in order to suggest to me that a future general ought to try to acquire all this kind of wisdom."

1 Institut. Orat. IX. 2.
with Hippias, as it is described both by Plato and Xenophon,\(^1\) at which the latter was present, may serve to show this difference more strikingly.

This Socratic irony was admirably calculated to place such conceited persons as the sophists in their true light. If any one entered into a discussion with them, he was so much overwhelmed with a host of philosophical terms and sophisms, that the point in question was entirely lost sight of. Socrates played the part of an attentive hearer, who was sincerely desirous of comprehending their sublime wisdom, and now and then asked a short question which was apparently quite insignificant, and did not at all belong to the point at issue,\(^2\) and which being answered by the sophists with a smile, he imperceptibly went on, and compelled them, at last, after being perplexed in contradictions, to acknowledge their ignorance. Examples of such conversations are found in all the writings of the disciples of Socrates; but here too we must chiefly depend upon Xenophon, the most faithful interpreter of the manner in which Socrates thought and acted. Besides the above-mentioned conversation with Hippias, examples occur in that with Euthydemus,\(^3\) and in other places.

But when Socrates met with disciples desirous of improvement, his instructions again were not given in a

\(^1\) Memorab. IV. 4.
\(^2\) Cicero, de Oratore, III. 16., blames Socrates for having first separated philosophy and eloquence, which however in the sense above described was highly praiseworthy.
\(^3\) Memorab. IV. 2.
didactic form; but he applied the same method of asking which is called after him the Socratic method, and which owes to Socrates, if not its origin, at least its cultivation and perfection. He himself called this method the τέχνη μανευτική (ars obstetricia), and on that account compared himself to his mother Phaenarete, who though not fruitful herself, was yet admirably skilled in bringing to light the children of others. "I am an accoucheur of the mind," says he, in the Theaetetes of Plato, "just as my mother is an accoucheur of the body." By this comparison Socrates sufficiently characterises the nature of his method. It is nothing else but an analytical development of the undigested materials existing in the minds of his hearers, and as such it is applicable only as far as the materials are already in the possession of the pupil, or previously communicated to him by synthesis. As regards the form, we have an example of this Socratic method of asking in the Meno of Plato; where Plato makes Socrates apply his method in order to prove his own (Plato's) doctrine of ideas. Socrates there asks quite an ignorant boy some geometrical questions, to which the boy gives correct answers. From this, Plato draws the conclusion that the boy could not have answered in that manner, if his soul had not acquired, in a state previous to its being united to its body, a knowledge of the nature of things; but he seems to have overlooked one important fact, that this knowledge had been previously communicated to the lad by Socrates, in the way of synthesis.

This method of asking, which is usually called the
Socratic method in a limited sense of the word, is in its character often similar to irony, but is different in its object and effect. It differs from our catechetical method in as much as it was confined almost exclusively to adult persons, in whom a tolerable share of knowledge might be supposed to exist, so that they not only answered, but also asked, and thus carried on a lively conversation. But what formed its characteristic feature, was its aiming at leading men to knowledge by reflecting upon themselves, and not upon external objects. This line of demarcation must not be overlooked, and it would be rashness to introduce the Socratic method into our elementary schools.  

Socrates applied this method with great skill, and in modern times he has justly been considered as the supreme master of it. He accommodated himself to the individual dispositions, and to the peculiar wants, of each of his disciples, and connected his instructions with the most ordinary events of the day. He rather appeared to instruct himself than to pretend to instruct others, rather called forth ideas than communicated them. The questions were clear and concise; however absurd the answers might be, he knew how to make


2 Cicero, de finib. II. 1. Socrates percontando atque interro-gando elicere solebat eorum opiniones, quibuscum disserebat, ut ad haec que hi respondissent, si quid videtur, diceret.—Hence the invention of dialogues is attributed to Socrates.
them subserve his purposes. In his conversation he commenced with the most undisputed propositions which even a person with any sagacity might understand and comprehend. He omitted no intermediate ideas, but went on carefully from one to another. If in his researches Socrates sometimes appears to have entered too much into detail, we must not forget that by the want of precision in Greek expressions this apparent diffuseness was often necessary. He introduced a great degree of clearness into his conversations; which he accomplished both by his placing a thing in a point of view the best suited to the person to whom he spoke, and by viewing it in all its relations, by returning to it in various ways, by accurately dissecting the simple qualities of an idea, until the truth which Socrates intended to teach, became evident to his disciples, and, as it were, their own. He knew how to interest those who conversed with him and who seemed to have no wish to enter into any further discussion with him — as Alcibiades — by describing their own character, and by appealing to their peculiar wishes and hopes.

This is the favourable side of the Socratic method; if however we examine it with impartiality, we must acknowledge that his art of asking was not altogether free from sophistry; yet this tinge of it did not constitute him a sophist, as he never substituted one idea for another, or confounded dissimilar ideas. Neither did

1 Xenoph. Mem. IV. 6. 15. Econ. 6. § 2 foll.
2 As in Xenoph. Mem. I. 2. 57; IV. 6. 3., 4, 13 & 23.
Socrates intentionally try to make error victorious over truth,—which is an essential feature in a sophist,—but his confounding heterogeneous ideas often arose from a want of precision in the Greek language. This kind of sophistry is found in the dialogues of Plato; as in the conversation with Thrasymachus, in the first book of the Republic, where the expression ἄμεθυστος ἔννοια gives rise to a sophistical dispute; and in all the passages in which the word καλός is sometimes interpreted by beautiful and sometimes by good. To these passages it might be objected that Plato made Socrates speak sophistically; but the same arguments are also found in Xenophon; and even in the writings of this most faithful disciple of Socrates, we find that he confounds

1 [This assertion, if applied to the Greek language in general, will certainly not find many advocates. If, however, the word καλός, which Wiggers especially mentions, is the only instance, few, who are acquainted with the meaning, which this word has in all the writings of Plato, will feel disposed to assent to the assertion in the text. For with what justice can we find fault with the Greek language, because some sophist avails himself of a word, which according to his opinion has two different meanings, while Plato himself certainly does not attribute two distinct meanings to it? According to Plato, nothing is useful which is not good, and nothing is good which is not at the same time useful. If we wish to account for the sophistries of Socrates, of which there are indeed several instances, it should be recollected that Socrates was in his youth instructed by sophists, and subsequently came very often in contact with them, and therefore cannot have been entirely free from their influence; every man partakes, more or less, of the character of the age in which he lives. On the other hand, Socrates sometimes used the weapons of the sophists themselves to expose their ignorance. — Ed.]

2 As in the Gorgias, p. 462. D.
the ideas of the beautiful and useful, which are both implied in the Greek word καλός; and also the ideas of virtue and happiness, the bene beateque vivere of Cicero, which the Greek expressed by the word εὐπραξία. In this manner he attributed to the expressions of those with whom he conversed, a meaning which was not intended.¹

A second peculiarity of the Socratic method of teaching is, that Socrates himself never gives a definition of the subject in dispute, but merely refutes the opinion of the person with whom he converses. Thus he awakened the true philosophical spirit; and by throwing out doubts, stimulated the mind of his hearer to further examination. In the Meno of Plato, Socrates does not, properly speaking, define what virtue is, but only what it is not, and thus merely refutes the definition given by Meno; and the conclusion that it is a θεία μοῖρα is rather ironical:² Meno therefore compares Socrates to a cramp-fish³ which paralyzes every one that

¹ Xenoph. Mem. III. 8; IV. 2. 26. The Socratic manner of asking questions is, however, a dangerous instrument in the hands of a sophist, as it is so very easy to take words in different senses, and thus to oblige the person who answers to make assertions which but for the application of those sophisms, he would never acknowledge as his own. Protagoras, who perceived this, combined the Socratic method with that of the sophists. Diog. IX. 8. 4.

² I should at least not like to infer with Carus (Geschichte der Psychologie, p. 254.) from this passage that Socrates had looked at virtuous men as inspired by the deity. Besides it would be incompatible with the assertion of Socrates that virtue can be taught.

³ p. 80. A.
comes in contact with it. 1 This mode of disputing (in utramque partem disputare) descended to the school of Plato, 2 and constituted the academica ratio disputandi, 3 though Socrates did not employ it in the sense in which the later academy made use of it. Socrates was far from philosophical scepticism; he was unconcerned about speculation; and the truths of practical philosophy had for him positive evidence.

By this mode of disputing, Socrates acquired a considerable advantage over the sophists; for as he did not openly express his own opinion, they could not lay hold of his views, but were obliged to allow him to attack and to refute their dogmatical assertions. "Thou shalt," says Hippias, the sophist, to Socrates, 4 "not hear my opinion, before thou hast explained to me what thou meanest by the just. For it is enough that thou laughest at others in proposing to them questions and refuting them; but thou never givest any account or answer thyself, nor wishest to express thy opinion on any subject."

As Socrates did not deliver any complete discourse, the form of his philosophical lectures cannot be spoken of, and consequently there are no complicated conclusions, corollaries, &c., which abound in the writings of other philosophers.

1 Ov γάρ, he says in the same dialogue (p. 80. C), εὑπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν, ἄλλα παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὖτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν.


3 Cicero Tuscul. I. 4.

A third peculiarity of the Socratic method was the inductive mode of reasoning. "Two things," says Aristotle (Metaph. XIII. 4.), "are justly ascribed to Socrates, induction and illustration by general ideas." Cicero also mentioned it as something peculiar to Socrates and Aspasia. Instances of such inductions are most numerous in the Memorabilia of Xenophon. Thus he tried to prove by induction, to Chærecrerates, who did not live on the most friendly terms with his brother Chærephon, what he ought to do to gain the affections of his brother; to his friend Diodorus that he must support poor Hermogenes; to timid Charmides, who had too great a diffidence in his own talents, that he must endeavour to obtain public appointments.

A fourth and last peculiarity of the Socratic method of teaching was the palpable and lively manner in which he delivered his instructions, leading his hearers from the abstract to the concrete by similes, allegories, fables, apophthegms, passages from poets, and sayings of wise men. A peculiar talent of Socrates was the power he possessed of demonstrating the correctness or incorrectness of general assertions by applying them to individual cases. It is evident that a distinctness of conception

1 De Invent. I. 51 foll. Topica. 10.
2 Οπότε δὲ, says Xenophon (Mem. IV. 6. 15.), αὐτὸς τι λόγῳ διεξε, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογομένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην τὴν ἀσφαλείαν εἶναι λόγου.
3 Xenoph. Mem. II. 3. 11 foll.
4 Ibid. II. 10.
5 Ibid. III. 7.
must have been promoted by such a popular method of reasoning, especially among a people thinking as practically as the Greeks. It was also best adapted for exposing the absurdity of many assertions of the sophists, who principally delighted in general propositions. If the sophists expressed themselves in dazzling theses and antitheses, Socrates directly applied them to individual cases taken from common life, and thus demonstrated in a palpable manner the inapplicability of their assertions. His similes were taken from the immediate circle of his hearers: a circumstance for which, it is well known, Socrates has often been ridiculed.

A great many passages from the Socratic philosophers might be quoted in proof of the manner in which he rendered abstract ideas palpable; but it will be sufficient here to give the classical passage from the Symposium of Plato, in which Alcibiades, the favourite of Socrates, gives his opinion on the method of teaching pursued by Socrates.¹

¹ p. 221. E. Ἐὰν ἐπιζήλει τις τῶν Ἐνεκράτους ἀκοῦειν λόγων, ἀφιέναι ἄν πάνυ γελοῦτοι τὸ πρῶτον ρατοῦτα καὶ ὅνῳ καὶ ῥήματα ἐξωθεὶς περιαμπέχονται Σατήρου ἄν τινα ὑβριστοῦ ὅραν. ὅνους γὰρ κανθαλίους λέγει καὶ χαλκέας τινὰς καὶ σκυτοῖς καὶ βυσσιδῆς, καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ταῦτὰ φαίνεται λέγειν, ὡςτε ἄπειρος καὶ ἀνόητος ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ἄν τῶν λόγων καταγελάσει. δοικαμένους δὲ ἰδὼν ἄν τις καὶ ἐντὸς αὐτῶν γιγνόμενος πρῶτον μὲν νοῦν ἔχοντας ἐνδον μόνος εὐρίσει τῶν λόγων, ἐπειτα θειοπάτους καὶ πλείστα ἀγάλματα ἀρετῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντας καὶ ἐπὶ πλείστον τείνοντας, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὅσον προσήκει σκοπεῖν τῷ μέλλοντι καλῷ κἀγαθῷ ἔσεσθαι. A great power in speaking is attributed to him even by his enemies, Aristoxenus.
The ironical character of the method of Socrates was principally directed against the sophists, whom he combated very successfully with this weapon: and indeed sharp weapons were necessary to humble these men who undeservedly enjoyed so great an authority among the Greeks. There were however among the sophists some very superior men, who only wanted the true spirit of philosophy, the love of truth and science, in order to accomplish great things. We cannot therefore rank all the sophists in the same class, and must carefully distinguish a Protagoras or a Gorgias, who deserve our sincere respect for their talents, and who were celebrated as orators, and made the first researches into the nature of language, — from a Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, whom Plato, in his Euthydemus, describes as true logomachists. Socrates took the field against these two classes of sophists, and established moral consciousness, founded on common sense, in opposition to their moral scepticism; and notwithstanding their sophistical stratagems, often extorted from them the shameful confession of their own ignorance. His disciples, encouraged by his example, carried the irony of their master against the sophists further than himself. "The sons of the richest people," says Socrates, in Plato's *Apology,* \(^1\) "who necessarily have the greatest leisure, follow me of their own accord, and are pleased when they hear me refuting these men. Yea, they themselves often follow

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\(^1\) C. X.
my example, and undertake to examine others." No wonder that Socrates gained for himself the perfect hatred of these people, and that they left no means untried to effect his ruin. But of this hereafter.
Socrates lived in the simplest manner; and it was from this circumstance that he was enabled to maintain his philosophical independence, notwithstanding his limited means. He despised the luxurious mode of living, which had greatly increased in his time at Athens, as well as all those sensual enjoyments that destroy the health both of body and mind. Yet Socrates did not violate the laws of taste and propriety; but observed a nice distinction, by the neglect of which the Cynics destroyed all that genuine humanity, which rendered Socrates so amiable, notwithstanding the austerity of his manners.

1 "I think," says Socrates to Critobulus in the Economicus of Xenophon (II. § 3.), "if I could find a reasonable purchaser, I should perhaps get five minae for all my property, including my house."

2 Ζηγ γονυ υτσς, says Antiphon, the sophist, to Socrates (Xenoph. Mem. I. 6. 2.), ως ουδ' αν εις δοδος υπο δεσποτυ διαιτωμενος μεινειε, στια τε στη, και ποτα πινεις τα φαυλοτατα, και ιμάτιον ημφισαι ου μόνον φαυλον, άλλα το αυτο θερονς τε και χειμωνος, άνοποδητος τε και άχιτων διατελεις.

3 The statement, in the Symposium of Plato, that Socrates bathed but seldom, is to be understood of warm baths, which Socrates considered as tending to make the body effeminate. The
But the exertions which Socrates devoted to the improvement of mankind, did not prevent him from fulfilling those duties which were incumbent on him as a citizen.

Socrates deserved well of the state as a father and a husband. Xanthippe, his wife, is sufficiently known to posterity as a woman of violent passions, and her name has even passed into a proverb. In modern times some scholars, as Heumann and Mendelssohn, have endeavoured to defend her, but with little success. That she possessed many good qualities, and notwithstanding her passionate character may have had a great deal of goodness of heart, can be easily admitted; but that she was of a very quarrelsome disposition, and made Socrates feel its effects, we may easily believe, without giving credit to the anecdotes recorded by Plutarch, Diogenes, and Ælian, from the manner in which Antisthenes, and even Socrates himself, in a playful manner express themselves concerning her. "But," says Antisthenes, "what is the reason, Socrates, that, convinced as thou art of the capacity of the female sex for education, thou dost not educate Xanthippe, for she is the worst woman of all that exist, nay, I believe of all that ever have existed, or ever will exist?" — "Because," replies he, "I see that those who wish to be-

description of philosophers by Aristophanes (Clouds, v. 833.) does not involve Socrates.

1 Heumann in the Acta Philosoph. vol. i. p. 103. Mendelssohn, in his Phædon, p. 23.

2 Xenophon Sympos. II. 10.
come best skilled in horsemanship, do not select the most obedient, but the most spirited horses. For they believe that after being enabled to bridle these, they will easily know how to manage others. Now as it was my wish to converse and to live with men, I have married this woman, being firmly convinced that in case I should be able to endure her, I should be able to endure all others." ¹ By Xanthippe Socrates had several sons; on the eldest of whom, called Lamprocles, he enjoins, in Xenophon's Memorabilia, ² obedience to his mother. At his death he left behind him three sons, one of whom was a youth, but the other two were still children. ³

¹ [Ritter remarks (History of Philosophy, II. p. 33, 34.) "Socrates was a perfect Greek in his faults and his virtues; hence he always regarded morals under a political aspect. In such a political view of virtue, the relations of domestic life fall naturally enough far into the back ground; the notorious bad feeling of his wife Xanthippe to her husband and child, prevents the supposition of a very happy home; and when we remark the degree to which, in his devotion to philosophy, he neglected his family duties, and the little attention he paid his wife and child, we are justified in ascribing to him, together with his countrymen, little respect for domestic life in comparison with public duties."—Ed.]

² II. 2. 7.

³ Plat. Apolog. c. XXIII. — Whether Socrates, as some think, had also been married to Myrto, cannot be decided with historical certainty. The contrary opinion, however, is far more probable, as appears from Meiner's examination (Geschichte der Wissenschaften, vol. II. p. 522). Even Panætius Rhodius in Athenæus (XIII. init. p. 555.) was of this opinion, which is also adopted by Bently in his Dissertat. de Epistolis Socratis, § 13. Luzac in his discourse de Socrate Cive, p. 7. supposes that Socrates had had two wives, first Myrto, and after her death Xanthippe. He at the
Socrates performed military service in three different battles, of which he gives us an account himself in the Apology of Plato.¹

The first time that Socrates performed military service, was in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in the thirty-seventh or thirty-eighth year of his age; at the siege of Potidæa, an Athenian colony in Thrace, in the years 431 and 430 b. c. The inhabitants of Potidæa had revolted from the Athenians, to whom they were tributary, and were supported by the Corinthians, and other Peloponnesians. In this campaign,

same time combats the opinion of those who think that Socrates had been married to two women at once. He assigns a different meaning to the Athenian law which was passed in the time of Pericles, and according to which, as is commonly supposed, it was lawful to contract a double marriage, — a law which the advocates of that opinion usually quote in support of it. The subject is still more minutely discussed by Luzac in the above-mentioned Lectiones Atticae, especially against Mahne's Diatribe de Aristoxeno.

¹ C. XVII.—Athenæus (Deipnosoph. V. 15) the bitter opponent of philosophers, and more especially of Plato, declares the whole narrative of the military services of Socrates to be a fiction, and observes that philosophers do not always strictly adhere to historical truth. Plato, he says, contradicts himself, since he asserts in the Crito that Socrates had never been out of Athens, except once, and that on a visit to the Isthmian games, and yet in the Apology, and Symposium, he makes Socrates say that he had fought in three battles. But this passage shows how little reliance is to be placed on the remarks of Athenæus, for in the Crito he has overlooked the following words: εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευ-σὸμενος. We are acquainted with too many instances of the carelessness of antient grammarians (see Wesseling on Diodorus Siculus, vol. I. p. 527. and Hutchinson on Xenophon's Anabasis, p. 301.) to have recourse to the hypothesis, that these words were omitted in the edition which Athenæus had before him.
Socrates endeavoured to harden his body, and to steel himself against the effects of hunger, thirst, and cold. Though Potidæa was besieged during the severest cold of a Thracian winter, Socrates, in his usual clothing, walked bare-foot through snow and ice.\(^1\) He distinguished himself so much by his bravery, that the prize was awarded to him, which he, however, gave up to Alcibiades, his favourite follower, (whom he himself had saved in this battle, as we are told by the latter, in the Symposium of Plato\(^2\)), with the object of encouraging him to deserve from his country such honours in future by his own personal merits. Various anecdotes are preserved respecting this campaign of Socrates;\(^3\) to which, however, we cannot attach any importance. Thus we are told by Gellius, Diogenes, and Ælian, that while the plague raged in the Athenian camp, and in Athens itself, Socrates was the only person who escaped the general infection. It is also said that he once stood for twenty-four hours on the same spot before the camp, absorbed in deep thought, with his eyes fixed on an object, as if his soul were absent from his body.\(^4\)

In his second campaign we find Socrates at Delium, a town in Bœotia, where the Athenians were defeated by the Bœotians.\(^5\) This battle was fought 424 B.C., when Socrates was at the age of forty-five, in the same

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1 Diog. II. § 12. Thucyd. I. 58 foll.
2 p. 220. D.
3 Aul. Gellius, Noct. Att. II. 1; Diog. II. § 25; Ælian, Nat. Hist. XIII. 27.
4 Thucyd. IV. 96.
year in which the Clouds of Aristophanes were performed. Although the issue was unfavourable to the Athenians, Laches, the Athenian general, whom Socrates afterwards accompanied in his flight, declared, that if all the Athenians had fought as bravely as Socrates, the Boeotians would have erected no trophies.  

Soon after this battle, Socrates was engaged in military service for the third time at Amphipolis, a city of Thrace or Macedonia, which was a colony of Athens, and a town of great commercial importance. It had been seized by Brasidas, a Lacedaemonian general, 424 B.C.; and the Athenians with a view to its recovery, sent an army 422 B.C. under Cleon to Thrace, which did not succeed in its undertaking. In this expedition Socrates was present; but we do not find him engaged afterwards in any other military duties, since he was now approaching the fiftieth year of his age.

Socrates was particularly attached to his native city. "I love my countrymen more than thine," he remarks.

I pass over the ridiculous anecdote of Diogenes (II. 23.), who says that Socrates, when all had taken to flight, retreated step by step, and often turned round to oppose any enemy that might attack him. This circumstance is mentioned by no other ancient writer. It finds a severe censor in Athenæus, who also doubts the fact that Socrates had given up the prize of bravery to Alcibiades at Potidæa, since Alcibiades had taken no part in that war. The latter circumstance, however, is sufficiently established on the authority of Plato (Sympos. p. 219. E). Simplicius ad Epictet. c. 31. tells us that the Boeotians had been deterred by the bravery of Socrates from pursuing the fugitives. Thus every thing is exaggerated, and often to a monstrous degree, by later writers.
in the Theætetes of Plato to Theodorus, a mathematician of Cyrene, who taught at Athens.¹ This partiality for Athens, which at that time presented a picture of the great world on a small scale, combined with a feeling of independence, were perhaps the principal reasons which determined him not to accept the flattering invitations of Archelaus, Scopas, and Eurylochus.² "He smiled upon three tyrants," says Libanius in his apology,³ "at their presents, their manner of living, and their exquisite pleasures." The riches, and the manner in which the great lived, had no attractions for him; not even the sovereign of Asia was happy in his opinion.⁴ He did not wish to go to a man, he told Archelaus, who could give more than he himself could return; at Athens, he said, four measures of flour were sold for one obolus, the springs yielded plenty of water, and he lived contented with what he possessed.⁵

Socrates did not like a country-life, for man attracted him more than nature. "Forgive me, my friend," he once said to Phædrus,⁶ who preferred a country-life,

¹ Compare Plato, Apol. XVII.—These expressions of Socrates seem to raise a doubt as to the statement of Cicero (Tuscul. V. 37.) and Plutarch (de Exilio, vol. VIII. p. 371.), that Socrates had said he was no Athenian, no Greek, but a citizen of the world. Compare Meiners' Geschichte der Wissenschaften, vol. II. p. 361.
³ p. 58 and 59. edit. Reiske.
⁴ Cic. Tuscul. V. 12.
⁶ Plat. Phædr. p. 230. D.
and who accused Socrates of being almost unacquainted with the neighbourhood of Athens, "I am very anxious to learn something; and from fields and trees I can learn nothing; but I can indeed from the men in town." Thus we do not read of his being absent from Athens, except on the expeditions mentioned above, and on some short journeys, such as to the Isthmian games and to Delphi; and as some think, on a journey to Samos, with Archelaus his teacher.¹

After Socrates returned to Athens from those expeditions, he was regarded by his countrymen and by the Greeks in general, as an eminent teacher and practical philosopher. But his activity as a citizen, was exerted in a still different sphere, for in his sixty-fifth year he became a senator. "I have," says he in the apology of Plato, "held no state-office, men of Athens, with the exception of having been a senator."

In order to understand fully the conduct of Socrates in this office, it is necessary to have a clear idea of the constitution of the Athenian senate. The Athenian senate usually called ἡ βουλὴ τῶν πειρακοσίων, consisted of five hundred senators, who were elected from the ten tribes established by Cleisthenes. Every month, viz. every thirty-fifth or thirty-sixth day, (for the Athenian year consisted of ten months), one tribe had the presidency, and this tribe was called φυλὴ πρυ-

¹ Plat. Crito, c. XIV. The journey to Samos is mentioned by Diogenes, II. 23, on the authority of Ion of Chios. This, however, contradicts the statement made in the passage of the Crito which Diogenes had shortly before (22.) confirmed.
Of these fifty Prytanes ten had the presidency every seven days, under the name of Προέδροι. Each day, one of these ten enjoyed the highest dignity, with the name of Ἐπιστάτης. His authority was of the greatest extent: he laid every thing before the assembly of the people, put the question to the vote, examined the votes, and in fact conducted the whole business of the assembly. A senator was only elected for one year; and a man could only be Epitates once, and only for one day. He, who was invested with this office, had the keys of the citadel and the treasury of the republic entrusted to his care.

Socrates was Epitates on the day when the unjust sentence was to be passed on the unfortunate admirals, who had neglected to take up the bodies of the dead, after the battle of Arginusæ. How did Socrates behave on that occasion? This is an event which shows Socrates to us, in such an active and indeed important office, that it is of the greatest importance in forming a proper estimate of his character, to observe his conduct on this occasion with the greatest attention.

In the battle off the islands of Arginusæ, (b. c. 404,) the Athenians had obtained a complete victory, under the command of ten admirals, among whom Pericles, an adopted son of the celebrated demagogue of that name, and Diomedon possessed considerable reputation. To take care of the burial of the dead was regarded by

1 Pollux, VIII. 9.
the Athenian laws, as a sacred duty; since the shades of the unburied dead, said the Greek superstition, restlessly wander a hundred years on the banks of the Styx. But after the battle there arose a violent storm; which prevented the ten generals from obtaining the bodies of the slain; yet in order to effect every thing in their power, they left behind them some inferior officers, ταξιάρχαι, to attend to the burial of the dead. Among these taxiarchs we find Thrasybulus, who expelled the thirty tyrants, and Theramenes who afterwards became so well known as one of these tyrants, and was at last executed. But the violent storm opposed insurmountable obstacles to the execution of their orders.

It then became necessary to give to the senate and the people of Athens, a full report of what had taken place. Although the admirals might have thrown the whole blame on the taxiarchs, yet, chiefly induced by Pericles and Diomedon, they stated in their report, that the storm had prevented them from fulfilling this sacred duty. But Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who had arrived at Athens before the ten admirals, brought such heavy charges against them, that six who had already returned, were, at the command of the senate, thrown into the public prison. They were summoned before the tribunal of the people (the Ἕλιοοι), Theramenes and Thrasybulus appearing foremost among their accusers; and were accused of high treason. They proved in their defence, by the evidence of their pilots, that the tempest had rendered it absolutely impracticable for them to fulfil their duty; besides which they had also
appointed Thrasybulus and Theramenes as taxiarchs, and therefore, if it were necessary for anybody to suffer punishment, it should be inflicted on them. This statement produced its natural effect on the people; and they would probably have been acquitted at once, if the question had been put to the vote. But by such an act, the design of their enemies would have been frustrated. They therefore managed to adjourn the assembly till another day, alleging that it was too dark to count the show of hands.

In the meanwhile, the enemies of the admirals set all their engines at work, to inflame the people against them. The lamentations and the mournful appearance of the kinsmen of the slain, who had been hired by Thrasybulus and Theramenes for this tragic scene, during the festival of the Απατουρία, which happened to fall on the day on which the assembly was held, were intended to inflame the minds of the people against the unfortunate admirals. The votes were to be given on the general question, whether the admirals had done wrong, in not taking up the bodies of those who had been left in the water after the battle; and if they should be condemned by the majority, (so the senate ordained,) they were to be put to death and their property to be confiscated.

1 The Απατουρία were solemnized for three days. The most probable interpretation of the word is to consider it synonymous with ομοπατουρία, as the children came with their fathers to register their names in the phratries. See Weiske on Xenoph. Hellen. I. 7. 8.

2 Xenoph. Mem. I. 1. 18. Hellen. I. 7. 34.: ἢ ὅτε τῆς βουλῆς γνώμη ἢν μιᾷ ψήφῳ ἀπανταίς κρίνειν. In this same passage the
But to condemn all by one vote, was contrary to an ancient law of Cannonus, according to which the vote ought to have been given upon each individual separately. Hence the prytanes, and Socrates at their head, refused to put the illegal question to the votes of the people. Yet, when the latter, enraged against the prytanes, loudly demanded that those who resisted their pleasure, should themselves be brought to trial, they yielded to the general clamour with the exception of Socrates, who alone remained unshaken.

Notwithstanding all the threatenings that were used against him, he could not be induced to desist from his resolution, but boldly declared he would do nothing which he considered contrary to his duty. In consequence of this refusal, the question could not be put to the vote, and the assembly was therefore adjourned; another epistates and other προεδρον were chosen, and the enemies of the admirals obtained what they had wished for. The admirals were condemned to death, and the six, who were in Athens, were executed.¹

This was the only civil office that Socrates ever held;

antient law of Cannonus is mentioned, which enjoined κρίνεσθαι δίχα ἵκαστον. [On the decree of Cannonus see Appendix II. to the fourth volume of Mr. Thirlwall's "History of Greece."—Ed.]

¹ They were sentenced to death B.c. 404. Luzac, in his Disquisitio de Epistatis et Proedris Atheniensium, p. 114, which is added to his discourse de Socrate Cive, has considered the subject very carefully. The principal passages of the antients are: Xenoph. Hellen. I. 7, and Ἀσχ. Axioschus, c. 12. Though Ἀσχines may not be author of this dialogue, yet the agreement existing between him and Xenophon, proves its authenticity with regard to historical facts.
and we cannot be surprised when so many acts of injustice were committed, which he alone could not possibly have prevented, that he entirely withdrew from public business. He mentions this himself, as the reason of his living a private man. "Be assured, men of Athens, if in former times, I had wished to engage in public affairs, I should have perished long ago, without being either useful to you or myself."  

Socrates himself lived to see the injurious consequences, which the unjust condemnation of those admirals brought down upon Greece, in the mournful issue of the Peloponnesian war. The very year after their condemnation, (405. B. c.) the Athenians for want of able generals were entirely defeated by the Lacedæmonians under Lysander; their fleet was destroyed, Athens besieged, and reduced to the necessity of surrendering at discretion to the victors. Lysander after this established the government of the Thirty Tyrants, whose memory is branded in history; and Socrates was one among the many who had to struggle with their injustice. Freret indeed has endeavoured to prove that Socrates supported these hateful oligarchs, and that by this circumstance we must account for his condemnation immediately after their fall. But this assertion is at variance with everything recorded, respecting the history and opinions of Socrates. He was indeed favourably disposed towards an aristocratical govern-

1 Plato, Apol. c. XIX.
2 Magazin Encyclopédique, Seconde Année, Tom. V. p. 474 foll.
ment, but in the old Attic sense of the word, viz. to a form of government in which the supreme power is lodged in the hands of the best and wisest; but he could never have approved of an oligarchy, and least of all of a despotic oligarchy, like that of the Thirty. Socrates loved his fellow-creatures too well to wish them to be ruled by such oppressors.

There can be no blame attached to Socrates, that Critias, one of the Thirty, had been his disciple, for it could not be in the school of Socrates that he had learnt the bad principles on which he acted. He had, as we are told by Xenophon,1 not sought the instruction of Socrates because he loved him, but like Alcibiades, in order to learn the _kingly art_—which was the name for politics, or the science of governing men2—in the same manner as every young Athenian anxious to distinguish himself in the state, sought the instructions of some one of the sophists, among whom Socrates was ranked. Critias not finding what he expected, soon afterwards abandoned the company of Socrates; and we also know how he afterwards behaved towards his former master. Socrates never made use of the language of flattery; but censured on every occasion the wicked rulers of a poor and orphan people. This reached the ears of the Thirty. Critias and Charicles, who were appointed to compose a code of laws, forbade, with the intention of injuring Socrates, any instruction to be given in the art of speaking; a profession, however, in which Socrates had never been engaged. But when he continued to converse with

1 _Memorab._ I. 2. 39.  
2 _Memorab._ IV. 2. 11.
young men, and show them the path of real wisdom, Critias, who moreover entertained an old aversion to Socrates for having censured his sensual pleasures with Euthydemus and Charicles, summoned him before their tribunal, and altogether forbade him from conversing with or instructing young men. Socrates in his usual manner had used a simile, which gave great offence to the Thirty, who felt its truth. "I should indeed wonder," Socrates had said, "if a cow-herd under whose care the cows grow fewer and thinner, would not own that he was a bad cow-herd, but it is still more astonishing to me, if a state-officer who diminishes the number of citizens and renders them unhappy, is not ashamed and will not own, that he is a bad officer of the state." Charicles added the significant words: "By god, pray, do not speak of the cow-herd! take care that thou dost not thyself diminish the flock by speaking again of them." "Now it was evident," adds Xenophon, "that after the simile of the cows had been reported to them, they were enraged against Socrates."¹

Thus Socrates, far from supporting the tyrants, was a declared enemy of these base and cruel men, and none of their edicts had the effect of inducing him to abandon that course which he considered his duty. Entertaining no fear of them, he did not leave Athens, which is duly appreciated by Cicero.² The Thirty summoned him with four others to the Tholos, the place in which the

¹ Memorab. I. 2. 29.
² Ad Attic. VIII. 2: "Socrates, quum triginta tyranni essent, pedem porta non extulit."
prytanes used to take their meals; and commanded him to bring Leon of Salamis to Athens, who had obtained the right of citizenship at Athens, but had chosen a voluntary exile, fearing that the tyrants might execute him, as he was a wealthy and distinguished man. 1 "Then indeed," says Socrates in Plato's apology, "I showed by my actions and not merely by my words, that I did not care (if it be not too coarse an expression) one jot for death; but it was an object of the greatest care to me to do nothing unjust or unholy. For that government, though it was so powerful, did not frighten me into doing anything unjust; but when we came out of the Tholos, the four went to Salamis and took Leon, but I went away home. And perhaps I should have suffered death on account of this, if the government had not soon been broken up."

In this manner Socrates most effectually refused taking any part in the unjust acts of the Thirty, 2 who were very anxious to gain him over to their interest, as

1 Τότε μὲν τοι ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ, ἀλλ` ἔργῳ αὐ ἐνεδειξάμην, ὧτι ἵμοι θανάτου μὴν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἡν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ` ὁτιόν k. t. l. c. XX.—Οὐδ` ὁτιόν seems to be an expression which only people of the lower classes made use of, hence the addition of Socrates: εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἡν εἰπεῖν, "quamvis forte rudior loqui videar." Libanius, the imitator of the Attic idiom, on this account adds before οὐδ` ὁτιόν the softening ὡς εἰπεῖν. Apol. p. 8. The courage and intrepidity of Socrates before the Thirty is often mentioned. Seneca Epist. 28: "Triginta tyranni Socratem circumsteterunt, nec potuerunt animum ejus infringere." Diog. H. 24: Ἡν εἰ (Σωκράτης) δημοκρατικός, ὡς ἐκλογ έκ τε τοῦ μὴ εἴξαι τοῖς περὶ Κριτίαν k. t. l.

2 Plat. Epist. VII. ad Dionis propinquis.
they wished in general to have as many of the citizens as possible accessory to their crimes. When he declared that he would never assist them in any unjust act, Charicles said: "Dost thou indeed wish to be at liberty to say what thou pleasest, and not suffer anything at all for it?" "I am willing to suffer any calamity," said Socrates, "but I will not do wrong to any one." Charicles was silent, and his associates looked at each other.

According to Diodorus, Socrates undertook the defence of Theramenes, a man of a very equivocal character. This account has been copied by other writers, but is not established on sufficient historical evidence being mentioned neither by Plato, by Xenophon, nor any other contemporary writer.

Theramenes was himself one of the thirty tyrants. When he was sent on an embassy by his fellow-citizens, who had placed great confidence in him, to enter into

1 Diod. Sic. XIV. 5. Aristotle, Cicero, and Diodorus, speak of Theramenes in the highest terms. Aristotle (in Plutarch, III. p. 337.) and Cicero, who seem to have been prejudiced in his favour by the constancy with which he suffered death, declare him to have been the best citizen of Athens. Cicero (Tuscul. I. 40.) speaks in terms of the highest admiration of his courage during his execution, and ranks him with Socrates; Diodorus (I. p. 640 foll. edit. Wesseling,) describes him as a very superior man. But from the records of history we must consider him as a weak, mean, vain, and selfish person. See Thucyd. VIII. 68 foll.; Lysias (edit. Markland), p. 210 & 215.; and Xenoph. Hellen. II. 2 & 3. We are informed by the latter that he was nick-named Κόθορπος, a word expressive of the fickleness of his character. See Weiske on this passage.

2 Among the writers of a later time, the author of the biographies of the ten orators, ascribes the defence of Theramenes to Isocrates, p. 836. F.
negotiations with Lysander, he abused his trust, and was the first who proposed to change the democracy to an oligarchy. He himself named ten of the Thirty; and lived on terms of intimate friendship with Critias, the most cruel of those tyrants. But the characters of these men were too different, to allow their friendship to be of long duration. Critias, a man of energetic character, never lost sight of the object which his imagination represented to him as desirable, and at the same time employed every means in his power which might enable him to gain his ends. Theramenes also wished to distinguish himself, but in the choice of his means, though little concerned about morality, he displayed great anxiety for his personal safety. The violent measures of Critias and his colleagues appeared to him too dangerous, and he proposed to elect a number of citizens, who might take a part in the business of the government and check the cruelties of the Thirty. But the Thirty were little disposed, to relinquish the power which they had obtained with difficulty, and had preserved with so much cruelty and bloodshed; and they resolved to rid themselves of one who might prove a powerful enemy to their designs. Critias accordingly accused Socrates before the council; and Theramenes defended himself in a manner, which made a very favourable impression on the council; but Critias, seeing that he could not depend upon the assistance of the council, condemned him to death, with the consent of his colleagues, without even putting the question to the vote as to his condemnation or acquittal. Theramenes
flew to the altar of Vesta; and Socrates, Diodorus says, undertook his defence. Supported by two other citizens, he used every exertion to save him, until Theramenes entreated him to desist from an undertaking, which was as dangerous for him, as it was useless to himself. Theramenes after this, drank the poisoned cup with great composure and serenity.

If Socrates actually undertook the defence of Theramenes, it was unquestionably a noble action; as the reason for which the Thirty punished their colleague, and the manner in which it was done, were equally detestable. Plato's silence respecting this occurrence may be accounted for; as in his seventh letter he evidently avoids every opportunity of speaking of Critias, who was his kinsman on his mother's side. But perhaps Plato as well as Xenophon may have considered Theramenes unworthy of the defence of Socrates, and on that account passed over it in silence. However, the works from which Diodorus compiled his history, especially where he does not mention his authorities, are not entitled to so much confidence as to justify us in having recourse to these hypotheses. It seems also contrary to the character of Socrates, that he should have been deterred by the representations of Theramenes, that his exertions would be fruitless and dangerous to himself; for Socrates did not easily desist from a resolution once taken up, as he cared little about personal danger, unless he was restrained by his genius.

1 Diogenes, III. 2.
CHAPTER VI.

We now come to the most interesting period in the life of Socrates; his accusation, defence, condemnation, and execution. We know that all this took place a few years after the abolition of the oligarchy by Thrasybulus, in the year 400, or according to others, 399 B.C. Anytus, Lycon and Meletus brought the accusation in a writ, (ἀντωμοσία) before the tribunal of the people, charging him with introducing new divinities and corrupting the

1 That it was the tribunal of the people, or the court of the Heliastæ (ἡλιασται), or Dicaste (δικασται), by which Socrates was condemned, has been proved by Bougainville, in his essay, "On the priests of Athens," in the Memoires de l'Academie des Inscriptions et des Belles Lettres, and by Meiners in his Gesch. d. Wiss. vol. ii. p. 482, against Meursius, who thought that Socrates had been condemned by the Areopagus. This usual supposition is also advocated by Patter and Stollberg in the remarks on the Apology. But Bougainville's arguments for substituting the Heliastæ seem to be convincing. The Heliastæ were elected from the whole body of the people without any regard to the different classes, and received a pay for their services. Their name arose from the circumstance of their assembling immediately after sunrise, and in a sunny place. [This etymology is too absurd to need any refutation. Ἡλιαία, the name of the place where the Ἡλιασται assembled, is another form of ἀλίη (an assembly), a word which frequently occurs in Herodotus.—It is also connected with ἀλής, and ἀλιζωμαι.—Ed.]
young; Anytus, on behalf of the demagogues, Lycon on behalf of the orators, and Meletus on behalf of the poets. 1 Socrates was sentenced to death. The circumstances of the trial are sufficiently known, and are accurately explained by Tychsen in the Bibliothek füralte Literatur und Kunst. 2 But the real causes of the condemnation of Socrates are not yet accurately ascertained; and for this reason, as well as on account of the light which they must throw on his character, the whole particulars of his trial seem to require careful examination. He is generally considered as a victim of the intrigues and hatred of his enemies, especially of the sophists; and in modern times, his death has sometimes been represented as a well-deserved punishment for his anti-democratical and revolutionary ideas.

Both these views, however, take only one side of the question, and I am convinced, that several causes must be taken together in order to judge impartially and to account satisfactorily for the condemnation of Socrates.

The causes which led to his condemnation appear to be of two kinds, partly direct and partly indirect. I call those indirect causes which led to the accusation of Socrates, and those direct which, independent of the points contained in the accusation, disposed the judges to pronounce the sentence of death.

The indirect causes will easily be seen, as soon as we have obtained a clear insight into the character of the

1 Plat. Apol. c. X. Diog. Laert. II. 39.
2 Part I. and II. Göttingen, 1786 and 87.
persons who accused him. Meletus\(^1\) who first laid the charge before the second archon, who bore the title of king, and before whose tribunal all religious affairs were brought—was the most insignificant of all, and perhaps only an instrument in the hands of the two other powerful accusers. He was a young tragic poet, who, however, did not sacrifice to the tragic muse with the best success. His memory as a poet has only been preserved from entire oblivion by the ridicule of Aristophanes.\(^2\) It was because Socrates valued true poetry so highly, that he was a great friend of Euripides, and whenever one of his pieces was performed, he went to the theatre;\(^3\) nay even in his old age, and during the thirty days which elapsed between his condonation and execution, he composed poems himself; but he could not bear that those, who possessed none of the true spirit of poetry, should obtrude their poems on public attention. Such persons, therefore, often had to sustain the ridicule of Socrates; and it is therefore not to be wondered at, that a vain young man feeling himself hurt by the remarks of our philosopher, should seize on the first opportunity of gratifying his desire for revenge. To this, however, another reason may be added; Meletus had been one of the four who, had, at the command of the Thirty, brought Leon of Salamis to Athens.\(^4\) Socrates having refused obedience to this command, and declared it an

\(^1\) Maxim. Tyr. Dissert. 9.

\(^2\) Aristoph. Ran. 1337 et Schol. ibid.

\(^3\) Ælian, Var. Hist. II. 13.

\(^4\) Andocides, de Myster. p. 12 and 34 edit. Steph.
act of injustice to which he could not be accessory, must have increased the enmity of Meletus. Libanius besides, describes him as a venal accuser, who for a drachma would accuse any one, whether he knew him or not. To this report, however, we cannot attach any great importance, as we are ignorant of the source from which it was derived.

Lycon was a public orator. We know that, according to a law of Solon, ten persons were elected to this office; whose duty was to advise the people and to maintain public justice. But these orators were very often individuals, who entirely neglected their high calling; and merely attended to their own private interests, and persecuted the most honest persons, whenever their personal advantage required it. Can we wonder that the name of an orator should be despised by every honest man? Can we wonder that a man like Socrates, whose whole heart was benevolence towards mankind, should hate these corrupters of morality and often censure their conduct in the strongest terms, when they hurried the people into the most unjust and revolting actions? On the other hand what was more natural than that Socrates should render these men his bitterest enemies, who became the more dangerous, as they scrupled not to employ any means to get rid of such a troublesome censor of their conduct.  

Anytus was the most powerful among the accusers of

1 *Apologetic*, edit. Reiske, p. 11 and 51.

2 Προηγούμαις ἐπὶ πᾶντα Δήκων ὁ ἐνμαγεύως, says Diogenes, II. 38.
Socrates; whence the latter in an expressive manner is called by Horace\(^1\) *Anyti reus*. Plato in his seventh letter ranks him with Lycon, among the most influential citizens. He had been driven into exile by the Thirty; and from this circumstance alone he would have been an interesting personage to his fellow-citizens, after the restoration of the democratical government. But his influence as a demagogue and a statesman must have been still more increased, since he himself had co-operated with Thrasybulus in expelling the Thirty.\(^2\)

He carried on the business of a tanner, whereby he acquired great importance; for after the changes introduced by Cleisthenes into the constitution of Solon, every tradesman or artizan could rise to the highest honours of the state. Socrates often censured the principle, that people totally ignorant of the constitution and of public business, should have an influence in the management of state-affairs. His examples were often derived from artizans. "Thou must," said Critias in the above mentioned conversation between himself, Charicles and Socrates,\(^3\) "no longer speak of shoemakers and other artizans, for I indeed think that they are tired of thy foolish talk, by which their trade has become so notorious." In the *Meno* of Plato, Socrates expresses a doubt as to whether a son could be taught virtue by his parents; and uses the example of shoemakers and other artizans, who, according to his view, are themselves

\(^1\) *Sat.* II. 4. 3.

\(^2\) *Xenoph.* *Hellen.* II. 3.

\(^3\) *Xenoph.* *Mem.* I. 2. 37.
ignorant of virtue. Hence the multitude were not much disposed in his favour, and Anytus in the Meno declares, that he would avail himself of the influence which he possessed, to make Socrates repent of his expressions. But there were causes still more personal, which drew down upon Socrates the hatred of Anytus. The latter had entrusted two of his sons to the instructions of Socrates with the intention of educating them as orators, which was the principal way to authority and wealth in Athens at that time. In one of these young men Socrates observed superior talents, which might raise him to something better than the profession of his father, and he told him, that he must give up the trade of his father and pursue a higher course. This exceedingly offended the vanity of a man, who, as a member of the popular assembly, wished to be thought a very important personage. The account of Libanius is therefore in itself not very improbable when he says, that Anytus after having accused Socrates, promised him, that he would desist from his accusation, if the latter would no longer mention tanners, shoemakers, &c., and that Socrates refused the proposal; but we cannot place much reliance on this account, since we are ignorant of the source from which Libanius derived it, and know besides

1 Xenoph. Apolog. § 29. Although this Apology in its present form was not written by Xenophon, it appears to express his views; the greater part of it, at least, is a compilation from the Memorabilia.

2 The author of the seventh of the Socratic letters, p. 30, says: Πῶς ἄν ὄν, ὃ Ἑινοφῶν, τὴν μαριαν τοῦ βουρσοδέσου Ἀνύτου γράψομι καὶ τὸ θρύσος αὐτοῦ;
that he composed his Apology of Socrates, merely as an exercise in rhetoric, and was probably not much concerned about historical truth.

But there was yet another reason, for which Anytus had a personal hatred to Socrates. Anytus entertained an impure love for Alcibiades; who refused, however, to yield to his wishes. It was the jealousy of disappointment, that inflamed Anytus with hatred against Socrates, who loved Alcibiades most fondly; though we are in no ways authorised to suppose that he regarded him with that unnatural feeling with which it has often been attempted to pollute his reputation. These remarks sufficiently characterize Anytus. Whatever brilliant qualities the popular party in the first enthusiasm of freedom may have attributed to him, and although they may have considered him as being next to Thrasybulus, the liberator of their country from the yoke of the Thirty, he was still nothing more than an ambitious sensualist. This judgement is confirmed by several other things which are recorded of him. Thus Aristotle and Plutarch relate that he was the first who bribed the judges at Athens, when he was charged of having been guilty of treachery at Pylos, at the end of the Peloponnesian war.

After this short sketch of the characters of his accusers,

1 Compare Plutarch, in the life of Alcibiades, c. 4. See also what Athenæus (XVI. p. 534. E.) says respecting the sensuality of Anytus.
2 In Harpocratin, under εκάζων.
3 Life of Coriolanus, c. 14.
4 Compare Diod. Sic. XIII. 64.
it will be easier to discover the true causes of the accusation of Socrates; for at first sight it is surprising, that so many other Greek philosophers, though they gave much greater offence to the popular religion, were yet allowed to live at Athens free from persecution; and that such a violent accusation should have been raised against Socrates alone. Epicurus, for instance, died in the seventy-first year of his age, highly lamented by his disciples without having ever been accused on account of his religious opinions.\(^1\) The causes, which led to the accusation of Socrates, may be fairly classed under four divisions which will form the subject of the following chapter.

\(^1\) [The assertion of Wiggers that Greek philosophers, who gave offence to the popular religion, were allowed to live at Athens free from persecution, is contrary to all historical evidence. Although sceptical opinions on religion had for many years previous to the death of Socrates made considerable progress among the upper classes at Athens, it is nevertheless certain that the lower orders were strongly attached to the popular religion, and highly resented any attempts which were made to question its truth. Anaxagoras was compelled to leave Athens, notwithstanding the powerful support of Pericles, on account of his religious opinions; and Diagoras of Melos was proscribed at Athens on account of his impiety, and a reward offered to any one who should either kill him, or bring him to justice. Protagoras, also, was accused and condemned to death for having read a work, at Athens, on the nature of the gods, in which he declared that he was unable to determine whether the gods existed or not. He escaped, however; but the book was publicly burnt, and all who possessed copies were ordered to give them up. — Ed.]
1. Every great man, especially under a democratical government and in a period of moral corruption, excites the envy of others; for it is the fate of the truly great to be envied by those who feel their own comparative inferiority. Even a superficial knowledge of the human heart shows how much we are inclined to envy those we cannot equal. Who does not remember the answer which that citizen of Athens gave to Aristides, when the latter asked him why he voted against him! If such a man be distinguished by his talents, others endeavour to degrade him, or if they do justice to his genius, speak in a derogatory manner of his feelings. But should he be a man distinguished by unusual moral goodness, by rare qualities of heart, and by a high enthusiasm for virtue and morality, he is still more in danger of being misunderstood by his contemporaries; for there are always persons mean enough to suppose, because their own hearts cannot comprehend such virtues, that the low objects of vanity and selfishness influence the actions and the noble philanthropic views of the man of superior morality, and ready enough to stigmatize the teachers and benefactors of mankind, as corruptors of the people and
seducers of the young. This must be the case principally in democratical states. The more numerous the relations and combinations in a state, and the more various the conflicts of the parties with each other, the less can a man be tolerated, who rises by his superior talents and virtues above the ordinary class of men. In a monarchical state in which his influence is not so great, and the various conflicts of different powers are not so numerous, he may live, if not more honoured, at any rate more peaceably. But the greater the immorality of the citizens in a democratical state, the less likely is a man of great moral excellence to be tolerated. The contrast between him and their own corruption is a sufficient reason to excite against him their hatred and persecution. Socrates was one of these superior beings, who are born not only to enlighten his own age, but mankind in general. Virtue and humanity had descended upon him in their sublime purity, and had excited his unbounded veneration. Could he be otherwise than offensive to the wise and the learned of his age, to the narrow-minded quibbling sophists, the selfish demagogues and the conceited poetasters? Hence Socrates himself in Plato's Apology mentions the hatred of the multitude as the cause of his fate.1

Socrates always lived under a democratical form of government,2 with the exception of the eight months, during which the Thirty possessed the supreme power.

1 C. XVI.
2 [An oligarchical form of government was established for a short time in B.C. 411.—Ed.]
In his intercourse, as a teacher of the people, with the orators, sophists, poets, &c., he frequently offended them, and sometimes injured their interests. He lived, moreover, in a corrupt period. Aristophanes, Plato, the author of the Axiochus, and other contemporary writers, describe the Athenian people as inconstant and frivolous; of a cruel disposition, ungrateful to those who deserved well of their country, and jealous of men who were distinguished by their virtue and superior qualities. 1

During the dazzling sway of Pericles, 2 or perhaps more

1 Aristoph. Equit. v. 40; Plat. Gorg. p. 521. C. foll; Axiochus, c. XIII. Δήμος ἀχάριστον, ἄψικοφον, ὦμόν, βάσκανον, ἀταίδευτον, ὡς ἀν συνηραινόμενον ἐκ συγκλύσων ὄχλου καὶ βιαίων φιλάρων. ὦ δὲ τούτῳ προσεταιρίζομενος, ἀθλιώτερος μακρῷ. To this state of things must also be referred the passage of Pliny, in which the picture of Parrhasius is mentioned (Hist. Nat. XXV. 10.): "Δήμον Atheniensium pinxit argumento ingenioso: volebat namque varium, iracundum, injustum, inconstantem; eundem inexorabilem, clementem, misericordem, excelsum, gloriosum, humilem, ferocem fugacemque et omnia pariter ostendere."

2 It cannot be denied that the government of Pericles was, in many respects, far from beneficial to the Athenians. He was an ambitious man, and by this disposition he was hurried into many actions injurious to his country. The diminution of the power of the Areopagus, to which Solon had wisely assigned an extensive sphere of action, is wholly unpardonable. On the other hand, we should undoubtedly be going too far, if we should credit all the assertions of the comic poets, which are partly repeated by Diodorus and Plutarch, and attribute the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war to the intrigues by which Pericles endeavoured to escape the necessity of accounting for the treasury of the allies, which he had lavished on magnificent buildings. This opinion, though very generally maintained, and usually adopted in historical manuals, cannot be supported by any authentic testimony. Diodorus (XII. p. 503—505.) and Plutarch (Pericles, I. p. 647 g
properly speaking, of Aspasia, who had, it is true, done very much to diffuse a taste for the fine arts, vices of every description had gained the ascendancy. During the Peloponnesian war, the neglect of all moral and religious cultivation had kept pace with the decay of external worship; the spirit of the times had taken a sophistical tendency, and selfishness had so evidently become the motive to action, that even Athenian ambassadors unblushingly declared to the Spartans and Melians, that it was lawful and right for the better and stronger to oppress and rule over the weak and helpless, asserting that not only all tribes of animals, but whole cities and nations acted according to this principle. It was a very common opinion that after death the soul ceased to exist; the religious phantoms of a future state were laughed at by an age so full of conceit, that nothing but a conscience disturbed in the last moments of life, could excite an apprehension, lest those ridiculed phan- toms might still not be wholly fictitious. But it is

foll.) might be mentioned as authorities, but it is evident that they have only copied the comic poets, without being much con- cerned about historical truth. Besides, their authority is little, compared with that of Thucydides, the impartial adversary of Peri- cles, who declares the desire to extend the power of Athens, and to humble the Spartans, to have been the true causes of the war. (I. 23. 24. 56 and 88, and II. 1. Compare Wytenbach's review of the Lectiones Andocideae of Sluiter in the Biblioth. Crit. vol. iii. P. iii. p. 79.)

1 Thucyd. I. 76; V. 105.

2 Plat. Phaed. and de Republ. VI. That free-thinking at that time generally prevailed, is evident from the tenth book de Legi- bus. These principles were chiefly and eagerly adopted by young people, who made such an application of the astronomical hypo-
obvious how completely every seed of virtue must have been crushed by the government of such corrupt men as the thirty tyrants. 1

theses of Anaxagoras, that they not only denied the divinity of the stars, but at the same time hazarded the assertion, that the gods being changed into the dust of the earth, were unconcerned about human affairs.

1 [Those persons, however, who are disposed to join in the common declamations against the vices of the Athenian constitution, would do well to weigh the following just and eloquent remarks of Niebuhr, before they pronounce an opinion. "Evil without end, may be spoken of the Athenian constitution, and with truth; but the common-place, stale declamation of its revilers would be, in a great measure silenced, if a man qualified for the task should avail himself of the advanced state of our insight into the circumstances of Athens, to show how even there the vital principle instinctively produced forms and institutions by which, notwithstanding the elements of anarchy contained in the constitution, the commonwealth preserved and regulated itself. No people in history has been so much misunderstood, and so unjustly condemned as the Athenians: with very few exceptions the old charges of faults and misdeeds are continually repeated. I should say: God shield us from a constitution like the Athenian! were not the age of such states irrevocably gone by, and consequently all fear of it in our own case. As it was, it shows an unexampled degree of noble-mindedness in the nation, that the heated temper of a fluctuating popular assembly, the security afforded to individuals of giving a base vote unobserved, produced so few reprehensible decrees: and that on the other hand the thousands, among whom the common man had the upper hand, came to resolutions of such self-sacrificing magnanimity and heroism, as few men are capable of except in their most exalted mood, even when they have the honour of renowned ancestors to maintain as well as their own.

"I will not charge those who declaim about the Athenians as an incurably reckless people, and their republic as hopelessly lost, in the time of Plato, with wilful injustice; for they know not what they do. But this is a striking instance, how imperfect
2. The accusation and trial of Socrates was also in part occasioned by the hatred which the sophists bore towards him, and by the freedom with which he always expressed his opinions. How revolting must it have been to a man of correct habits of thinking, that persons assuming the venerable appellation of the wise, should have

knowledge leads to injustice and calumnies; and why does not every one ask his conscience whether he is himself capable of forming a sober judgment on every case that lies before him? A man of candour will hear the answer, in a voice like that of the genius of Socrates. Let who will clamour and scoff: for myself, should trials be reserved for my old age, and for my children, who will certainly have evil days to pass through, I pray only for as much self-control, as much temperance in the midst of temptation, as much courage in the hour of danger, as much calm perseverance in the consciousness of a glorious resolution, which was unfortunate in its issue, as was shown by the Athenian people, considered as one man: we have nothing to do here with the morals of the individuals: but he who as an individual possesses such virtues, and withal is guilty of no worse sins in proportion than the Athenians, may look forward without uneasiness to his last hour.

"The antient rhetoricians were a class of babblers; a school for lies and scandal: they fastened many aspersions on nations and individuals. So we hear it echoed from one declamation to another, among the examples of Athenian ingratitude,—that Paches was driven to save himself by his own dagger, from the sentence of the popular tribunal. How delighted was I last year, to find in a place where no one will look for such a discovery, that he was condemned for having violated free women in Mitylene at its capture. The Athenians did not suffer his services in this expedition, or his merit in averting an alarming danger from them, to screen him from punishment.

"The fathers and brothers who, in the epigraph of the thousand citizens who fell as freemen at Chaeronea, attested with joy that they did not repent of their determination, for the issue was in the hands of the Gods, the resolution, the glory of man,—who
LIFE OF SOCRATES.

aimed at confounding the fundamental ideas of right and wrong, of virtue and vice! The sophists were most dangerous men, not only on account of their theoretical unbelief, which they indiscreetly preached, but also on account of their moral doctrines, which were founded on egotism and selfishness. Disinterested virtue, they de-

...
clared, was folly, and the civil laws were at variance with the laws of nature; moderation and temperance were enemies to pleasure, and contrary to the precepts of good sense. Socrates too deeply felt the corruption of his age not to oppose its authors in every way, and to express his indignation as loudly as possible. Their dazzling sophistries he opposed with weapons, which must have been very painful to conceited people, who loved anything better than the truth. Pretending to be a disciple, anxious to learn something, he attentively listened to the wisdom which flowed from the lips of the sophists; and perhaps praised it exceedingly, whilst he lamented his own dullness, and at the same time willingly admitted the truth of the greater part of their doctrines, and only now and then indulged in a little modest question, which they could not refuse to answer to an industrious disciple, and which appeared to them so insignificant, that it could not contribute in the least to refute their assertions. But he went gradually further, and traced things to their ultimate causes, and thus extorted from them the confession of their ignorance. He perhaps even followed them as he did Euthydemus, until he could engage them, with propriety in a conversation which would humble their pride. The

1 Compare Plato, in the Gorgias, and de Republ. II. The beautiful allegory of Prodicus, "Hercules at the cross-way," which has acquired such celebrity, and perhaps owes its perfection to Xenophon, at least as far as its form is concerned, was only a declamation, and probably belonged to those show-speeches which this sophist delivered in the cities of Greece. Philostr. de vit. Sophist. p. 482 foll.
method of examining and refuting (ἐξετάζειν and ἐλέγχειν according to the expression of the Socratic philosophers), with which his disciples, imitating their teacher, tried every one who gloried in his wisdom, was still more disagreeable to the sophists. But the indignation of those who had been tested in this manner did not fall on the disciples, but on Socrates himself, as he asserts in the Apology.  

But in general it was by too freely expressing what

1 C. X.

2 Xenoph. Mem. I. 2. § 49: Σωκράτης τοὺς πατέρας προπηλακίζειν ἑδίδασκε: a charge which had been brought against Socrates by Aristophanes. Excellent remarks on the ironical manner in which Socrates treated the sophists, are found in Reinhard’s essay: De Methodo Socratica, in the first vol. of his Opuscul. Academ., edited by Pöllitz. Lipsiae, 1808.
he thought, that Socrates made enemies, and brought on his accusation. He not only combated the fallacies and the perversity of the sophists, but every kind of vice and folly, and called them by their true names; he attacked every error, and that the more zealously, the closer it was connected with morality. Thus not only sophists, but poets, orators and demagogues, soothsayers and priests, became his enemies. He despised the comic poets who delighted the multitude at the expense of morality; and bad poets and sophistical orators felt the sting of his irony. The demagogues hated him because he was the opponent of their teachers, the sophists, from whom many among them had learnt the art of deceiving the people. What could indeed be more absurd in the eyes of reason, than that persons totally ignorant of the constitution and public business, such as artizans, tanners, shoemakers, &c., should have an influence on the conduct of public affairs? These he made the objects of his satire, and exposed the absurdity of their pretensions. Socrates had, besides, a prejudice against mechanical arts, which he sometimes expressed too indiscreetly and offensively. Thus he says to Critobulus: 1 "Mechanical arts are despised, and indeed it is not with injustice that they are little valued by states; for they are injurious to the bodies of the workmen as well as to the superintendents, since they render it necessary for them to sit, and to remain constantly in-doors; and many of them pass all the day near the fire. And whenever the body is languid, the mind loses its energy. Besides

1 Xenophon, Ἐκονομ. IV. 2.
those arts allow us no time to devote to our friends and to the state, so that such people are little useful to their friends, and bad protectors of their country. Nay in some, principally in warlike states, no citizen is allowed to pursue mechanical arts."

Even the tyranny of the Thirty, as we have seen, did not escape the satire of Socrates. The priests too, as we know from the Euthyphron of Plato, were obliged to hear from his lips the truth that their ideas of divine worship were totally erroneous. It is natural enough, that Socrates should have made a number of individuals his enemies by these free expressions, and especially by interfering with the interests of the priests, who de-

1 That poets were allowed to express themselves freely on religious subjects, and that philosophers were deprived of this privilege, may be accounted for in the following way. Poets wrote for the sake of amusement; a little freedom was easily granted to them, provided they made the people laugh; but the words of a philosopher had a more serious tendency. Besides, we know that dramatic representations originated in the festival of Dionysus, which was solemnised as licentiously as the Bacchanalia of the Romans. On the other hand, a distinction must be drawn between political religion, i.e. that which being intimately connected with the constitution was observed in public festivals and ceremonies, and the monstrous mass of fables concerning the origin and history of the gods; for at Athens religious belief was unconnected with public worship. With regard to mythological stories, the Greeks were allowed to express themselves as freely as they liked, provided they did not attack the mysteries, or doubt the existence of the gods. Proofs of this we find not only in the comic writers, but in the most celebrated tragic poets, as Æschylus, and Euripides, and in the history of Alcibiades. But it is surprising that Xenophanes in Magna Græcia was allowed to express himself so freely on the state-religion, whilst philosophical opinions much less connected with religion proved so dangerous to Anaxagoras at Athens.
manded the greatest submission, as their religious system did not bear a free examination. The analogy of history and daily experience shows this sufficiently, even if we leave out of consideration the facts stated in the accusation.

3. The odious light in which Socrates was represented by Aristophanes, created enemies to the former, and contributed to his accusation. The assertion founded on the report of Ælian, 1 that Aristophanes had been bribed by the enemies of Socrates, especially by Meletus and Anytus, to represent him in a ridiculous light, though it was in former times almost generally believed, is certainly destitute of any historical evidence. Meletus was a young man when he accused Socrates (vēos, βαθυγένεος, he is called in the Euthyphron of Plato): how is it possible that twenty-three years 2 before that time he should have bribed Aristophanes? On the first representation of the Clouds, Anytus was only fourteen years old, and on good terms with Socrates, as we are told by Plato. With our present accurate knowledge of the nature of the so-called old Attic comedy, we cannot even suppose that Aristophanes was a personal enemy of Socrates, 3 though he represented him to

1 Var. Hist. II. 13.
2 The Clouds were performed 423 B.C., on the festival of Dionysus.
3 The scholiasts, endeavouring to account for the odious light in which Socrates is represented in the Clouds, are of different opinions, some ascribing it to the inveterate hatred of the comic poets against the philosophers, others to personal jealousy, since Socrates had been preferred by king Archelaus to Aristophanes,
the Athenian people in the manner we see in the Clouds. The manner in which Socrates lived was a subject too tempting for a comic poet not to have introduced, though he might not have been provoked by any external causes. How many truly comical scenes might be derived from Socrates gazing at one object for twenty-four hours, and from the many anecdotes which were told of him; in addition to which, we must not forget his resemblance to a Silenus, and many other peculiarities in his conduct.\(^1\) On the other hand, however, it would

\&c. But all these hypotheses can easily be dispensed with. The comic poet took up any subject which did not appear to be wanting in comical interest, and made it suit his purpose. Besides, Aristophanes was not the only one who brought Socrates on the stage. Eupolis and Amipsias did the same (see Diog. Laert. II. 18. Schol. *ad Nub.* 96 and 129.), and Socrates shared this fate with all the distinguished men of his age, Pericles, Alcibiades, and Euripides. Thus the Frogs of Aristophanes were a satire upon Euripides, and, to a certain extent, upon Œschylus also. These comedies gave great delight to the multitude, as they considered it an essential part of their democratical liberty to laugh with impunity at the most eminent men of the age; even their demagogues, the adored Pericles and Cleon, were not spared. To attack the People was, properly speaking, not allowed,—though Aristophanes made occasional exceptions,—for it was sacred; but every individual might be brought on the stage by the comic poet.

Xenoph. *De Republica Athen.* c. 2. The first archon, whose name could not be profaned on the stage, formed the only exception. Compare the Schol. on the *Clouds*, l. 32.

\(^1\) Plat. *Sympos.* p. 220. C. "Meditating on some subject, he once stopped somewhere, early in the morning (viz. during the expedition against Potidæa), and as he did not succeed in his search, he remained in deep thought, standing on the same spot. When it had become noon-time, he attracted the attention of the people, and one said to another: 'Socrates has been standing there, on the same spot, thinking about something, from an early
be going too far to assert that the ridiculous representation of Socrates had no influence on his fate. Even a cursory perusal of the Clouds of Aristophanes must convince the reader that every thing is calculated to exhibit Socrates in an odious light, as seducing the young, introducing new gods, and consequently as highly injurious to the commonwealth; and it is surprising to see these charges, twenty-three years afterwards, repeated by Meletus. Socrates himself, in the Apology, says that Aristophanes, and his party, were enemies far more dangerous to him than his accusers, and that Meletus in reality had only repeated the charges of the former. 2

hour in the morning. 1 In the evening when he was still standing, there some of the Ionian soldiers, after supper, took out their carpets, partly to repose on them in the refreshing evening air (for it was a summer night), partly to watch whether Socrates would actually pass the night in that position. And he actually remained standing till day-break, and then addressed his prayers to the rising sun, and hastened away. 1—Aul. Gellius, Noct. Att. II. 1.

* * *

1 *Ε'μοβ γάρ πολλοί κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ύμᾶς, says he, καὶ πάλαι πολλά ἦν ἐπὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλληθές λέγοντες οὐς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἄμφι Ἀρντον, καὶ περι'ὑντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς. Ἀλλ' ἱκείνοι δεινότεροι, ὃ ἄνδρες, οὐ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παιδῶν παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπειδὸν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοὶ οὐδὲν ἄλληθες, ὡς ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, σοφός ἄνήρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστῆς, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἀπαντα ἀνεξητηκώς, καὶ τὸν ἦπτω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν* οὔτοι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
Aristophanes and his party, it is true, could not directly contribute to the accusation of Socrates, for the times were too distant; but they assisted to prejudice the minds of the people against our philosopher, and to exhibit him not only as an object of ridicule, but as a man dangerous to the constitution. This was certainly an effect which these calumnies were calculated to produce, and in which they wonderfully succeeded. Mele-

good one, by means of eloquence. This proves that Aristophanes did not distinguish Socrates from the sophists; and indeed proofs of this are met with throughout the Clouds. Thus Socrates invokes the Clouds, the protecting deities of the sophists; Socrates teaches how the λόγος δίκαιος may be conquered by the λόγος ἄδικος; he makes astronomical researches (to this must be referred his soaring in the air in a basket, v. 184 foll.); and he receives money for his instructions (v. 98. 99. 113—115. 245. 246.) &c. A slight allusion to the sophistry of Socrates we find also in the answer of Ischomachus (in Xenoph. Econom. c. 11. § 25.) to the question, how Ischomachus was getting on with his lawsuit: "When it is sufficient," he says, "for my defence to tell the truth, very well; but when I have recourse to lies, dear Socrates, I cannot give to the bad cause the appearance of a good one." The opinion of those who suppose that Aristophanes had been induced by the sophists to abuse Socrates, may be thus satisfactorily refuted.
tus would perhaps not have ventured to come forth with an accusation against Socrates, had not a favourite poet of the Athenian people paved the way, and indirectly undertaken his accusation. "Let us go back," says Socrates, in the Apology, "to the commencement, and the first charge from which the calumny has arisen, relying on which, Meletus has brought the present charge against me." That the Clouds of Aristophanes did not obtain the prize, but a play of Cratinus, who contested for it with him and Amipsias, cannot surprise us; nor should it lead us to the conclusion, that the Clouds of Aristophanes were unfavourably received by the Athenians. It was not the applause of the people which decided the prize, but judges were especially appointed for that purpose; who were often biassed by opposite motives, and who may have been influenced in this instance by circumstances unknown to us.

1 Argum. II. ad Nubes edit. Herm. says that Alcibiades and his party had prevented the success of this piece. According to Ælian's account (Var. Hist. II. 13.) the people were so much pleased with the Clouds of Aristophanes, that they exclaimed: "No one but Aristophanes ought to be rewarded with the prize." Aristophanes himself considered it the most perfect of his comedies (Nub. v. 522, and Vespæ, v. 1039). The account of Ælian, however, deserves just as little credit as the anecdote which he relates immediately after it, that Socrates knowing that he would be the object of bitter satire, was not only present during the performance, but that having heard that many strangers were present, and were inquiring who Socrates was, he came forth in the midst of the comedy, and remained standing in a place where he could be observed by all, and compared with the copy.

2 [For an account of the Clouds of Aristophanes, see a note at the end of this chapter. — Ed.]
4. Socrates was not in favour of a democratic form of government: this must also have contributed to his accusation. Socrates, like the sages of antiquity in general, approved of an aristocracy in the original sense of the word, viz. a constitution which entrusted the supreme power to the hands of the best in a moral point of view. Socrates was aware how dangerous it is to intrust the supreme power to the hands of an uneducated populace; his own experience taught him how easy it was for selfish demagogues to gain favour with an in-

1 An aristocracy, according to the conceptions of the Athenians before the time of Alexander the Great, was not opposed to democracy, but to oligarchy. In an aristocracy the people always had great influence, but in an oligarchy they were entirely deprived of it. One of the principal passages relating to this point is in the Menexenus of Plato, p. 238. C. Plato there represents Socrates as repeating a funeral discourse of Aspasia, in honour of those who had died for their country. Πολιτεία γὰρ τροφή ἀνθρώπων ἦστι, says Aspasia, καλὴ μὲν ἁγαθών, ἢ δὲ ἐναντία κακῶν. ὡς οὖν ἐν καλῇ πολιτείᾳ ἐτράφσαν αἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν, ἄναγκαιον δῆλωσαι, δι’ ἥν ἡ δή κακείνοι ἁγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ νῦν εἰσιν, ο∤ δὲ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες οἱ τετελευτηκότες. Ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ πολιτεία καὶ τότε ἦν καὶ νῦν, ἀριστοκρατία, ἐν γ’ νῦν τε πολιτεύμεθα καὶ τὸν ἂεί χρόνον ἐξ ἱκείνου ἐς τὰ πολλά. καλεὶ δὲ ὁ μὲν αὐτὴν ἐνμοκρατίαν, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο, ἂν χαίρῃ. ἐστὶ δὲ τῇ ἄληθείᾳ μετ’ εὐδοξίας πλήθους ἀριστοκρατία. βασιλείς μὲν γὰρ ἂεὶ ἢμῖν εἰσίν οὕτως δὲ τοτε μὲν ἐν γένοις, τοτε-δὲ αἴρετοι ἐγκρατεῖς δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὰ πολλὰ τὸ πλῆθος, τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς δίδωσι καὶ τὸ κράτος τοῖς ἂεὶ δόξασιν ἀρίστοις εἰναι, καὶ οὕτε ἀσθενεῖα, οὕτε πεινα, οὕτε ἀγνωσία πατέρων ἀπελήλαται οὔδεις οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις πετίρμαται ὡσπέρ ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, ἄλλα εἰς ὅρος, οὸ δόξας σοφὸς ἢ ἁγαθὸς εἰναι κρατεῖ καὶ ἀρχεῖ. Compare with this Xenoph. Mem. IV. 6. § 12: "Whenever public offices were held by persons who executed the will of the law, Socrates considered the government to be an Aristocracy." More arguments in support of this opinion are given by Luzac. l. c. p. 67.
constant multitude, and to carry plans into execution, which were often highly injurious to the whole nation. Hence, he frequently spoke in a sarcastic manner of the Athenian constitution, and satirised their bean-archons. Socrates said to Charmides, an able young man, who, however, was too timid to speak in the public assembly, "Is it the fullers that thou art afraid of, or the shoe-makers? the carpenters, or the smiths? the peasants, or the merchants, or the higgler who exchange things in the market, and think of nothing else but how they may sell at the highest price, what they have bought at the lowest? for of such people the assembly is composed." Still more forcible is the account given by Ælian, who appears to have confounded Charmides with the more celebrated Alcibiades: "Thou surely art not afraid of that shoemaker?" When Alcibiades denied this, he

1 Xenoph. Mem. I. 2. § 9. The archons were elected by beans: white beans were used in voting for a candidate, black ones in voting against him. The names of the candidates for the βουλή were put into one vase, and into another an equal number of beans, fifty of which were white, the remainder black. Simultaneously with the name of a candidate drawn from one vase, a bean was drawn from the other. A white bean accompanying the name made the candidate a senator. Hence the expression κυαμεντοι ἄρχοντες for senators. That Socrates was averse to the democratical constitution of the Athenians, is also stated by Ælian, Var. Hist. III. 17: Σωκράτης ἐν τῇ μὲν Ἀθηναίων πολιτείᾳ οὐκ ἤρέκετο, τυφανωμένην γὰρ καὶ μοναρχικὴν ἑώρα τὴν δημοκρατίαν οὖσαν. This sentiment was also maintained by his successors. Plato and Xenophon, although differing in their principles and opinions on other subjects, agree with each other on this point.


3 II. 1.
said: "but perhaps that crier in the market or the tent-maker?" When Alcibiades answered this also in the negative, "Well then," said Socrates, "do not the people of Athens consist of nothing but such persons? and if thou art not afraid of each of them individually, thou canst not be afraid of them when they are assembled." Even in his Apology he did not conceal his anti-democratical feelings. It is but natural that such assertions of our philosopher should have inflamed those irritable Athenian democrats, according to whose ideas the election of magistrates by lot was the very foundation of their democracy, and that they should have been strongly inclined to accuse a man who held such opinions.

This anti-democratical mode of thinking was not only thought to be discovered in the expressions of Socrates; his having educated the cruel tyrant Critias, was alleged as an actual proof of it, although Socrates had not the slightest share in his tyrannical principles. We cannot be surprised that in the accusation of Socrates no mention was formally made of Critias and of the Thirty Tyrants in general, of Alcibiades, Hipparchus, and many others of the oligarchical party, who had been more or less intimately connected with Socrates; nor can it be maintained that these connections had no influence on the accusation. The omission of this very important point must be ascribed to the general amnesty.

1 C. XIX. Οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν, ὡστὶς ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ύμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίῳ ἐναντιούμενος καὶ ἐικώλίων πολλὰ ἁδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι.
which had been proposed by Archinus, and was established after the banishment of the Thirty.\(^1\) And yet Xenophon, the most trustworthy of all the writers who has transmitted to us accounts of Socrates, says\(^2\) that the ridicule of Socrates on the election of magistrates by lot, his having instructed Critias, and quoted passages from the most eminent poets, which bestowed praise on tyranny, were the principal articles in the second charge which accused Socrates of seducing the young.\(^3\) The account of Xenophon strongly confirms the supposition, that the connection between Socrates and Critias, whose cruelties were still well remembered by the democratical party, must have contributed to his accusation, and is indeed very probable, when we only consider the state of affairs. A passage of \(\text{Æ}schines,\) the orator, might also be adduced to confirm this opinion, but we have reason to doubt the veracity of \(\text{Æ}schines,\) whenever it is his object to bring charges against his adversary, Demosthenes. This passage occurs in the speech against Timarchus,\(^4\) which \(\text{Æ}schines\) delivered before the assembly of the people. “You who have put to death Socrates, the sophist, whom you knew to have educated Critias, one of the Thirty Tyrants who abolished your democracy, will you allow yourselves to be moved by the

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1 Plat. \textit{Menexen.} p. 234. B.
2 \textit{Memorab.} I. 2.
3 Xenophon clearly seeing that he could not refute the first of these facts, namely, the ridicule on the \textit{kuamēnroi}, wisely avoids mentioning it.
4 In the third volume of Reiske’s edition of the “\textit{Oratores Græci},” p. 168.
private interest of an orator like Demosthenes?" The name of sophist, which Æschines must surely have known not to have belonged to Socrates, but which orators frequently applied to philosophers to express their contempt of them, and the mention of Critias, are sufficient to prove the intention of Æschines, who wished by these sentiments to hurt the feelings of Demosthenes, a disciple of Plato, and a kinsman of Critias.

[The Clouds of Aristophanes.

In the Clouds of Aristophanes, which was exhibited B. c. 423, Socrates is introduced as the great master of the school of the Sophists. A plain, simple citizen of Athens, named Strepsia-des, engaged in husbandry, having married into a family of distinction, and having contracted debts through the extravagance of his wife (v. 49. sq. 437. sq. ed. Dindorf) and his son's (Pheidippides) fashionable love of horses, in order to defeat the impending suits of his creditors, wishes to place his son in a school of philosophy and rhetoric, where he may learn the arts of oratory, and of turning right into wrong, in order thereby to repair the ills which he had chiefly brought upon himself. On the son's refusal, the father applies in person to the master of the school, who is named Socrates: by him he is solemnly initiated, instructed, and examined, but being found too old and stupid to learn, he is dismissed; upon which, after he has given his son some samples of the new philosophy, he forces him much against his will into the school: here the young man makes such great and rapid progress in learning, that he is able to teach his father, who exults at his brilliant success, the most extraordinary tricks for the attainment of his object; but as he is now himself enlightened, and has raised himself above con-
siderations of right and duty, he denies and scorns in the coarsest manner the relation in which he stands both to his father and mother; he defends his new opinions with the refinements of sophistry, and retorting upon his father the good lessons he had before received from him, pays him in the same coin. Upon this the father, cured of his error, in wishing to get rid of his embarrassments by dishonesty and sophistical chicanery, returns to take revenge upon the school of that pernicious science and upon its master, who is obliged to receive back all the subtle arguments and high-flown words, which he had himself made use of, and the old man levels the establishment to the ground.

From this connected view of the story, we see that it is throughout directed against that propensity of the Athenians to controversies and law-suits, which was eminently promoted by their practice of getting into debt; and against the pernicious, sophistical and wrangling oratory, which was ever at the service of this disposition, in the courts of justice, and particularly in the discussion of all public transactions; and Aristophanes never loses an opportunity of combating these two vices.

Moreover, as the story is set in action by the perverse purpose awakened in Strepsiades, as it comes to an end when he is cured, and as this change arises from the unexpected and extravagant result of the experiment upon Pheidippides, who is to be the instrument of the father's design; the school of sophistry in which the youth is to be formed, is clearly the hinge on which the whole action turns; for its influence on Pheidippides decides the success or failure of the views of Strepsiades, and consequently the issue of the story of the drama.

This, therefore, is the view which we must take of the relation of the several parts to each other; namely, that the principal character to which the whole refers, is not Socrates, who has generally been considered to be so, in consequence of the story lingering so long at his shop, and of his being the sufferer at the conclusion, but Strepsiades himself; whereas Socrates is the intermediate party who is to instruct Pheidippides for the vicious purposes of the father; and this he executes so perfectly, that the old gentleman is at first deceived; but he soon reaps fruits, the nature of which opens his eyes to his own folly, and to the destructive tendency of this system of education.

In "The Clouds" the poet introduces us to the original source,
whence, according to his view, the new-fangled and pernicious system of education took its rise, namely, the school of sophistical eloquence. He represents the Phrontisterion or subtlety shop, as its seat and centre of union, this being necessary in a dramatic point of view; and he concentrates in the schoolmaster those essential properties of the school, which are to explain his purpose, interwoven as they are with others, which belong to the real Socrates, under whose name and mask he clothed the dramatic personage. This individual centralization was indispensably requisite for the conduct of the drama; and this is the poet's only excuse for representing Socrates within the walls of a school, as the philosopher himself was continually moving about in public, a contradiction, which has been considered as a convincing proof that the whole exhibition, as we have it, could not have been intended really for him. Aristophanes lays open to us, with the colouring, indeed, of a caricature, the whole interior sayings and doings of the school; he draws a sketch of the methods and means of instruction peculiar to it; and he shews the extent to which the mischief has already gone, since the λόγος δίκαιος is unable to defend himself; he points out likewise, what results we are to expect from the school, what immediate calamities threaten not merely the parents themselves, who were blind enough to encourage such a system of education, but the common-weal also; and finally, what the people ought to do, to annihilate the evil at its source.

The Socrates in "The Clouds" must not, therefore, be considered as an individual, or as the copy of an individual; but as the principal personages in Aristophanes are for the most part symbolical, he too must be viewed as symbolical, that is, as the representative of the school and of its principle. And as we see in him a good deal, which answers to the individual, whose name and mask he bears, and much too, which is heterogeneal to him, although by means of certain allusions, and the ingenuity of dramatic combination, these two are amalgamated together; so also in the characters of Strepsiades and Pheidippides, many traits which are perfectly apposite to the objects which they are intended to typify, are combined with many which are extravagantly caricatured, and the creatures of poetic fiction. Strepsiades for example, whose name is explained by his tendency to evil (v. 1455 comp. v. 88), and by the pleasure he takes in distorting right (v. 434), is the representative of
the good old time, working out its own destruction by the abandon-
ment of the laborious, frugal, peasant's life, by illustrious mar-
riages, and female influence, by the extravagant life which his son
leads in consequence of it, and by the debts and lawsuits which
this occasions, all of which open the door to sophistical eloquence;
or if you will, he is the representative of the elder portion of the
Athenian people, in this dangerous crisis of their affairs. As in
some other characters of the comedies of Aristophanes, which
present the people under different aspects, for example, the Demos
there is always a groundwork of truth and honesty, but which is
alloyed with falsehood, and led into error, and whose cure and
restoration to a healthy and vigorous state and a right view of
things, form the end and aim of the dramas; so likewise in
"The Clouds," a sickly disposition of the people, the nature and
bent of which are pourtrayed under the character of Strepsiades, in
the most lively colours of caricature, is represented as the school,
in which that personage seeks the means of obtaining the object
of his desires, but is cured the moment that the full operation of
those means is unexpectedly brought to light. Pheidippides, on
the other hand, is the picture of the new or modern times, in the
young men of fashion just coming out into the world, whose
struggle with the older generation is pointed out by words of de-
rision and raillery. The fashionable and chevaleresque passion
for horses and carriages in the young men of the time, was ac-
 companied by λαλώ (loquaciousness) and her whole train of
vicious propensities; and yet how much better would it be,
as Aristophanes implies, to leave the youth to these pursuits,
and honourably bear up against the lesser evil of the debts,
which had grown out of them, than that from selfish and dis-
honest motives encouragement should be given to what was
calculated to poison the youths in their hearts' core, and there-
by to bring disorder into all domestic and political relations!
In this sense, when Pheidippides expresses his delight and satis-
faction with what he had gained from the art of oratory, as it put
him in a situation to prove that it was right for a son to correct
his father, Strepsiades retorts upon him in these words:—
"Ride on and drive away, 'fore Jove! I'd rather keep a coach
and four, than be thus beat and mauled."

This, then, is the lesson, which Aristophanes would give to his
contemporaries in Athens, by "The Clouds." If one of the two must have its way, let the young men indulge themselves in their horses and carriages, however it may distress you; but check the influence of these schools, unless you wish to make a scourge for yourself and for the state; exterminate in yourselves that dishonest propensity which entangles you in lawsuits, and which, by means of those schools, will make your sons the instruments of your ruin! The younger population he strives to deter from the same fate by a display of the manners of the school, and of the pale faces and enervated limbs which come out of it (v. 102, 504, 1012, 1171).

We cannot, therefore, say that the play of "The Clouds" is pointed at any one definite individual; but it reproves one general and dangerous symptom of the times, in the whole habits and life, political and domestic, of the Athenians, developing it in its source, in every thing which fostered it, and made it attractive, in the instruments by which it was established, and which gave to it its pernicious efficiency; and thus whilst he strictly and logically deduces real effects from real causes, as far as this developement is concerned, the personages which bear a part in the action, are consequently one and all historical. Hence we can very well understand the striking references in particular characters to certain individuals; and I think it more than probable, that such reference is intended, not merely in the personage which bears the name of Socrates, but also in that of Pheidippides; whilst in the character of Strepsiades the poet only meant to point to the people in general.

The excessive love of horses exhibited in Pheidippides, and the extravagance consequent upon it, the rapid strides too, which he makes in readiness of speech, in debauchery, and in selfish arrogance, and the relation in which he stands to Socrates, evidently point, without further search, to Alcibiades, in whom we find all these features united, on whom all the young men of the higher classes of his time pinned their faith, and whom they assisted a few years afterwards, in carrying through his political projects.

In "The Clouds," Aristophanes introduces Alcibiades as a ready orator and a debauchée, as the fruit of that school, from which, as the favourite pupil of Socrates, he seems to have issued, in short, as the type of Pheidippides; although all the traits attributed to the latter are not to be looked for individually in
Alcibiades, and although his name does not occur in the course of the drama. Moreover, the supposed lineage of Pheidippides, whose mother (v. 46) was the niece of a Megacles, the frequent mention of that uncle (v. 70, 124, 825), and that of his descent from a celebrated ancient lady of the name of Κοιαφά,\(^{1}\) distinctly point to Alcibiades, whose mother, Deinomache, was herself a daughter of Megacles,\(^{2}\) and from whose family the Alcmaeonidae, to which Κοιαφά belonged, he had inherited his strong passion for a well-furnished stable.\(^{3}\) This passion is, indeed, brought forward in the care taken by Pheidippides' mother, that the word ίππος should be introduced somehow or other into his name; as in truth it did occur also in 'Ιππαρίη,\(^{4}\) the daughter of Hipponicus, and wife of Alcibiades. With all these circumstances to point it out, the part of Pheidippides in the play could not have failed to remind the Athenians of Alcibiades, who, about this time, or somewhat earlier, began to neglect, as Isocrates says,\(^{5}\) the contests of the gymnasia (and this is an important matter in reference to the play of "The Clouds"), and to devote himself to those equestrian and charioteering pursuits, to which he was indebted for his victory at the Olympic games. The very name of Pheidippides, is not a pure invention of Aristophanes; but forms at once a connecting link between the youth himself, and that Pheidippus, son of Thessalus,\(^{6}\) who was one of the ancestors of the Thessalian Aleuadae, famous for their breed of horses; and, at the same time, by its final syllables, it keeps up the allusion to Alcibiades, who had likewise learned the science of the manège, both in riding and driving, in Thessaly; and the same comparison with the Aleuadae is implied, which we find also in Satyros,\(^{7}\) who tells us that Alcibiades spent his time in Thessaly,

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\(^{1}\) V. 48 and 800.
\(^{2}\) Plut. Alcib. c. 1.
\(^{3}\) Herodot. VI. 121.
\(^{5}\) L. c. compare Plut. Alcib. c. 11.
\(^{6}\) Homer II. II. 678.
\(^{7}\) In Athenæus XII. c. 9, p. 534—6. 'Εν Θεταλίᾳ δὲ ίπποτροφῶν καὶ ἱππαρίην, τῶν Ἀλευάδῶν ίππικώτερος.
breeding horses, and driving cars, with more fondness for horse-flesh even than the Aleuadæ. An allusion, also, to the well known infantine τραυλισμὸς of Alcibiades, or his defect in the articulation of certain letters,1 could not fail to fix the attention of the Athenian public to this remarkable personage. If then, the actor, who represented Pheidippides, did but imitate slightly this τραυλισμὸς, in appropriate passages, and if he bore in his mask and conduct any resemblance to Alcibiades, there was no further occasion whatever for his name; and we need not have recourse to the supposition, that his not being mentioned by name in the play was owing to any fear of Alcibiades, who did not understand such raillery on the part of the comic poets; since the other characteristics by which he was designated were sufficiently complete and intelligible for comic representation; and the whole was affected with much more freedom and arch roguery, than if, in addition to that of Socrates, the name likewise of Alcibiades had crudely destroyed the whole riddle, it being already quite piquant enough for a contemporary audience. The proof of an allusion in "The Clouds" to Alcibiades, and to the youths who shared in his pursuits and disposition, is confirmed also by the second argument prefixed to the play, and by the notice it contains, that Alcibiades and his party had prevented the first prize being awarded to Aristophanes; from which it is evident, even were the fact not probable in itself, that a tendency hostile to Alcibiades and his friends was perceived even by the antients in this drama.

It was also about this time that the intimacy between Alcibiades and Socrates was at its height, as the flight from Delion took place in the winter of the first year of the 89th Olympiad, that is, in the year in which "The Clouds" was represented; and the share they both had in this engagement, and the assistance which Alcibiades gave to Socrates, were manifest proofs of that intimacy. Alcibiades also about this time must have been deeply engaged in public affairs.

But the question arises: why did Aristophanes, when he gave a name and mask to the master of the school of subtlety, which was so foreign to the real Socrates, select the name and mask of that very individual?

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1 Plutarch, Alcib. c. 1.
Aristophanes selected Socrates, not only because his whole exterior, and his mode of life offered a most appropriate mask for comic representation; but also (and this was his chief reason) because in these circumstances, as well as in many other points, the occupations of Socrates, and his mode of instruction bore a great resemblance to those of the natural philosophers and of the sophists. The poet thus found abundance of subject-matter, which composed a picture suited to his views; namely, to exhibit to the public, a master of the school, whence the mischief he strove to put down, was working its way into the hearts of the Athenian youths. We must also take into our consideration the important fact, that several individuals, such as Euripides, Pericles, Alcibiades, Theramenes, and Critias, who supported the modern system of education, were in close habits of intimacy with Socrates, and in part, too, with the natural philosophers and sophists: and this helped to give additional relief and light to the portrait of the man, who was the centre around which they moved.

It should be recollected that it was not the object of Aristophanes to represent Socrates as he appeared to his confidential pupils, to Xenophon, to Plato, to Phædo, to Cebes, and others; but how he might be represented to the great mass of the Athenian people, that is, how they comprehended and judged him from his outward and visible signs; and how they understood and appreciated the usual extravagancies of the comic poets; in short, how it was to be managed, that whilst his name, and his mask, caricatured to the utmost, were kept together by fundamental affinities, the former might appear sufficiently justified, and be not improperly placed in connection with individuals, who were displaying before the eyes of the public the germs which were developed in Alcibiades, and the early results to which they had given birth. But as the people saw Socrates for ever and deeply employed, either in meditations, like the natural philosophers, ἐρωτιζόμεν, or like the sophists in inductive intercourse with the youth, σοφίζομεν, as Pericles called it, and as Socrates was frequently engaged in conversation with those sophists, (besides many palpable points of resemblance, calculated to mislead even those who observed him more closely), it would necessarily follow, that they reckoned him one of that community, as Ἐschines himself does when

1 In Timarch. p. 346, ed. Bekker.
him a sophist; judging then as they did from outward appearances, they placed him in the same category with those of his associates, whom they knew to be most engaged on the theatre of public life. Aristophanes himself seems to have had no other notion of Socrates; at least the whole range of his comedy furnishes us with many characteristic traits perfectly similar to the picture we have of him in "The Clouds." In "The Birds" (v. 1282) the poet expresses by ἴσωκράτονυ the ideal of a hardy mode of life, and neglect of outward appearances; and in v. 1554 he represents Socrates, who is there called the unwashed (ἀλουτος,) as ὑψαγωγός, conductor of souls, maker of images, conjurer-up of spirits, who is obeyed by the shadowy forms of his scholars, amongst whom Chærephon is particularly designated, the same who is assailed also in "The Clouds," and on various other occasions by the comic poets, as the confidential friend of his youth. And not only in "The Clouds," but in "The Frogs" also, near the end, the Socratic dialogues are ridiculed, as solemn twaddle, and empty nonsense. Although therefore the chief purpose of Socrates' appearance in "The Clouds" is on account of Alcibiades, who is principally aimed at in the character of Pheidippides, and though this motive for introducing him necessarily influenced the formation of that character, yet it is evident that the picture of Socrates and his school, as portrayed in "The Clouds," was not created by Aristophanes merely for the purposes of this comedy, but that he had for his groundwork a definite and decided model.


"There are two points with regard to the conduct of Aristophanes, which appear to have been placed by recent investigations beyond doubt. It may be considered as certain, that he was not animated by any personal malevolence towards Socrates, but only attacked him as an enemy and corrupter of religion and morals; but on the other hand it is equally well established, that he did not merely borrow the name of Socrates for the representative of the sophistical school, but designed to point the attention, and to excite the feelings of his audience against the real individual. The only question which seems to be still open to controversy on this subject, concerns the degree in which Aristophanes was acquainted with the real character and aims of Socrates, as they are known to us from the uniform testimony of his intimate friends and dis-
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ciples. We find it difficult to adopt the opinion of some modern writers who contend that Aristophanes, notwithstanding a perfect knowledge of the difference between Socrates and the sophists, might still have looked upon him as standing so completely on the same ground with them, that one description was applicable to them and him. It is true, as we have already observed, that the poet would have willingly suppressed all reflection and enquiry on many of the subjects, which were discussed both by the sophists and by Socrates, as a presumptuous encroachment on the province of authority. But it seems incredible, that if he had known all that makes Socrates so admirable and amiable in our eyes, he would have assailed him with such vehement bitterness, and that he should never have qualified his satire by a single word indicative of the respect which he must then have felt to be due at least to his character and his intentions. But if we suppose what is in itself much more consistent with the opinions and pursuits of the comic poet, that he observed the philosopher attentively indeed, but from a distance which permitted no more than a superficial acquaintance, we are then at no loss to understand how he might have confounded him with a class of men, with which he had so little in common, and why he singled him out to represent them. He probably first formed his judgment of Socrates by the society in which he usually saw him. He may have known that his early studies had been directed by Archelaus, the disciple of Anaxagoras; that he had both himself received the instruction of the most eminent sophists, and had induced others to become their hearers: that Euripides, who had introduced the sophistical spirit into the drama, and Alcibiades who illustrated it most completely in his life, were in the number of his most intimate friends. Socrates, who never willingly stirred beyond the walls of the city, lived almost wholly in public places, which he seldom entered without forming a circle round him, and opening some discussion connected with the object of his philosophical researches; he readily accepted the invitations of his friends, especially when he expected to meet learned and inquisitive guests, and probably never failed to give a speculative turn to the conversation. Aristophanes himself may have been more than once present, as Plato represents him, on such occasions. But it was universally notorious, that, whenever Socrates appeared, some subtle disputation was likely to ensue; the method by which he drew out and
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tried the opinions of others, without directly delivering his own, and even his professions,—for he commonly described himself as a seeker, who had not yet discovered the truth,—might easily be mistaken for the sophistical scepticism, which denied the possibility of finding it. Aristophanes might also, either immediately, or through hearsay, have become acquainted with expressions and arguments of Socrates, apparently contrary to the established religion."—Thirlwall's "History of Greece," vol. IV. p. 267. 268.—Ed.]
CHAPTER VIII.

These causes sufficiently account for the accusation of Socrates;—but why was it delayed till he had reached his seventieth year?

The hatred against Socrates, as an enemy of the democracy, did not dare to display itself previous to the banishment of Alcibiades, the powerful friend of Socrates, who still remained his friend even after he had given up his intimate acquaintance. Besides this, during the Peloponnesian war the attention of the people was engaged by more important affairs than the accusation of Socrates, and his enemies who belonged for the most part to the democratical party, had not sufficient influence during the government of the Thirty, to attempt anything against him. On the other hand, the Thirty in spite of their own corruption, could not deny him their esteem, and they also probably dreaded his friends, whose number was not small, and therefore endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to gain him over to their interest, as we have seen in the affair of Leon of Salamis. But there was hardly a moment more favourable to the accusation of a man suspected of anti-democratic senti-
ments,\(^1\) than that which the accusers of Socrates actually chose. After the recovery of democratical liberty, the Athenians still feeling the consequences of the unfortunate issue of the Peloponnesian war, which their superstition ascribed to the profanation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermes-busts by Alcibiades, and remembering the horrors with which the government of the Thirty Tyrants was branded, became more jealous of their constitution than ever, and more inclined to punish persons against whom such plausible charges could be brought, as those against Socrates, the teacher of Critias and Alcibiades.

But the old charge, so often repeated against philosophers,\(^2\) that they introduced new gods and corrupted the young, and which was also employed against Socrates, was not followed by his immediate condemnation. We know from the Apology of Plato,\(^3\) that Meletus

\(^1\) That Socrates was not considered as a friend of the people according to the notions of the multitude, we also see from the Apology ascribed to Xenophon, in which great pains are taken to represent him as a δημοτικός. Compare the Apology of Libanius, p. 17: "Socrates hated democracy, and would have liked to have seen a tyrant at the head of the republic, &c." "He is an enemy of the people, and persuades his friends to despise democracy.—He praised Pisistratus, admired Hippias, honoured Hipparchus, and called that period the happiest of the Athenians," &c. These are the charges against which Socrates is defended by Libanius.

\(^2\) The accusation of impiety was so comprehensive, that the greatest and best men, on whom not a shadow of any other crime could fall, were charged with it. The tribunal before which they were tried, was not the same at all times, as the cause might be pleaded before the Areopagus, the senate, or the Heliæa.

\(^3\) C. XXV.
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requested the assistance of the party of Anytus and Lycon, in order to induce the judges to pronounce the preliminary sentence of guilty. Had Meletus not been supported by them, he would, as Socrates himself says, have failed in his accusation, and been fined one thousand drachmas; for an accuser who failed in obtaining

1 A preliminary sentence; for a proper condemnation in matters, which were not considered criminal, only took place after a counter-estimate had been made by the defendant; and wherever a punishment was stated by the law, it was inflicted according to the law, and not left to the discretion of the judges. We find one irregularity in the trial of Socrates, for which we can only account by supposing that some expressions of Socrates were considered by the judges as personally insulting to themselves. But although the accuser thought the matter criminal (τιμημαθαντων, he added, according to Diog. II. 40.), yet it was not treated as such by the judges. The first estimate of the punishment was made by the plaintiff, and this kind of estimating was called τιμαν; the counter-estimate was made by the defendant, and the terms for it were ἀντιτιμαν, ἀντιτιμασθαι (Plat. Apol. C. XXVI. Compare Pollux, VIII. 150.), or ὑποτιμασθαι (Xenoph. Apol. § 23.). The positive decision of the punishment was the privilege of the judges, and to fix the punishment was called προετιμαν. The calculation of votes which Fischer has made, in a remark on the passage of Plato, is too artificial; a more simple interpretation, which is adopted by Schleiermacher and others, is that the union of the party of Anytus and Lycon was required in order to obtain, in combination with that of Meletus, a fifth part of the votes. The number of the judges in the trial of Socrates is said to have been 556. 281 voted against him, 275 for him. If Socrates had had three votes more in his favour, the numbers would have been equal on both sides, and in this case he would have been acquitted. Tychsen, by correcting Diogenes, endeavours to reconcile him with Plato, for they contradict each other with regard to the number of votes. He accordingly increases the number of judges to 559, of whom 281 condemned, and 278 acquitted him. [For an account of the number of judges who were present at the trial of Socrates, see note (c) on C. XXV of the Apology, p. 134—Ed.]
less than the fifth part of the votes,\(^1\) was fined this sum. But even after the preliminary sentence had been pronounced, it would have been easy for Socrates to have given his trial a turn favourable to himself, if he had chosen to condescend to those practices, which other defendants had recourse to in such cases, and which men of the highest character employed. In cases which were not criminal, as stated above, a counter-estimate\(^2\) took place; that is, the defendant was allowed to fix on any punishment for himself which he considered proper. It was left to Socrates to choose between imprisonment for life, exile,\(^3\) or a fine. He might have escaped with a small fine, which his friends had declared themselves willing to collect for him; but he rejected this offer, as well as a speech composed by Lysias in his defence. “My whole life,” he said, “forms a defence against the present accusation.”

When Meletus had accused him of a crime against

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1 Meursius, Lect. Att. V. 13. Sometimes banishment was inflicted, as we see from the case of Æschines.

2 Cic. de Orat. I. 54: Erat Athenis, reo damnatto, si fraus capitalis non esset, quasi poææ æstimatio: et sententia quum judicibus daretur, interrogabatur reus, quam quasi æstimationem commeruisset.

3 In the Crito of Plato, C. XIV. the laws are introduced speaking thus: “Even during thy trial thou wast at liberty to declare thyself deserving exile, if thou hadst wished to do so, and with the consent of the state thou mightest have done what thou art now undertaking against her will. But thou didst even boast, as if thou wert not thyself alarmed, thou even didst say that thou wouldst prefer death to exile.” It was the privilege of every Athenian citizen to avoid the severity of the laws by a voluntary exile. Pollux, VIII. 10. 117.
the republic,” says Xenophon\(^1\), “he refused doing the slightest thing contrary to the laws, although others, in opposition to the law, were accustomed to implore the compassion of the judges, and to flatter and entreat them, which frequently procured their acquittal. On the contrary, however easy it might have been for him to have been acquitted by the judges, if he had chosen to act in the usual manner, he preferred death in consonance with the laws, to a life maintained by their violation.” Instead of trying to make a favourable impression upon the judges, he pronounced these proud words. “If I must estimate myself according to my desert, I estimate myself as deserving to be maintained in the prytaneum at the public expense.”\(^2\) This was the highest honour and was conferred on the prytanes, i.e. the fifty senators belonging to the presiding tribe, on the conquerors of the Olympian games, on youths whose fathers had died in defence of their country, on foreign ambassadors, &c., and at the end of his speech he ironically adds: “If I had had money, I would have estimated myself at as high a sum as I should have been able to pay, for that would not have injured me; but now I cannot do so, for I have nothing, unless you will fine me in such a sum, as I can pay. But perhaps I might be able to pay a mina of silver: that shall therefore be my estimate. But Plato here, men of Athens, and Crito, and Critobulus, and Apollodorus are persuading me to fine myself thirty minae, and they themselves

\(^1\) Memorab. IV. 4. § 4.
\(^2\) Plato Apolog. C. XXVI.
are ready to answer for me: that therefore shall be my estimate, and they will be satisfactory guarantees for this sum.’¹ Such a proud answer, and the language in general which Socrates used,² inflamed all the judges against him, and eighty of those who at first had been favourably disposed towards him, now voted for his death.³ The real cause of his condemnation was therefore the noble pride, the “libera contumacia,” as Cicero⁴

¹ *Apolog.* C. XXVIII. The account in the Apology ascribed to Xenophon (§ 23.), that Socrates did not fine himself, nor allow his friends to do so, because this would have been acknowledging his crimes, may be reconciled with the statement of Plato quoted above; for the estimate mentioned by the latter, as appears from the whole context, is pronounced in quite an ironical tone; it is in reality no estimate. Tychsen doubts the authority of Plato, thinking that it was only the intention of Plato to immortalise the offer which he and his friends had made to Socrates. But for this supposition we have no reason whatever. Tychsen in his account of this affair follows Diogenes, who differs from Plato, in as much as he states that the estimate of the thirty minae preceded the proud assertion that he deserved to be maintained in the Prytaneum. But the authority of Plato is surely more important. The source from which Diogenes derived his account, is unknown.

² *Cic.* *de Orat.* I. 54: Socrates in judicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed magister aut dominus videretur esse judicum.

³ *Cic.* *Ibid.*: Cujus responso sic judices exarserunt ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent.

⁴ *Cic.* *Tuscul.* I. 24: Socrates nec patronum quæsivit ad judicium capitis, nec judicibus supplex fuit, adhibuitque liberam contumaciam, a magnitudine animi ductam, non a superbia. This *libera contumacia* is expressed by the author of the Apology ascribed to Xenophon by μεγαληγορία. Diog. II. 24. also says of him: ἢν δὲ ἰχυρογνώμων (contumax). We see from the Apology of Plato (see also Xenoph. *Apol.* § 14.) that the judges had
calls it, which he displayed during his trial. He fell, properly speaking, as a voluntary victim. It would, however, be improper to suppose that the proud language, which he made use of before his judges, proceeded wholly and alone from a consciousness of his own worth. The reason, for which Socrates did not wish to defend himself, and rather did every thing to dispose the judges for his condemnation, was of a religious nature, as appears from several passages of the Socratic philosophers. ¹ He was not restrained by his daemon—this was the reason to which he referred the calmness of his mind and the omission of all that he might have done for his defence. Socrates considered himself as a man destined

taken it very ill of Socrates that he mentioned the declaration of the Delphic god, and that he spoke of a genius by whom he was guided. But they were most bitterly enraged by the manner in which he estimated his punishment. The author of the Xenoph. Apology attributes to Socrates one other expression, which must have excited the indignation of the Athenians. Socrates there tells them, that Apollo had expressed himself still more strongly in favour of Lycurgus, the legislator of the Lacedæmonians (who were so much detested by the Athenians), and had declared him to be the noblest, justest, and most moral of men. See § 15 and 16.

¹ Plat. Apol. C. XVII: "Whatever you may think of my conduct and my instructions, I shall change the one as little as the other, and I will rather obey the commands of the god who sent me as your teacher, than those of men." Xenoph. Memorab. IV. 8. 5: "Dost thou not know," Hermogenes says to Socrates, "that the judges at Athens, when offended by one word, have often condemned innocent men to death, and acquitted many criminals?" "Yes, indeed, they have; but, by Zeus, dear Hermogenes," he answered, "when I was thinking of my defence before the judges, my genius opposed and warned me." Compare Xenoph. Apol. § 4.
by the deity to be a general instructor of the people, and regarded his death as a sacrifice which was demanded by the same deity. This is undoubtedly an interesting point, but at the same time one that has too frequently been overlooked in the life of Socrates.

Respecting the immediate cause of the condemnation of Socrates, we must come to the conclusion, that he did not so much fall a victim to the hatred of his enemies, as to his religious mode of thinking, combined with a strong feeling of his own worth. The indirect causes of his death were certainly his accusers, who were actuated in a great measure by very ignoble motives; but the conduct of the judges, however unjustifiable, is yet excusable in many respects. Socrates had certainly expressed himself too freely on the constitution; and he must have appeared to the democratic Athenians to have seduced the young by such an open avowal of his opinions. The second point, however, with which Socrates was charged, that he did not believe in the gods worshipped by the state, and on which even the hypothesis of Anaxagoras concerning the sun and the moon was brought to bear, was perfectly unfounded, and is satisfactorily refuted by Socrates in his Apology, and by Xenophon in the Memorabilia. On the other hand, however, even the calmest judge could not help being prejudiced against him by his pride. He appeared as a man who was in no way willing to own his errors, and who was consequently incapable of improvement. Death is indeed a very severe punishment according to our ideas, but it was not so amongst the Athenians, with
whom it was considered equal to perpetual exile, and was inflicted for crimes of a less serious nature.\(^1\)

Socrates was thus condemned to drink the poisoned cup. A guarantee was demanded that he might not escape from punishment by flight; and Crito became answerable for him. According to the form then customary, as it is expressed in Plutarch's life of Antiphon, the sentence must have run thus: "Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, of the tribe of Antiochis and the deme of Alopece, has been condemned to be surrendered to the Eleven." To be surrendered to the Eleven was an euphemism of the Attic language instead of, to be condemned to death; since the Athenians wished to avoid the word death, which was considered ominous. The Eleven formed a commission, which consisted of the executioner and ten individuals, named respectively by each of the ten tribes. The superintendence of the prisons was intrusted to them, and they carried into execution the sentence of the courts. After the sentence had been pronounced and made publicly known by the herald, they seized the condemned person; and after putting him in fetters, accompanied him to his prison. We must

\(^1\) The Athenian laws in this respect were very much like the English. Xenoph. Mem. I. 2. 62. says: "If a man proves to be a thief, to have stolen clothings from a bath, to be a pickpocket, to have broken through a wall, to have enslaved free citizens, or robbed a temple, he is punished with death according to the laws.' If the value of things stolen in a bath exceeded ten drachmas, death was inflicted, as is observed by Hindenburg on this passage from Demosthenes in Timocrat.
suppose that these formalities were likewise observed with regard to Socrates.

After the sentence had been pronounced, Socrates once more addressed the judges who had condemned him, and with great resignation and intrepidity, spoke of the evil which they inflicted upon themselves by his punishment; and to those, who had voted for his acquittal, he spoke upon subjects, which at that moment were of the greatest interest—death and immortality. The last words of this address are particularly beautiful, and have found in Cicero\(^1\) an enthusiastic admirer. “However, it is time for us to go,—for me to die, for you to live; which is the better, is unknown to all except to God.”

When Socrates had spoken these words, he went with cheerfulness to the prison, where death awaited him. “Magno animo et vultu,” says Seneca\(^2\), “carcerem intravit.” He comforted his weeping friends, who followed him; and gently reproached Apollodorus, who uttered loud complaints respecting the unjust condemnation of his master.\(^3\)

\(^1\) **Tuscul. I. 41.**

\(^2\) **Consol. ad Helviam, c. XIV.**

\(^3\) The author of the so-called Apology of Xenophon perfectly agrees with Plato on these facts, which are in themselves credible enough. See Plat. Phædo. The former however adds (§ 29 foll.) that Socrates said, whilst Anytus passed by: “That man is perhaps very proud, as if he had performed something very great and sublime by having caused my death. Oh, the unhappy man, who does not seem to know that he is the conqueror who has been active for all futurity in the best and most useful manner! Homer has ascribed to some, who were near the end of their life,
The next day Socrates would have been executed, had not a particular festival, which was then celebrated at Athens, postponed it for thirty days. It was the time when the Athenians sent to Delos a vessel with presents for the oracle of Apollo, as a grateful acknowledgment for the successful expedition of Theseus against the Minotaurus. This great festival was solemnized at Athens every year, and from the moment when the vessel was adorned with a garland of laurel for its departure till the moment of its return, no criminal was allowed to be executed. The festival itself called θεωρία, was a kind of propitiation, during which the city was purified. The vessel in which the presents were conveyed to Delos, was called θεωρίς. As the vessel had been crowned the day before the condemnation of Socrates, the whole interval between this and the return of the vessel was at the disposal of Socrates to prepare himself for his death. This interval lasted, as we have said, thirty days.¹

Although he was confined in irons, Socrates passed these thirty days with his usual cheerfulness, in conversation with his friends, in meditations on his future ex-

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¹ The passages upon which these statements rest, may be found in the Crito of Plato, and in Xenoph. Mem. IV. 8. § 2.
istence, and on the history of his past life, as well as in attempts at composing verses. "During this time also," says Xenophon, 1 "he lived before the eyes of all his friends, in the same manner as in former days; but now his past life was most admired on account of his present calmness and cheerfulness of mind." Among the conversations with his friends two are particularly interesting, which are preserved by Plato in his Crito and Phædo—in the latter not without a considerable addition of Plato's own thoughts. In the Crito he treats of the duties of a citizen. Crito, a wealthy Athenian and powerful friend of Socrates, came to him early one morning; but finding him asleep, he waited till he awoke. When he awoke, Crito discovered to him a plan of escaping from prison, which he had formed in common with his other friends; and informed him that every thing was prepared for his escape, and that an asylum was provided for him in Thessaly. A lively conversation then arose between them, in which Socrates proved to Crito that a citizen is not justified, under any circumstances, in escaping from prison.

On the day of his death, Socrates had a conversation with his friends on the immortality of the soul. The arguments adduced in the Phædo of Plato, are for the most part invented by Plato; but the real arguments of Socrates are probably preserved by Xenophon in the Cyropædia, in the dying speech of Cyrus.

The exercises which Socrates made in poetry, were versifications of a hymn to Apollo, and of some fables of

1 Mem. IV. 8. § 2.
Æsop. Socrates undertook these on account of an admonition given him in a dream. But the reason for his choosing fables of Æsop, was probably that this kind of poetry which has such a decided moral tendency, particularly agreed with his own inclinations.¹

The vessel returned from Delos; the Eleven announced to Socrates the hour of his death, and one of their executioners was ready to prepare the poisoned cup which Socrates was obliged to empty after the sun had set. At a very early hour of the day his friends had assembled around him in great numbers, and Xanthippe with her children was also present. His friends were in the deepest distress; which, according to their different characters, was more or less loudly expressed. Apollodorus wept aloud, and moved all to tears except Socrates. Xanthippe, the violent and passionate woman, was inconsolable at the prospect of the death of her husband. Without fortune, without support, without any consolation, she saw herself and her children, of whom two were still at a tender age,

¹ Πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον, he says (Phædo, p. 60. E. foll.), ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτρ ἐν ἄλλη δεικνύομενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγουν, ὩΣ ὁ Ἐκκρατεῖς, ἐφή, μονσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζον. καὶ ἤγω ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, ὅπερ ἔπραττον, τούτῳ ὑπελάμβανον αὐτῷ μοι παρακελεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὃς ὁ τοῖς θέους διακελεύομενοι, καὶ ἵμοι οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὅπερ ἔπραττον, τούτῳ ἐπικελεύειν, μονσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὀσίης μεγίστης μονσικῆς, ἵμοῦ δὲ τούτῳ πρῶτοντος. νῦν δ' ἔπειδὴ ἢ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἢ του θεοῦ ἔστη ἔστικὼς με ἀποθνῄσκειν, ἐδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττει τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτῃ τῇ δημόδῃ μονσικὴν ποιεῖν μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν, κ. τ. λ.
left in want and misery. Socrates, probably with the intention of sparing her the distressing sight of her dying husband, requested Crito to send her home.

The executioner entered the prison, and offered the poisoned cup to Socrates: he took and emptied it with the intrepidity of a sage who is conscious of his virtuous life; and even at the moment when he held it in his hand, he spoke, according to Cicero’s expression,¹ in such a manner that he appeared not to die, but to ascend into heaven. “The lower part of his body had already grown cold, he then uncovered himself, (for he had before been covered) and spoke his last words: “Crito,” said he, “I owe a cock to Æsculapius. Offer one to him as a sacrifice; do not forget it.” Socrates alluded in these words to the happiness he should enjoy after being delivered from the chains of his body. Crito asked, whether he wished anything else to be done. To this question Socrates made no reply, and a short time afterwards became convulsed. His eyes became dim—and he expired.² He died in the year 400, or

¹ Tuscul. I. 29.
² All this is more circumstantially related in the Phædo of Plato. The above interpretation of the words at the end of the Phædo: “Crito, I owe a cock to Æsculapius,” &c., which is also adopted by Olympiodorus, appears to be the most suitable. It is well known, how many underserved reproaches have been inflicted upon Socrates for this expression. The ecclesiastical fathers Origen, Eusebius, Chrysostom and others pretended to discover in it the real belief of Socrates in polytheism. [“It is extremely difficult to determine the precise relation in which the opinions of Socrates stood to the Greek polytheism. He not only spoke of the gods with reverence, and conformed to the rites of
according to others 399, B.C. under the Archon Laches,¹ or Aristocrates.

the national worship, but testified his respect for the oracles in a manner which seems to imply that he believed their pretensions to have some real ground. On the other hand he acknowledged one Supreme Being, as the framer and preserver of the universe;* used the singular and the plural number indiscriminately, concerning the object of his adoration,† and when he endeavoured to reclaim one of his friends, who scoffed at sacrifices and divination, it was according to Xenophon, by an argument drawn exclusively from the works of the one Creator.‡ We are thus tempted to imagine, that he treated many points to which the vulgar attached great importance, as matters of indifference, on which it was neither possible, nor very desirable, to arrive at any certain conclusion: that he was only careful to exclude from his notion of the Gods, all attributes which were inconsistent with the moral qualities of the Supreme Being; and that, with this restriction, he considered the popular mythology as so harmless, that its language and rites might be innocently adopted. The observation attributed to him in one of Plato's early works,§ seems to throw great light on the nature and extent of his conformity to the state religion. Being asked whether he believes the Attic legend of

† αἱ θεοὶ, ὁ θεὸς, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ δαιμόνιον.
‡ Mem. I. 4. If the conversation has been faithfully reported by Xenophon, Aristodemus shifted his ground in the course of the argument. But he suggests no objection to the inference drawn by Socrates, from the being and providence of God, as to the propriety of conforming to the rites of the state religion, and Xenophon himself seems not to have been aware that it might be disputed. He thinks that he has sufficiently refuted the indictment which charged Socrates with disbelieving the existence of the gods acknowledged by the state, when he has proved that he believed in a deity.
§ Phædrus, p. 229.
LIFE OF SOCRATES.

Boreas and Orithuia, he replies, that he should indeed only be following the example of many ingenious men, if he rejected it, and attempted to explain it away;* but that such speculations, however fine, appeared to him to betoken a mind not very happily constituted; for the subjects furnished for them by the marvellous beings of the Greek mythology were endless, and to reduce all such stories to a probable form, was a task which required much leisure. This he could not give to it; for he was fully occupied with the study of his own nature. He therefore let those stories alone, and acquiesced in the common belief about them." Thirlwall's "History of Greece," vol. iv. p. 268, foll. Ed.]

1 Diog. II. 55 and 56. Marmor. Oxon. 57. Sachse places his death in Ol. 95, 1; Fabricius and Hamberger, Ol. 94, 2. [According to Diogenes II. 43. (c. xxiii.) the Athenians immediately repented of the death of Socrates; and manifested their sorrow by closing the palaestras and gymnasia. They are said to have condemned Meletus to death; and to have banished the other accusers; and also to have erected a bronze statue of Socrates. It is also said, in the lives of the Ten Orators, that Isocrates appeared in mourning for Socrates the day after his execution. — Ed.]

* I should say that she had been carried by the north wind over the cliffs, near which she had been playing with Pharmacea.
ΔΙΟΓΕΝΟΤΣ ΛΑΕΡΤΙΟΤ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΤΣ ΒΙΟΣ.

I. (18.) Σωκράτης Σωφρονίσκου μὲν ἢν ὑσος λιθογροῦ, καὶ Φαναρέτης μαίας (ὦς καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Θεατῆτῳ φησὶν) Ἀθηναίος, τὸν δὴμον Ἀλωπεκήθεν.

II. Ἐδόκει δὲ συμποιεῖν Εὐριπίδην. "Ὅθεν Μυησίλοχος οὔτω φησίν

Φρύγες ἵστι καὶ νῦν δράμα τοῦτ' Εὐριπίδουν,

"Ὡς καὶ τά φρύγανα ὑποτίθησι Σωκράτης.

καὶ πάλιν,

Εὐριπίδης, σωκρατογόμφος.

καὶ Καλλίας πεδήταις,

"Ὅθη σὺ σεμνή, καὶ φρονεῖς οὔτω μέγα.

"Εξεστὶ γὰρ μοι. Σωκράτης γὰρ αἰτίος.

Ἀριστοφάνης νεφέλαις,

Εὐριπίδης δ' ὃ τὰς τραγωδίας ποιῶν

Τὰς περιλαλούσας οὔτος ἤστι τὰς σοφάς.

III. (19.) Ἀκούσας δὲ Ἀναξαγόρου, κατὰ τινας, ἄλλα καὶ Δάμωνος, ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν διαδοχαῖς, μετὰ τὴν ἰκεῖνου καταδίκην διήκουσεν Ἀρχελάου τοῦ φυσικοῦ' οὔ καὶ παιδικὰ γενέσθαι φησίν Ἀριστόκρινος.

IV. Δούρις δὲ καὶ δουλεύσαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐργάσασθαι λίθους. 

Εἰναι τε αὐτὸῦ καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀκροπόλει Χάριτας ἐνοι φασιν, ἐνδεικτικός ὑπὼς. "Ὅθεν καὶ Τίμωνα ἐν τοῖς Σίλλοις εἰπεῖν,
'Εκ δ’ ἀρα τῶν ἀπεκλίνει λιθοδόξος, ἐννομολέσχης, Ἐλλήνων ἔπαιοοδὸς, ἀκριβολόγους ἀποφήμας, Μυκήτηρ, ῥητορόμυκτος, ὑπαττικὸς, εἰρωνευτὴς.

V. 'Ην γάρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς δεινῶς, ὡς φησὶ καὶ 'Ἰδομένευς. Ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ τριάκοντα αὐτῶν ἐκώλυσαν τέχνας διδάσκειν λόγων, ὡς φησὶ Ἐσεωφῶν. (20.) Καὶ 'Αριστοφάνης αὐτῶν κωμικὸς, ὡς τὸν ἠττῶν λόγον κρείττω ποιοῦντα. Καὶ γάρ πρῶτος (ὡς φησὶ Φασφώρινος ἐν παντοδαπῇ ἱστορίᾳ) μετὰ τοῦ μαθητοῦ Λοιχίνου ῥητορεύει τείδεα. Λέγει δὲ τούτῳ καὶ 'Ἰδομένευς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν Σωκρατικῶν. Καὶ πρῶτος περὶ βιον διελέχθη καὶ πρῶτος φιλοσόφων καταδικασθείς ἱτελεῖτα. Φησὶ δ’ αὐτῶν 'Αριστοτέλεως ὁ Σπυνάρου καὶ χρηματίσαταί τιθέντα γούν τὸ βαλλόμενον κέραμα ἀθροίζειν ἐπὶ ἀναλώσαντα, πάλιν τιθέναι. Κρίτωνα δ’ ἀναστήσας αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργαστηρίου, καὶ παίδευσα, τῆς κατὰ ψυχήν χάριτος ἔρασθέντα, Δημήτριος φησιν ὁ Βυζάντιος.

VI. (21.) Γνώντα δὲ τῆν φυσικήν Ἑσεωιάν μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὰ ἡθικὰ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀρέσκει ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν ἐργαστηρίων καὶ ἐν τῷ ἁγορᾷ φήκειν δὲ φάσκειν ζητεῖν,

"Ο,ττι τοῦ ἐν μεγάροις κακόν τ’ ἀγαθὸν τε τέτυκται. Πολλάκις δὲ βιαιωτέρον ἐν ταῖς ζητῆσει διαλεγόμενον, κονδυλιζεῦσα καὶ παρατίθενταί τι, τὸ πλέον τε γελάσαστα καταφρονοῦμεν καὶ πάντα ταῦτα φέρειν ἀνεξικάκως. Ὄθεν καὶ λακτισθέντα, ἐπειδή ἣνίσχετο, τούτῳ Θαυμάσαντος, εἶπεν, Εἰ δὲ μὲ οὐν ἱλακτίς, δίκην ἀν αὐτῷ Ἰάγαχανον; Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Δημήτριος.

VII. (22.) 'Αποδημίας δὲ ὡς ἐδεήθη, καθάπερ οἱ πλείους, πλὴν εἰ μὴ στρατεύεσθαι ἐδεί. Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν αὐτὸδε μίνων, φιλονεικότερον συνεζήτητα τοῖς προδιαλεγόμενοι, οὐχ ὡστὲ ἀφέλεσθαι τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦς, ἀλλ’ ὡστὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐκμαθεῖν πειράθαι. Φασὶ δ’ Ἐὐριπίδην αὐτῷ δόντα τοῦ Ἱρακλείτου συγγράμμα, ἔρεσθαι, Τί δοκεῖ; Τὸν δὲ φάναι, "Α μὲν συνῆκα, γενναία’ οἷμαι δι’, καὶ α μὴ συνῆκα’ πλὴν Δηλίου γέ τίνος δέιται κολυμβητήριον. Ἐπεμελέειτο δὲ καὶ σωμασκίας, καὶ ἦν εὐκτητής. 'Εστρατεύσατο γούν εἰς 'Αμφίπολιν’ καὶ Ξενοφότῳ ἀφ’ ἱππον πεσόντα εἰ τῇ κατὰ Δήλιον μάχη, διεσώσεις υπολαβών. (23.) ὅτε καὶ πάντων φευγόντων 'Ἀθηναίων, αὐτὸς ἥρεμα ἄνεχώρη, παρεπιστρεφόμενος ἡσυχῆ, καὶ τηρῶν ἀμύνασθαι, εἰ τὸς ἐπέλθοι. 'Εστρατεύσατο
καὶ εἰς Ποτίδαιαν διὰ Σαλάττης· πεζῷ γὰρ οὐκ ἔνη, τοῦ πολέμου εὐλόγοντος. Ὅτε καὶ μείνα τυχῶς ὢν ἐφ᾽ ἐνδε τοῖς σχῆμασις τοῦ τὸν ἀριστεύοντα αὐτότι παραχωρήσαε 'Αλκιβιάδην κορήν τοῦ ἀριστεύοντα, οὐ καὶ ἐφασθήναι φησίν αὐτὸν 'Αριστεύοντος ἐν τετάρτῳ περὶ παλαιᾶς τροφῆς. Ἡμῶν δὲ ὦ Χῖος, καὶ νέον ὄντα εἰς Σάμου σὺν Ἀρχελάῳ ἀποδημῆσαι. Καὶ Πυθαίδο θείειν, Ἀριστοτέλης φησίν. Ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς Ἰσθμόν, ὡς Φασορίνος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἀπομακρυνμένων.

VIII. (24) Ἡμῶν δὲ καὶ ἱσχυρογνώμων καὶ δημοκρατικός, ὡς ὀδὴν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἰσαί τοῖς περὶ Κριτίαν, κελεύοντες Δεοντά τῶν Σαλαμίνων, πλοῦσιον ἀνάγρα, ἀγαγεὶν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὡστε ἀπολέσαι ἀλλὰ καὶ μόνον ἀποφήσασθαι τῶν ἐκεί στρατηγῶν. Καὶ ἐνόν αὐτῷ ἀποδράναι τῆς εἰρηκῆς, μὴ ἐθελῆσαι τοῖς τε κλαίοντας αὐτῶν ἐπιπλῆξαι, καὶ τοὺς καλλίστους λόγους ἐκείνους δεδεμένους διαθέσαται. 

IX. Καὶ ποτὲ 'Αλκιβιάδον (καθὰ φησὶ Παρφίλη ἐν τῷ ἐβδόμῳ τῶν ὑπομημάτων) εἰςδόντος αὐτῷ χώραν μεγάλην ἔνα οἰκοδομήσῃσαι οἰκίαν, φάναι. Καὶ εἰ ὑποθήματων ἔδω, βύρσαν μοι εἴδους, ἵν’ ἔμαυτῷ ὑποδήματα ποιησάμην; καὶ καταγέλαστος ἕν ἂν λαβὼν. (25) Πολλάκις δ’ ἀφοῦ εἰς τὰ πλήθη τῶν πιπρασκομένων, ἔλεγε πρὸς αὐτούς, Πόσον ἐγὼ χρείαν οὐκ ἔχω; Καὶ συνεχές ἐκεῖνα ἀνεφθέγγετο τὰ ἱαμβεία, τὰ δ’ ἀργυρώματ’ ἐστίν, ἥ τε πορφύρα.

Eἰς τοὺς τραγῳδοὺς χρῆσιμα’, οὐκ εἰς τὸν βίον.

'Ὑπερεφόνησε δὲ καὶ 'Αρχελάον τοῦ Μακεδόνος, καὶ Σκώπα τοῦ Κρανωνίου, καὶ Εὐφρόνων τοῦ Λαρισσαίου, μήτε χρήματα προσέμενος αὐτῶν, μήτε παρ’ αὐτοῦς ἀπιλθῶν. Εὐτακτὸς τε ἐν τῇ δίαιτᾳ οὔτως, ὡστε πολλάκις 'Ἀθήνην λημμών γενομένων μόνον οὐκ ἐνόσης.

Χ. (26) Φησὶ δ’ 'Ἀριστοτέλης, ὅλου γυναικὸς αὐτῶν ἀγανέσθαι προτέραν μὲν Ξανθίππην, ἐξ ἡς αὐτῷ γενέσθαι Λαμπροκλία, δευτέραν δὲ, Μυρτῷ, τὴν 'Αριστείδου τοῦ δικαίου Ἐυγατέρα, ἤν καὶ ἄροικον λαβεῖν ἐξ ἡς γενέσθαι Σαφρονίσκον καὶ Μενέξενον. Οἱ δὲ προτέραν γῆμα τὴν Μυρτῷ φασὶν ἐννοεῖ δὲ, καὶ ἀμφότερα ἔχειν ὁμοί. 'Ον ἦστι Ξανθίς τε καὶ 'Ἰερώνυμος ὁ 'Ρόδιος. Φασὶ γὰρ, βουλήθεντας 'Αθηναίους, διὰ τὸ λειπανδρεῖν, συναυ-
LIFE OF Socrates,'
πατρὶ γραψάμενον ἔνιας δίκην, περὶ ὅσιον τινὰ διαλεχθεῖς ἀτηγαγε. Καὶ τὸν Ἀυσὶν δὲ ἥθικώτατον ἐποιήσε προτρέψας. "Ην γὰρ ἴκανὸς ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων τοὺς λόγους εὐφράκιοι. Ἠν ἐτρεψε δὲ καὶ Λαμπροκλέα τὸν ὑδὸν τῷ μητρὶ ἀγριανόμενον, ὡς τοὺς καὶ Εὐνοφῶν εἴρηκε. Καὶ Γλαύκωνα μὲν τὸν Πλάτωνος ἀδελφὸν ἔδινατο πολιτεύεσθαι, ἀπέστησε, διὰ τὸ ἀπείρως ἔχειν, ὡς φησιν ὁ Εὐνοφῶν. Χαρμίδην δὲ τούναντι ἐπέστησεν, οἰκείως ἔχοντα. (30) Ἐπήρε δὲ καὶ εἰς φρόνημα Ἰφικράτην τὸν στρατηγὸν, δεῖξας αὐτῷ τοῦ κουρίως Μίδου ἀλεξτρυώνας ἄντιν τῶν Καλλίου πτερνεμένους. Καὶ αὐτὸν Γλαυκωνίδης ἥξιον τῇ πόλει περιποιεῖν, καθάπερ φασιανὸν ὅρμον, ἢ ταῦτ. "Ελεγε δὲ ὡς Ἐαῦμα, τὰ μὲν ἑκαστὸν εἰπέν ἄν ράδιως ὑπά ἐχοι, φίλους δ' οὐκ ἂν ὄνυμασί ὁπότως κέκτηται οὕτως ὄλγωρος ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοῖς. Ὅρων δ' Ἐυκλείδην ἐσπουδασκάτοι περὶ τοὺς ἱμω- τικοῦς λόγους, Οὐ Εὐκλείδη, ἐφη, σοφισταῖς μὲν δυνῆς χρήσθαι, ἀνθρώποις δ' οὐδαμῶς. Ἀχρηστόν γαρ φηνί εἶναι τὴν περὶ ταῦτα αἰσχρολογίαν, ὡς καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Ἐβυθυδήμῳ φησὶ.

XIII. (31) Χαρμίδου τε οἰκείας αὐτῷ διδόντος, ἢν ἀπ' αὐτῶν προσδεδόειν, οὐχ ἐίλετο· καὶ κάλλος ὑπερείδειν 'Ἀλκεβιάδου, κατὰ τινὰς.

XIV. Καὶ ἔπνει σχολὴν, ὡς κάλλιστον κτημάτων, καθὰ καὶ Εὐνοφῶν ἐν συμποσίῳ φησίν. "Ελεγε δὲ καὶ ἐν μονὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὴν ἑπιστήμην" καὶ ἐν μόνον κακὸν, τὴν ἀμαθίαν. Πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ εὐγένειαν οὖθεν σεμνὸν ἔχεν" πάν δὲ τούναντι κακῶν. Εἰπόντος γοῦν τινος αὐτῷ ὡς ἐγγέμισθην ἡμείς Ἀρτίσθενης μετρὸς Θράτης, Εὐ δ' ἄτομον, ὑπερακοπῆς ἀνεφαίρετον ἐκ δύον Ἀθηναίων γενότατον; Φαίδωνα δὲ δ' αἰχμαλωσίαν ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθιμένου προσέταξε Κρίτων λυτρώσασθαι, καὶ φιλόσοφον ἀπειράσατο.

XV. (32) Ἀλλὰ καὶ λυρίζειν ἐμάνθανεν, ὅτε καίρος· μηδὲν λέγωι ἄποντον εἶναι, ἀ τις μὴ οἴδεν ἐκμιαθάνει. Ἔτσι τε ὄρ- χείτο συνεχές, τῇ τοῦ σώματος εὐθείᾳ λυτρεῖειν ἡγούμενος τὴν τοιαύτην γυμνασίαν, ὡς καὶ Εὐνοφῶν ἐν συμποσίῳ φησίν.

XVI. "Ελεγε δὲ καὶ προσημαίνειν τὸ δαμόνιον τὰ μέλλοντα αὐτῷ. Τὸ τε εὐ ἀρχέσθα, μικρὸν μὲν μὴ εἶναι, παρὰ μικρὸν δὲ. Καὶ εἰδέναι μὲν μηδὲν, πλὴν αὐτὸ τούτο εἰδέναι. Τοίς τε τὰ ἑρμα πολλοῦ ἐννημενούς, ἀπογινώσκειν ἐλεγεν εἰς τὰς ὥρας ἐλθεῖν. Καὶ ποτὲ ἐρωτηθείς, τίς ἀρετὴ νέον; Τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν, εἰπεν. Ἐφασκὸ τε δεῖν γεωμετρεῖν, μέχρι ἂν τις μέτρω δύνηται.
γῆν τε παραλαβεῖν καὶ παραδοῦναι. (33) Εὐριπίδου δὲ ἐν τῷ Ἀθηνείους περὶ ἀρετῆς,

Κράτιστον εἰκῆ ταύτ' ἦν ἀφειμένα, ἀναστάς ἠξῆλθε φήσας, γελοιοῦ ἦναι, ἀνδράποδον μὲν μὴ εὐ-
ρισκόμενον, ἀξιοὺν ἦτειν ἁρετὴν δ' οὕτω ἦν καὶ ἀπολογέλαναι. Ἐρωτηθείς, πότερον γῆμαι ἡ μῆ; ἡφη, "Ὁ ἂν αὐτῶν ποιήσῃς, μεταγγύσῃ. "Ελεγέ τε Ζαυμάζειν τῶν τὰς λυθνοὺς εἰκόνας κατα-
σκευαζόμενων, τοῦ μὲν λίθου προσοική, ὡς ομοίωτατος ἔσται αὐτῶν δ' ἀμελεῖν, ὡς μὴ ομοίως τῷ λίθῳ φαίνεσθαι ἥξιον δὲ καὶ τούς νέους συνεχῶς καταστρέφεσθαι, ὦν εἰ μὲν καλὸι ἔειν, ἄξιοι γίγνοντο 'ε δ' αἰσχροὶ, παιδεία τῆν δυσείδειαν ἐπικαλύ-
ποιοει. (34) Καλέσας ἑπὶ δεῖπνον πλουσίον, καὶ τῆς Ξανθίνηςς, αἰδουμένος, ἡφη, Θάρρει 'ε μὲν γὰρ ἔειν μέτριοι, συμπεριενεχ-
θεῖεν ἡν' ἦτειν δὲ φαῖλοι, ὡς αὐτῶν οὐδὲν μελὴση. "Ελεγε τούς μὲν ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἦν, ἦν ἱσθλοιν αὐτὸν δὲ ἱσθλεὶς, ἱνα ἐλεύθερον. Πρὸς τὸ οὐκ ἀξιόλογον πλῆθος ἔρασκεν, οὐμοί εἰ τε-
τράδρακμον ἐν ἀποδοκιμάζων, τὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σωρὸν ὡς δόκιμον ἀποδεχόσθω. Αἰσχίνοι δὲ εἰπόντως, Πίννης εἰμί καὶ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ἔχω, δίδωμι δὲ σοι ἡμαυτὸν. 'Ἀρ' οὖν, ἕπεν, οὐκ 
αἰσθάνῃ τὰ μέγιστά μοι διδοῖς; Πρὸς τὸν ἀποδεικτοῦτα ἑπὶ τῷ παροράθαι, ὑπὸ τα θεανησαν οἱ ἰαίκοντα, Ἁρα, ἡφη, μή 
τι σοι μεταμελῆ; (35) Πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, Θάνατον σοῦ κατε-
γνωσαν 'Αθηναίου, Κάκεινον, φησίν, ἡ φύσις. Οἱ δὲ τούτ' Ἀν-
ἀγάγγαραν φασίν εἰπέν. Τῆς γυναίκος εἰποῦσης, Ἀδίκας ἀπο-
θυσίκεις, Σὺ δὲ ἡφη, δικαίως ἐβούλω; 'Οναρ δόξας τινὰ αὐτῷ 
λέγειν, "Ηματι κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἵκοι 
πρὸς Αἰσχίνην ἡφη, Εἰς τρίτην ἀποθανοῦμαι. Μὴλλοντὶ τε 
αὐτῷ τὸ κόωλεον πίεσθαι, Ἀπολλόδωρος ἰμάτιον ἐδίδου καλὸν, ὡν' ἐν ἰκετεῖ ἰεποθανήν' καὶ δς, Τί δ', ἡφη, τὸ ἔμαν ἰμάτιον ἰμ-
βιώναι μὲν ἐπιτήδειον, ἰκαποθανεῖν δὲ συν; Πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, 
Κακῶς ὁ δεῖνα σε λέγει; Καλῶς γὰρ, ἡφη, λέγειν οὐκ ἔρασθε. (36) Στρέψαντος Ἀντισθένους τὸ διερθωμὸ τοῦ τρίβοιον εἰς 
tοιμασίας, Ὄρῳ σου, ἡφη, διά τοῦ τρίβοιον τῆν κενοδοξίαν. 
Πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, Οὐ σοὶ λοιδορεῖται ὁ δεῖνα; Οὐχὶ, ἡφη ἐμοὶ 
γὰρ οὐ πρόχεστι ταύτα. "Ελεγε δὲ τοὺς κωμικοὺς δεῖν ἐπιτηδεῖς.
BY DIOGENES LAERTIUS.

ἐαυτὸν διδόναι. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν προσόντων λέξειαν, διορθώσονται· εἰ δ’ οὖ, οὖδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

XVII. Πρὸς Ξανθίππην, πρότερον μὲν λοιδοροῦσαν, ὑστερον δὲ καὶ περιχέασαν αὐτῷ, Ὄθεν ἔλεγον, εἶπεν, ὅτι Ξανθίππη βροντώσα, καὶ ἤδη ποιήσει; Πρὸς Ἀλκιβίαδὴν εἰπόντα, οὐκ ἀνεκτῇ ἡ Ξανθίππη λοιδοροῦσα, 'ἈΛΛ' ἔγωγ', ἔφη, συνείδησιμαι, καθαρεί καὶ τραχύλεις ἀκούων συνεχές. Καὶ σὺ μὲν, εἰπε, χνῶν βοῶντων ἀνέχῃ. (37) Τοῦ δὲ εἰπόντος, ἈΛΛΑ μοι ὡδ καὶ νεοτόρις τίκτουσι· Κάμοι, φησι, Ξανθίππη παιδία γεννᾷ. Ποτὲ αὐτῆς ἐν ἀγορᾷ καὶ Θωμάτων περιμελομένης, συνεβολευόν οἱ γνώριμοι χρήσειν ἀμύνασθαι. Νὴ Δ', εἶπεν, ἐν ἡμῶν πυκτεύ- όντων, ἕκαστος ὑμῶν λέγει, εὐ Σώκρατες, εὐ Ξανθίππη. ἨΕλεγε συνείναι τραχεία γνωσιί, καθάπερ οἱ ἑπτίκοι Ἐμυοδέσδεν ἅπτοι. 'ἈΛΛ' ὡς ἐκείνου, φησι, τούτων κρατήσαντες, ῥᾴδιος τῶν ἀλλων περιγίνονται, οὐτως κἀγὼ Ξανθίππη χρώμενος, τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώπως συμπεριενεχθήσομαι.

XVIII. Ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τοιαύτα λέγων καὶ πράττων, πρὸς τῆς Πυθιᾶς ἰμαρτυρήθη, Χαιρεφώντι ἀνέλυουση ἐκείνο δὴ τὸ περι- φερόμενον,

'Ανδρῶν ἀπάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος.

(38) 'Αφ' οὖ δὴ καὶ ἐφθονήθη μάλιστα. Καὶ δὴ καὶ ὦτι διήλεγχε τοὺς μεγαλοφρονοῦντας ἐφ' ἐαυτοῖς, ὡς ἀνοητοῖς, καθάπερ Μέ- λιτον καὶ 'Ἀνυτόν' ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ Πλάτωνι ἐστὶ Μέλιτον. Οὗτος γὰρ οὐκ ἔφεσα τὸν ὑπὸ Σωκράτους χλευαζόν, πρώτον μὲν ἐπὶ- λεψαν αὐτῷ τοὺς περὶ 'Ἀριστοφάνην' ἑπέτει καὶ Μέλιτον συνε- πεισεν ἀπενέχασθαι κατ' αὐτοῦ γραφὴν ἀσεβείας καὶ τῶν νέων διαφθοράς. 'Ἀπηνέγκατο μὲν οὖν τὴν γραφήν ὦ Μέλιτος· εἴπε δὲ τὴν δίκην Πολιδευκτος, ὡς φησι Φαβωρίνος ἐν παντοδαπῇ ἱστο- ρίᾳ. Συνήγραψε δὲ τὸν λόγον Πολυκράτης ὁ σοφιστής, ὡς φησιν "Ἐρμίππος· ἢ Ἀνυτός, ὡς τινες. Προητοίμασε δὲ πάντα Λύ- κων ὁ δημαγωγὸς. (39) Ἀντισθένης δ’ ἐν ταῖς τῶν φιλοσόφων διαδοχαῖς, καὶ Πλάτων ἐν ἀπολογίᾳ, τρεῖς αὐτοῦ κατηγορήσας φασι, "Ἀνυτόν καὶ Δύκωνα καὶ Μέλιτον" τὸν μὲν ὁ 'Ἀνυτόν περὶ τῶν δημουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν ὀργιζόμενον' τὸν δὲ Δύκωνα, ὑπὲρ τῶν ρητόρων καὶ τὸν Μέλιτον ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν' οὗς ἀπαντᾷ ὁ Σωκράτης διήσυρε. Φαβωρίνος δὲ φησιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων, μὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον τὸν Πολυ-
LIFE OF Socrates,

kreutos. 'En autw gar, phsoi, mnemosines tov upo Kownos teixwv anastatentwn, a geonew ev etesw ex tis Sowkratos telentis usteron. Kai estin ouswv exon.


XX. 'O d' av philososofos, Lusios graapanton apologian autou, diaignous, evhi, Kallos men o logos, o Lusia, ou men armpottai emoi. Dhladi gar ino to pleo diskanikos, h emofilodofos. (41) Eiptontos d' ev tov Lusion, Pws, ei kalos estin o logos, ouk an sou armpotai; evhi. Ou gar kai ematia kalas kai upotimata eth an emoi anaromostaa. Krouminouv d' autou, phsian 'Iousitos o Tiberiies ev to steumati, Plattwna anaebhina epi to bima, kai eipen, Neostatos ino, o andres 'Atheiato, tov esti to bima anaebantov tis dikastas ebohsa, Katabantwn, touste katabhthi.


XXII. 'Alla kai paiavan kata tina istorh, ou h arxh.


Dionysodoro de phsai, m'h einai autou twn paiavan. 'Epoishe de kai muthon Lisopeion, ou panu epiteuteumwenw, ou h arxh.

Diaspotos pot' Eleexe Korivhion asto vymousi.
Mh kriwv arhetin laodikw sofia.
καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὅδε. Φιλόχωρος δὲ φησὶ, προτελευτήσαι τοῦ Ἐυ-
ριπίδην τοῦ Σωκράτους. Ἐγεννήθη δὲ (καθ’ φησιν Ἀπολλό-
δώρος ἐν τοῖς χρονικοῖς) ἐπὶ Ἀφειώνος, ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ ἔτει τῆς ἐβδο-
μηκοστής ἐβδόμης Ολυμπιάδος, Θαρηγήλωνος ἕκτῳ, ὅτε κα-
θαίρουσα τὴν πόλιν Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ τὴν Ἀρτεμίδα γενέσθαι Δήλοις
φασιν. Ἐπελευθησε δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ ἔτει τῆς ἐννεακοστῆς πέμ-
πτης Ὀλυμπιάδος, γεγονός ἐτῶν ἐβδομήκοντα. Καὶ ταῦτα φησὶ
καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεύς. (44) Ἐνιαὶ γὰρ ἐξήκοντα ἐτῶν τε-
λευτήσαι αὐτὸν φασὶν. 

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λευτήσαι αὐτὸν φασὶν.

Πινὲ νυν ἐν Δίος ὁμιλεῖ, ὁ Σωκράτης. Ἡ σε γὰρ ὄντως
Καὶ σοφὸς εἶπε Ζεῦς, καὶ Ζεῦς ἦ σοφῆς.
LIFE OF SOCRATES, &c.

Pr jos gar 'Athenaiwn kowiein aplovs men eidoxw, 
Avtoci o txeipion tvoto teip stórmati.

XXV. Toútw tis, kathá feisn 'Arwstotéllhs ev trítw peri 
powetikhe, éfylvoekei 'Auwidochoj Lémvwn, kai 'Avntiwvn o te-
ratoskopos, wós Pvbagória Kúdwn kai Ovntac kai Ságáris
'Omhpw ðwnti, ápobanónti de Þewofánhs ó Kolofónios kai
Kérvkps 'Hsódpw ðwnti, tleuvtísanvi de o praeirmévnos Þewo-
únhs' kai Pwvdárf 'Arwmínhs ð Kfös. Óalhtti de Ferekídhns,
kai Bíaunti Sálaroj Priúnevns Piptaka 'Arwmínídaa kai 'Al-
kaías, 'Anaxagórta Sowhbios kai Símovídh Tiimokréwv.

XXVI. (17) Twn dé diadexaménnov autón, tvn leugoménwn
Swkrateikwn, oj kouwfiaótato mé Plátwn, Þewofón, 'Antis-
thévnw. Twn dé ñeroméñwn déka oj diasmóratoi téssaros, Æis-
chéws, Faitwvn, Eúkleaídhs, 'Arístipsos. Lektéon dé prótov
peri Þewofónvns e bow peri 'Auwsthdneuvn ev tois kwnicós
ëpeta peri tvn Swkrateikwn, ñoú autw peri Plátwnos' ñepei
katárchei tvn déka aírefeov, kai tvn prótew 'Akadémian autós
svnntíseto. 'H mév oún ákolouthia toútvn ëxewv tvn tróton.

XXVII. Gégonv dé Swkraitéws kai étewos, ístórídós, peri-
hghnun 'Arghous gegrafous kai állov, periptathtikós, Bthvns-
kai étewos, épigmamátov powetihv kai o Kfós, èpikhlseis
Stévn gegrafous.
SCHLEIERMACHER

ON THE

WORTH OF SOCRATES AS A PHILOSOPHER.

That very different and even entirely opposite judg-
ments should be formed by different men, and according
to the spirit of different times, on minds of a leading and
peculiar order, and that it should be late, if ever, before
opinions agree as to their worth, is a phenomenon of
everyday occurrence. But it is less natural, indeed it
seems almost surprising, that at any one time a judg-
ment should be generally received with regard to any
such mind, which is in glaring contradiction with itself.
Yet, if I am not mistaken, it is actually the case with
Socrates, that the portrait usually drawn of him, and the
historical importance which is almost unanimously at-
tributed to him, are at irreconcileable variance. With
Socrates most writers make a new period to begin in the
history of Greek philosophy; which at all events mani-
festly implies that he breathed a new spirit and character
into those intellectual exertions of his countrymen, which
we comprehend under the name of philosophy, so that they
assumed a new form under his hands, or at least that he materially widened their range. But if we enquire how the same writers describe Socrates as an individual, we find nothing that can serve as a foundation for the influence they assign to him. We are informed, that he did not at all busy himself with the physical investigations which constituted a main part even of Greek philosophy, but rather withheld others from them, and that even with regard to moral inquiries, which were those in which he engaged the deepest, he did not by any means aim at reducing them into a scientific shape, and that he established no fixed principle for this, any more than for any other branch of human knowledge. The base of his intellectual constitution, we are told, was rather religious than speculative, his exertions rather those of a good citizen, directed to the improvement of the people, and especially of the young, than those of a philosopher; in short, he is represented as a virtuoso in the exercise of sound common sense, and of that strict integrity and mild philanthropy, with which it is always associated in an uncorrupted mind; all this, however, tinged with a slight air of enthusiasm. These are no doubt excellent qualities; but yet they are not such as fit a man to play a brilliant part in history, but rather, unless where peculiar circumstances intervene, to lead a life of enviable tranquillity, so that it would be necessary to ascribe the general reputation of Socrates, and the almost unexampled homage which has been paid to him, by so many generations, less to himself than to such peculiar circumstances. But least of all are these qualities which
could have produced conspicuous and permanent effects on the philosophical exertions of a people already far advanced in intellectual culture. And this is confirmed, when we consider what sort of doctrines and opinions are attributed to Socrates in conformity with this view. For in spite of the pains taken to trick them out with a show of philosophy, it is impossible after all to give them any scientific solidity whatever: the farthest point we come to is, that they are thoughts well suited to warm the hearts of men in favour of goodness, but such as a healthy understanding, fully awakened to reflexion cannot fail to light upon of itself. What effect then can they have wrought on the progress, or the transformation of philosophy? If we would confine ourselves to the well-known statement, that Socrates called philosophy down from heaven to earth, that is, to houses and market-places, in other words, that he proposed social life as the object of research in the room of nature: still the influence thus ascribed to him is far from salutary in itself, for philosophy consists not in a partial cultivation either of morals or physics, but in the co-existence and inter-communion of both, and there is moreover no historical evidence that he really exerted it. The foundations of ethical philosophy had been laid before the time of Socrates, in the doctrines of the Pythagoreans, and after him it only kept its place by the side of physics, in the philosophical systems of the Greeks. In those of Plato, of Aristotle, and of the Stoics, that is, of all the genuine Socratic schools of any importance, we again meet with physical investigations, and ethics were ex-
clusively cultivated only by those followers of Socrates who themselves never attained to any eminence in philosophy. And if we consider the general tendency of the above-named schools, and review the whole range of their tenets, nothing can be pointed out, that could have proceeded from a Socrates, endowed with such qualities of mind and character as the one described to us, unless it be where their theories have been reduced to a familiar practical application. And even with regard to the elder Socratics, we find more satisfaction in tracing their strictly philosophical speculations to any other source rather than to this Socrates; not only may Aristippus, who was unlike his master in his spirit as well as his doctrines, be more easily derived from Protagoras, with whom he has so much in common, but Euclid, with his dialectic bias, from the Eleatics. And we find ourselves compelled to conclude, that the stem of Socrates, as he is at present represented to us, can have produced no other shoot than the Cynical philosophy, and that, not the cynism of Antisthenes, which still retains many features which we should rather refer to his earlier master, Gorgias, but the purer form, which exhibits only a peculiar mode of life, not a doctrine, much less a science: that of Diogenes, the mad Socrates, as he has been called, though in truth the highest epithet due to him is that of Socrates caricatured. For his is a copy in which we find nothing but features of such an original: its approximation to the self-contentedness of the deity in the retrenchment of artificial wants, its rejection of mere theoretical knowledge, its unassuming course of going
about in the service of the god to expose the follies of mankind. But how foreign all this is to the domain of philosophy, and how little can be there effected with such means, is evident enough.

The only rational course then that seems to be left, is to give up one or other of these contradictory assumptions. Either let Socrates still stand at the head of the Athenian philosophy, but then let those who place him there undertake to establish a different notion of him from that which has been long prevalent: or let us retain the conception of the wise and amiable man, who was made not for the school but wholly for the world: but then let him be transferred from the history of philosophy to that of the general progress of society at Athens, if he can claim any place there. The latter of these expedients is not very far removed from that which has been adopted by Krug1! For as in his system Socrates stands at the end of the one period, and not at the beginning of the next, he appears not as the germ of a new age, but as a product and aftergrowth of an earlier one; he sinks, as an insulated phenomenon, into the same rank with the sophists, and other late fruits of the period, and loses a great part of his philosophical importance. Only it is but a half measure that this author adopts, when he begins his new period with the immediate disciples of Socrates as such; for at its head he places the genuine Socratics, as they are commonly called, and above all Xenophon, men of whom he himself says, that their only merit was that of having propagated and

1 Gesch. der Philos. alter Zeit.
diffused Socratic doctrines, while the doctrines themselves do not appear to him worth making the beginning of a new period. — Ast had previously arrived at the same result by a road in some respects opposite.* With him Plato is the full bloom of that which he terms the Athenian form of philosophy, and as no plant begins with its bloom, he feels himself constrained to place Socrates at the head of this philosophy, but yet not strictly as a philosopher. He says, that the operation of philosophy in Socrates was confined to the exercise of qualities that may belong to any virtuous man, that is to say, it was properly no philosophy at all; and makes the essence of his character to consist in enthusiasm and irony. Now he feels that he cannot place a man endowed with no other qualities than these at the head of a new period, and therefore he ranges the sophists by his side, not indeed without some inconsistency, for he himself sees in them the perverse tendency which was to be counteracted by the spirit of the new age; but yet he prefers this to recognizing the germ of a new gradation in Socrates alone, whose highest philosophical worth he makes to consist in his martyrdom, which however cannot by any means be deemed of equal moment in the sphere of science, as in that of religion or politics. Though in form this course of Ast's is opposite to Krug's, in substance it is the same: its result is likewise to begin a new period of philosophy with Plato. For Ast perceives nothing new or peculiar in the struggle Socrates made against the Sophists, only

* Grundriss einer Gesch. der Philos.
AS A PHILOSOPHER.

virtue and the thirst after truth, which had undoubtedly animated all the preceding philosophers; what he represents as characteristic in the Athenian philosophy, is the union of the elements which had been previously separate and opposed to each other; and since he does not in fact show the existence of this union in Socrates himself, and distinctly recognizes their separation in his immediate disciples, Plato is after all the point at which according to him that union begins.

But if we choose really to consider Plato as the true beginner of a new period, not to mention that he is far too perfect for a first beginning, we fall into two difficulties. First as to his relation to Aristotle. In all that is most peculiar to Plato, Aristotle appears as directly opposite to him as possible; but the main division of philosophy, notwithstanding the wide difference between their modes of treating it, he has in common with Plato, and the Stoics with both; it fits as closely and sits as easily on one as the other, so that one can scarcely help believing that it was derived from some common origin, which was the root of Plato's philosophy as well as theirs. The second difficulty is to conceive what Plato's relation to Socrates could really have been, if Socrates was not in any way his master in philosophy. If we should suppose that Plato's character was formed by the example of Socrates, and that reverence for his master's virtue, and love of truth, was the tie that bound him, still this merely moral relation is not a sufficient solution of the difficulty. The mode in which Plato introduces So-
crates, even in works which contain profound philosophical investigations, must be regarded as the wildest caprice, and would necessarily have appeared merely ridiculous and absurd to all his contemporaries, if he was not in some way or other indebted to him for his philosophical life. Hence we are forced to abide by the conclusion, that if a great pause is to be made in Greek philosophy, to separate the scattered tenets of the earlier schools from the later systems, this must be made with Socrates; but then we must also ascribe to him some element of a more strictly philosophical kind than most writers do, though as a mere beginning it needs not to have been carried very far toward maturity. Such a pause as this, however, we cannot avoid making: the earlier philosophy which we designate by the names of Pythagoras, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, &c. has evidently a common type, and the later, in which Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno are the conspicuous names, has likewise one of its own, which is very different from the other. Nothing can have been lost between them, which could have formed a gradual transition: much less is it possible so to connect any of the later forms with any of the earlier, as to regard them as a continuous whole. This being so, nothing remains to be done, but to subject the case of Socrates to a new revision, in order to see whether the judges he has met with among posterity have not been as unjust, in denying his philosophical worth, and his merits in the cause of philosophy, as his contemporaries were in denying his worth as a citizen, and imputing to him imaginary
offences against the commonwealth. But this would
render it necessary to ascertain somewhat more dis-
tinctly, wherein his philosophical merit consists.

But this new inquiry naturally leads us back in the
first instance to the old question, whether we are to be-
lieve Plato or Xenophon in their accounts of what
Socrates was; a question, however, which only deserves
to be proposed at all, so far as these two authors are
really at variance with each other, and which therefore
only admits of a rational answer, after it has been de-
cided whether such a variance exists, and where it lies.
Plato nowhere professes himself the historian of So-
crates; with the exception perhaps of the Apology, and
of insulated passages, such as the speech of Alcibiades
in the Banquet. For it would certainly have been in
bad taste, if here, where Plato is making contemporaries
of Socrates speak of him in his presence, he had ex-
hibited him in a manner that was not substantially
faithful, though even here many of the details may have
been introduced for the sake of playful exaggeration.
On the other hand, Plato himself does not warrant any
one to consider all that he makes Socrates say in his
dialogues, as his real thoughts and language; and it
would be rendering him but a poor service to confine his
merit to that of having given a correct and skilful report
of the doctrines of Socrates. On the contrary, he un-
doubtedly means his philosophy to be considered as his
own, and not Socrates'. And accordingly every intelli-
gent reader is probably convinced by his own reflections,
that none but original thoughts can appear in such a
dress; whereas a work of mere narrative—and such these dialogues would be, if the whole of the matter belonged to Socrates—would necessarily show a fainter tone of colouring, such as Xenophon's conversations really present. But as on the one hand it would be too much to assert that Socrates actually thought and knew all that Plato makes him say: so on the other hand it would certainly be too little to say of him, that he was nothing more than the Socrates whom Xenophon represents. Xenophon, it is true, in the Memorabilia, professes himself a narrator; but, in the first place, a man of sense can only relate what he understands, and a disciple of Socrates, who must have been well acquainted with his master's habit of disclaiming knowledge, would of all men adhere most strictly to this rule. We know, however, and this may be admitted without being harshly pressed, that Xenophon was a statesman, but no philosopher, and that beside the purity of his character, and the good sense of his political principles, beside his admirable power of rousing the intellect, and checking presumption, which Xenophon loved and respected in Socrates, the latter may have possessed some really philosophical elements which Xenophon was unable to appropriate to himself, and which he suffered to pass unnoticed; which indeed he can have felt no temptation to exhibit, for fear of betraying defects such as those which his Socrates was wont to expose. On the other hand, Xenophon was an apologetic narrator, and had no doubt selected this form for the very purpose, that his readers might not expect him to exhibit
Socrates entire, but only that part of his character which belonged to the sphere of the affections and of social life, and which bore upon the charges brought against him; every thing else he excludes, contenting himself with showing, that it cannot have been anything of so dangerous a tendency as was imputed to Socrates. And not only may Socrates, he must have been more, and there must have been more in the background of his speeches, than Xenophon represents. For if the contemporaries of Socrates had heard nothing from him but such discourses, how would Plato have marred the effect of his works on his immediate public, which had not forgotten the character of Socrates, if the part which Socrates plays there stood in direct contradiction with the image which his real life left in the reader's mind? And if we believe Xenophon, and in this respect we cannot doubt the accuracy of the contemporary apologist, that Socrates spent the whole of his time in public places, and suppose that he was always engaged in discourses which, though they may have been more beautiful, varied, and dazzling, were still in substance the same with these, and moved in the same sphere to which the Memorabilia are confined: one is at a loss to understand, how it was that, in the course of so many years, Socrates did not clear the market-place, and the work-shops, the walks, and the wrestling-schools, by the dread of his presence, and how it is that, in Xenophon's native Flemish style of painting, the weariness of the interlocutors is not still more strongly expressed, than we here and there actually find
it. And still less should we be able to comprehend, why men of such abilities as Critias and Alcibiades, and others formed by nature for speculation, as Plato and Euclid, set so high a value on their intercourse with Socrates, and found satisfaction in it so long. Nor can it be supposed, that Socrates held discourses in public such as Xenophon puts into his mouth, but that he delivered lessons of a different kind elsewhere, and in private; for this, considering the apologetic form of Xenophon's book, to which he rigidly confines himself, he would probably not have passed over in silence. Socrates must have disclosed the philosophical element of his character in the same social circle of which Xenophon gives us specimens. And is not this just the impression which Xenophon's conversations make? philosophical matter, translated into the unphilosophical style of the common understanding, an operation in which the philosophical base is lost; just as some critics have proposed, by way of test for the productions of the loftiest poetry, to resolve them into prose, and evaporate their spirit, which can leave nothing but an extremely sober kind of beauty remaining. And as after such an experiment the greatest of poets would scarcely be able exactly to restore the lost poetry, but yet a reader of moderate capacity soon observes what has been done, and can even point it out in several passages, where the decomposing hand has grown tired of its work: so it is in the other case with the philosophical basis. One finds some parallels with Plato, other fragments are detected in other ways: and the
only inference to be drawn from the scarcity of these passages is, that Xenophon understood his business; unless we choose to say, that as Aristotle is supposed to have held his philosophical discourses in the forenoon, and the exoteric in the afternoon (Gellius N. A. xx. 5), Socrates reversed this order, and in the morning held conversations in the market-place with the artisans, and others who were less familiar with him, which Xenophon found it easier to divest of their philosophical aspect: but that of an evening, in the walks, and wrestling-schools, he engaged in those subtler, deeper, and wittier dialogues with his favourites, which it was reserved for Plato to imitate, embellish, and expand, while he connected his own investigations with them.

And thus, to fill up the blank which Xenophon has manifestly left, we are still driven back to the Socrates of Plato, and the shortest way of releasing ourselves from the difficulty, would be to find a rule by which we could determine, what is the reflex, and the property, of Socrates in Plato, and what his own invention and addition. Only the problem is not to be solved by a process such as that adopted by Meiners, whose critical talent is of a kind to which this subject in general was not very well suited. For if in all that Plato has left we are to select only what is least speculative, least artificial, least poetical, and hence, for so we are taught, least enthusiastic, we shall indeed still retain much matter for this more refined and pregnant species of dialogues, to season Xenophon's
tediousness, but it will be impossible in this way to
discover any properly philosophical basis in the con-
stitution of Socrates. For if we exclude all depth
of speculation, nothing is left but results, without the
grounds and methodical principles on which they de-
pend, and which therefore Socrates can only have pos-
sessed instinctively, that is without the aid of phi-
losophy. The only safe method seems to be, to in-
quire: What may Socrates have been, over and above
what Xenophon has described, without however con-
tradicting the strokes of character, and the practical
maxims, which Xenophon distinctly delivers as those
of Socrates: and what must he have been, to give
Plato a right, and an inducement, to exhibit him as
he has done in his dialogues? Now the latter branch
of this question inevitably leads us back to the his-
torical position from which we started; that Socrates
must have had a strictly philosophical basis in his
composition, so far as he is virtually recognized by
Plato as the author of his philosophical life, and is
therefore to be regarded as the first vital movement
of Greek philosophy in its more advanced stage; and
that he can only be entitled to this place by an element,
which, though properly philosophical, was foreign to
the preceding period. Here however we must for the
present be content to say, that the property which
is peculiar to the post-Socratic philosophy, begin-
ning with Plato, and which henceforward is common
to all the genuine Socratic schools, is the co-existence
and inter-communion of the three branches of know-
AS A PHILOSOPHER.

ledge, dialectics, physics, ethics. This distinction separates the two periods very definitely. For before Socrates either these branches were kept entirely apart, or their subjects were blended together without due discrimination, and without any definite proportion: as for instance ethics and physics among the Pythagoreans, physics and dialectics among the Eleatics; the Ionians alone, though their tendency was wholly to physics, made occasional excursions, though quite at random, into the region both of dialectics and of ethics. But when some writers refuse Plato himself the honour of having distinguished and combined these sciences, and ascribe this step to Xenocrates, and think that even Aristotle abandoned it again; this in my opinion is grounded on a misunderstanding, which however it would here lead us too far to explain. Now it is true we cannot assert, that Socrates was the first who combined the characters of a physical, ethical, and dialectic philosopher in one person, especially as Plato and Xenophon agree in taking physics out of his range; nor can it be positively said that Socrates was at least the author of this distribution of Science, though its germ may certainly be found from the Memorabilia. But we may surely inquire whether this phenomenon has not some simpler and more internal cause, and whether this may not be found in Socrates. The following observation will, I conceive, be admitted without much dispute. So long as inquirers are apt to step unwittingly across the boundaries that separate one province of knowledge from another, so long,
and in the same degree, does the whole course of their intellectual operations depend on outward circumstances: for it is only a systematic distribution of the whole field that can lead to a regular and connected cultivation of it. In the same way, so long as the several sciences are pursued singly, and their respective votaries contentedly acquiesce in this insulation, so long, and in the same degree, is the specific instinct for the object of each science predominant in the whole sphere of intellectual exertion. But as soon as the need of the connexion and co-ordinate growth of all the branches of knowledge has become so distinctly felt, as to express itself by the form in which they are treated and described, in a manner which can never again be lost; so far as this is the case, it is no longer particular talents and instincts, but the general scientific talent of speculation, that has the ascendant. In the former of these cases it must be confessed, that the idea of science as such is not yet matured, perhaps has not even become the subject of consciousness, for science as such can only be conceived as a whole, in which every division is merely subordinate, just as the real world to which it ought to correspond. In the latter case, on the contrary, this idea has become a subject of consciousness; for it can have been only by its force that the particular inclinations which confine each thinker to a certain object, and split science into insulated parts, have been mastered. And this is unquestionably a simpler criterion to distinguish the two periods of Greek phi-
losophy. In the earlier period, the idea of science as such was not the governing idea, and had not even become a distinct subject of consciousness: and this it is that gives rise to the obscurity which we perceive in all the philosophical productions of that period, through the appearance of caprice which results from the want of consciousness, and through the imperfection of the scientific language, which is gradually forming itself out of the poetical and historical vocabulary. In the second period, on the other hand, the idea of science has become a subject of consciousness. Hence the main business everywhere is to distinguish knowledge from opinion, hence the precision of scientific language, hence the peculiar prominence of dialectics, which have no other object than the idea of science; things which were not comprehended even by the Eleatics in the same way as by the Socratic schools, since the former still make the idea of being their starting-point, rather than that of knowledge.

Now this waking of the idea of science, and its earliest manifestations, must have been, in the first instance, what constituted the philosophical basis in Socrates; and for this reason he is justly regarded as the founder of that later Greek philosophy, which in its whole essential form, together with its several variations, was determined by that idea. This is proved clearly enough by the historical statements in Plato, and this too is what must be supplied in Xenophon's conversations, in order to make them worthy of Socrates, and Socrates of
his admirers. For if he went about in the service of the god, to justify the celebrated oracle, it was impossible that the utmost point he reached could have been simply to know that he knew nothing; there was a step beyond this which he must have taken, that of knowing what knowledge was. For by what other means could he have been enabled to declare that which others believed themselves to know, to be no knowledge, than by a more correct conception of knowledge, and by a more correct method founded upon that conception? And every where, when he is explaining the nature of non-science (ἀνεπιστημοσύνη), one sees that he sets out from two tests: one, that science is the same in all true thoughts, and consequently must manifest its peculiar form in every such thought: the other, that all science forms one whole. For his proofs always hinge on this assumption: that it is impossible to start from one true thought, and to be entangled in a contradiction with any other, and also that knowledge derived from any one point, and obtained by correct combination, cannot contradict that which has been deduced in like manner from any other point; and while he exposed such contradictions in the current conceptions of mankind, he strove to rouse those leading ideas in all who were capable of understanding, or even of divining his meaning. Most of what Xenophon has preserved for us may be referred to this object, and the same endeavour is indicated clearly enough in all that Socrates says of himself in Plato’s Apology, and what Alcibiades says of him in his eulogy. So that if we
conceive this to have been the central point in the character of Socrates, we may reconcile Plato and Xenophon, and can understand the historical position of Socrates.

When Xenophon says (Mem. IV. 6. 15.): that as often as Socrates did not merely refute the errors of others, but attempted to demonstrate something himself, he took his road through propositions which were most generally admitted: we can perfectly understand this mode of proceeding, as the result of the design just described; he wished to find as few hindrances and diversions as possible in his way, that he might illustrate his method clearly and simply; and propositions, if there were such, which all held to be certain, must have appeared to him the most eligible, in order that he might show in their case, that the conviction with which they were embraced was not knowledge; since this would render men more keenly sensible of the necessity of getting at the foundation of knowledge, and of taking their stand upon it, in order to give a new shape to all human things. Hence too we may explain the preponderance of the subjects connected with civil and domestic life in most of these conversations. For this was the field that supplied the most generally admitted conceptions and propositions, the fate of which interested all men alike. But this mode of proceeding becomes inexplicable, if it is supposed that Socrates attached the chief importance to the subject of these conversations. That must have been quite a secondary point. For when the object is to elucidate any subject,
it is necessary to pay attention to the less familiar and more disputed views of it, and how meagre most of those discussions in Xenophon are in this respect, is evident enough. From the same point of view we must also consider the controversy of Socrates with the Sophists. So far as it was directed against their maxims, it does not belong to our present question; it is merely the opposition of a good citizen to the corrupters of government and of youth. But even looking at it from the purely theoretical side, it would be idle to represent this contrast as the germ of a new period of philosophy, if Socrates had only impugned opinions which were the monstrous shapes into which the doctrines of an earlier school had degenerated, without having established any in their stead, which nobody supposes him to have done. But for the purpose of awakening the true idea of science, the sophists must have been the most welcome of all disputants to him, since they had reduced their opinions into the most perfect form; and hence were proud of them themselves, and were peculiarly admired by others. If, therefore, he could succeed in exposing their weakness, the value of a principle so triumphantly applied would be rendered most conspicuous.

But in order to show the imperfection of the current conceptions both in the theories of the Sophists, and in common life, if the issue was not to be left to chance, some certain method was requisite. For it was often necessary in the course of the process to lay down intermediate notions, which it was necessary to define to
the satisfaction of both parties; otherwise, all that was done would afterwards have looked like a paltry surprise; and the contradiction between the proposition in question, and one that was admitted, could never be detected without ascertaining what notions might or might not be connected with a given one. Now this method is laid down in the two problems which Plato states in the Phaedrus, as the two main elements in the art of dialectics, that is, to first know how correctly to combine multiplicity in unity, and again to divide a complex unity according to its nature into a multiplicity, and next to know what notions may or may not be connected together. It is by this means that Socrates became the real founder of dialectics, which continued to be the soul of all the great edifices reared in later times by Greek philosophy, and by its decided prominence constitutes the chief distinction between the later period and the earlier; so that one cannot but commend the historical instinct which has assigned so high a station to him. At the same time this is not meant to deny, that Euclid and Plato carried this science, as well as the rest, farther toward maturity; but it is manifest that in its first principles, Socrates possessed it as a science, and practised it as an art, in a manner peculiar to himself. For the construction of all Socratic dialogues, as well of those doubtfully ascribed to Plato, and of those attributed with any degree of probability to other original disciples of Socrates, as of all those reported in the Memorabilia, hinges without any exception on this point. The same inference re-
sults from the testimony of Aristotle (Metaph. I. 6. XIII. 4.): that what may be justly ascribed to Socrates, is that he introduced induction and general definitions; a testimony which bears every mark of impartiality and truth. Hence there is no reason to doubt that Socrates taught this art of framing and connecting notions correctly. Since however it is an art, abstract teaching was not sufficient, and therefore no doubt Socrates never so taught it: it was an art that required to be witnessed and practised in the most manifold applications, and one who was not firmly grounded in it, and left the school too early, lost it again, and with it almost all that was to be learned from Socrates, as indeed is observed in Plato’s dialogues. Now that this exercise and illustration was the main object of conversations held by Socrates even on general moral subjects, is expressly admitted by Xenophon himself, when, under the head—What Socrates did to render his friends more expert in dialectics,—he introduces a great many such discourses and inquiries, which so closely resemble the rest, that all might just as well have been put in the same class.

It was with a view therefore to become masters in this art, and thereby to keep the faster hold of the idea of science, that men of vigorous and speculative minds formed a circle round Socrates as long as circumstances allowed, those who were able to the end of his life, and in the meanwhile chose to tread closely in their master’s steps, and to refrain for a time from making a systematic application of his art in the different depart-
ments of knowledge, for the more elaborate cultivation of all the sciences. But when after his death the most eminent among them, first of all at Megara, began a strictly scientific train of speculation, and thus philosophy gradually ripened into the shape which, with slight variations, it ever after retained among the Greeks: what now took place was not indeed what Socrates did, or perhaps could have done, but yet it was undoubtedly his will. To this it may indeed be objected, that Xenophon expressly says (Mem. I. 1. 11.): that Socrates in his riper years not only himself gave up all application to natural philosophy, but endeavoured to withhold all others from it, and directed them to the consideration of human affairs; and hence many hold those only to be genuine Socratics, who did not include physics in their system. But this statement must manifestly be taken in a sense much less general, and quite different from that which is usually given to it. This is clearly evinced by the reasons which Socrates alleges. For how could he have said so generally, that the things which depend on God ought not to be made the subject of inquiry, before those which depend on man have been despatched, since not only are the latter connected in a variety of ways with the former, but even among things human there must be some of greater moment, others of less, some of nearer, others of more remote concern, and the proposition would lead to the conclusion that before one was brought to its completion, not even the investigation of another ought to be begun. This might have been not unfairly turned by a sophist against Socrates
himself, if he had dragged in a notion apparently less familiar, in order to illustrate another; and certainly this proposition, taken in a general sense, would not only have endangered the conduct of life, but would also have altogether destroyed the Socratic idea of science, that nothing can be known except together with the rest, and along with its relation to all things beside. The real case is simply this. It is clear that Socrates had no peculiar talent for any single science, and least of all for that of physics. Now it is true that a merely metaphysical thinker may feel himself attracted toward all sciences, as was the case with Kant; but then this happens under different circumstances, and a different mental constitution from that of Socrates. He on the contrary made no excursions to points remote from his centre, but devoted his whole life to the task of exciting his leading idea as extensively and as vividly as possible in others; his whole aim was, that whatever form man's wishes and hopes might take, according to individual character and accidental circumstances, this foundation might be securely laid, before he proceeded further. But till then his advice was, not to accumulate fresh masses of opinions; this he for his part would permit only so far as it was demanded by the wants of active life, and for this reason he might say, that if those who investigated meteorig phenomena had any hope of producing them at their pleasure, he should be more ready to admit their researches; language, which in any other sense but this would have been absurd. We cannot therefore conclude from this that
Socrates did not wish that physics should be cultivated, any more than we are authorised to suppose, that he fancied it possible to form ethics into a science by sufficiently multiplying those fragmentary investigations into which he was drawn in discussing the received opinions on the subject. The same law of progression was involuntarily retained in his school. For Plato, though he descends into all the sciences, still lays the principal stress on the establishment of principles, and expatiates in details only so far as they are necessary, and so much the less as he has to draw them from without: it is Aristotle who first revels in their multiplicity.

This appears to me as much as can be said with certainty of the worth of Socrates as a philosopher. But should any one proceed to ask, how far he elaborated the idea of science in his lessons, or in what degree he promoted the discovery of real knowledge in any other province by his controversial discussions, and his dialectic essays, there would perhaps be little to say on this head, and least of all should I be able to extricate any thing to serve this purpose from the works of Plato taken by themselves. For there in all that belongs to Plato there is something of Socrates, and in all that belongs to Socrates something of Plato. Only if any one is desirous of describing doctrines peculiar to Socrates, let him not, as many do in histories of philosophy for the sake of at least filling up some space with Socrates, string together detached moral theses, which, as they arose out of occasional discussions, can never
make up a whole, and as to other subjects, let him not lose sight of the above quoted passage of Aristotle, who confines Socrates' philosophical speculations to principles. The first point therefore to examine would be, whether some profound speculative doctrines may not have originally belonged to Socrates, which are generally considered as most foreign to him, for instance, the thought which is unfolded by Plato in his peculiar manner, but is exhibited in the germ by Xenophon himself (Mem. I. 4. 8.), and is intimately connected with the great dialectic question as to the agreement between thought and being: that of the general diffusion of intelligence throughout the whole of nature. With this one might connect the assertion of Aristocles (Euseb. Preep. XI. 3.), that Socrates began the investigation of the doctrine of ideas. But the testimony of this late Peripatetic is suspicious, and may have had no other foundation than the language of Socrates in the Parmenides.

But whether much or little of this and other doctrines belonged to Socrates himself, the general idea already described cannot fail to suggest a more correct mode of conceiving, in what light it is that Plato brings forward his master in his works, and in what sense his Socrates is to be termed a real, or a fictitious personage. Fictitious, in the proper sense, I hold, he is not, and his reality is not a merely mimic one, nor is Socrates in those works merely a convenient person who affords room for much mimic art, and much cheerful pleasantry, in order to temper the abstruse investigations with this
agreeable addition. It is because the spirit and the method of Socrates are everywhere predominant, and because it is not merely a subordinate point with Plato to adopt the manner of Socrates, but is as truly his highest aim, that Plato has not hesitated to put into his mouth what he believed to be no more than deductions from his fundamental ideas. The only material exceptions we find to this (passing over several more minute which come under the same head with the anachronisms) occur in later works, as the Statesman and the Republic; I mean doctrines of Plato foreign to the real views of Socrates, perhaps indeed virtually contradicting them, and which are nevertheless put into his mouth. On this head we must let Plato appeal to the privilege conferred by custom. But on the whole we are forced to say, that in giving Socrates a living share in the propagation of that philosophical movement which took its rise from him, Plato has immortalized him in the noblest manner, that a disciple can perpetuate the glory of his master; in a manner not only more beautiful, but more just, than he could have done it by a literal narrative.
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